- •Table of Contents
- •Foreword
- •OECD Journal on Budgeting
- •Board of Advisors
- •Preface
- •Executive Summary
- •Sharp differences exist in the legal framework for budget systems
- •Public finance and legal theories do not explain inter-country differences in budget system laws
- •Political variables and legal culture help explain the inter-country differences
- •Norms for budget systems have been issued and many should be in budget system laws
- •Budget system laws are adopted to strengthen the powers of the legislature or the executive
- •Country studies reveal a multiplicity of reasons for adopting budget-related laws
- •Conclusions
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Budget processes
- •2.1. Budgeting: a five-stage process
- •Figure I.1. The roles of Parliament and the executive in the budget cycle
- •2.2. How are the different legal frameworks for budget systems organised?
- •Figure I.2. Different models for organising the legal framework of budget systems
- •3. Can economic theory explain the differences?
- •3.1. New institutional economics
- •3.2. Law, economics and public choice theory
- •3.3. Constitutional political economy: budgetary rules and budgetary outcomes
- •3.4. Can game theory help?
- •4. Can comparative law explain the differences?
- •4.1. Families of legal systems and the importance of the constitution
- •Box I.2. Purposes of constitutions and characteristics of statutes
- •4.2. Absence of norms for constitutions partly explains differences in budget system laws
- •4.3. Hierarchy within primary law also partly explains differences in budget-related laws
- •Box I.3. Hierarchy of laws: The example of Spain
- •4.4. Not all countries complete all steps of formal law-making processes
- •Box I.4. Steps in making law
- •4.5. Greater use is made of secondary law in some countries
- •Table I.1. Delegated legislation and separation of powers
- •4.6. Decisions and regulations of the legislature are particularly important in some countries
- •4.8. Are laws “green lights” or “red lights”?
- •5. Forms of government and budget system laws
- •5.1. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchies
- •5.2. Presidential and semi-presidential governments
- •5.3. Parliamentary republics
- •5.4. Relationship between forms of government and budget system law
- •Table I.2. Differences in selected budgetary powers of the executive and the legislature
- •Figure I.3. Separation of powers and the need to adopt budget-related laws
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Introduction
- •Figure II.1. Density of legal framework for budget systems in 25 OECD countries
- •Table II.1. Legal frameworks for budget systems: 13 OECD countries
- •2. Different purposes of the legal frameworks for budget systems
- •Box II.1. Purposes of budget system laws
- •2.1. Legal necessity?
- •Figure II.2. Budget reforms and changes in budget laws
- •2.2. Budget reform: when is law required?
- •2.3. Elaborating on the budget powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive
- •3. Differences in the legal framework for the main actors in budget systems
- •3.1. Legislatures
- •3.2. Executives
- •Box II.2. New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988
- •3.3. Judiciary
- •3.4. External audit offices
- •Table II.3. External audit legal frameworks: Selected differences
- •3.5. Sub-national governments
- •3.6. Supra-national bodies and international organisations
- •4. Differences in the legal framework for budget processes
- •4.1. Budget preparation by the executive
- •Table II.4. Legal requirements for the date of submission of the budget to the legislature
- •Box II.3. France: Legal requirements for budget information
- •4.2. Parliamentary approval of the budget
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting systems
- •Box II.4. Finland: Legal requirements for annual report and annual accounts
- •Table II.5. Legal requirements for submission of annual report to the legislature: Selected countries
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Have standards for the legal framework of budget systems been drawn up?
- •1.1. Normative and positive approaches to budget law
- •1.2. Limited guidance from normative constitutional economics
- •2. Who should set and monitor legally binding standards?
- •2.1. Role of politicians and bureaucrats
- •2.2. International transmission of budget system laws
- •2.3. International organisations as standard setters
- •Box III.1. The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- •Box III.2. Constitutional norms for external audit: Extracts from the INTOSAI “Lima Declaration”
- •2.4. Monitoring standards
- •3. Principles to support the legal framework of budget systems
- •Box III.3. Ten principles for a budget law
- •3.1. Authoritativeness
- •Table III.1. Stages of the budget cycle and legal instruments
- •3.2. Annual basis
- •3.3. Universality
- •3.4. Unity
- •3.5. Specificity
- •3.6. Balance
- •3.7. Accountability
- •Box III.4. Possible minimum legal norms for budget reporting
- •Box III.5. Ingredients of legal norms for external audit
- •3.8. Transparency
- •Box III.6. Ingredients of legal norms for government agencies
- •3.9. Stability or predictability
- •3.10. Performance (or efficiency, economy, and effectiveness)
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Canada: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Canada: Main provisions of the Spending Control Act 1992
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Canada: Major transfers from the federal to the provincial governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Canada: Key steps in the annual budgeting process
- •Box 5. Canada: Major contents of the main estimates
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. France: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Germany: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 2. Germany: Public agencies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 3. Germany: Budget processes in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit17
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Japan: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Japan: Main contents of the 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Act
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Japan: Grants from central government to local governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Japan: The timetable for the budget process
- •Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Korea: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Korea: Major acts governing the fiscal relationship across government levels
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Korea: Legal requirements for the timetable for budget preparation and deliberation
- •Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
- •Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
- •Box 4. New Zealand: Information required to support the first appropriation act
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Nordic Countries: The main budget system laws or near-laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The constitutions of the four countries
- •Table 1. Nordic countries: Age and size of constitutions
- •3.2. Legislatures
- •Table 2. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the legislatures
- •3.3. The political executive
- •Table 3. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the political executive
- •3.4. Ministries and executive agencies
- •3.5. Civil service
- •3.6. Sub-national governments
- •4. Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting
- •4.1. Authority of Parliament
- •Table 4. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the authority of Parliament
- •4.2. Timing of submission of the annual budget
- •4.3. Non-adoption of the annual budget before the year begins
- •4.4. Content of the budget and types of appropriations
- •4.5. Documents to accompany the draft budget law
- •4.6. Parliamentary committees and budget procedures in Parliament
- •4.7. Parliamentary amendment powers, coalition agreements, two-stage budgeting and fiscal rules
- •4.8. Supplementary budgets
- •4.10. Cancellation of appropriations and contingency funds
- •4.11. Government accounting
- •4.12. Other fiscal reporting and special reports
- •Table 5. Nordic countries: Constitutional requirements for external audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Spain: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
- •Box 3. Spain: The major content of medium-term budget plans
- •Box 4. Spain: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United Kingdom: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system law
- •Box 2. United Kingdom: Reforms of the budget system in the past 20 years
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 3. United Kingdom: Executive agencies and other bodies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 4. United Kingdom: Budget processes in Parliament
- •Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •Table 2. United Kingdom: Transfers of budgetary authority
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United States: Main federal budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. United States: Major transfers between different levels of government
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
- •Box 5. United States: Other information required by law
- •4.2. Budget process in the legislature
- •Box 6. United States: Legal and internal deadlines for congressional budget approval
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •5. Sanctions and non-compliance
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
IV. NEW ZEALAND
4.5.5. Reporting obligations and publication
A major activity of the CAG every year is the audit of the annual financial statements of the government. According to the PFA (s. 30), the CAG must provide an audit report on those statements to the Treasury within 30 days of receiving them. This enables the Treasury to forward them to the Minister of Finance, who presents the audit report to the HR within 10 working days after receiving them from the Treasury. In total, the PFA requires that the audit report is transmitted to Parliament within a period of three months and 10 working days after the end of the financial year.
The PAA (s. 37) requires the CAG to prepare and present an annual report to the HR, which must include: the audited financial statements prepared in accordance with section 35 of the PFA and audited in accordance with section 39 of that act; an account of the implementation of the annual plan; and a list of the entities audited by the CAG. In addition to the annual report, the PAA requires the CAG to report at least once every calendar year to the HR on matters arising out of the performance and exercise of the CAG’s functions, duties, and powers (s. 20). Furthermore, the CAG may report to a minister, a committee of the HR, a public entity, or any person on any matter arising out of the performance and exercise of the CAG’s functions, duties, and powers that the CAG considers it desirable to report on (s. 21). For local government entities, the CAG may direct the public entity to table the report during a meeting of the public entity that is open to the public (s. 22).
The PAA also requires the CAG to publish, by way of a report to the HR, the auditing standards that the CAG applies, or intends to apply, to the conduct of audits and inquiries and the provision of other auditing services (s. 23). All reports presented to Parliament or otherwise published are publicly available on the AG’s Internet site (www.oag.govt.nz). Printed copies of most reports may also be available.
4.5.6. Enforcement of findings
The PAA does not provide any special provisions for the enforcement of findings. However, the audit reports presented to the HR by the CAG play key roles in overseeing the government’s financial activities by giving the Parliament an independent opinion on whether public entities are operating and accounting for their performance in accordance with Parliament’s intentions.
Notes
1.Draft estimates of expenditures are grouped into “Votes” with one or more “Vote” for each minister. Normally, there is one vote for each ministerial portfolio except where the portfolio relates to more than one department. While it is common for
340 |
OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 4 – NO. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2004 |
|
IV. NEW ZEALAND
a department to administer just one vote, there are a number of multi-vote departments providing outputs to more than one minister.
2.The 2004 Act clarified the Crown entities to be included and, for the first time, required the central bank to be included in government financial statements.
3.The NZDMO’s main responsibilities include: developing and maintaining a portfolio management framework that promotes the Crown’s debt management objectives; determining a portfolio structure for currency, maturity and credit exposures; managing risk and undertaking transactions in a manner consistent with government policy and the NZDMO’s portfolio management policy and procedural manuals (see www.treasury.govt.nz/orgstructure/alm/nzdmo.asp)
4.At least 60 days before the beginning of each fiscal year, the PAA requires the CAG to prepare and submit to the Speaker of the HR a draft annual plan that describes the CAG’s proposed work programme for that year. After considering any comments from any committee of the HR, the CAG must present a completed annual plan to the Speaker before the beginning of each fiscal year (s. 36).
Bibliography
Audit Office (1999), The Accountability of Executive Government to Parliament, Third Report of the Controller and Auditor-General, Office of the Controller and Auditor General, Wellington, www.oag.govt.nz/HomePageFolders/Publications/3rdReport1999/3rd_Report_99.pdf.
Governor General’s Office (2004), The Constitution of New Zealand, Governor General’s Office, Wellington, www.gg.govt.nz/role/constofnz.htm.
Janssen, John (2001), New Zealand’s Fiscal Policy Framework: Experience and Evolution, The Treasury, Wellington, www.treasury.govt.nz/workingpapers/2001/01-25.asp.
Minister of Finance and the Minister of State Services (2003), Pre-Introduction Parliamentary Briefing-Public Finance (State Sector Management) Bill, Wellington, www.beehive.govt.nz/mallard/public-finance/index.cfm, August.
OECD (1997), Managing Across Levels of Government, OECD, Paris.
Pallot, June (2002), “Government Accounting and Budgeting Reform in New Zealand”, OECD Journal on Budgeting, Vol. 2, Supplement 1, OECD, Paris, pp. 163-186.
Parliament (2004), Standing Orders of the House of Representatives, as amended, Office of the House of Representatives, Wellington, www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz/publications/other.
Petrie, Murray, and David Webber (2001), Review of Evidence on Broad Outcome of Public Sector Management Regime, New Zealand Treasury Working Paper No. 01/6, New Zealand Treasury, Wellington, www.treasury.govt.nz.
Rae, David (2002), Next Steps for Public Spending in New Zealand: the Pursuit of Effectiveness, OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 337, OECD, Paris.
Schick, Allen (1996), The Spirit of Reform: Managing the New Zealand State Sector in a Time of Change, a report prepared for the SSC and the Treasury, State Services Commission, Wellington, www.ssc.govt.nz/Documents/Schick_report.pdf.
Scott, Graham (1996), Government Reform in New Zealand, IMF Occasional Paper No. 140, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.
Scott, Graham (2001), Public Management in New Zealand: Lessons and Challenges, New Zealand Business Roundtable, Wellington.
OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 4 – NO. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2004 |
341 |
|
IV. NEW ZEALAND
State Services Commission (1995), The Constitutional Setting, State Services Commission, Wellington, www.ssc.govt.nz/upload/downloadable_files/pcp_constitutional__setting.pdf.
State Services Commission (1998), New Zealand’s State Sector Reform: A Decade of Change, State Services Commission, Wellington, www.ssc.govt.nz/decade-of-change.
Treasury (1989), Putting it Simply: An Explanatory Guide to Financial Management Reform, The Treasury, Wellington, www.treasury.govt.nz/publicsector/simply/default.asp.
Treasury (1996), Putting It Together: An Explanatory Guide to the New Zealand Public Sector Financial Management System, The Treasury, Wellington, www.treasury.govt.nz/ publicsector/pit/.
Treasury (2004), Guide to the Public Finance (State Sector Management) Bill, The Treasury, Wellington, www.treasury.govt.nz/pfssm/guide-pfssm-bill.pdf.
342 |
OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 4 – NO. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2004 |
|
ISSN 1608-7143
OECD Journal on Budgeting – Volume 4 – No. 3 © OECD 2004
Four Nordic Countries*
|
Structure of the Case Study |
|
1. |
Overview...................................................................................... |
344 |
2. |
Principles underlying budget system laws .................................. |
349 |
3. |
Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors |
|
|
in the budget system.................................................................... |
350 |
4. |
Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting......... |
357 |
*This study has benefited from comments from national authorities, including Hans Christian Holdt (Ministry of Finance, Denmark), Yvan Pederson (National Audit Office, Denmark), Pia Lahti and Timo Lehtinen (National Audit Office, Finland), Tuomas Pöysti (Ministry of Finance, Finland), Alpo Rivinoja (Finance Committee of Parliament, Finland), Espen Aasen and Anniken Hoelsaeter (Ministry of Finance, Norway), Tora Jarlsby (National Audit Office, Norway), Martin Engman (National Audit Office, Sweden), Ake Hjalmarsson (Ministry of Finance, Sweden) and Richard Murray (Statskontoret, Sweden), as well as OECD colleagues including Alexandra Bibbee, Jón Blöndal, Per Mathis Kongsrud and Martin Jorgensen.
OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 4 – NO. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2004 |
343 |
|