- •Table of Contents
- •Foreword
- •OECD Journal on Budgeting
- •Board of Advisors
- •Preface
- •Executive Summary
- •Sharp differences exist in the legal framework for budget systems
- •Public finance and legal theories do not explain inter-country differences in budget system laws
- •Political variables and legal culture help explain the inter-country differences
- •Norms for budget systems have been issued and many should be in budget system laws
- •Budget system laws are adopted to strengthen the powers of the legislature or the executive
- •Country studies reveal a multiplicity of reasons for adopting budget-related laws
- •Conclusions
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Budget processes
- •2.1. Budgeting: a five-stage process
- •Figure I.1. The roles of Parliament and the executive in the budget cycle
- •2.2. How are the different legal frameworks for budget systems organised?
- •Figure I.2. Different models for organising the legal framework of budget systems
- •3. Can economic theory explain the differences?
- •3.1. New institutional economics
- •3.2. Law, economics and public choice theory
- •3.3. Constitutional political economy: budgetary rules and budgetary outcomes
- •3.4. Can game theory help?
- •4. Can comparative law explain the differences?
- •4.1. Families of legal systems and the importance of the constitution
- •Box I.2. Purposes of constitutions and characteristics of statutes
- •4.2. Absence of norms for constitutions partly explains differences in budget system laws
- •4.3. Hierarchy within primary law also partly explains differences in budget-related laws
- •Box I.3. Hierarchy of laws: The example of Spain
- •4.4. Not all countries complete all steps of formal law-making processes
- •Box I.4. Steps in making law
- •4.5. Greater use is made of secondary law in some countries
- •Table I.1. Delegated legislation and separation of powers
- •4.6. Decisions and regulations of the legislature are particularly important in some countries
- •4.8. Are laws “green lights” or “red lights”?
- •5. Forms of government and budget system laws
- •5.1. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchies
- •5.2. Presidential and semi-presidential governments
- •5.3. Parliamentary republics
- •5.4. Relationship between forms of government and budget system law
- •Table I.2. Differences in selected budgetary powers of the executive and the legislature
- •Figure I.3. Separation of powers and the need to adopt budget-related laws
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Introduction
- •Figure II.1. Density of legal framework for budget systems in 25 OECD countries
- •Table II.1. Legal frameworks for budget systems: 13 OECD countries
- •2. Different purposes of the legal frameworks for budget systems
- •Box II.1. Purposes of budget system laws
- •2.1. Legal necessity?
- •Figure II.2. Budget reforms and changes in budget laws
- •2.2. Budget reform: when is law required?
- •2.3. Elaborating on the budget powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive
- •3. Differences in the legal framework for the main actors in budget systems
- •3.1. Legislatures
- •3.2. Executives
- •Box II.2. New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988
- •3.3. Judiciary
- •3.4. External audit offices
- •Table II.3. External audit legal frameworks: Selected differences
- •3.5. Sub-national governments
- •3.6. Supra-national bodies and international organisations
- •4. Differences in the legal framework for budget processes
- •4.1. Budget preparation by the executive
- •Table II.4. Legal requirements for the date of submission of the budget to the legislature
- •Box II.3. France: Legal requirements for budget information
- •4.2. Parliamentary approval of the budget
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting systems
- •Box II.4. Finland: Legal requirements for annual report and annual accounts
- •Table II.5. Legal requirements for submission of annual report to the legislature: Selected countries
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Have standards for the legal framework of budget systems been drawn up?
- •1.1. Normative and positive approaches to budget law
- •1.2. Limited guidance from normative constitutional economics
- •2. Who should set and monitor legally binding standards?
- •2.1. Role of politicians and bureaucrats
- •2.2. International transmission of budget system laws
- •2.3. International organisations as standard setters
- •Box III.1. The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- •Box III.2. Constitutional norms for external audit: Extracts from the INTOSAI “Lima Declaration”
- •2.4. Monitoring standards
- •3. Principles to support the legal framework of budget systems
- •Box III.3. Ten principles for a budget law
- •3.1. Authoritativeness
- •Table III.1. Stages of the budget cycle and legal instruments
- •3.2. Annual basis
- •3.3. Universality
- •3.4. Unity
- •3.5. Specificity
- •3.6. Balance
- •3.7. Accountability
- •Box III.4. Possible minimum legal norms for budget reporting
- •Box III.5. Ingredients of legal norms for external audit
- •3.8. Transparency
- •Box III.6. Ingredients of legal norms for government agencies
- •3.9. Stability or predictability
- •3.10. Performance (or efficiency, economy, and effectiveness)
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Canada: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Canada: Main provisions of the Spending Control Act 1992
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Canada: Major transfers from the federal to the provincial governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Canada: Key steps in the annual budgeting process
- •Box 5. Canada: Major contents of the main estimates
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. France: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Germany: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 2. Germany: Public agencies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 3. Germany: Budget processes in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit17
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Japan: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Japan: Main contents of the 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Act
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Japan: Grants from central government to local governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Japan: The timetable for the budget process
- •Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Korea: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Korea: Major acts governing the fiscal relationship across government levels
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Korea: Legal requirements for the timetable for budget preparation and deliberation
- •Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
- •Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
- •Box 4. New Zealand: Information required to support the first appropriation act
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Nordic Countries: The main budget system laws or near-laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The constitutions of the four countries
- •Table 1. Nordic countries: Age and size of constitutions
- •3.2. Legislatures
- •Table 2. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the legislatures
- •3.3. The political executive
- •Table 3. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the political executive
- •3.4. Ministries and executive agencies
- •3.5. Civil service
- •3.6. Sub-national governments
- •4. Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting
- •4.1. Authority of Parliament
- •Table 4. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the authority of Parliament
- •4.2. Timing of submission of the annual budget
- •4.3. Non-adoption of the annual budget before the year begins
- •4.4. Content of the budget and types of appropriations
- •4.5. Documents to accompany the draft budget law
- •4.6. Parliamentary committees and budget procedures in Parliament
- •4.7. Parliamentary amendment powers, coalition agreements, two-stage budgeting and fiscal rules
- •4.8. Supplementary budgets
- •4.10. Cancellation of appropriations and contingency funds
- •4.11. Government accounting
- •4.12. Other fiscal reporting and special reports
- •Table 5. Nordic countries: Constitutional requirements for external audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Spain: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
- •Box 3. Spain: The major content of medium-term budget plans
- •Box 4. Spain: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United Kingdom: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system law
- •Box 2. United Kingdom: Reforms of the budget system in the past 20 years
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 3. United Kingdom: Executive agencies and other bodies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 4. United Kingdom: Budget processes in Parliament
- •Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •Table 2. United Kingdom: Transfers of budgetary authority
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United States: Main federal budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. United States: Major transfers between different levels of government
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
- •Box 5. United States: Other information required by law
- •4.2. Budget process in the legislature
- •Box 6. United States: Legal and internal deadlines for congressional budget approval
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •5. Sanctions and non-compliance
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
IV. JAPAN
Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
●Specification of the revenue budget.
●Request of the planned expenditure of each ministry or agency.
●Statement of the total and net amount of the final fiscal reporting of the previous three years including the current fiscal year.
●Report on the state of national treasury funds in the previous three years including the current fiscal year.
●Report on the state of national bonds and borrowings, the estimated balance as well as the list of the year of redemption of public bonds and borrowing.
●Report on the balance of national property in the three previous years.
●Report on assets and liabilities, and profits and losses of major corporations in which the government has invested in the three previous years.
●Report on any measures incurring liabilities with National Treasury funds including the plan of the repayment.
●Report on continuing expenditure.
(Art. 18). When the Cabinet intends to make decisions on these estimates, the PFA requires Cabinet to ask in advance the heads of those organisations for their opinions (Art. 18). Furthermore, in cases where the Cabinet reduces the estimates proposed by those organisations, the PFA requires the Cabinet to clarify this in the budget (Art. 19).
4.2. Budget process in Parliament
4.2.1. The timetable for budget adoption and constraints on the budget debate in Parliament
According to the Constitution and the Diet Act, the parliamentary review process starts in the HR first. Major stipulations in the Diet Act concerning parliamentary budget review are as follows:
●A Committee on the Budget may be established as a Standing Committee in each House to consider the budget proposal (Art. 41).
●The Committee on the Budget is required to hold open hearings on the overall budget and to hear views from the interested parties (Art. 51).
●Motions of budget amendment are allowed (see section 4.2.3 below).
After the approval of the budget by the HR Budget Committee, the amendment of which is not always the case, it is put to a vote at a plenary session of the HR. Following its approval, the budget is then sent to the HC,
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whose Budget Committee deliberates in the same way as that of the HR. Likewise, the Budget Committee sends the budget to the plenary session of the HC for its approval. Provided approval is received before 1st April, the budget becomes effective as from that date, the beginning of the fiscal year. The Constitution and the Diet Act stipulate special reconciliation procedures in a situation where the two Houses have different opinions on the budget (see section 3.1.5 above).
4.2.2. Provisional budgets
The PFA (Art. 30) allows the Cabinet to prepare a provisional budget to cover a specified portion of the fiscal year in order to avoid the shutdown of the government, when the Cabinet expects that the regular budget cannot be approved by 1st April, for reasons such as an upcoming general election. The provisional budget becomes invalid once the regular budget is approved by the Diet. Expenditures or contracts based on the provisional budget are regarded as based on the regular annual budget. The law does not mention the scope of the provisional budget in detail, but in practice the expenditures in the provisional budget are strictly limited to those that are indispensable to be appropriated for the proper functioning of the government until the adoption of the regular budget by the Diet.
4.2.3. Powers of amendment
The Diet Act provides the Diet with the power to amend the draft budget. The Act requires a motion of budgetary amendment to be supported by at least 50 members in the HR or at least 20 in the HC (Art. 57bis), but the act does not place quantitative limits on amending the draft budget. However, the Constitution also stipulates that only the Cabinet makes budget proposals. Moreover, the Diet Act requires a House or a Budget Committee to afford the Cabinet an opportunity to give its opinion on a proposed amendment that increases the total amount in the budget (Art. 57ter).11 Although the Cabinet does not have the right to veto the budget amendment made by the Diet, the general understanding is that the Diet cannot amend the government’s budget proposal significantly. By virtue of the nature of parliamentary government, the executive directly depends on majority support in the Diet, and the composition of the Diet and the executive are intertwined, so the executive’s draft budget is conventionally accepted without any serious amendments or modifications.12 Like other parliamentary governments, attempts by the Diet to refuse the draft budget of the executive, if successful, would be considered tantamount to a vote of no confidence in the government.
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4.2.4. Approval of resources
The Constitution states that no new taxes are imposed or existing ones modified except by law or under such conditions as the law may prescribe (Art. 84). The PFA states that any surcharge as well as any monopolistic price or charge for a service which legitimately or practically belongs to the government, is determined in accordance with the law or by a Diet resolution (Art. 3).13 In addition, the Diet approves the draft annual revenue budget prepared by the Cabinet and set out according to the source of the revenues.
4.2.5. The nature, structure and duration of appropriations
The budget appropriations specify the maximum limit of government expenditures although this is not specified by law. Concerning the structure of appropriations, the PFA requires the budget including the special accounts, to be classified administratively (according to department and division) and into paragraphs (kwan) according to the purpose of the disbursement (Art. 23). Within ministries, the PFA requires expenditure paragraphs (kwan) to be subdivided into articles (kou). Articles (kou) are the unit of appropriation by the Diet and the budget documents include detailed figures which break down articles (kou). The budget is adopted mainly on an economic classification of expenditure, supplemented by a mixed programme and functional classification at a more detailed level. In line with this classification, line ministries are required to implement expenditures.
4.2.6. Carryover of appropriations and borrowing of future appropriations
The period of the appropriation is usually one year except for continuing expenditure. For projects such as construction and manufacturing which require a few years for completion, the government may continue to disburse over several fiscal years, subject to the Diet resolution in advance (Art. 14bis, PFA). The continuing expenditure does not exceed five consecutive years unless the Diet authorises it. There are no permanent appropriations.
Expenditure that is not likely to be spent within the fiscal year is allowed to be carried over to the following fiscal year under exceptional circumstances. The PFA permits carryover to the following fiscal year with the approval of the Ministry of Finance if this is caused by the nature of expenditure or any reasons after the approval of the budget, subject to the Diet resolution in advance (Art. 14). For the purpose of obtaining approval of the Ministry of Finance, the PFA (Art. 43) requires line ministries to prepare a statement of carryover, in which reasons for and the amount of expenditure to be carried over is specified by item. If approval is obtained, the expenditure may be carried over and used in the following years within the approved amount. Line
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ministries are also required to report the use of the carried over expenditure to the Ministry of Finance and the Board of Audit.
4.2.7. Public debt approval
The Constitution requires that all obligations entered into by the government be authorised by the Diet (Art. 85). Obligations include both debt and potential liabilities such as guarantees. The PFA stipulates that public bonds or borrowings are only permissible for limited purposes such as the finance of public works expenses not exceeding the amount approved by the Diet resolution with repayment plans submitted to the Diet (Art. 4). All matters with some exceptions concerning the issue of public bonds are prohibited to be undertaken by the Bank of Japan (Art. 5). The limit of the amount of public bonds or borrowings must be included in the general provisions of the annual budget and approved by the Diet (Art. 22). Furthermore, in cases where a surplus is generated in current transactions in each fiscal year, an amount equivalent to more than half of the surplus, in addition to what is otherwise required by other laws, is used for the redemption of public bonds and repayment of borrowing, within two years from the fiscal year in which the surplus was generated (Art. 6).
4.2.8. Promulgation, veto and publication of the adopted budget
There is no legal requirement for promulgation because the budget is not perceived as law which requires promulgation to take effect. The Constitution and the PFA require the government to make the adopted budget available to the public. The Constitution stipulates that the Cabinet should report regularly to the Diet on the fiscal information (Art. 91). The PFA provides that the content of the national budget, and supporting information, should be made available to the public as soon as it passes the Diet (Art. 46).
4.2.9. Supplementary budgets (rectifying laws)
The PFA provides the legal basis of supplementary budgets. The Cabinet is permitted to prepare and submit a draft supplementary budget to the Diet to amend the initial budget (Art. 29). There is no legal constraint on the number of supplementary budgets. The Cabinet can compile a supplementary budget and submit it to the Diet in the following cases: 1) to supplement a shortage of funds necessary to meet statutory contractual government obligations, or to supplement the budget so as to meet additional expenditure or contract requirements needed after the budget is made; and 2) to modify the budget for other reasons arising after the budget is made.
Supplementary budgets are adopted for a variety of reasons such as the necessity of stimulating the economy or recovering from a natural disaster.
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