- •Table of Contents
- •Foreword
- •OECD Journal on Budgeting
- •Board of Advisors
- •Preface
- •Executive Summary
- •Sharp differences exist in the legal framework for budget systems
- •Public finance and legal theories do not explain inter-country differences in budget system laws
- •Political variables and legal culture help explain the inter-country differences
- •Norms for budget systems have been issued and many should be in budget system laws
- •Budget system laws are adopted to strengthen the powers of the legislature or the executive
- •Country studies reveal a multiplicity of reasons for adopting budget-related laws
- •Conclusions
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Budget processes
- •2.1. Budgeting: a five-stage process
- •Figure I.1. The roles of Parliament and the executive in the budget cycle
- •2.2. How are the different legal frameworks for budget systems organised?
- •Figure I.2. Different models for organising the legal framework of budget systems
- •3. Can economic theory explain the differences?
- •3.1. New institutional economics
- •3.2. Law, economics and public choice theory
- •3.3. Constitutional political economy: budgetary rules and budgetary outcomes
- •3.4. Can game theory help?
- •4. Can comparative law explain the differences?
- •4.1. Families of legal systems and the importance of the constitution
- •Box I.2. Purposes of constitutions and characteristics of statutes
- •4.2. Absence of norms for constitutions partly explains differences in budget system laws
- •4.3. Hierarchy within primary law also partly explains differences in budget-related laws
- •Box I.3. Hierarchy of laws: The example of Spain
- •4.4. Not all countries complete all steps of formal law-making processes
- •Box I.4. Steps in making law
- •4.5. Greater use is made of secondary law in some countries
- •Table I.1. Delegated legislation and separation of powers
- •4.6. Decisions and regulations of the legislature are particularly important in some countries
- •4.8. Are laws “green lights” or “red lights”?
- •5. Forms of government and budget system laws
- •5.1. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchies
- •5.2. Presidential and semi-presidential governments
- •5.3. Parliamentary republics
- •5.4. Relationship between forms of government and budget system law
- •Table I.2. Differences in selected budgetary powers of the executive and the legislature
- •Figure I.3. Separation of powers and the need to adopt budget-related laws
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Introduction
- •Figure II.1. Density of legal framework for budget systems in 25 OECD countries
- •Table II.1. Legal frameworks for budget systems: 13 OECD countries
- •2. Different purposes of the legal frameworks for budget systems
- •Box II.1. Purposes of budget system laws
- •2.1. Legal necessity?
- •Figure II.2. Budget reforms and changes in budget laws
- •2.2. Budget reform: when is law required?
- •2.3. Elaborating on the budget powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive
- •3. Differences in the legal framework for the main actors in budget systems
- •3.1. Legislatures
- •3.2. Executives
- •Box II.2. New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988
- •3.3. Judiciary
- •3.4. External audit offices
- •Table II.3. External audit legal frameworks: Selected differences
- •3.5. Sub-national governments
- •3.6. Supra-national bodies and international organisations
- •4. Differences in the legal framework for budget processes
- •4.1. Budget preparation by the executive
- •Table II.4. Legal requirements for the date of submission of the budget to the legislature
- •Box II.3. France: Legal requirements for budget information
- •4.2. Parliamentary approval of the budget
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting systems
- •Box II.4. Finland: Legal requirements for annual report and annual accounts
- •Table II.5. Legal requirements for submission of annual report to the legislature: Selected countries
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Have standards for the legal framework of budget systems been drawn up?
- •1.1. Normative and positive approaches to budget law
- •1.2. Limited guidance from normative constitutional economics
- •2. Who should set and monitor legally binding standards?
- •2.1. Role of politicians and bureaucrats
- •2.2. International transmission of budget system laws
- •2.3. International organisations as standard setters
- •Box III.1. The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- •Box III.2. Constitutional norms for external audit: Extracts from the INTOSAI “Lima Declaration”
- •2.4. Monitoring standards
- •3. Principles to support the legal framework of budget systems
- •Box III.3. Ten principles for a budget law
- •3.1. Authoritativeness
- •Table III.1. Stages of the budget cycle and legal instruments
- •3.2. Annual basis
- •3.3. Universality
- •3.4. Unity
- •3.5. Specificity
- •3.6. Balance
- •3.7. Accountability
- •Box III.4. Possible minimum legal norms for budget reporting
- •Box III.5. Ingredients of legal norms for external audit
- •3.8. Transparency
- •Box III.6. Ingredients of legal norms for government agencies
- •3.9. Stability or predictability
- •3.10. Performance (or efficiency, economy, and effectiveness)
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Canada: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Canada: Main provisions of the Spending Control Act 1992
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Canada: Major transfers from the federal to the provincial governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Canada: Key steps in the annual budgeting process
- •Box 5. Canada: Major contents of the main estimates
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. France: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Germany: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 2. Germany: Public agencies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 3. Germany: Budget processes in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit17
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Japan: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Japan: Main contents of the 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Act
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Japan: Grants from central government to local governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Japan: The timetable for the budget process
- •Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Korea: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Korea: Major acts governing the fiscal relationship across government levels
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Korea: Legal requirements for the timetable for budget preparation and deliberation
- •Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
- •Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
- •Box 4. New Zealand: Information required to support the first appropriation act
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Nordic Countries: The main budget system laws or near-laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The constitutions of the four countries
- •Table 1. Nordic countries: Age and size of constitutions
- •3.2. Legislatures
- •Table 2. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the legislatures
- •3.3. The political executive
- •Table 3. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the political executive
- •3.4. Ministries and executive agencies
- •3.5. Civil service
- •3.6. Sub-national governments
- •4. Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting
- •4.1. Authority of Parliament
- •Table 4. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the authority of Parliament
- •4.2. Timing of submission of the annual budget
- •4.3. Non-adoption of the annual budget before the year begins
- •4.4. Content of the budget and types of appropriations
- •4.5. Documents to accompany the draft budget law
- •4.6. Parliamentary committees and budget procedures in Parliament
- •4.7. Parliamentary amendment powers, coalition agreements, two-stage budgeting and fiscal rules
- •4.8. Supplementary budgets
- •4.10. Cancellation of appropriations and contingency funds
- •4.11. Government accounting
- •4.12. Other fiscal reporting and special reports
- •Table 5. Nordic countries: Constitutional requirements for external audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Spain: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
- •Box 3. Spain: The major content of medium-term budget plans
- •Box 4. Spain: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United Kingdom: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system law
- •Box 2. United Kingdom: Reforms of the budget system in the past 20 years
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 3. United Kingdom: Executive agencies and other bodies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 4. United Kingdom: Budget processes in Parliament
- •Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •Table 2. United Kingdom: Transfers of budgetary authority
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United States: Main federal budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. United States: Major transfers between different levels of government
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
- •Box 5. United States: Other information required by law
- •4.2. Budget process in the legislature
- •Box 6. United States: Legal and internal deadlines for congressional budget approval
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •5. Sanctions and non-compliance
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
IV. UNITED KINGDOM
4.4.4. Annual accounts and reports
The GRA Act 2000 distinguishes between departmental accounts and whole-of-government accounts. For departmental accounts, the law requires that “a government department for which an estimate is approved by the House of Commons in respect of a financial year shall prepare resource accounts for that year detailing: a) resources acquired, held or disposed of by the department during the year, and b) the use by the department of resources during the year. Resource accounts shall be prepared in accordance with directions issued by H.M. Treasury (s. 5). In addition to all government departments, the House of Commons, the House of Lords and other constitutional bodies also submit accrual-based accounts.
Concerning whole-of-government accounts, the GRA Act 2000 (s. 9) states that “the Treasury shall prepare, for each financial year, a set of accounts for a group of bodies which, it appears to the Treasury, exercise functions of a public nature and are entirely or substantially funded from public money... The accounts shall contain such information in such form as the Treasury thinks fit”. As with departmental accounts, the law specifies that “the Treasury determines the form and content of the accounts, aiming to ensure that the accounts present a fair and true view and that they conform to GAAP”.
4.5. External audit
The post of the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) of the United Kingdom was created in 1866, although its origins go back much further (see White and Hollingsworth, 1999, chapter 4). Since 1998, external audit arrangements have changed to reflect the creation of new national assemblies in Scotland and Wales (Box 5). This section focuses mainly on the legal basis for the National Audit Office (NAO), which is headed by the C&AG.
To co-ordinate external audit arrangements in the nation, a public audit forum, comprised of representatives of all the public audit offices, was launched in 1997 (independently of any law requiring this). The forum published “Principles of Public Audit”, which stresses the independence of public sector auditors, the wide scope of audits and the need for public availability of audit results (see www.public-audit-forum.gov.uk).
4.5.1. Managerial, financial and operational independence
The C&AG is managerially independent. The E&AD Act 1866 specifies that the Queen appoints the “Comptroller General of the Receipt and Issue of Her Majesty’s Exchequer and Auditor General of the Government’s Accounts”.30 Since 1983, C&AGs have been appointed upon a motion of the Prime Minister, acting with the agreement of the chairman of the PAC [s. 1(3), National Audit Act]. The C&AG may not hold any other office appointed by the
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Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
Comptroller and Auditor General (of the United Kingdom)
●Post created under Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1866.
●Head of the National Audit Office, which was created by statute law in 1983.
●Audits all central government bodies in England, as well as reserved areas (for example, defence, foreign affairs, social security) throughout the United Kingdom.
Audit Commission
●Created by Local Government Finance Act 1982 (although the function goes back much further).
●Role and functions now set out in Audit Commission Act 1998.
●Audits local governments in England and Wales.
Auditor General for Scotland
●Created in the Scotland Act 1998.
●Heads Audit Scotland.
●Audits accounts of bodies funded by the Scottish Parliament.
Auditor General for Wales
●Created in the Government of Wales Act 1998.
●Audits accounts of the Welsh National Assembly and its sponsored bodies.
●The Wales Audit Office is planned to be operational in 2005.
Auditor General for Northern Ireland
●Post created in the 1921 Exchequer and Audit Departments Act (Northern Ireland).
●Supported by the Northern Ireland Audit Office.
●Audits Northern Ireland departmental and local government expenditure.
●Mainly based on the Audit (Northern Ireland) Order 1987.
Queen, nor is he/she able to hold office in either house of Parliament (s. 3, E&AD Act 1866). To further enhance the independence of the C&AG from the Crown, the National Audit Act specifies that the status of the C&AG is an “officer of the House of Commons” [s. 1(2), National Audit Act]. The 1983 Act changed the status of the staff of the NAO from being civil servants to “staff appointed at such remuneration and conditions as the C&AG may determine” [s. 3(3), National Audit Act].
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The NAO is financially independent: “the expense of the NAO shall be defrayed out of moneys provided by Parliament” (s. 4, National Audit Act). Accordingly, the C&AG’s salary is a direct charge on the Consolidated Fund. Regarding the NAO’s budget, “the C&AG shall prepare an estimate of the expenses of the NAO and the Public Accounts Commission shall examine the estimate, and lay them before Parliament, with modification if the Commission thinks fit”.31 The C&AG is also given the authority to charge fees for auditing; any such fees shall be paid by him/her into the Consolidated Fund (s. 5). The accounts pertaining to the annual budget of the NAO are examined each year by the PAC.
Operational independence is ensured in law. The C&AG has complete discretion in the discharge of his/her functions. However, in determining whether to carry out examinations, he/she shall take into account any proposals made by the PAC [s. 1(3), National Audit Act].
4.5.2. Institutional coverage of audits
The GRA Act 2000 provides the authority for the C&AG’s financial audits of departmental resource accounts. It also provides for his/her statutory audit of other accounts such as the whole-of-government accounts. All executive agencies are audited by the C&AG under the GRA Act. The National Audit Act (ss. 6-7) provides the C&AG with statutory powers to conduct value-for-money examinations of departments, executive agencies, NDPBs, and a wide variety of NHS and other public bodies.
The C&AG is the auditor of almost all central government bodies. This definition includes NDPBs, but excludes some publicly funded bodies such as higher education institutions and housing associations. Some NDPBs are companies and ministers appoint private auditors to audit them. The C&AG is currently unable, under the Companies Act, to audit limited companies. It has been recommended that the C&AG should audit such companies on behalf of Parliament (Sharman, 2001).
To allow the C&AG to extend the scope of bodies covered by his/her audits, H.M. Treasury may, by law, order a public body’s accounts to be audited by the C&AG, subject to the restriction that the body is performing public functions or being substantially funded by public money (s. 25, GRA Act 2000). In this context, H.M. Treasury initiated the GRA Act (Audit of Public Bodies) Order 2003, which made the C&AG the statutory auditor of a further 25 NDPBs. Also, the GRA Act 2000 (Rights of Access of Comptroller and Auditor General) Order 2003 gave the C&AG wider statutory access to different bodies for audit or examination purposes. Finally, the C&AG’s activities are not limited to those specifically prescribed by statute. At times, he/she conducts some audits by agreement, not because statute requires him/her to do so.
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4.5.3. Types of audit
The E&AD Act 1866 mandated regularity audits to ensure that every payment was supported by vouchers and that money expended was for the purposes granted by Parliament. As early as the late 19th century, economy and efficiency audits began, with PAC support, but not under any specific statutory authority (Sharman, 2001, annex B). The compulsory review of every financial transaction was abandoned, as from the E&AD Act 1921. The National Audit Act 1983 gave the C&AG the express power to report to Parliament at his/ her own discretion on the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which government bodies have used public funds. The emphasis in the law is on the discretion of the C&AG.
The GRA Act 2000 (s. 6) obliges the C&AG to provide an audit certificate in which he/she must state whether in his/her opinion the accounts show:
●a true and fair view (as required in company accounts);
●that the money provided, and resources authorised, by Parliament have been expended for the purposes intended by Parliament;
●that the financial transactions covered by the accounts are in accordance with the relevant authority which governs them.
For local governments, under the Audit Commission Act 1998 (s. 34), the Audit Commission is also authorised to undertake or promote studies that assess the impact of policies on economy, efficiency and effectiveness. The Audit Commission is authorised to require relevant bodies to publish performance standards information for different financial years (s. 44). Thus, by law, bodies delivering public services at local government are obliged to prepare performance indicators for their sphere of activity.
4.5.4. Powers of investigation
The C&AG has strong powers of investigation, explicit in two separate acts. In relation to financial audits, “he shall have a right of access at all reasonable times to any of the documents relating to the department’s accounts”. “A person who holds or has control of any of those documents shall give the C&AG any assistance, information or explanation which he requires in relation to any of those documents” (s. 8, GRA Act 2000). Concerning value- for-money audits, the C&AG “shall have a right of access at all reasonable times to all such documents as he may reasonably require for carrying out examinations” and “shall be entitled to require … explanations as are reasonably necessary for that purpose” (s. 8, National Audit Act). Time delays for the provision of specific information are not specified in law.
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4.5.5. Reporting obligations and publication
As from 1866, the C&AG was required to submit to the Treasury audits of Consolidated Fund accounts and other specific appropriation accounts. If H.M. Treasury did not submit the audit report of the C&AG to the House of Commons within 10 months, the C&AG was authorised to do so (ss. 21 and 32, E&AD Act 1866). The C&AG’s statutory powers to report to Parliament were extended in 1983; he/she may report to the House of Commons the results of any value-for-money examination (s. 9, National Audit Act). These are laid before Parliament as House of Commons papers. The NAO publishes around 60 value-for-money reports each year.
The GRA Act 2000 maintained the same reporting to Parliament procedures and timetable as the 1866 Act. Departments must send accounts to the C&AG within eight months after the fiscal year begins and the C&AG is given two months to audit them. The rather long ten-month delay reflects the late adoption of appropriation acts. However, the GRA Act authorises H.M. Treasury, by statutory instrument, to change any of the reporting dates (s. 22), subject to annulment by a resolution of the House of Commons. Also, should H.M. Treasury not report to the House of Commons within the legal deadlines, the C&AG is required to report as soon as possible after their expiry (s. 26).
Concerning whole-of-government reports, the C&AG must satisfy him/ herself that the accounts present a true and fair view. After certifying the accounts, the C&AG returns his/her annual report to H.M. Treasury, which lays the accounts and the C&AG’s report before the House of Commons (s. 11). By law, it is H.M. Treasury’s responsibility to decide on the timing of submission of the whole-of-government accounts to the House of Commons [s. 11(6), GRA Act 2000].
4.5.6. Enforcement of findings
The NAO has no independent powers to enforce its findings – it is up to the PAC to ensure follow-up. After the NAO’s reports are laid before Parliament, the PAC normally takes oral evidence in public from the department’s AO, with briefings provided by the NAO. The PAC considers the evidence and publishes its own report, referring to the NAO report. The PAC is unable to examine all departmental matters and the House of Commons departmental select committees take little interest in financial matters, preferring to rely on the PAC.
The PAC has an important deterrent effect, since waste or ineffective spending by departments may be uncovered by reports or hearings. By a longstanding convention, the government responds to every PAC report, usually within two months (responses are known as Treasury Minutes). The NAO and
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