- •Table of Contents
- •Foreword
- •OECD Journal on Budgeting
- •Board of Advisors
- •Preface
- •Executive Summary
- •Sharp differences exist in the legal framework for budget systems
- •Public finance and legal theories do not explain inter-country differences in budget system laws
- •Political variables and legal culture help explain the inter-country differences
- •Norms for budget systems have been issued and many should be in budget system laws
- •Budget system laws are adopted to strengthen the powers of the legislature or the executive
- •Country studies reveal a multiplicity of reasons for adopting budget-related laws
- •Conclusions
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Budget processes
- •2.1. Budgeting: a five-stage process
- •Figure I.1. The roles of Parliament and the executive in the budget cycle
- •2.2. How are the different legal frameworks for budget systems organised?
- •Figure I.2. Different models for organising the legal framework of budget systems
- •3. Can economic theory explain the differences?
- •3.1. New institutional economics
- •3.2. Law, economics and public choice theory
- •3.3. Constitutional political economy: budgetary rules and budgetary outcomes
- •3.4. Can game theory help?
- •4. Can comparative law explain the differences?
- •4.1. Families of legal systems and the importance of the constitution
- •Box I.2. Purposes of constitutions and characteristics of statutes
- •4.2. Absence of norms for constitutions partly explains differences in budget system laws
- •4.3. Hierarchy within primary law also partly explains differences in budget-related laws
- •Box I.3. Hierarchy of laws: The example of Spain
- •4.4. Not all countries complete all steps of formal law-making processes
- •Box I.4. Steps in making law
- •4.5. Greater use is made of secondary law in some countries
- •Table I.1. Delegated legislation and separation of powers
- •4.6. Decisions and regulations of the legislature are particularly important in some countries
- •4.8. Are laws “green lights” or “red lights”?
- •5. Forms of government and budget system laws
- •5.1. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchies
- •5.2. Presidential and semi-presidential governments
- •5.3. Parliamentary republics
- •5.4. Relationship between forms of government and budget system law
- •Table I.2. Differences in selected budgetary powers of the executive and the legislature
- •Figure I.3. Separation of powers and the need to adopt budget-related laws
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Introduction
- •Figure II.1. Density of legal framework for budget systems in 25 OECD countries
- •Table II.1. Legal frameworks for budget systems: 13 OECD countries
- •2. Different purposes of the legal frameworks for budget systems
- •Box II.1. Purposes of budget system laws
- •2.1. Legal necessity?
- •Figure II.2. Budget reforms and changes in budget laws
- •2.2. Budget reform: when is law required?
- •2.3. Elaborating on the budget powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive
- •3. Differences in the legal framework for the main actors in budget systems
- •3.1. Legislatures
- •3.2. Executives
- •Box II.2. New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988
- •3.3. Judiciary
- •3.4. External audit offices
- •Table II.3. External audit legal frameworks: Selected differences
- •3.5. Sub-national governments
- •3.6. Supra-national bodies and international organisations
- •4. Differences in the legal framework for budget processes
- •4.1. Budget preparation by the executive
- •Table II.4. Legal requirements for the date of submission of the budget to the legislature
- •Box II.3. France: Legal requirements for budget information
- •4.2. Parliamentary approval of the budget
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting systems
- •Box II.4. Finland: Legal requirements for annual report and annual accounts
- •Table II.5. Legal requirements for submission of annual report to the legislature: Selected countries
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Have standards for the legal framework of budget systems been drawn up?
- •1.1. Normative and positive approaches to budget law
- •1.2. Limited guidance from normative constitutional economics
- •2. Who should set and monitor legally binding standards?
- •2.1. Role of politicians and bureaucrats
- •2.2. International transmission of budget system laws
- •2.3. International organisations as standard setters
- •Box III.1. The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- •Box III.2. Constitutional norms for external audit: Extracts from the INTOSAI “Lima Declaration”
- •2.4. Monitoring standards
- •3. Principles to support the legal framework of budget systems
- •Box III.3. Ten principles for a budget law
- •3.1. Authoritativeness
- •Table III.1. Stages of the budget cycle and legal instruments
- •3.2. Annual basis
- •3.3. Universality
- •3.4. Unity
- •3.5. Specificity
- •3.6. Balance
- •3.7. Accountability
- •Box III.4. Possible minimum legal norms for budget reporting
- •Box III.5. Ingredients of legal norms for external audit
- •3.8. Transparency
- •Box III.6. Ingredients of legal norms for government agencies
- •3.9. Stability or predictability
- •3.10. Performance (or efficiency, economy, and effectiveness)
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Canada: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Canada: Main provisions of the Spending Control Act 1992
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Canada: Major transfers from the federal to the provincial governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Canada: Key steps in the annual budgeting process
- •Box 5. Canada: Major contents of the main estimates
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. France: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Germany: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 2. Germany: Public agencies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 3. Germany: Budget processes in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit17
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Japan: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Japan: Main contents of the 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Act
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Japan: Grants from central government to local governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Japan: The timetable for the budget process
- •Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Korea: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Korea: Major acts governing the fiscal relationship across government levels
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Korea: Legal requirements for the timetable for budget preparation and deliberation
- •Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
- •Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
- •Box 4. New Zealand: Information required to support the first appropriation act
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Nordic Countries: The main budget system laws or near-laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The constitutions of the four countries
- •Table 1. Nordic countries: Age and size of constitutions
- •3.2. Legislatures
- •Table 2. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the legislatures
- •3.3. The political executive
- •Table 3. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the political executive
- •3.4. Ministries and executive agencies
- •3.5. Civil service
- •3.6. Sub-national governments
- •4. Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting
- •4.1. Authority of Parliament
- •Table 4. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the authority of Parliament
- •4.2. Timing of submission of the annual budget
- •4.3. Non-adoption of the annual budget before the year begins
- •4.4. Content of the budget and types of appropriations
- •4.5. Documents to accompany the draft budget law
- •4.6. Parliamentary committees and budget procedures in Parliament
- •4.7. Parliamentary amendment powers, coalition agreements, two-stage budgeting and fiscal rules
- •4.8. Supplementary budgets
- •4.10. Cancellation of appropriations and contingency funds
- •4.11. Government accounting
- •4.12. Other fiscal reporting and special reports
- •Table 5. Nordic countries: Constitutional requirements for external audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Spain: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
- •Box 3. Spain: The major content of medium-term budget plans
- •Box 4. Spain: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United Kingdom: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system law
- •Box 2. United Kingdom: Reforms of the budget system in the past 20 years
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 3. United Kingdom: Executive agencies and other bodies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 4. United Kingdom: Budget processes in Parliament
- •Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •Table 2. United Kingdom: Transfers of budgetary authority
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United States: Main federal budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. United States: Major transfers between different levels of government
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
- •Box 5. United States: Other information required by law
- •4.2. Budget process in the legislature
- •Box 6. United States: Legal and internal deadlines for congressional budget approval
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •5. Sanctions and non-compliance
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
IV. UNITED STATES
the executive and the legislature in fiscal management. State and local governments also have clearly defined fiscal responsibilities, operating independently from the federal government. Budget documentation is easily accessible to the public, timely, comprehensive, and reliable. However, with the expiration of the BEA, and a sharp expansion in the federal deficit after 2000, there is a lack of clarity on the longer-term direction of fiscal policy (IMF, 2003).
3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
3.1. The executive and the legislature
3.1.1. Overview
The federal government is composed of three separate branches: the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. The checks and balances exercised by each branch is a defining feature of the Constitution and the budget management system. The executive branch consists of the President, the Cabinet, various departments and other agencies. The power of the executive branch is vested exclusively in the President (Art. II, s. 1, Constitution). The President appoints 15 secretaries as heads of department, other officials as heads of other agencies, and oversees the various federal government departments and agencies. These administrative heads serve at the discretion of the President.
The legislative branch (Congress) consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives, each with a substantial number of committees involved in budget decision making. Congress is supported by the GAO and the CBO. The role of Congress in authorising the budget is more active and often more independent than the legislature’s role in most OECD countries (Blondal et al., 2003). Congress has no limits on the extent to which it may amend the President’s budget proposals.
The judicial branch is asked to adjudicate when issues arise concerning the constitutionality of budget procedures. For example, in 1998 the Supreme Court ruled that the Line-Item Veto Act 1995 was unconstitutional.11 This Act would have provided the President with line-item veto power against the appropriations bills approved by the Congress (Schick, 2002). The Supreme Court ruled that a constitutional amendment would be necessary to provide such sweeping powers.
3.1.2. Roles and responsibilities of the Cabinet and individual ministers
The Cabinet is an informal structure with no explicit legal basis (it is implicitly drawn from the Art. II, s. 2, Constitution). It includes the Vice-President and the heads of 15 executive departments, including the Secretary of the
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Treasury and the Director of the OMB. Although one of the principal purposes of the Cabinet is to advise the President on any subject, it plays little or no role in budget decision making (unlike Westminster countries, where the Cabinet of ministers is the most important budget decision-making body). The President is also advised by the Executive Office of the President, consisting of the White House Office and other specialised offices, including the OMB. In practice, the President relies heavily upon the OMB for budget advice – it reports directly to the President.
3.1.3. Establishment of ministries and executive branch agencies
There are only indirect references in the Constitution to administrative organisation within the executive. The President “may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the Executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective officers”; “Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President, or in the Heads of Departments” (Art. II, s. 2, paragraphs 1 and 2). Based on these constitutional provisions, Congress, through legislation, establishes departments and agencies, and determines their missions. The 15 executive departments12 are listed in Title 5, Chapter 1. All presidential proposals for restructuring any department have to be submitted to Congress for approval, according to procedures meticulously defined in the law. Few countries have such strong control by the legislature over internal reorganisations within the executive. The strong congressional control over administrative structures has a budgetary counterpart: in a given fiscal year, every appropriations sub-committee carefully examines how much money is appropriated to each administrative structure.
Some 200 departmental agencies exist as the operating units responsible for the implementation of budget programmes. In addition, there are about 70 independent agencies that are not located within any department and which are not subject to the same management laws and regulations as agencies within departments (Moe, 2002).
Within the executive branch, the primary responsibility for budget formulation rests with the OMB, established by the BAA (s. 1105) to assist the President to oversee federal budget preparation and to supervise its administration (Tanaka et al., 2003; OMB, 2004c). The OMB evaluates the effectiveness of agency programmes, policies, and procedures, assesses competing funding demands among agencies, and sets funding priorities. OMB ensures that agency reports, rules, regulations, testimony, and proposed legislation are consistent with the President’s budget and with the administration’s policies.
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Competencies for fiscal management are shared. The primary responsibility for tax policy and tax estimates, accounting and public debt management lies with the Department of the Treasury created by an Act of Congress in 1789 (codified in Title 31, Chapter 3). Furthermore, the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) plays an important role in formulating fiscal policy and economic forecasts in collaboration with the Treasury and the OMB. The CEA is a three-member council appointed by the President that is supported by staff (mostly political appointees). In addition to the CEA, the National Economic Council (NEC) was established in 1993 within the Executive Office of the President, to advise the President on matters (including budgeting) related to economic policy.
3.1.4. Responsibilities of senior civil servants
The general legal basis for the responsibilities of civil servants is provided in the Title 5 Chapter 15. Civil servants are not permitted to use their official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the result of an election or political activities (s. 1502). They are also provided with clear legal and administrative guidance concerning ethics and conflict of interest. Relevant legislation includes the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, the Office of Government Ethics Reauthorisation Act of 1988, and the Ethics Reform Act of 1989. Political activity by federal employees is also governed by law.
3.1.5. Establishment and roles of legislative committees
The CBA created congressional and senate budget committees, which play the key role in deciding the amounts approved in annual appropriations laws. Furthermore, the Rules of the House (Rule X) and the Standing Rules of the Senate (Rule XXV) specify the establishment of committees and their functions respectively.13 The House and the Senate have 19 and 16 standing committees respectively, as well as special and ad hoc committees. Several joint committees operate, including the Joint Committee on Taxation, which analyses all estimates of changes in the Tax Code.
Each house has three main committees that play a major role in the budget process: a Budget Committee, an Appropriations Committee and a Tax Writing Committee (known as the Finance Committee in the Senate and the Ways and Means Committee in the House). Budget committees in both houses have jurisdiction on matters relating to concurrent resolutions on the budget [as defined in s. 3(4) of the CBA, see below]. Appropriations committees are split into 13 sub-committees, one of which is responsible for one appropriations bill through Congress. The Ways and Means Committee in the House and the Finance Committee in the Senate have jurisdiction on matters relating to revenues (for example, tax, customs, bonded debts).
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