- •Table of Contents
- •Foreword
- •OECD Journal on Budgeting
- •Board of Advisors
- •Preface
- •Executive Summary
- •Sharp differences exist in the legal framework for budget systems
- •Public finance and legal theories do not explain inter-country differences in budget system laws
- •Political variables and legal culture help explain the inter-country differences
- •Norms for budget systems have been issued and many should be in budget system laws
- •Budget system laws are adopted to strengthen the powers of the legislature or the executive
- •Country studies reveal a multiplicity of reasons for adopting budget-related laws
- •Conclusions
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Budget processes
- •2.1. Budgeting: a five-stage process
- •Figure I.1. The roles of Parliament and the executive in the budget cycle
- •2.2. How are the different legal frameworks for budget systems organised?
- •Figure I.2. Different models for organising the legal framework of budget systems
- •3. Can economic theory explain the differences?
- •3.1. New institutional economics
- •3.2. Law, economics and public choice theory
- •3.3. Constitutional political economy: budgetary rules and budgetary outcomes
- •3.4. Can game theory help?
- •4. Can comparative law explain the differences?
- •4.1. Families of legal systems and the importance of the constitution
- •Box I.2. Purposes of constitutions and characteristics of statutes
- •4.2. Absence of norms for constitutions partly explains differences in budget system laws
- •4.3. Hierarchy within primary law also partly explains differences in budget-related laws
- •Box I.3. Hierarchy of laws: The example of Spain
- •4.4. Not all countries complete all steps of formal law-making processes
- •Box I.4. Steps in making law
- •4.5. Greater use is made of secondary law in some countries
- •Table I.1. Delegated legislation and separation of powers
- •4.6. Decisions and regulations of the legislature are particularly important in some countries
- •4.8. Are laws “green lights” or “red lights”?
- •5. Forms of government and budget system laws
- •5.1. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchies
- •5.2. Presidential and semi-presidential governments
- •5.3. Parliamentary republics
- •5.4. Relationship between forms of government and budget system law
- •Table I.2. Differences in selected budgetary powers of the executive and the legislature
- •Figure I.3. Separation of powers and the need to adopt budget-related laws
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Introduction
- •Figure II.1. Density of legal framework for budget systems in 25 OECD countries
- •Table II.1. Legal frameworks for budget systems: 13 OECD countries
- •2. Different purposes of the legal frameworks for budget systems
- •Box II.1. Purposes of budget system laws
- •2.1. Legal necessity?
- •Figure II.2. Budget reforms and changes in budget laws
- •2.2. Budget reform: when is law required?
- •2.3. Elaborating on the budget powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive
- •3. Differences in the legal framework for the main actors in budget systems
- •3.1. Legislatures
- •3.2. Executives
- •Box II.2. New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988
- •3.3. Judiciary
- •3.4. External audit offices
- •Table II.3. External audit legal frameworks: Selected differences
- •3.5. Sub-national governments
- •3.6. Supra-national bodies and international organisations
- •4. Differences in the legal framework for budget processes
- •4.1. Budget preparation by the executive
- •Table II.4. Legal requirements for the date of submission of the budget to the legislature
- •Box II.3. France: Legal requirements for budget information
- •4.2. Parliamentary approval of the budget
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting systems
- •Box II.4. Finland: Legal requirements for annual report and annual accounts
- •Table II.5. Legal requirements for submission of annual report to the legislature: Selected countries
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Have standards for the legal framework of budget systems been drawn up?
- •1.1. Normative and positive approaches to budget law
- •1.2. Limited guidance from normative constitutional economics
- •2. Who should set and monitor legally binding standards?
- •2.1. Role of politicians and bureaucrats
- •2.2. International transmission of budget system laws
- •2.3. International organisations as standard setters
- •Box III.1. The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- •Box III.2. Constitutional norms for external audit: Extracts from the INTOSAI “Lima Declaration”
- •2.4. Monitoring standards
- •3. Principles to support the legal framework of budget systems
- •Box III.3. Ten principles for a budget law
- •3.1. Authoritativeness
- •Table III.1. Stages of the budget cycle and legal instruments
- •3.2. Annual basis
- •3.3. Universality
- •3.4. Unity
- •3.5. Specificity
- •3.6. Balance
- •3.7. Accountability
- •Box III.4. Possible minimum legal norms for budget reporting
- •Box III.5. Ingredients of legal norms for external audit
- •3.8. Transparency
- •Box III.6. Ingredients of legal norms for government agencies
- •3.9. Stability or predictability
- •3.10. Performance (or efficiency, economy, and effectiveness)
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Canada: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Canada: Main provisions of the Spending Control Act 1992
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Canada: Major transfers from the federal to the provincial governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Canada: Key steps in the annual budgeting process
- •Box 5. Canada: Major contents of the main estimates
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. France: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Germany: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 2. Germany: Public agencies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 3. Germany: Budget processes in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit17
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Japan: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Japan: Main contents of the 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Act
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Japan: Grants from central government to local governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Japan: The timetable for the budget process
- •Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Korea: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Korea: Major acts governing the fiscal relationship across government levels
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Korea: Legal requirements for the timetable for budget preparation and deliberation
- •Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
- •Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
- •Box 4. New Zealand: Information required to support the first appropriation act
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Nordic Countries: The main budget system laws or near-laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The constitutions of the four countries
- •Table 1. Nordic countries: Age and size of constitutions
- •3.2. Legislatures
- •Table 2. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the legislatures
- •3.3. The political executive
- •Table 3. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the political executive
- •3.4. Ministries and executive agencies
- •3.5. Civil service
- •3.6. Sub-national governments
- •4. Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting
- •4.1. Authority of Parliament
- •Table 4. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the authority of Parliament
- •4.2. Timing of submission of the annual budget
- •4.3. Non-adoption of the annual budget before the year begins
- •4.4. Content of the budget and types of appropriations
- •4.5. Documents to accompany the draft budget law
- •4.6. Parliamentary committees and budget procedures in Parliament
- •4.7. Parliamentary amendment powers, coalition agreements, two-stage budgeting and fiscal rules
- •4.8. Supplementary budgets
- •4.10. Cancellation of appropriations and contingency funds
- •4.11. Government accounting
- •4.12. Other fiscal reporting and special reports
- •Table 5. Nordic countries: Constitutional requirements for external audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Spain: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
- •Box 3. Spain: The major content of medium-term budget plans
- •Box 4. Spain: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United Kingdom: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system law
- •Box 2. United Kingdom: Reforms of the budget system in the past 20 years
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 3. United Kingdom: Executive agencies and other bodies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 4. United Kingdom: Budget processes in Parliament
- •Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •Table 2. United Kingdom: Transfers of budgetary authority
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United States: Main federal budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. United States: Major transfers between different levels of government
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
- •Box 5. United States: Other information required by law
- •4.2. Budget process in the legislature
- •Box 6. United States: Legal and internal deadlines for congressional budget approval
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •5. Sanctions and non-compliance
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
IV. SPAIN
is the calendar year (Art. 34, GBA). The principle of annuality is complemented by the medium-term budget principle embodied in the GABS and the GBA. The GABS requires the budgets for the State sector to be prepared within the framework of an MTBP compatible with the annual principle which governs the approval and the execution of the budget (Art. 4). The GBA specifies that management of the State sector is subject to the annual budget as approved by Parliament within the spending limits of the MTBP (Art. 27.1).
The GABS, along with the OAGABS and the GBA, incorporates the principles of budget stability, transparency, and efficiency or performance (Art. 3, GABS and OAGABS; Art. 26, GBA). Those acts require the preparation, approval and execution of budgets to be carried out within the framework of budgetary stability arising from the Stability and Growth Pact.6 The public authorities are required to include in the budgetary regulations the instruments and necessary procedures to ensure that the budgetary stability objective is complied with. Notwithstanding the powers vested in the SGCs, the government must ensure that budgetary stability objectives are observed at all times in the public sector (Art. 7, GABS). Exceptional situations of budgetary deficit must be justified by explaining the reasons which have led to it and identifying the revenues and expenditure related to it; a medium-term economic financial plan is required to be prepared in order to correct this situation.
The transparency principle requires the budget documents to include sufficient and adequate information to allow for verification of compliance with the budgetary stability principle (Art. 5, GABS). A performance-oriented budget is also an integral part of the budget system: budgets are required to be executed to secure their effectiveness, efficiency and quality (Art. 6, GABS). The principle of specificity is embodied in the GBA (Art. 42). It requires line ministries to use their budget exclusively for the specific purpose for which they have been allocated it under the State budget, as specified in the GBA (Art. 41). Accountability is also a well-recognised principle, guarded by the COA (see section 4.5 below).
3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
3.1. The executive and the legislature
3.1.1. Overview
Spain is a unitary State and a parliamentary monarchy (Art. 1, Constitution) with three tiers of government: central government; the SGCs (regional tier); and provincial and municipal authorities (local tier). The King is the head of State (Art. 56). The King has many constitutional rights, although
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IV. SPAIN
in large part symbolic (United Kingdom National Audit Office, 2001). He promulgates laws, summons and dissolves Parliament, proposes a candidate for the President and appoints or removes him from office, and appoints and dismisses members of the government on the recommendation of the President (Art. 62).
There is strict separation of duties between the executive and the legislature. Executive power is held by the President. The government exercises executive authority and issues regulations in accordance with the Constitution and laws (Art. 97). The government consists of the President, Vice-Presidents (one or several), ministers and other members as may be created by the law (Art. 98). The President directs the government’s action and co-ordinates the functions of the government (Art. 98). In contrast, legislative power is vested in the Parliament, which consists of two houses, the Congress of Deputies and the Senate (Art. 66). The Senate is the house of territorial representation – in principle, there are four senators for each province (Art. 69).
3.1.2. Role and responsibilities of the Council of Ministers and individual ministers
The function and the structure of the government are regulated by the Constitution (Arts. 97-107). The Constitution prescribes that the Council of Ministers is the supreme decision-making organisation of the government (Art. 107), and the OAOFCSA makes provision for its membership and its terms of reference. The Council of Ministers plays a fundamental role in the budget process. It approves the general directives for budget preparation and sets guidelines for the central government’s economic financial and monetary policy. It settles disagreements over appropriations between the Minister of the Economy and Finance (MOEF) and other ministers. At the conclusion of the preparatory stage, it takes decisions concerning amendments to tax provisions and approves the draft budget for presentation to Parliament. The Constitution establishes that the government is accountable to the Deputies for its conduct of political business (Art. 108).
3.1.3. Establishment of ministries and executive branch agencies
The Constitution states that the organs of State administration are set up, directed and co-ordinated in accordance with the law (Art. 103). The OAOFCSA specifies hierarchical organisational arrangements in ministries and executive branch agencies. However, the creation of a new ministry needs the enactment of its own establishing act. In contrast, the President has discretion to reorganise its existing ministries as long as it does not entail new staff and additional budgetary resources.
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The Constitution states that the budget is prepared by the government and the OAOFCSA specifies that the MOEF holds the main budgetary powers and responsibilities, including revenue, expenditure and macroeconomic forecasting in accordance with budget legislation. The MOEF is divided into a State Secretariat for Finance and a State Secretariat for the Economy. The former holds the main responsibility for the whole budget process, while the latter is in charge of proposing and implementing the general measures of economic policy of the government. Line ministries prepare bills and decrees within their area of responsibility and are charged with administering policies at national level.
The OAOFCSA established a classification for general government entities into two types: autonomous bodies with administrative functions and public entities providing market-oriented services of goods (Zapico Goni and Garces, 2002). The former play an administrative role and are fully regulated by general public law, while the latter play an entrepreneurial role and are regulated under private law, except for some specific functions explicitly governed by general public laws.
Pursuant to the OAGABS (Art. 5), the Tax and Financial Council of the SGCs (TFC) plays a key role in the co-ordination of the budgetary policy of the State and the SGCs with a view to achieving budgetary stability. The TFC acts as the co-ordination body between the State and the SGCs to ensure compliance with the guiding principles of the OAGABS (Art. 5). Pursuant to the act, the TFC took on new and highly relevant functions to ensure that the stability objectives assigned to the various public administrations are met effectively. The TFC submits a report on the stability objectives of all SGCs and decides on the adequacy of each of the measures included in the budgetary stability objectives (Art. 6).
3.1.4. Responsibilities of senior civil servants
The Constitution requires that a law lays down the status of civil servants, the entry into the civil service in accordance with the principles of merit and ability, the features of their right to union membership, and the guarantees regarding impartiality in the discharge of their duties (Art. 103).
3.1.5. Establishment and roles of parliamentary committees
The Standing Orders of both houses govern the establishment of parliamentary committees. The Congress of Deputies has 15 standing committees and other ad hoc committees, and the Senate has 16 standing committees and other ad hoc committees. Both sets of Standing Orders require each house to establish a standing Budget Committee, which is responsible for examining, amending as necessary, and approving the State budget (Art. 46,
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Standing Orders of the Congress of Deputies; Art. 49, Standing Orders of the Senate).
3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
A process of decentralisation began following the adoption of the 1978 Constitution. With the transfer of health service provision to several SGCs in 2002, Spain became one of the most decentralised OECD member countries. Spain’s distribution of functions and its system of governance are close to those of a federal State (OECD, 2003a). The Constitution states that the SGCs, provinces, and municipalities enjoy self-government for the management of their respective interests (Art. 137). The State is now divided into 17 SGCs or regions; territorially it includes 50 provinces and about 8 000 municipalities.
The Constitution clearly states the jurisdiction of the State and the SGCs (Arts. 148-149). The State exclusively governs the following (Art. 149): 1) the regulation of the basic conditions guaranteeing the equality of all citizens; 2) international relations; 3) defence and the armed forces, and the administration of justice; 4) general finances and the State debt; 5) the basic legislation and the financial system of social security; 6) the basic legislation for environmental protection. In contrast, the SGCs may assume jurisdiction in respect of the following (Art. 148): 1) the organisation of their institutions of self-government, and changes in the municipal boundaries within their territory; 2) environmental protection management; 3) promotion of the economic development of the SGCs within the objectives set by national economic policy; and 4) social assistance, health and hygiene. Accordingly, the SGCs’ main responsibilities concern social services (excluding contributory pensions), health, labour market policy, education, culture and some public infrastructure. SGCs account for one-third of consolidated public expenditure and employ more than twice as many civil servants as central government (excluding social security) (OECD, 2003a).
The Constitution also declares the principle of the financial autonomy of the SGCs in conformity with the principles of co-ordination with the State Treasury (Art. 156). The budgets of the SGCs are required to be prepared on an annual basis and for the same period as those of the State budget, in accordance with the principle of budgetary stability. They must record all the revenue and expenditure of the bodies and institutions which are part of SGCs. The resources of SGCs are clearly stated in the Constitution (Art. 157): 1) taxes wholly or partially made over to them by the State; surcharges on State taxes and other shares in State revenue; 2) their own taxes, rates and special levies; 3) transfers from an inter-territorial clearing fund and other allocations to be charged to the general State budget; 4) revenues accruing from their property and private law income; 5) the yield from credit operations.
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