- •Table of Contents
- •Foreword
- •OECD Journal on Budgeting
- •Board of Advisors
- •Preface
- •Executive Summary
- •Sharp differences exist in the legal framework for budget systems
- •Public finance and legal theories do not explain inter-country differences in budget system laws
- •Political variables and legal culture help explain the inter-country differences
- •Norms for budget systems have been issued and many should be in budget system laws
- •Budget system laws are adopted to strengthen the powers of the legislature or the executive
- •Country studies reveal a multiplicity of reasons for adopting budget-related laws
- •Conclusions
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Budget processes
- •2.1. Budgeting: a five-stage process
- •Figure I.1. The roles of Parliament and the executive in the budget cycle
- •2.2. How are the different legal frameworks for budget systems organised?
- •Figure I.2. Different models for organising the legal framework of budget systems
- •3. Can economic theory explain the differences?
- •3.1. New institutional economics
- •3.2. Law, economics and public choice theory
- •3.3. Constitutional political economy: budgetary rules and budgetary outcomes
- •3.4. Can game theory help?
- •4. Can comparative law explain the differences?
- •4.1. Families of legal systems and the importance of the constitution
- •Box I.2. Purposes of constitutions and characteristics of statutes
- •4.2. Absence of norms for constitutions partly explains differences in budget system laws
- •4.3. Hierarchy within primary law also partly explains differences in budget-related laws
- •Box I.3. Hierarchy of laws: The example of Spain
- •4.4. Not all countries complete all steps of formal law-making processes
- •Box I.4. Steps in making law
- •4.5. Greater use is made of secondary law in some countries
- •Table I.1. Delegated legislation and separation of powers
- •4.6. Decisions and regulations of the legislature are particularly important in some countries
- •4.8. Are laws “green lights” or “red lights”?
- •5. Forms of government and budget system laws
- •5.1. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchies
- •5.2. Presidential and semi-presidential governments
- •5.3. Parliamentary republics
- •5.4. Relationship between forms of government and budget system law
- •Table I.2. Differences in selected budgetary powers of the executive and the legislature
- •Figure I.3. Separation of powers and the need to adopt budget-related laws
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Introduction
- •Figure II.1. Density of legal framework for budget systems in 25 OECD countries
- •Table II.1. Legal frameworks for budget systems: 13 OECD countries
- •2. Different purposes of the legal frameworks for budget systems
- •Box II.1. Purposes of budget system laws
- •2.1. Legal necessity?
- •Figure II.2. Budget reforms and changes in budget laws
- •2.2. Budget reform: when is law required?
- •2.3. Elaborating on the budget powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive
- •3. Differences in the legal framework for the main actors in budget systems
- •3.1. Legislatures
- •3.2. Executives
- •Box II.2. New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988
- •3.3. Judiciary
- •3.4. External audit offices
- •Table II.3. External audit legal frameworks: Selected differences
- •3.5. Sub-national governments
- •3.6. Supra-national bodies and international organisations
- •4. Differences in the legal framework for budget processes
- •4.1. Budget preparation by the executive
- •Table II.4. Legal requirements for the date of submission of the budget to the legislature
- •Box II.3. France: Legal requirements for budget information
- •4.2. Parliamentary approval of the budget
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting systems
- •Box II.4. Finland: Legal requirements for annual report and annual accounts
- •Table II.5. Legal requirements for submission of annual report to the legislature: Selected countries
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Have standards for the legal framework of budget systems been drawn up?
- •1.1. Normative and positive approaches to budget law
- •1.2. Limited guidance from normative constitutional economics
- •2. Who should set and monitor legally binding standards?
- •2.1. Role of politicians and bureaucrats
- •2.2. International transmission of budget system laws
- •2.3. International organisations as standard setters
- •Box III.1. The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- •Box III.2. Constitutional norms for external audit: Extracts from the INTOSAI “Lima Declaration”
- •2.4. Monitoring standards
- •3. Principles to support the legal framework of budget systems
- •Box III.3. Ten principles for a budget law
- •3.1. Authoritativeness
- •Table III.1. Stages of the budget cycle and legal instruments
- •3.2. Annual basis
- •3.3. Universality
- •3.4. Unity
- •3.5. Specificity
- •3.6. Balance
- •3.7. Accountability
- •Box III.4. Possible minimum legal norms for budget reporting
- •Box III.5. Ingredients of legal norms for external audit
- •3.8. Transparency
- •Box III.6. Ingredients of legal norms for government agencies
- •3.9. Stability or predictability
- •3.10. Performance (or efficiency, economy, and effectiveness)
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Canada: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Canada: Main provisions of the Spending Control Act 1992
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Canada: Major transfers from the federal to the provincial governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Canada: Key steps in the annual budgeting process
- •Box 5. Canada: Major contents of the main estimates
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. France: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Germany: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 2. Germany: Public agencies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 3. Germany: Budget processes in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit17
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Japan: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Japan: Main contents of the 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Act
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Japan: Grants from central government to local governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Japan: The timetable for the budget process
- •Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Korea: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Korea: Major acts governing the fiscal relationship across government levels
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Korea: Legal requirements for the timetable for budget preparation and deliberation
- •Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
- •Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
- •Box 4. New Zealand: Information required to support the first appropriation act
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Nordic Countries: The main budget system laws or near-laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The constitutions of the four countries
- •Table 1. Nordic countries: Age and size of constitutions
- •3.2. Legislatures
- •Table 2. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the legislatures
- •3.3. The political executive
- •Table 3. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the political executive
- •3.4. Ministries and executive agencies
- •3.5. Civil service
- •3.6. Sub-national governments
- •4. Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting
- •4.1. Authority of Parliament
- •Table 4. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the authority of Parliament
- •4.2. Timing of submission of the annual budget
- •4.3. Non-adoption of the annual budget before the year begins
- •4.4. Content of the budget and types of appropriations
- •4.5. Documents to accompany the draft budget law
- •4.6. Parliamentary committees and budget procedures in Parliament
- •4.7. Parliamentary amendment powers, coalition agreements, two-stage budgeting and fiscal rules
- •4.8. Supplementary budgets
- •4.10. Cancellation of appropriations and contingency funds
- •4.11. Government accounting
- •4.12. Other fiscal reporting and special reports
- •Table 5. Nordic countries: Constitutional requirements for external audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Spain: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
- •Box 3. Spain: The major content of medium-term budget plans
- •Box 4. Spain: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United Kingdom: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system law
- •Box 2. United Kingdom: Reforms of the budget system in the past 20 years
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 3. United Kingdom: Executive agencies and other bodies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 4. United Kingdom: Budget processes in Parliament
- •Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •Table 2. United Kingdom: Transfers of budgetary authority
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United States: Main federal budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. United States: Major transfers between different levels of government
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
- •Box 5. United States: Other information required by law
- •4.2. Budget process in the legislature
- •Box 6. United States: Legal and internal deadlines for congressional budget approval
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •5. Sanctions and non-compliance
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
IV. CANADA
●Follow-up reports, which review the actions taken by departments in response to previous audits.
●Audit observations, which are significant matters that are not included in the above audit reports.
Each annual report is required to be submitted to the House of Commons on or before 31 December in the year to which the report relates. Where the Auditor General proposes to make an additional report, he/she is required to send written notice to the House of Commons, and each additional report is required to be submitted to the House of Commons on the expiration of 30 days after the notice is sent (Art. 7).
4.5.6. Enforcement of findings
The Office of the Auditor General has no enforcement powers of its own. It provides information and advice to Parliament, and relies on the power of Parliament and the force of public opinion to have its recommendations adopted. In 2004, the Auditor General’s annual report identified a number of issues involving non-respect of financial controls and actions by public officials who knowingly mismanaged public funds. In response, the government announced it will review and strengthen the FAA, with a view to increasing oversight and accountability.
Notes
1.In addition to these laws, there are various tax acts as well as legislation for other statutory programmes and appropriations acts, which authorise the government to spend money or collect taxes. In 1992, the Spending Control Act was adopted to control government expenditures; it ceased to be in force in 1996. Similarly, the Debt Servicing and Reduction Act 1992 was formally repealed in 2003.
2.Although the act contributed to reduced spending, the purposes of the act may have been better achieved if the law had also focused on the revenue side of the budget (Geist, 1997; Philipps, 1997).
3.These are: 1) Does the programme serve a public interest?; 2) Is this an appropriate role for the government?; 3) Could this be done better by another level of government (provincial or municipal)?; 4) Could this be left to the private sector or volunteer sector?; 5) Could the programme be delivered more efficiently?; 6) Is it affordable?
4.The FAA provides the legal authority for establishing the Treasury Board as a Committee of the Privy Council. Article 7 defines the responsibilities of the Treasury Board for general administrative policy in the public service, public service organisation and control, financial management, including estimates, expenditures, financial commitments, accounts, procedures by which departments manage, record and account for revenues received or receivable, the review of annual and longer term expenditure plans and programmes of department, and determination of priorities with respect thereto, and personnel management in the public service including the determination of the terms and conditions of employment. In addition, the FAA provides the legal basis for the establishment of
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IV. CANADA
the Ministry of Finance, responsible for the management of the Consolidated Revenue Fund and the supervision, control and direction of all matters relating to financial affairs not by law assigned to the Treasury Board or to any minister (Arts. 14-16).
5.The new Public Service Employment Act replaces the 1967 Act, amended in 1992, of the same name. It is to be implemented in stages, through 2005. See www.parl.gc.ca/ 37/2/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/government/C-25/C-25_4/C-25_cover-E.html.
6.See Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (2002).
7.The stated purpose of the pre-budget consultations is to provide a mechanism by which citizens could make suggestions to include in the upcoming budget. The pre-budget consultations would, however, appear to have been launched primarily to educate the public about the fiscal situation and create an environment more conducive to accepting difficult budget decisions. By using Parliament as the vehicle for this, it also served the purpose of involving the opposition in discussions of fiscal policy changes.
8.This constitutional convention is common to most of Westminster countries and derives from 18th century budget practices in Great Britain where the monarch “billed” Parliament for his expenses. Parliament did not “volunteer” funds to the monarch.
9.For example, the Clark Government resigned in 1979 due to Parliament’s refusal to adopt its budget proposals. Since then, governments usually ensure that its proposals enjoy the support of Parliament before introducing them. If parliamentary support is not ensured, specific aspects of the budget may be withdrawn.
Bibliography
Blöndal, Jón (2001), “Budgeting in Canada”, OECD Journal on Budgeting Vol. 1, No. 2, OECD, Paris, pp. 39-84.
Department of Finance of Canada (2003a), Economic and Fiscal Update, Department of Finance, Ottawa, November.
Department of Finance of Canada (2003b), The Budget in Brief, Department of Finance, Ottawa.
Geist, Michael (1997), “Balanced Budget Legislation: An Assessment of the Recent Canadian Experience”, Ottawa Law Review.
IMF (International Monetary Fund) (2002), Canada: Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes: Fiscal Transparency Module, IMF, Washington DC.
Kelly, Joanne (2001), “Managing the Politics of Expenditure Control: Cabinet Budget Committees in Australia and Canada, 1975 to 1999”, unpublished paper, Griffith University, Australia.
OECD (2000), Managing Across Levels of Government, OECD, Paris.
OECD (2002), OECD Territorial Reviews of Canada, OECD, Paris.
Philipps, Lisa C. (1997), “The Rise of Balanced Budget Laws in Canada: Legislating Fiscal (Ir)Responsibility”, Osgoodehall Law Journal, Vol. 34.
Public Service Commission (2003a), How Government Works, Public Service Commission, Ottawa, www.edu.psc-cfp.gc.ca/tdc/learn-apprend/psw/hgw/menu_e.htm.
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Public Service Commission (2003b), Overview of Recent Public Service Reforms in Canada, Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the United States, Research Directorate of the PSC, Ottawa, www.psc-cfp.gc.ca/research/world_ps/world_ps_e.pdf.
Sturm, Roland, and Markus M. Müller (1999), Public Deficits: A Comparative Study of their Economic and Political Consequences in Britain, Canada, Germany and the United States,
Pearson Education Limited, Essex, United Kingdom.
Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (2002), Preparation Guide Departmental Performance Reports, Treasury Board of Canada, Ottawa.
Wanna, John, Lotte Jensen, and Jouke de Vries (eds.) (2003), Controlling Public Expenditure: the Changing Roles of Central Budget Agencies – Better Guardians?, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, United Kingdom.
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France*
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Structure of the Case Study |
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1. |
Overview...................................................................................... |
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2. |
Principles underlying budget system laws .................................. |
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3. |
Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors |
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in the budget system.................................................................... |
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4. |
Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle ..................... |
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*This study has benefited from comments from: Frank Mordacq, Director of Budgetary Reform, Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry (MINEFI); Benoît Chevauchez, Institute of Public Management and Economic Development, MINEFI; Michel Bouvier, University of Paris-Sorbonne; Gabriel Montagnier, Professor Emeritus, University of Lyon 3; and Céline Allard, European Department, International Monetary Fund.
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