- •Table of Contents
- •Foreword
- •OECD Journal on Budgeting
- •Board of Advisors
- •Preface
- •Executive Summary
- •Sharp differences exist in the legal framework for budget systems
- •Public finance and legal theories do not explain inter-country differences in budget system laws
- •Political variables and legal culture help explain the inter-country differences
- •Norms for budget systems have been issued and many should be in budget system laws
- •Budget system laws are adopted to strengthen the powers of the legislature or the executive
- •Country studies reveal a multiplicity of reasons for adopting budget-related laws
- •Conclusions
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Budget processes
- •2.1. Budgeting: a five-stage process
- •Figure I.1. The roles of Parliament and the executive in the budget cycle
- •2.2. How are the different legal frameworks for budget systems organised?
- •Figure I.2. Different models for organising the legal framework of budget systems
- •3. Can economic theory explain the differences?
- •3.1. New institutional economics
- •3.2. Law, economics and public choice theory
- •3.3. Constitutional political economy: budgetary rules and budgetary outcomes
- •3.4. Can game theory help?
- •4. Can comparative law explain the differences?
- •4.1. Families of legal systems and the importance of the constitution
- •Box I.2. Purposes of constitutions and characteristics of statutes
- •4.2. Absence of norms for constitutions partly explains differences in budget system laws
- •4.3. Hierarchy within primary law also partly explains differences in budget-related laws
- •Box I.3. Hierarchy of laws: The example of Spain
- •4.4. Not all countries complete all steps of formal law-making processes
- •Box I.4. Steps in making law
- •4.5. Greater use is made of secondary law in some countries
- •Table I.1. Delegated legislation and separation of powers
- •4.6. Decisions and regulations of the legislature are particularly important in some countries
- •4.8. Are laws “green lights” or “red lights”?
- •5. Forms of government and budget system laws
- •5.1. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchies
- •5.2. Presidential and semi-presidential governments
- •5.3. Parliamentary republics
- •5.4. Relationship between forms of government and budget system law
- •Table I.2. Differences in selected budgetary powers of the executive and the legislature
- •Figure I.3. Separation of powers and the need to adopt budget-related laws
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Introduction
- •Figure II.1. Density of legal framework for budget systems in 25 OECD countries
- •Table II.1. Legal frameworks for budget systems: 13 OECD countries
- •2. Different purposes of the legal frameworks for budget systems
- •Box II.1. Purposes of budget system laws
- •2.1. Legal necessity?
- •Figure II.2. Budget reforms and changes in budget laws
- •2.2. Budget reform: when is law required?
- •2.3. Elaborating on the budget powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive
- •3. Differences in the legal framework for the main actors in budget systems
- •3.1. Legislatures
- •3.2. Executives
- •Box II.2. New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988
- •3.3. Judiciary
- •3.4. External audit offices
- •Table II.3. External audit legal frameworks: Selected differences
- •3.5. Sub-national governments
- •3.6. Supra-national bodies and international organisations
- •4. Differences in the legal framework for budget processes
- •4.1. Budget preparation by the executive
- •Table II.4. Legal requirements for the date of submission of the budget to the legislature
- •Box II.3. France: Legal requirements for budget information
- •4.2. Parliamentary approval of the budget
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting systems
- •Box II.4. Finland: Legal requirements for annual report and annual accounts
- •Table II.5. Legal requirements for submission of annual report to the legislature: Selected countries
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Have standards for the legal framework of budget systems been drawn up?
- •1.1. Normative and positive approaches to budget law
- •1.2. Limited guidance from normative constitutional economics
- •2. Who should set and monitor legally binding standards?
- •2.1. Role of politicians and bureaucrats
- •2.2. International transmission of budget system laws
- •2.3. International organisations as standard setters
- •Box III.1. The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- •Box III.2. Constitutional norms for external audit: Extracts from the INTOSAI “Lima Declaration”
- •2.4. Monitoring standards
- •3. Principles to support the legal framework of budget systems
- •Box III.3. Ten principles for a budget law
- •3.1. Authoritativeness
- •Table III.1. Stages of the budget cycle and legal instruments
- •3.2. Annual basis
- •3.3. Universality
- •3.4. Unity
- •3.5. Specificity
- •3.6. Balance
- •3.7. Accountability
- •Box III.4. Possible minimum legal norms for budget reporting
- •Box III.5. Ingredients of legal norms for external audit
- •3.8. Transparency
- •Box III.6. Ingredients of legal norms for government agencies
- •3.9. Stability or predictability
- •3.10. Performance (or efficiency, economy, and effectiveness)
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Canada: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Canada: Main provisions of the Spending Control Act 1992
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Canada: Major transfers from the federal to the provincial governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Canada: Key steps in the annual budgeting process
- •Box 5. Canada: Major contents of the main estimates
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. France: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Germany: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 2. Germany: Public agencies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 3. Germany: Budget processes in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit17
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Japan: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Japan: Main contents of the 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Act
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Japan: Grants from central government to local governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Japan: The timetable for the budget process
- •Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Korea: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Korea: Major acts governing the fiscal relationship across government levels
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Korea: Legal requirements for the timetable for budget preparation and deliberation
- •Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
- •Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
- •Box 4. New Zealand: Information required to support the first appropriation act
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Nordic Countries: The main budget system laws or near-laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The constitutions of the four countries
- •Table 1. Nordic countries: Age and size of constitutions
- •3.2. Legislatures
- •Table 2. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the legislatures
- •3.3. The political executive
- •Table 3. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the political executive
- •3.4. Ministries and executive agencies
- •3.5. Civil service
- •3.6. Sub-national governments
- •4. Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting
- •4.1. Authority of Parliament
- •Table 4. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the authority of Parliament
- •4.2. Timing of submission of the annual budget
- •4.3. Non-adoption of the annual budget before the year begins
- •4.4. Content of the budget and types of appropriations
- •4.5. Documents to accompany the draft budget law
- •4.6. Parliamentary committees and budget procedures in Parliament
- •4.7. Parliamentary amendment powers, coalition agreements, two-stage budgeting and fiscal rules
- •4.8. Supplementary budgets
- •4.10. Cancellation of appropriations and contingency funds
- •4.11. Government accounting
- •4.12. Other fiscal reporting and special reports
- •Table 5. Nordic countries: Constitutional requirements for external audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Spain: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
- •Box 3. Spain: The major content of medium-term budget plans
- •Box 4. Spain: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United Kingdom: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system law
- •Box 2. United Kingdom: Reforms of the budget system in the past 20 years
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 3. United Kingdom: Executive agencies and other bodies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 4. United Kingdom: Budget processes in Parliament
- •Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •Table 2. United Kingdom: Transfers of budgetary authority
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United States: Main federal budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. United States: Major transfers between different levels of government
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
- •Box 5. United States: Other information required by law
- •4.2. Budget process in the legislature
- •Box 6. United States: Legal and internal deadlines for congressional budget approval
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •5. Sanctions and non-compliance
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
IV. KOREA
Notes
1.For more discussion see, for example, Koh (2000) and MPB (2001).
2.The PEBAA will not apply to the railways as from 2005, due to their planned privatisation.
3.Reforms implemented during past decades include the preliminary feasibility study for new large-scale infrastructure projects, tighter management of total investment estimates for large-scale projects, introduction of a medium-term fiscal plan (not legally binding), pilot projects for performance-oriented budgeting, and a budget incentive system to induce lower public expenditures. These led to minor changes in the BAA. See MPB (2002) for more information.
4.This low public debt is explained largely by the culture of fiscal conservation that prevails both within the administration and the public. In addition the concentration of powers for both the drafting and execution of the budget in the hands of a single powerful ministry, the MPB (the former Economic Planning Board), has helped impose a hard budget constraint on line ministries. Moreover, budgets are prepared on the basis of deliberately conservative revenue forecasting, leading to a tendency for overshooting projected revenues. On the appropriations side, spending overruns are rare.
5.For more discussion on the budget’s role in overcoming the 1997 financial crisis, see Mun et al., 2002.
6.Quasi taxes are generally defined as “all pecuniary expenses that a corporation is obliged to pay other than taxes” (MPB, 2002). This definition takes the broadest possible interpretation of quasi taxes, and includes legally mandated statutory expenses (e.g. social insurance contributions) and other non-voluntary expenses.
7.Major provisions of a fiscal responsibility bill are: 1) The bill would require the government to submit to the National Assembly a three-year fiscal plan, including targets for a consolidated budget balance and public debt; 2) It would restrict supplementary budgets to emergency situations, and establish public debt reduction as the priority in the allocation of any budget surpluses; 3) It would require that any proposals generating higher public spending or lower revenue include a plan on how to offset the negative financial impact; (4) It would create a National Debt Management Committee that reports to the MPB.
8.In September 2004, the “National Fiscal Management Plan (2004-2008)” was approved by the State Council. This plan shows the economic assumptions, the budget aggregates by major sector or ministry, major public expenditure priorities, and national debt for the next five years. The MPB, on behalf of the government, also submitted the draft budget with this plan to the National Assembly. Spending ministries are required to prepare their draft budgets within budget aggregates given by this plan. For more information on the medium-term fiscal framework and top-down budget system, see Kim (2004) and Hur (2004).
9.In some of the other countries reviewed in this book, the State Council is known as “the Cabinet” or “the Council of Ministers”.
10.Included are the Government Information Agency, the Public Procurement Service, the Korea National Statistical Office, the Central Supply Office, and the National Medical Center. See MPB (2002).
11.For more information on local government finance, see OECD (2001); Kim (2003a); Yoo (2003).
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IV. KOREA
12.FAFM functions as the parent law. Only public funds, which are listed in the FAFM, can be established by individual establishing acts. The FAFM also regulates the operation of public funds’ assets in order to secure the stability and efficiency of the fund.
13.Examples include the Agricultural Management Fund, the Employment Insurance Fund, the National Pension Fund, the Employment Promotion Fund for the Disabled, the Tourism Promotion Fund, the Information Promotion Fund, the Industrial Workers’ Accident Compensation Insurance Fund, the Fund for National Heath Promotion, the Livestock Development Fund, and the Broadcasting Development Fund.
14.There were 11 extrabudgetary public funds that were not subject to parliamentary approval under the FAFM, even though they have a substantial impact on the status of public finances. They include the Credit Guarantee Fund, the Housing Finance Credit Guarantee Fund, and the Non-performing Asset Management Fund. However, the amended FAFM in 2003 requires all these funds to be subject to parliamentary oversight.
15.From the early 1980s, the budget authority adopted a new means of budget review, a de facto “Council for Budget Deliberation”. This Council, which consists of the Assistant Minister for the Budget, three director generals and some major directors, deliberates on budget drafts prepared by each budget division of the MPB. Although having no written statute for its foundation, this council has significantly contributed to improving budget formulation, in line with national priorities.
16.Several government reorganisations have occurred over the last decade, especially concerning the institutions responsible for macroeconomic forecasting, budgeting, and co-ordination. In 1994, the Economic Planning Board, which was responsible for economic forecasting and budgeting, was merged with the Ministry of Finance to form the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE). This was soon broken up leading to the establishment of the Planning and Budget Commission (PBC) and the Office of National Budget (ONB) as separate bodies from the MOFE. Shortly thereafter, the PBC and ONB themselves were merged to create the MPB, leaving the MOFE (economic forecasting function) and the MPB (budget function) as two independent ministries.
17.After 1997, the government issued guaranteed bonds equivalent to 27% of GDP for financial sector restructuring. There is no legal obligation to show the current value of the full cost of this debt, nor the risks involved. Presently, only the interest on the bonds is incorporated into the national budget. There is a risk that any defaults on the bonds would have a high budgetary cost (OECD, 2003).
Bibliography
Cho, Sung Il (2004), “Proposals to Consolidate Public Funds”, informal paper presented at Korea Development Institute (KDI), Seoul (in Korean).
Kim, Dong Yeon (2004), “MTEF Framework and Implementation Strategy for Korea: Key Issues for Introducing MTEF and Top-down Budgeting in Korea”, paper presented at the International Conference held by the Korea Development Institute and the World Bank, KDI, Seoul, 15 March.
Kim, Junghun (2003a), “Local Government Financing and Bond Market Financing in Korea”, paper presented at the Korea Development Institute Seminar on Local Government Financing, Korea Institute of Public Finance, Seoul (in Korean), 24 January.
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Kim, Junghun (2003b), “Devolution of Fiscal Functions”, paper presented at a Joint Conference of the World Bank and the Korea Development Institute on Developing and Strengthening the System of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Fiscal Decentralization, KDI, Seoul, 22 July.
Koh, Young-Sun (2000), Budget Structure, Budget Process, and Fiscal Consolidation in Korea, KDI Working Paper, Korea Development Institute, Seoul.
Koh, Young-Sun (2004), “Proposals to Consolidate Special Accounts”, paper presented at Korea Development Institute seminar on Consolidation of Special Accounts and Public Funds, KDI, Seoul (in Korean), 13 September.
Hur, Seok-Kyun (2003), “Intergovernmental Allocation of Tax Bases in Korea”, paper presented at a Joint Conference of the World Bank and the KDI on Developing and Strengthening the System of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Fiscal Decentralization, KDI, Seoul, 22 July.
Hur, Seok-Kyun (2004), “Successful Installation of MTEF to the Korean Fiscal System”, paper presented at the International Conference held by the Korea Development Institute and the World Bank, KDI, Seoul, 15 March.
IMF (International Monetary Fund) (2001), Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes: Republic of Korea, IMF, Washington DC.
MPB (Ministry of Planning and Budget) (2001), Korea’s Budget, Maeil Business Newspaper Co. Ltd., Seoul (in Korean).
MPB (2002), How Korea Reformed the Public Sector, Ministry of Planning and Budget, Seoul.
MPB (2004a), “Fiscal Reforms in Korea”, Keynote speech presented by the Minister of Planning and Budget at the Korea Development Institute-World Bank Conference on Knowledge Partnership, KDI, Seoul, 4 April, English available at www.mpb.go.kr.
MPB (2004b), The National Budget Bill 2004, Ministry of Planning and Budget, Seoul, http://210.114.108.6/epic_attach/2004/R0407040.pdf (in Korean).
MPB (2004c), The Innovation in Budget Formulation: the Top-down Budget System, Ministry of Planning and Budget, Seoul (in Korean).
MPB (2004d), National Fiscal Management Plan (2004-2008), Ministry of Planning and Budget, Seoul (in Korean).
Mun, Hyungpyo, et al. (eds.) (2002), 2002 National Budget and Fiscal Policy, Korea Development Institute, Seoul (in Korean).
National Assembly Budget Office (NABO) (2004), Mission of NABO, National Assembly, Seoul, English available at www.nabo.go.kr.
OECD (2001), OECD Territorial Reviews Korea, OECD, Paris.
OECD (2003), OECD Economic Surveys Korea, OECD, Paris.
OECD (2004), OECD Economic Surveys Korea, OECD, Paris.
Park, Sumin (2004), “MTEF Implementation in Korea: Top-down Allocation”, paper presented at International Conference held by the Korea Development Institute and the World Bank, KDI, Seoul, 15 March.
Yoo, Ilho (2003), “Strategies to Enhance Accountability and Efficiency of Local Government Expenditure”, paper presented at a Joint Conference of the World Bank and the KDI on Developing and Strengthening the System of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Fiscal Decentralization, KDI, Seoul, 22 July.
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Structure of the Case Study |
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Overview...................................................................................... |
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2. |
Principles underlying budget system laws .................................. |
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3. |
Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors |
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in the budget system.................................................................... |
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4. |
Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle ..................... |
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*This study has benefited from comments from: Roger Beckett and Ken Warren of the New Zealand Treasury; Wendy Ventner of the Office of the Auditor General; and OECD colleagues including David Rae of the Economics Department.
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