- •Table of Contents
- •Foreword
- •OECD Journal on Budgeting
- •Board of Advisors
- •Preface
- •Executive Summary
- •Sharp differences exist in the legal framework for budget systems
- •Public finance and legal theories do not explain inter-country differences in budget system laws
- •Political variables and legal culture help explain the inter-country differences
- •Norms for budget systems have been issued and many should be in budget system laws
- •Budget system laws are adopted to strengthen the powers of the legislature or the executive
- •Country studies reveal a multiplicity of reasons for adopting budget-related laws
- •Conclusions
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Budget processes
- •2.1. Budgeting: a five-stage process
- •Figure I.1. The roles of Parliament and the executive in the budget cycle
- •2.2. How are the different legal frameworks for budget systems organised?
- •Figure I.2. Different models for organising the legal framework of budget systems
- •3. Can economic theory explain the differences?
- •3.1. New institutional economics
- •3.2. Law, economics and public choice theory
- •3.3. Constitutional political economy: budgetary rules and budgetary outcomes
- •3.4. Can game theory help?
- •4. Can comparative law explain the differences?
- •4.1. Families of legal systems and the importance of the constitution
- •Box I.2. Purposes of constitutions and characteristics of statutes
- •4.2. Absence of norms for constitutions partly explains differences in budget system laws
- •4.3. Hierarchy within primary law also partly explains differences in budget-related laws
- •Box I.3. Hierarchy of laws: The example of Spain
- •4.4. Not all countries complete all steps of formal law-making processes
- •Box I.4. Steps in making law
- •4.5. Greater use is made of secondary law in some countries
- •Table I.1. Delegated legislation and separation of powers
- •4.6. Decisions and regulations of the legislature are particularly important in some countries
- •4.8. Are laws “green lights” or “red lights”?
- •5. Forms of government and budget system laws
- •5.1. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchies
- •5.2. Presidential and semi-presidential governments
- •5.3. Parliamentary republics
- •5.4. Relationship between forms of government and budget system law
- •Table I.2. Differences in selected budgetary powers of the executive and the legislature
- •Figure I.3. Separation of powers and the need to adopt budget-related laws
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Introduction
- •Figure II.1. Density of legal framework for budget systems in 25 OECD countries
- •Table II.1. Legal frameworks for budget systems: 13 OECD countries
- •2. Different purposes of the legal frameworks for budget systems
- •Box II.1. Purposes of budget system laws
- •2.1. Legal necessity?
- •Figure II.2. Budget reforms and changes in budget laws
- •2.2. Budget reform: when is law required?
- •2.3. Elaborating on the budget powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive
- •3. Differences in the legal framework for the main actors in budget systems
- •3.1. Legislatures
- •3.2. Executives
- •Box II.2. New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988
- •3.3. Judiciary
- •3.4. External audit offices
- •Table II.3. External audit legal frameworks: Selected differences
- •3.5. Sub-national governments
- •3.6. Supra-national bodies and international organisations
- •4. Differences in the legal framework for budget processes
- •4.1. Budget preparation by the executive
- •Table II.4. Legal requirements for the date of submission of the budget to the legislature
- •Box II.3. France: Legal requirements for budget information
- •4.2. Parliamentary approval of the budget
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting systems
- •Box II.4. Finland: Legal requirements for annual report and annual accounts
- •Table II.5. Legal requirements for submission of annual report to the legislature: Selected countries
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Have standards for the legal framework of budget systems been drawn up?
- •1.1. Normative and positive approaches to budget law
- •1.2. Limited guidance from normative constitutional economics
- •2. Who should set and monitor legally binding standards?
- •2.1. Role of politicians and bureaucrats
- •2.2. International transmission of budget system laws
- •2.3. International organisations as standard setters
- •Box III.1. The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- •Box III.2. Constitutional norms for external audit: Extracts from the INTOSAI “Lima Declaration”
- •2.4. Monitoring standards
- •3. Principles to support the legal framework of budget systems
- •Box III.3. Ten principles for a budget law
- •3.1. Authoritativeness
- •Table III.1. Stages of the budget cycle and legal instruments
- •3.2. Annual basis
- •3.3. Universality
- •3.4. Unity
- •3.5. Specificity
- •3.6. Balance
- •3.7. Accountability
- •Box III.4. Possible minimum legal norms for budget reporting
- •Box III.5. Ingredients of legal norms for external audit
- •3.8. Transparency
- •Box III.6. Ingredients of legal norms for government agencies
- •3.9. Stability or predictability
- •3.10. Performance (or efficiency, economy, and effectiveness)
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Canada: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Canada: Main provisions of the Spending Control Act 1992
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Canada: Major transfers from the federal to the provincial governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Canada: Key steps in the annual budgeting process
- •Box 5. Canada: Major contents of the main estimates
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. France: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Germany: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 2. Germany: Public agencies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 3. Germany: Budget processes in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit17
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Japan: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Japan: Main contents of the 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Act
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Japan: Grants from central government to local governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Japan: The timetable for the budget process
- •Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Korea: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Korea: Major acts governing the fiscal relationship across government levels
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Korea: Legal requirements for the timetable for budget preparation and deliberation
- •Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
- •Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
- •Box 4. New Zealand: Information required to support the first appropriation act
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Nordic Countries: The main budget system laws or near-laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The constitutions of the four countries
- •Table 1. Nordic countries: Age and size of constitutions
- •3.2. Legislatures
- •Table 2. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the legislatures
- •3.3. The political executive
- •Table 3. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the political executive
- •3.4. Ministries and executive agencies
- •3.5. Civil service
- •3.6. Sub-national governments
- •4. Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting
- •4.1. Authority of Parliament
- •Table 4. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the authority of Parliament
- •4.2. Timing of submission of the annual budget
- •4.3. Non-adoption of the annual budget before the year begins
- •4.4. Content of the budget and types of appropriations
- •4.5. Documents to accompany the draft budget law
- •4.6. Parliamentary committees and budget procedures in Parliament
- •4.7. Parliamentary amendment powers, coalition agreements, two-stage budgeting and fiscal rules
- •4.8. Supplementary budgets
- •4.10. Cancellation of appropriations and contingency funds
- •4.11. Government accounting
- •4.12. Other fiscal reporting and special reports
- •Table 5. Nordic countries: Constitutional requirements for external audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Spain: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
- •Box 3. Spain: The major content of medium-term budget plans
- •Box 4. Spain: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United Kingdom: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system law
- •Box 2. United Kingdom: Reforms of the budget system in the past 20 years
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 3. United Kingdom: Executive agencies and other bodies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 4. United Kingdom: Budget processes in Parliament
- •Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •Table 2. United Kingdom: Transfers of budgetary authority
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United States: Main federal budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. United States: Major transfers between different levels of government
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
- •Box 5. United States: Other information required by law
- •4.2. Budget process in the legislature
- •Box 6. United States: Legal and internal deadlines for congressional budget approval
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •5. Sanctions and non-compliance
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
IV. UNITED STATES
of the Budget (the predecessor to the Office of Management and Budget, OMB) to oversee the budget process within the executive and the General Accounting Office (the predecessor to the Government Accountability Office, GAO) as an external audit entity to provide Congress with an independent audit of accounts. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act (CBA) 1975 provides a framework for co-ordinating and controlling the legislative branch’s budget activities. The act created House and Senate Budget Committees, as well as the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to assist congressional budget review. The law also curbs the President’s power to block expenditures approved by Congress (“impoundment” power).
Laws to improve financial management include the Inspector General Act (IGA) 1978 and the Federal Manager’s Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) 1982, which focuses on internal financial controls. The Chief Financial Officers Act (CFOA) 1990 aimed at establishing responsibility in federal financial management systems. To improve performance in federal government agencies, the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) was adopted in 1993. The Budget Enforcement Acts (BEA) of 1990 and 1997 replaced the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, commonly known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) Act, which aimed to control, by legislative means, the federal deficit that was burgeoning in the 1980s (see next section on reforms).3
All laws, except for the Constitution, are “ordinary” laws – there are no higher primary laws. All laws are codified in the US Code.4 Title 31 (“Money and Finance”) includes the BAA and other laws. In addition, various regulations and circulars govern the budget process. Rules of the House and the Senate provide operational procedures and the distribution of competencies of the Appropriations Committees, the Senate Finance Committee, and the House Ways and Means Committee. Presidential executive orders and OMB circulars govern budget preparation and execution processes within the executive, especially the formulation of the President’s budget proposal and the execution and accounting of the budget.
1.2. Reforms of budget system laws5
Major reforms in budget system law have been made since 1920s, reflecting shifts in the balance of budgetary powers between the executive and the Congress, and the need to reduce the budget deficits.
Until the enactment of the BAA in 1921, the President had a limited role in overseeing federal finances – there was no central budget authority. Little effort was made to co-ordinate individual agencies’ spending or to ensure that they were in accordance with national priorities. Due, in part, to the growth of federal spending, stronger and more centralised presidential leadership in the
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IV. UNITED STATES
budget process was needed. The BAA requires the submission of a single, comprehensive budget proposal to Congress by the President to propose an allocation of federal resources. Departments were barred from giving their requests directly to Congress. Since 1921, the President formulates a budget proposal for congressional reaction.
The 1974 CBA created a new budget process in Congress. Previously, there was no framework for Congress to establish its own spending priorities before work began on specific spending and revenue bills. A dispute in the early 1970s between the President and the Congress regarding presidential authority to impound money appropriated by Congress6 also contributed to the enactment of the CBA. The CBA established procedures for developing an annual congressional budget plan and achieving a system of impoundment control by creating Budget Committees in the House and the Senate, as well as the CBO to serve as the apolitical “scorekeeper” for Congress.
During the 1980s and 1990s, legislation aiming at reducing budget deficits was adopted. In the face of increasing budget deficits, Congress enacted the GRH Act in 1985, which called for the progressive reduction in the deficit in each fiscal year from 1986 through 1990 and for a balanced budget in fiscal year 1991. This objective was to be enforced by an automatic cancellation of budget resources (sequestration) if the projected deficit exceeded the target for a fiscal year.7 Due to defects in the GRH Act’s procedures, the law failed to achieve its main objective (Schick, 2002) (federal deficits continued to increase during those years). First, the law did not require that the actual deficits be within the target, but only that the deficit projected at the start of each fiscal year be. Second, Congress exempted most of the budget from the sequestration process. Third, any increase in the deficit during the fiscal year, whether because of estimation errors, changes in economic conditions or new policies, did not require congressional or presidential action to offset the increase.
To address the flaws in the GRH Act procedures, the BEA was adopted in 1990 (Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 1990).8 The BEA established two independent mechanisms for reducing the deficit: caps on discretionary spending and a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) requirement for mandatory spending and revenue legislation (see Box 2 for details). Until 1998, the discretionary expenditure caps were largely maintained and the PAYGO requirement was upheld (CBO, 2003). However, the effectiveness of the BEA began to erode when budget surpluses started to emerge, beginning in 1998. From 1999 to 2002 annual appropriations for discretionary spending exceeded the caps set in 1997 by large amounts, without triggering sequestrations. The emergency clause of the BEA, which allowed temporary overspending, was loosely interpreted. In addition, the Appropriations Acts for 2001 and 2002 raised the caps by large amounts. Advance appropriations were also
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Box 2. United States: Major contents of the Budget
Enforcement Act
Mandatory and discretionary spending
●Mandatory spending is defined as budget authority provided by law other than appropriations acts and entitlement authority. It includes payments for Medicare and Medicaid, the food stamp programme, unemployment insurance benefits, and farm price supports. Discretionary spending is defined residually as all non mandatory spending. It includes operating costs of most federal agencies, most defence expenditures, and various grant programmes. Discretionary budget authority is provided in annual appropriations acts.
Discretionary spending caps
●If the amount of budget authority provided in an appropriations act for the year exceeds the cap on budget authority, or if OMB estimates of the amount of outlays exceed the cap on outlays, the BEA requires the President to issue a sequestration order reducing most programmes by a uniform percentage. Special rules applied for some programmes. Importantly, the BEA exempted some programmes from sequestration.
PAYGO requirements
●Mandatory spending and new revenue proposals were subject to a “pay-as- you-go” (PAYGO) requirement. When a proposed law increased the deficit in the budget year or any of the following years, another provision of law was required to offset the increase. This could be achieved by either a reduction in spending or an increase in receipts in each year affected. A provision that increased welfare benefit payments, for example, would have to be offset by a provision reducing other mandatory spending or increasing taxes.
OMB and CBO estimates
●The BEA required both the OMB and the CBO to make estimates that determine whether there was to be a sequestration and report them to the President and Congress. Any differences between the OMB and CBO estimates required explanation.
Source: Senate Budget Committee, www.senate.gov/~budget/democratic/laws/balbudgetact1985.pdf.
expanded. In addition, during 1998-2002, large amounts of net costs under PAYGO were waived. In conclusion, during 1998-2002, the BEA rules were either circumvented or explicitly waived (Blondal et al., 2003). The BEA was allowed to expire in 2002. However, the budget reform proposals by the President to revive the BEA requirements is under discussion between the executive and Congress (OMB, 2004a).9
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