- •Table of Contents
- •Foreword
- •OECD Journal on Budgeting
- •Board of Advisors
- •Preface
- •Executive Summary
- •Sharp differences exist in the legal framework for budget systems
- •Public finance and legal theories do not explain inter-country differences in budget system laws
- •Political variables and legal culture help explain the inter-country differences
- •Norms for budget systems have been issued and many should be in budget system laws
- •Budget system laws are adopted to strengthen the powers of the legislature or the executive
- •Country studies reveal a multiplicity of reasons for adopting budget-related laws
- •Conclusions
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Budget processes
- •2.1. Budgeting: a five-stage process
- •Figure I.1. The roles of Parliament and the executive in the budget cycle
- •2.2. How are the different legal frameworks for budget systems organised?
- •Figure I.2. Different models for organising the legal framework of budget systems
- •3. Can economic theory explain the differences?
- •3.1. New institutional economics
- •3.2. Law, economics and public choice theory
- •3.3. Constitutional political economy: budgetary rules and budgetary outcomes
- •3.4. Can game theory help?
- •4. Can comparative law explain the differences?
- •4.1. Families of legal systems and the importance of the constitution
- •Box I.2. Purposes of constitutions and characteristics of statutes
- •4.2. Absence of norms for constitutions partly explains differences in budget system laws
- •4.3. Hierarchy within primary law also partly explains differences in budget-related laws
- •Box I.3. Hierarchy of laws: The example of Spain
- •4.4. Not all countries complete all steps of formal law-making processes
- •Box I.4. Steps in making law
- •4.5. Greater use is made of secondary law in some countries
- •Table I.1. Delegated legislation and separation of powers
- •4.6. Decisions and regulations of the legislature are particularly important in some countries
- •4.8. Are laws “green lights” or “red lights”?
- •5. Forms of government and budget system laws
- •5.1. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchies
- •5.2. Presidential and semi-presidential governments
- •5.3. Parliamentary republics
- •5.4. Relationship between forms of government and budget system law
- •Table I.2. Differences in selected budgetary powers of the executive and the legislature
- •Figure I.3. Separation of powers and the need to adopt budget-related laws
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Introduction
- •Figure II.1. Density of legal framework for budget systems in 25 OECD countries
- •Table II.1. Legal frameworks for budget systems: 13 OECD countries
- •2. Different purposes of the legal frameworks for budget systems
- •Box II.1. Purposes of budget system laws
- •2.1. Legal necessity?
- •Figure II.2. Budget reforms and changes in budget laws
- •2.2. Budget reform: when is law required?
- •2.3. Elaborating on the budget powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive
- •3. Differences in the legal framework for the main actors in budget systems
- •3.1. Legislatures
- •3.2. Executives
- •Box II.2. New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988
- •3.3. Judiciary
- •3.4. External audit offices
- •Table II.3. External audit legal frameworks: Selected differences
- •3.5. Sub-national governments
- •3.6. Supra-national bodies and international organisations
- •4. Differences in the legal framework for budget processes
- •4.1. Budget preparation by the executive
- •Table II.4. Legal requirements for the date of submission of the budget to the legislature
- •Box II.3. France: Legal requirements for budget information
- •4.2. Parliamentary approval of the budget
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting systems
- •Box II.4. Finland: Legal requirements for annual report and annual accounts
- •Table II.5. Legal requirements for submission of annual report to the legislature: Selected countries
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Have standards for the legal framework of budget systems been drawn up?
- •1.1. Normative and positive approaches to budget law
- •1.2. Limited guidance from normative constitutional economics
- •2. Who should set and monitor legally binding standards?
- •2.1. Role of politicians and bureaucrats
- •2.2. International transmission of budget system laws
- •2.3. International organisations as standard setters
- •Box III.1. The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- •Box III.2. Constitutional norms for external audit: Extracts from the INTOSAI “Lima Declaration”
- •2.4. Monitoring standards
- •3. Principles to support the legal framework of budget systems
- •Box III.3. Ten principles for a budget law
- •3.1. Authoritativeness
- •Table III.1. Stages of the budget cycle and legal instruments
- •3.2. Annual basis
- •3.3. Universality
- •3.4. Unity
- •3.5. Specificity
- •3.6. Balance
- •3.7. Accountability
- •Box III.4. Possible minimum legal norms for budget reporting
- •Box III.5. Ingredients of legal norms for external audit
- •3.8. Transparency
- •Box III.6. Ingredients of legal norms for government agencies
- •3.9. Stability or predictability
- •3.10. Performance (or efficiency, economy, and effectiveness)
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Canada: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Canada: Main provisions of the Spending Control Act 1992
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Canada: Major transfers from the federal to the provincial governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Canada: Key steps in the annual budgeting process
- •Box 5. Canada: Major contents of the main estimates
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. France: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Germany: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 2. Germany: Public agencies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 3. Germany: Budget processes in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit17
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Japan: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Japan: Main contents of the 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Act
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Japan: Grants from central government to local governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Japan: The timetable for the budget process
- •Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Korea: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Korea: Major acts governing the fiscal relationship across government levels
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Korea: Legal requirements for the timetable for budget preparation and deliberation
- •Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
- •Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
- •Box 4. New Zealand: Information required to support the first appropriation act
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Nordic Countries: The main budget system laws or near-laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The constitutions of the four countries
- •Table 1. Nordic countries: Age and size of constitutions
- •3.2. Legislatures
- •Table 2. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the legislatures
- •3.3. The political executive
- •Table 3. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the political executive
- •3.4. Ministries and executive agencies
- •3.5. Civil service
- •3.6. Sub-national governments
- •4. Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting
- •4.1. Authority of Parliament
- •Table 4. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the authority of Parliament
- •4.2. Timing of submission of the annual budget
- •4.3. Non-adoption of the annual budget before the year begins
- •4.4. Content of the budget and types of appropriations
- •4.5. Documents to accompany the draft budget law
- •4.6. Parliamentary committees and budget procedures in Parliament
- •4.7. Parliamentary amendment powers, coalition agreements, two-stage budgeting and fiscal rules
- •4.8. Supplementary budgets
- •4.10. Cancellation of appropriations and contingency funds
- •4.11. Government accounting
- •4.12. Other fiscal reporting and special reports
- •Table 5. Nordic countries: Constitutional requirements for external audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Spain: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
- •Box 3. Spain: The major content of medium-term budget plans
- •Box 4. Spain: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United Kingdom: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system law
- •Box 2. United Kingdom: Reforms of the budget system in the past 20 years
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 3. United Kingdom: Executive agencies and other bodies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 4. United Kingdom: Budget processes in Parliament
- •Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •Table 2. United Kingdom: Transfers of budgetary authority
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United States: Main federal budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. United States: Major transfers between different levels of government
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
- •Box 5. United States: Other information required by law
- •4.2. Budget process in the legislature
- •Box 6. United States: Legal and internal deadlines for congressional budget approval
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •5. Sanctions and non-compliance
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
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(Title 31, Chapter 11, s. 1112). However, there is no legal requirement for state and local governments to report budgetary developments to the federal government for consolidation in nationwide accounts and for information to Congress. Such information can be produced by informal arrangements.
4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
4.1.1. Institutional coverage of the budget
The federal budget covers all federal agencies and programmes, including the legislature, the judiciary, the Executive Office of the President, 15 departments, and independent agencies (including the Environment Protection Agency, the General Service Administration, and the Social Security Administration), and about 90 smaller agencies, boards, councils, and offices. The federal budget does not include the state and local government, nor does the federal government provide guidelines for the budgets of states and local governments.
4.1.2. Extrabudgetary funds and earmarking of revenues
The federal budget has relatively few extrabudgetary funds. “Off-budget” has a special meaning. The social security funds (old-age, survivors, and disability insurance) and the Postal Service funds are by law classified as “offbudget” in the federal budget. They are federally owned and controlled funds whose receipts, outlays, surplus or deficit, and budget authority are excluded from the “on-budget” totals. However, most tables in the budget documents include the on-budget and off-budget amounts in the “unified budget” totals (OMB, 2004a). Federal outlays and receipts are therefore shown comprehensively. The unified budget totals generally receive the most attention from policy makers and the public.
4.1.3. Definition of budget aggregates
The President’s budget is prepared by the OMB according to the requirements of the BAA, which requires estimates for the current fiscal year, projections for the budget year and for the following four years in order to reflect the effect of budget decisions over the longer term despite no binding effects on the following fiscal year’s budget (Title 31, Chapter 11, s. 1105). The CBO must by law present similar aggregate estimated projections (s. 202, CBA). In practice, the CBO has provided data for nine years past the budget year.
4.1.4. Fiscal rules
Fiscal rules were embodied in law, notably the GRH Act 1985, which included declining quantitative limits on the consolidated deficit
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through 1990, and the BEA with its caps on discretionary spending and the PAYGO rule for mandatory expenditures and budget revenue. Since September 2002, when the enforcement mechanisms of the BEA expired, there are no legally binding fiscal rules at federal level. Each year, under the CBA, the House and the Senate are required to agree on total revenues and expenditures in a “budget resolution” (see below); however, the agreement is not legally binding.
4.1.5. The timetable for budget preparation and presentation to the legislature
The fiscal year begins on 1st October and ends on 30 September. Title 31 requires the President to submit a draft budget for the following fiscal year to Congress no later than the first Monday in February (Chapter 11, s. 1105). It also requires the head of each agency to prepare and submit to the President each appropriation request for the agency in the form prescribed by the President and by the date established by the President (s. 1108). The OMB and the federal agencies work together to prepare a budget to meet the February deadline according to a schedule established annually in an OMB circular (Box 4). The budget preparation process begins about 18 months before the beginning of the fiscal year. This is much earlier than any other OECD country.
4.1.6. Approval process within the executive
The approval procedure within the executive is stated in OMB circulars (s. 10.5), not law. It is regarded as an internal process. There is no Cabinet meeting to discuss the complete set of departmental budget proposals prepared by the OMB. Secretaries of departments can appeal the decisions of the OMB regarding their totals. Appeals are first made to the OMB itself and most are settled at that level. Any further appeals are normally made to a Budget Review Board (although not every President uses a Budget Review Board), composed of the Vice-President, the White House Chief of Staff, the Director of the OMB, and one or two senior White House officials (the composition varies from administration to administration as well as year to year). Final decisions may be appealed to the President who has the final decision-making authority.
4.1.7. Documents to accompany the budget law
The President is required to provide a budget message and summary in each budget transmitted to Congress (Title 31, s. 1105). Each year, the budget message and summary are included in “The Budget of the United States Government”, which provides information on the President’s budget and management priorities, and budget overviews for each agency, including
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Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
April May: spring guidance and review
●The OMB director issues a letter to the head of each agency providing policy guidance for the agency’s budget request in the fiscal year which begins in approximately 18 months. This begins the process of formulating the budget for year (+2).
●The OMB works with agencies to identify major issues for the budget for year (+2), to develop and analyse options for the upcoming autumn review, and to plan for the analysis of issues that will need future decisions.
July: OMB issues Circular No. A-11, which provides detailed instructions to all federal agencies on how to prepare and submit the budget to OMB for review (s. 1104).
September: Agencies make initial budget submissions.
October November: autumn review
●OMB staff analyse agency budget proposals in the light of presidential priorities, programme performance, and budget constraints. They raise issues and present options to OMB policy officials for decision.
Late November: passback
●OMB briefs the President and senior advisors on proposed budget policies. OMB usually informs all executive branch agencies at the same time about decisions on budget requests.
December: appeal process
●Executive branch agencies may appeal to the OMB and the President. An agency head may ask OMB to reverse or modify certain decisions.
First Monday in February: President transmits the budget to Congress.*
*The actual timing may vary from the plan. For example, on several occasions, a President has submitted the budget later than specified for various reasons, including late enactment of appropriations for the previous fiscal year or a change in the administration.
Source: OMB, 2004d.
assessments of their performance. Detailed information is required to be put in the message by 10 pages of law (Title 31, s. 1105). Each year, much of the required information is provided in:
●Analytical Perspectives, which contain analyses designed to highlight specific subject areas or provide other presentations of budget data. This volume includes economic and accounting analyses; information on federal
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receipts and collections; analyses of federal spending; detailed information on federal borrowing and debt; baseline or current services estimates; information on programme performance (including PART information), long-range budget estimates; and other technical presentations.
●Historical Tables, which provide data on budget receipts, outlays, surpluses or deficits, federal debt, and federal employment, over extended historical periods (data begin as early as 1940) and for the future (the law requires projections for the four years beyond the budget year).
●The Appendix, which is designed primarily for the use of the appropriations committees. It contains very detailed financial information on individual programmes and appropriation accounts. It includes for each agency: the proposed text of appropriations language, budget schedules for each account, new legislative proposals, explanations of why funds are needed, and provisions applicable to appropriations of entire agencies or groups of agencies. Information is also provided on activities whose outlays are not part of the budget totals.
Medium-term macroeconomic framework and fiscal strategy. The budget presents estimates for each of the four years beyond the budget year (for example, for budget year 2005, years 2006 through 2009). The formulation of the macroeconomic assumptions for budget projection is a shared responsibility of the CEA, the Treasury Department, and OMB. The budget proposal includes substantial discussion of its underlying economic assumptions as well as reconciliation against the previous year’s forecasts (OMB, 2004a). The economic assumptions include estimates of the effects of Presidential policies if adopted. In contrast, the CBO provides a set of economic assumptions that contest the assumptions of the OMB and do not include effects of policy change. Since the expiry of the BEA, multi-year expenditure projections are not legally binding limits.
New measures versus existing expenditure policies. Title 31 requires estimated receipts for the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted and the four fiscal years after that year under: 1) laws in effect when the budget is submitted, and 2) proposals in the budget to increase revenues (Chapter 11, s. 1105). Estimates of new initiatives and the ongoing cost of government policies are therefore clearly distinguished in the budget documents. The law also requires that each budget proposal that would expand a government activity or function, have a table showing the impact on appropriations and expenditures for the fiscal year and each of the four fiscal years after that year.
Performance-related information. The GPRA requires agencies to produce strategic plans, annual performance plans, and annual programme performance reports. In addition to this, as from 2004, the OMB started a new systematic evaluation procedure (the PART process). This shows five ratings on the
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implementation of programmes: effective, moderately effective, adequate, ineffective, and results not demonstrated. The government has assessed approximately 400 programmes representing approximately 40% of the federal budget: 234 programmes in 2003 and 173 programmes in 2004. The assessments indicate that about 40% of programmes were rated either “effective” or “moderately effective”, and a quarter of programmes rated just “adequate” or “ineffective”, and 40% of programmes were unable to demonstrate results (OMB, 2004a). This information is required to be produced annually as part of the President’s budget (Part 6 of OMB Circular No. A-11).
Tax expenditures, contingent liabilities and fiscal risks. Tax expenditures are defined in the CBA as “revenue losses attributable to provisions of the federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of liability”. The CBA requires that a list of tax expenditures for individual and corporation income taxes be included in the budget (s. 3). Analytical Perspectives 2005 includes a chapter that outlines all significant tax expenditures. The largest tax expenditures are those associated with income taxes, including deductions and exclusions provided for pension contributions and earnings, employer contributions for medical insurance and home mortgage interest payments. The cost of tax expenditures is presented for the same period for which budget information is provided (the past fiscal year, the current fiscal year, and the following four years). Several states prepare tax expenditure estimates when presenting their budgets to state legislatures.14
The budget does not include a comprehensive list of contingent liabilities or fiscal risks.15 However, since 1990, the law requires the long-term costs of federal credit programmes to be budgeted. The Federal Credit Reform Act (FCRA)16 1990 changed the budgetary treatment of direct loans and loan guarantees by requiring that the budgetary cost of a credit programme be the long-term subsidy cost at the time the credit is provided (s. 502). Annual outlays for credit programmes in the budget are estimated based on the present value of the long-term subsidy costs of direct loans or loan guarantees issued in each year. This is more transparent than prior practice, which reported only the cash flows associated with direct loans or loan guarantees.
Other information required by law. The OMB also provides highly detailed information to Congress in the budget, in line with BAA requirements (Box 5).
4.1.8. Budgets of the legislature and other constitutional bodies
The budgets of the legislative and the judicial branches are prepared independently from the executive branch according to provisions of the
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