- •Table of Contents
- •Foreword
- •OECD Journal on Budgeting
- •Board of Advisors
- •Preface
- •Executive Summary
- •Sharp differences exist in the legal framework for budget systems
- •Public finance and legal theories do not explain inter-country differences in budget system laws
- •Political variables and legal culture help explain the inter-country differences
- •Norms for budget systems have been issued and many should be in budget system laws
- •Budget system laws are adopted to strengthen the powers of the legislature or the executive
- •Country studies reveal a multiplicity of reasons for adopting budget-related laws
- •Conclusions
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Budget processes
- •2.1. Budgeting: a five-stage process
- •Figure I.1. The roles of Parliament and the executive in the budget cycle
- •2.2. How are the different legal frameworks for budget systems organised?
- •Figure I.2. Different models for organising the legal framework of budget systems
- •3. Can economic theory explain the differences?
- •3.1. New institutional economics
- •3.2. Law, economics and public choice theory
- •3.3. Constitutional political economy: budgetary rules and budgetary outcomes
- •3.4. Can game theory help?
- •4. Can comparative law explain the differences?
- •4.1. Families of legal systems and the importance of the constitution
- •Box I.2. Purposes of constitutions and characteristics of statutes
- •4.2. Absence of norms for constitutions partly explains differences in budget system laws
- •4.3. Hierarchy within primary law also partly explains differences in budget-related laws
- •Box I.3. Hierarchy of laws: The example of Spain
- •4.4. Not all countries complete all steps of formal law-making processes
- •Box I.4. Steps in making law
- •4.5. Greater use is made of secondary law in some countries
- •Table I.1. Delegated legislation and separation of powers
- •4.6. Decisions and regulations of the legislature are particularly important in some countries
- •4.8. Are laws “green lights” or “red lights”?
- •5. Forms of government and budget system laws
- •5.1. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchies
- •5.2. Presidential and semi-presidential governments
- •5.3. Parliamentary republics
- •5.4. Relationship between forms of government and budget system law
- •Table I.2. Differences in selected budgetary powers of the executive and the legislature
- •Figure I.3. Separation of powers and the need to adopt budget-related laws
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Introduction
- •Figure II.1. Density of legal framework for budget systems in 25 OECD countries
- •Table II.1. Legal frameworks for budget systems: 13 OECD countries
- •2. Different purposes of the legal frameworks for budget systems
- •Box II.1. Purposes of budget system laws
- •2.1. Legal necessity?
- •Figure II.2. Budget reforms and changes in budget laws
- •2.2. Budget reform: when is law required?
- •2.3. Elaborating on the budget powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive
- •3. Differences in the legal framework for the main actors in budget systems
- •3.1. Legislatures
- •3.2. Executives
- •Box II.2. New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988
- •3.3. Judiciary
- •3.4. External audit offices
- •Table II.3. External audit legal frameworks: Selected differences
- •3.5. Sub-national governments
- •3.6. Supra-national bodies and international organisations
- •4. Differences in the legal framework for budget processes
- •4.1. Budget preparation by the executive
- •Table II.4. Legal requirements for the date of submission of the budget to the legislature
- •Box II.3. France: Legal requirements for budget information
- •4.2. Parliamentary approval of the budget
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting systems
- •Box II.4. Finland: Legal requirements for annual report and annual accounts
- •Table II.5. Legal requirements for submission of annual report to the legislature: Selected countries
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Have standards for the legal framework of budget systems been drawn up?
- •1.1. Normative and positive approaches to budget law
- •1.2. Limited guidance from normative constitutional economics
- •2. Who should set and monitor legally binding standards?
- •2.1. Role of politicians and bureaucrats
- •2.2. International transmission of budget system laws
- •2.3. International organisations as standard setters
- •Box III.1. The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- •Box III.2. Constitutional norms for external audit: Extracts from the INTOSAI “Lima Declaration”
- •2.4. Monitoring standards
- •3. Principles to support the legal framework of budget systems
- •Box III.3. Ten principles for a budget law
- •3.1. Authoritativeness
- •Table III.1. Stages of the budget cycle and legal instruments
- •3.2. Annual basis
- •3.3. Universality
- •3.4. Unity
- •3.5. Specificity
- •3.6. Balance
- •3.7. Accountability
- •Box III.4. Possible minimum legal norms for budget reporting
- •Box III.5. Ingredients of legal norms for external audit
- •3.8. Transparency
- •Box III.6. Ingredients of legal norms for government agencies
- •3.9. Stability or predictability
- •3.10. Performance (or efficiency, economy, and effectiveness)
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Canada: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Canada: Main provisions of the Spending Control Act 1992
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Canada: Major transfers from the federal to the provincial governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Canada: Key steps in the annual budgeting process
- •Box 5. Canada: Major contents of the main estimates
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. France: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Germany: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 2. Germany: Public agencies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 3. Germany: Budget processes in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit17
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Japan: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Japan: Main contents of the 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Act
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Japan: Grants from central government to local governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Japan: The timetable for the budget process
- •Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Korea: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Korea: Major acts governing the fiscal relationship across government levels
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Korea: Legal requirements for the timetable for budget preparation and deliberation
- •Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
- •Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
- •Box 4. New Zealand: Information required to support the first appropriation act
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Nordic Countries: The main budget system laws or near-laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The constitutions of the four countries
- •Table 1. Nordic countries: Age and size of constitutions
- •3.2. Legislatures
- •Table 2. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the legislatures
- •3.3. The political executive
- •Table 3. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the political executive
- •3.4. Ministries and executive agencies
- •3.5. Civil service
- •3.6. Sub-national governments
- •4. Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting
- •4.1. Authority of Parliament
- •Table 4. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the authority of Parliament
- •4.2. Timing of submission of the annual budget
- •4.3. Non-adoption of the annual budget before the year begins
- •4.4. Content of the budget and types of appropriations
- •4.5. Documents to accompany the draft budget law
- •4.6. Parliamentary committees and budget procedures in Parliament
- •4.7. Parliamentary amendment powers, coalition agreements, two-stage budgeting and fiscal rules
- •4.8. Supplementary budgets
- •4.10. Cancellation of appropriations and contingency funds
- •4.11. Government accounting
- •4.12. Other fiscal reporting and special reports
- •Table 5. Nordic countries: Constitutional requirements for external audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Spain: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
- •Box 3. Spain: The major content of medium-term budget plans
- •Box 4. Spain: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United Kingdom: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system law
- •Box 2. United Kingdom: Reforms of the budget system in the past 20 years
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 3. United Kingdom: Executive agencies and other bodies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 4. United Kingdom: Budget processes in Parliament
- •Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •Table 2. United Kingdom: Transfers of budgetary authority
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United States: Main federal budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. United States: Major transfers between different levels of government
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
- •Box 5. United States: Other information required by law
- •4.2. Budget process in the legislature
- •Box 6. United States: Legal and internal deadlines for congressional budget approval
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •5. Sanctions and non-compliance
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
IV. FRANCE
4.1.8. Budgets of Parliament and other constitutional bodies
Each house of Parliament is financially independent (see Ordonnance of November 1958 relating to the functioning of the two houses, Art. 7). The same law specifies that the budget of each house is prepared by a joint commission presided by a chair of a chamber of the Court of Accounts.
The LOLF does not address explicitly the budget procedures for nonexecutive State entities. However, a specific mission is envisaged for the “public powers” (Art. 7), each of which may receive one or more allocations (dotations). Dotations may allow single-line budget appropriations for the National Assembly, the Senate, the Court of Justice and the Presidency, without the need for them to present mission statements and performance indicators. The Court of Accounts is not shown separately – its budget will not be a separate mission, unlike the Economic and Social Council (also a constitutional body). The latter will have a single-programme mission under the new budget nomenclature, i.e. the objectives of the Economic and Social Council are among the 48 missions of the State, whereas the arguably more important body, the Court of Accounts, does not have its own mission.
4.2. Budget process in Parliament
Parliament has progressively been receiving more information on the draft budget from the government. In particular, before the draft budget law is submitted to Parliament, the National Assembly and the Senate have a chance to debate a pre-budget report provided by the government. The LOLF formalised this procedure, known as the débat d’orientation budgétaire.
4.2.1. The timetable for budget adoption and constraints on the budget debate in Parliament
The draft budget law must be submitted to in Parliament by the first Tuesday of October (LOLF, Art. 39). Annual budget laws – for the State and for social security financing – must be initiated by the government, not Parliament (Gicquel, 1998). The Constitution (Art. 39) specifies that the annual draft budget laws must first be debated in the National Assembly, i.e. the government may not first submit the draft budget law to the Senate. This article shows symbolically the political pre-eminence of the National Assembly.
The Constitution specifies strict time limits for debate in the two houses on the annual budget. The aim of these provisions is to accelerate parliamentary debate and to adopt the budget law and the law for financing social security before 1st January. Following the reception of the draft budget law in early October, the number of days allowed for completing the first readings are specified by law: the National Assembly has 40 days (Constitution, Art. 47) and the Senate 20 days (LOLF, Art. 40). A 70-day limit from the reception of the draft
200 |
OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 4 – NO. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2004 |
|
IV. FRANCE
in early October is imposed on Parliament to make a final decision on the budget. This limit is inclusive of committee examinations in the two houses. In the case of disagreement of the committees of the two houses, the Prime Minister may establish a joint committee to resolve the impasse (Constitution, Art. 45).28 If the 70-day limit is not respected, the government adopts the budget by special ordonnance.29 Similarly, a 50-day limit for parliamentary decision on the draft law for financing social security is included in Article 47-1 of the Constitution.
4.2.2. Provisional budgets
Should the budgets not be adopted by 31st December, the executive is authorised by the Constitution (Art. 47 and 47-1) to adopt a provisional State budget and a provisional law for financing social security. For the State budget, expenditures (“services votés”) are based on policies of the previous year (LOLF, Art. 45); this is the only reason why the concept of services votés has been retained.
4.2.3. Powers of amendment
The Constitution does not allow Parliament to propose any amendments (to any law) that would create new expenditures, raise total State expenditure (charges) or lower revenues (ressources) (Art. 40). Parliament may only alter the composition of proposed State budget spending, by changing the amount allocated to programmes within missions (LOLF, Art. 47).
Even if Parliament proposes amendments, another constitutional provision allows the government to force through its own version of the budget. Article 49 authorises the Prime Minister, after agreement within the Council of Ministers, to commit the responsibility of the government on a draft law. If he/she does so, the text is considered to be passed into law unless the National Assembly proposes a motion of censure (which would result in the fall of the government) within 24 hours. This provision was used by a minority government in the early 1990s to adopt the annual budget (Hubert, 1996). Use of this provision was made possible by prior understandings with political parties supportive of the government’s budgetary policies.
4.2.4. Approval of resources
The authority for the government to collect taxes and other revenues is re-issued for a 12-month period in each budget, by a single vote of Parliament on the first part of the State budget (LOLF, Art. 34). Revenues are projected on a gross basis, although in execution, withholding of revenues destined to local governments and the EU is allowed (Art. 6). The draft budget law is voted in two parts, with Parliament first approving revenues, total expenditure ceilings
OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 4 – NO. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2004 |
201 |
|
IV. FRANCE
(for the general budget, budget annexes and special accounts) and balance, before beginning a discussion on the second part of the budget law (Art. 42), namely detailed appropriations – a vote for each mission (Art. 43). If this procedure is not followed, the Constitutional Council may annul the entire budget law by declaring it to be unconstitutional (this happened in 197930). In order to renew the annual authority to collect taxes as from 1st January, the Constitution (Art. 47) includes an emergency procedure on which the LOLF (Art. 45) elaborates: a special temporary law to authorise tax collection must be passed prior to the adoption of the annual budget law.
4.2.5. The nature, structure and duration of appropriations
Prior to 2006, budget appropriations are by ministry and by economic type of expenditure (salaries, other current expenditures, investment, etc.), with the latter broken down between existing and new policies. The 2001 LOLF replaced this appropriation structure by one based on missions and programmes. Parliament particularly wished to see results from government programmes and an avoidance of overlap in government functions that had been perpetuated by a budget adopted on the basis of administrative units (see Arthuis, 2003).
Although the annual budget, as from 2006, is to be voted by mission and by programme, the programmes are to be broken down by seven different types of expenditures (salaries, running expenses, investment, etc.) (LOLF, Art. 5). With one exception, these are purely indicative; budget programme managers may reallocate between them. For example, investment and running expenses for a programme may be swapped by the budget manager without the authority of Parliament (not the case under the 1959 Ordonnance). The exception is for personnel expenditure: the upper limit for each programme is binding (LOLF, Art. 7). Moreover, the budget law must contain, for each ministry, binding ceilings for the number of personnel (Art. 7-III).
Under the LOLF, Parliament authorises a maximum amount for expenditure for each programme of the general State budget, each budget annex and each special account. Authority to spend is provided for both commitments and cash payments (LOLF, Art. 34). For commitments, Parliament grants authority and approves an upper limit for the State to enter into contractual arrangements that involve future payment. There is no time limit on commitment budget authority (LOLF, Art. 8). In contrast, the authorisations of cash payment are the upper limits for payment order issuance or actual payment within a 12-month period (LOLF, Art. 8). For personnel spending, the law states that commitments and payments are equal.
For most expenditures, budgeted amounts are binding maximum limits (crédits limitatifs). For certain expenditures (debt servicing, call-up of government guarantees, and others enumerated in Art. 10 of the LOLF), the limits
202 |
OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 4 – NO. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2004 |
|
IV. FRANCE
are non-binding (crédits évaluatifs). These are items that must be paid irrespective of possible projection errors. If any excess spending relative to approved budgetary projections occurs on these items, the Minister of Finance must inform the parliamentary budget committee of each house of the reasons why overspending occurred. The Minister must also propose rectification in a supplementary budget before the end of the fiscal year (LOLF, Art. 10).
4.2.6. Carryover of appropriations and borrowing of future appropriations
Carryover of previous-year commitment authorisations must be stated in a government order (LOLF, Art. 15). For cash spending authorisations, carryover of expenditures within a given programme is allowed up to 3%. For non-personnel expenditures beyond this limit, any carryover has to be re-appropriated in a new budget law (Art. 15). Borrowing from next year’s appropriations is permitted for expenditure commitments, under conditions established in budget laws (Art. 9).
4.2.7. Public debt approval
Net increases in negotiable State debt are approved annually in the context of approval of the total resources – the first part of the budget (Art. 34-9). Lending by the State is subject to binding limits (except for foreign currency lending to countries where France has a monetary union). The LOLF also establishes mechanisms for following up on loan defaults by beneficiaries (Art. 24).
The law does not fix quantitative limits on the projected stock of public sector debt, nor does the LOLF refer to the need to establish prudent debt levels. This is in line with the constitutional limitation that the LOLF only deals with revenues and expenditures (Art. 34), not debt, other liabilities or assets. France, like other EU member countries, reports general government debt levels to the EU at least once a year. The MINEFI updates France’s threeyear Stability Programme, which is approved by the Council of Ministers (but not Parliament). After assessment by the EU Commission, the EU Council adopts a formal opinion of the programme, in particular in relation to the Maastricht criteria.
4.2.8. Promulgation, veto and publication of the adopted budget
All laws, including annual budget laws, must be promulgated by the President of the Republic within 15 days of their adoption (Constitution, Art. 10). The President may, within the 15-day limit, require Parliament to reconsider the budget. Promulgated laws are published in the Official Gazette.
OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 4 – NO. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2004 |
203 |
|