- •Table of Contents
- •Foreword
- •OECD Journal on Budgeting
- •Board of Advisors
- •Preface
- •Executive Summary
- •Sharp differences exist in the legal framework for budget systems
- •Public finance and legal theories do not explain inter-country differences in budget system laws
- •Political variables and legal culture help explain the inter-country differences
- •Norms for budget systems have been issued and many should be in budget system laws
- •Budget system laws are adopted to strengthen the powers of the legislature or the executive
- •Country studies reveal a multiplicity of reasons for adopting budget-related laws
- •Conclusions
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Budget processes
- •2.1. Budgeting: a five-stage process
- •Figure I.1. The roles of Parliament and the executive in the budget cycle
- •2.2. How are the different legal frameworks for budget systems organised?
- •Figure I.2. Different models for organising the legal framework of budget systems
- •3. Can economic theory explain the differences?
- •3.1. New institutional economics
- •3.2. Law, economics and public choice theory
- •3.3. Constitutional political economy: budgetary rules and budgetary outcomes
- •3.4. Can game theory help?
- •4. Can comparative law explain the differences?
- •4.1. Families of legal systems and the importance of the constitution
- •Box I.2. Purposes of constitutions and characteristics of statutes
- •4.2. Absence of norms for constitutions partly explains differences in budget system laws
- •4.3. Hierarchy within primary law also partly explains differences in budget-related laws
- •Box I.3. Hierarchy of laws: The example of Spain
- •4.4. Not all countries complete all steps of formal law-making processes
- •Box I.4. Steps in making law
- •4.5. Greater use is made of secondary law in some countries
- •Table I.1. Delegated legislation and separation of powers
- •4.6. Decisions and regulations of the legislature are particularly important in some countries
- •4.8. Are laws “green lights” or “red lights”?
- •5. Forms of government and budget system laws
- •5.1. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchies
- •5.2. Presidential and semi-presidential governments
- •5.3. Parliamentary republics
- •5.4. Relationship between forms of government and budget system law
- •Table I.2. Differences in selected budgetary powers of the executive and the legislature
- •Figure I.3. Separation of powers and the need to adopt budget-related laws
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Introduction
- •Figure II.1. Density of legal framework for budget systems in 25 OECD countries
- •Table II.1. Legal frameworks for budget systems: 13 OECD countries
- •2. Different purposes of the legal frameworks for budget systems
- •Box II.1. Purposes of budget system laws
- •2.1. Legal necessity?
- •Figure II.2. Budget reforms and changes in budget laws
- •2.2. Budget reform: when is law required?
- •2.3. Elaborating on the budget powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive
- •3. Differences in the legal framework for the main actors in budget systems
- •3.1. Legislatures
- •3.2. Executives
- •Box II.2. New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988
- •3.3. Judiciary
- •3.4. External audit offices
- •Table II.3. External audit legal frameworks: Selected differences
- •3.5. Sub-national governments
- •3.6. Supra-national bodies and international organisations
- •4. Differences in the legal framework for budget processes
- •4.1. Budget preparation by the executive
- •Table II.4. Legal requirements for the date of submission of the budget to the legislature
- •Box II.3. France: Legal requirements for budget information
- •4.2. Parliamentary approval of the budget
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting systems
- •Box II.4. Finland: Legal requirements for annual report and annual accounts
- •Table II.5. Legal requirements for submission of annual report to the legislature: Selected countries
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Have standards for the legal framework of budget systems been drawn up?
- •1.1. Normative and positive approaches to budget law
- •1.2. Limited guidance from normative constitutional economics
- •2. Who should set and monitor legally binding standards?
- •2.1. Role of politicians and bureaucrats
- •2.2. International transmission of budget system laws
- •2.3. International organisations as standard setters
- •Box III.1. The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- •Box III.2. Constitutional norms for external audit: Extracts from the INTOSAI “Lima Declaration”
- •2.4. Monitoring standards
- •3. Principles to support the legal framework of budget systems
- •Box III.3. Ten principles for a budget law
- •3.1. Authoritativeness
- •Table III.1. Stages of the budget cycle and legal instruments
- •3.2. Annual basis
- •3.3. Universality
- •3.4. Unity
- •3.5. Specificity
- •3.6. Balance
- •3.7. Accountability
- •Box III.4. Possible minimum legal norms for budget reporting
- •Box III.5. Ingredients of legal norms for external audit
- •3.8. Transparency
- •Box III.6. Ingredients of legal norms for government agencies
- •3.9. Stability or predictability
- •3.10. Performance (or efficiency, economy, and effectiveness)
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Canada: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Canada: Main provisions of the Spending Control Act 1992
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Canada: Major transfers from the federal to the provincial governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Canada: Key steps in the annual budgeting process
- •Box 5. Canada: Major contents of the main estimates
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. France: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Germany: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 2. Germany: Public agencies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 3. Germany: Budget processes in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit17
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Japan: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Japan: Main contents of the 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Act
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Japan: Grants from central government to local governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Japan: The timetable for the budget process
- •Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Korea: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Korea: Major acts governing the fiscal relationship across government levels
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Korea: Legal requirements for the timetable for budget preparation and deliberation
- •Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
- •Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
- •Box 4. New Zealand: Information required to support the first appropriation act
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Nordic Countries: The main budget system laws or near-laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The constitutions of the four countries
- •Table 1. Nordic countries: Age and size of constitutions
- •3.2. Legislatures
- •Table 2. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the legislatures
- •3.3. The political executive
- •Table 3. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the political executive
- •3.4. Ministries and executive agencies
- •3.5. Civil service
- •3.6. Sub-national governments
- •4. Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting
- •4.1. Authority of Parliament
- •Table 4. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the authority of Parliament
- •4.2. Timing of submission of the annual budget
- •4.3. Non-adoption of the annual budget before the year begins
- •4.4. Content of the budget and types of appropriations
- •4.5. Documents to accompany the draft budget law
- •4.6. Parliamentary committees and budget procedures in Parliament
- •4.7. Parliamentary amendment powers, coalition agreements, two-stage budgeting and fiscal rules
- •4.8. Supplementary budgets
- •4.10. Cancellation of appropriations and contingency funds
- •4.11. Government accounting
- •4.12. Other fiscal reporting and special reports
- •Table 5. Nordic countries: Constitutional requirements for external audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Spain: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
- •Box 3. Spain: The major content of medium-term budget plans
- •Box 4. Spain: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United Kingdom: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system law
- •Box 2. United Kingdom: Reforms of the budget system in the past 20 years
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 3. United Kingdom: Executive agencies and other bodies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 4. United Kingdom: Budget processes in Parliament
- •Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •Table 2. United Kingdom: Transfers of budgetary authority
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United States: Main federal budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. United States: Major transfers between different levels of government
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
- •Box 5. United States: Other information required by law
- •4.2. Budget process in the legislature
- •Box 6. United States: Legal and internal deadlines for congressional budget approval
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •5. Sanctions and non-compliance
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
IV. FRANCE
3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
3.1. The executive and the legislature
3.1.1. Overview
The 1958 Constitution establishes a two-house Parliament composed of a directly elected National Assembly and an indirectly elected Senate. The functioning of both houses is governed by an organic law. Since a 1962 referendum, the head of State, the President of the Republic, has been elected by universal suffrage. The President nominates the Prime Minister as well as other ministers (on the recommendation of the Prime Minister), chairs meetings of the Council of Ministers, and promulgates laws adopted by Parliament (or asks Parliament to reconsider laws). The government is headed by the Prime Minister, who may delegate certain powers to individual ministers (Constitution, Art. 22) who cannot retain their seats in Parliament if they are elected parliamentarians (Art. 23). The government determines the nation’s policies and is collectively responsible before Parliament (Art. 20) – namely the National Assembly (Art. 49 and 50).
France is a unitary State and the central government has traditionally been very strong. Certain central government functions and powers are progressively being transferred to local governments. The top tier of local government – a region – was created by law in 1982. In contrast, departments (départements) and municipalities (communes) are long-standing forms of local government.
3.1.2. Roles and responsibilities of the Council of Ministers and individual ministers
There are no constitutional constraints on the number of ministers. As a consequence, the number of ministers has varied greatly over the past 50 years. The Prime Minister directs the work programme and action of the government. After consultation with the Council of Ministers, he/she is responsible for defending the government’s programme before Parliament.
The Minister of Finance is not mentioned in the Constitution. His/her roles are specified by a presidential decree, signed also by the Prime Minister. In 2004, the Minister headed a “super-ministry” covering economy, public finance and industry.15 The Minister’s attributions include preparing and executing the budget, pensions, public accounting, and tax/customs policies. Several of these responsibilities have been delegated to the Secretary of State for the Budget and Budgetary Reform. Based on Decree No. 2002-952, the Secretary of State for the Budget and Budgetary Reform is specifically charged with implementing the 2001 LOLF.
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IV. FRANCE
3.1.3. Establishment of ministries and executive branch agencies
Spending ministries do not need a law for their establishment. Government decisions create, merge, or abolish ministries. The number of ministries has varied enormously, as different Councils of Ministers have attempted to reform government administration via ministerial fragmentation or consolidation.16 Their internal organisation – particularly the number of internal departments (directions générales) – is established by Prime Ministerial decrees, after draft decrees are examined by the Council of State (Conseil d’État – see section 3.1.6).
The Constitution specifies that categories of public establishments are to be established by law. However, no overall framework law has been adopted, even though public establishments play a very important role in implementing the annual budget. In broad terms, there are two main categories of public establishment (see Box 2). In 2003, there were about 1000 EPAs (excluding thousands of schools and hospitals) and about 100 EPICs at national level.17 Within the “administrative” public establishments (EPAs), there are several subcategories, the most important of which are the social security organisations. Individual public establishments are created either by law or by decree. Apart from the social security public establishments, there is no common framework for essential matters such as governance structures or the preparation and submission of mission statements to supervising ministries. Although regular reporting to Parliament of the activities of public establishments is not required by law (except for the social security EPAs), a dedicated unit in the MINEFI closely monitors State-owned companies and reports to Parliament annually.18
Box 2. France: Characteristics and types
of public establishments (établissements publics)
●Public establishments are legal entities, separate from the State, with financial management flexibility of varying degrees.
●Public establishments are distinguished by function – notably those that perform commercial functions (EPICs), administrative functions (EPAs), or scientific, cultural, or educational functions (specialized public establishments). The major social security funds are national EPAs.
●EPICs are public enterprises, usually governed by corporate law; EPAs are governed by public law.1 Personnel of EPAs are treated as civil servants and all accounting is performed by public accountants under the MINEFI.
1.In the absence of clear distinguishing features of EPICs and EPAs, the distinction between them is being deprived of meaning (Rochet, 2003, p. 152). Some non-commercial EPAs have the status of an EPIC, mainly so that they can escape certain public law requirements.
Source: Rochet, 2002.
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IV. FRANCE
Public establishments generally have a management board (conseil d’administration). The State generally has a representative from the responsible ministry, as well as a representative of MINEFI, on the management board. In many cases, the board’s president is nominated by government decree. For some public establishments, a director, selected by the government, coexists with a board president. Local governments, users, and other interested parties are also represented on the board, depending on the functions of the public establishment. For the social security funds (for which governance structures are clearly laid out in the Social Security Code), employer and employee representatives dominate boards.
3.1.4. Responsibilities of senior civil servants
Under the Constitution, the Council of Ministers appoints senior civil servants – directors of central administrations (Art. 13). In practice, the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and the minister concerned jointly sign off on high-level appointments. All civil servants’ general responsibilities and rights are specified in Law No. 83-634 of 1983 (itself a revision of a law passed in the 1940s). Civil servants’ roles are further elaborated in law (dispositions statutaires), notably Law No. 84-16 of 1984, or by decree (dispositions réglementaires), with advice provided by the Council of State (Conseil d’État – see section 3.1.6). These laws concern recruitment, career structure, discipline, etc. However, the laws do not lay out principles for any special relationships between senior civil servants and higher authorities. Implementing decrees accord privileges to particular categories of civil servants. Overall, the legal framework induces rigidity in employment structures, which may inhibit the decentralised management responsibilities required for implementing the LOLF. It is recognised that written performance agreements may be required to clarify the responsibilities of budget programme managers, staff in ministerial private offices (including political appointees), ministry heads and ministers. However, the nature of contractual arrangements has not been made explicit in law (Arthuis, 2003, p. 83).
3.1.5. Establishment and roles of parliamentary committees
The Constitution limits the number of permanent parliamentary committees in each house to six (Art. 43). Special parliamentary committees may be created for examining specific laws. The detailed internal regulations of each house (which have the status of law) fix the composition and appointment methods of each permanent or special committee. The law that governs the functioning of parliamentary assemblies empowers these committees to summon to hearing any person judged necessary (1958 Ordonnance No. 58-1100, Art. 5bis). The same ordonnance allows the creation of parliamentary temporary commissions of enquiry. Three parliamentary evaluation offices that serve
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