- •Table of Contents
- •Foreword
- •OECD Journal on Budgeting
- •Board of Advisors
- •Preface
- •Executive Summary
- •Sharp differences exist in the legal framework for budget systems
- •Public finance and legal theories do not explain inter-country differences in budget system laws
- •Political variables and legal culture help explain the inter-country differences
- •Norms for budget systems have been issued and many should be in budget system laws
- •Budget system laws are adopted to strengthen the powers of the legislature or the executive
- •Country studies reveal a multiplicity of reasons for adopting budget-related laws
- •Conclusions
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Budget processes
- •2.1. Budgeting: a five-stage process
- •Figure I.1. The roles of Parliament and the executive in the budget cycle
- •2.2. How are the different legal frameworks for budget systems organised?
- •Figure I.2. Different models for organising the legal framework of budget systems
- •3. Can economic theory explain the differences?
- •3.1. New institutional economics
- •3.2. Law, economics and public choice theory
- •3.3. Constitutional political economy: budgetary rules and budgetary outcomes
- •3.4. Can game theory help?
- •4. Can comparative law explain the differences?
- •4.1. Families of legal systems and the importance of the constitution
- •Box I.2. Purposes of constitutions and characteristics of statutes
- •4.2. Absence of norms for constitutions partly explains differences in budget system laws
- •4.3. Hierarchy within primary law also partly explains differences in budget-related laws
- •Box I.3. Hierarchy of laws: The example of Spain
- •4.4. Not all countries complete all steps of formal law-making processes
- •Box I.4. Steps in making law
- •4.5. Greater use is made of secondary law in some countries
- •Table I.1. Delegated legislation and separation of powers
- •4.6. Decisions and regulations of the legislature are particularly important in some countries
- •4.8. Are laws “green lights” or “red lights”?
- •5. Forms of government and budget system laws
- •5.1. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchies
- •5.2. Presidential and semi-presidential governments
- •5.3. Parliamentary republics
- •5.4. Relationship between forms of government and budget system law
- •Table I.2. Differences in selected budgetary powers of the executive and the legislature
- •Figure I.3. Separation of powers and the need to adopt budget-related laws
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Introduction
- •Figure II.1. Density of legal framework for budget systems in 25 OECD countries
- •Table II.1. Legal frameworks for budget systems: 13 OECD countries
- •2. Different purposes of the legal frameworks for budget systems
- •Box II.1. Purposes of budget system laws
- •2.1. Legal necessity?
- •Figure II.2. Budget reforms and changes in budget laws
- •2.2. Budget reform: when is law required?
- •2.3. Elaborating on the budget powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive
- •3. Differences in the legal framework for the main actors in budget systems
- •3.1. Legislatures
- •3.2. Executives
- •Box II.2. New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988
- •3.3. Judiciary
- •3.4. External audit offices
- •Table II.3. External audit legal frameworks: Selected differences
- •3.5. Sub-national governments
- •3.6. Supra-national bodies and international organisations
- •4. Differences in the legal framework for budget processes
- •4.1. Budget preparation by the executive
- •Table II.4. Legal requirements for the date of submission of the budget to the legislature
- •Box II.3. France: Legal requirements for budget information
- •4.2. Parliamentary approval of the budget
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting systems
- •Box II.4. Finland: Legal requirements for annual report and annual accounts
- •Table II.5. Legal requirements for submission of annual report to the legislature: Selected countries
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Have standards for the legal framework of budget systems been drawn up?
- •1.1. Normative and positive approaches to budget law
- •1.2. Limited guidance from normative constitutional economics
- •2. Who should set and monitor legally binding standards?
- •2.1. Role of politicians and bureaucrats
- •2.2. International transmission of budget system laws
- •2.3. International organisations as standard setters
- •Box III.1. The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- •Box III.2. Constitutional norms for external audit: Extracts from the INTOSAI “Lima Declaration”
- •2.4. Monitoring standards
- •3. Principles to support the legal framework of budget systems
- •Box III.3. Ten principles for a budget law
- •3.1. Authoritativeness
- •Table III.1. Stages of the budget cycle and legal instruments
- •3.2. Annual basis
- •3.3. Universality
- •3.4. Unity
- •3.5. Specificity
- •3.6. Balance
- •3.7. Accountability
- •Box III.4. Possible minimum legal norms for budget reporting
- •Box III.5. Ingredients of legal norms for external audit
- •3.8. Transparency
- •Box III.6. Ingredients of legal norms for government agencies
- •3.9. Stability or predictability
- •3.10. Performance (or efficiency, economy, and effectiveness)
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Canada: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Canada: Main provisions of the Spending Control Act 1992
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Canada: Major transfers from the federal to the provincial governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Canada: Key steps in the annual budgeting process
- •Box 5. Canada: Major contents of the main estimates
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. France: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Germany: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 2. Germany: Public agencies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 3. Germany: Budget processes in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit17
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Japan: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Japan: Main contents of the 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Act
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Japan: Grants from central government to local governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Japan: The timetable for the budget process
- •Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Korea: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Korea: Major acts governing the fiscal relationship across government levels
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Korea: Legal requirements for the timetable for budget preparation and deliberation
- •Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
- •Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
- •Box 4. New Zealand: Information required to support the first appropriation act
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Nordic Countries: The main budget system laws or near-laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The constitutions of the four countries
- •Table 1. Nordic countries: Age and size of constitutions
- •3.2. Legislatures
- •Table 2. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the legislatures
- •3.3. The political executive
- •Table 3. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the political executive
- •3.4. Ministries and executive agencies
- •3.5. Civil service
- •3.6. Sub-national governments
- •4. Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting
- •4.1. Authority of Parliament
- •Table 4. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the authority of Parliament
- •4.2. Timing of submission of the annual budget
- •4.3. Non-adoption of the annual budget before the year begins
- •4.4. Content of the budget and types of appropriations
- •4.5. Documents to accompany the draft budget law
- •4.6. Parliamentary committees and budget procedures in Parliament
- •4.7. Parliamentary amendment powers, coalition agreements, two-stage budgeting and fiscal rules
- •4.8. Supplementary budgets
- •4.10. Cancellation of appropriations and contingency funds
- •4.11. Government accounting
- •4.12. Other fiscal reporting and special reports
- •Table 5. Nordic countries: Constitutional requirements for external audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Spain: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
- •Box 3. Spain: The major content of medium-term budget plans
- •Box 4. Spain: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United Kingdom: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system law
- •Box 2. United Kingdom: Reforms of the budget system in the past 20 years
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 3. United Kingdom: Executive agencies and other bodies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 4. United Kingdom: Budget processes in Parliament
- •Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •Table 2. United Kingdom: Transfers of budgetary authority
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United States: Main federal budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. United States: Major transfers between different levels of government
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
- •Box 5. United States: Other information required by law
- •4.2. Budget process in the legislature
- •Box 6. United States: Legal and internal deadlines for congressional budget approval
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •5. Sanctions and non-compliance
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
IV. FRANCE
Unlike federal States such as Germany, for example, the Constitution does not specify revenue and expenditure competencies of local governments. The Constitution nonetheless contains a number of general provisions that point to specific areas to be governed by separate laws. In particular, Article 72- 2 of the Constitution provides that:
●Local governments may use revenues within conditions laid down by law. Revenues may come from any tax, whose base and rate are established by law.
●Local governments’ self-raised revenues are to provide the major portion of their resources. An organic law is to govern this rule.23
●Transfers of expenditure competencies from the State to local governments
must be accompanied by a corresponding increase in resources, to be determined by law.24
●Equalisation mechanisms that promote regional equality across local governments are to be determined by law.
The Local Government Code (Code général des collectivités territoriales), which regroups, under specific themes, the various laws and decrees relating to local governments, is divided into four main parts. The first part (general dispositions) includes the establishment of a high-level committee on local government finances. This committee is composed of representatives from: both houses of Parliament, the central government, regions, departments, municipalities, inter-municipal public entities25 and mayors. The committee prepares an annual report on local government finances and studies of medium-term developments of local government spending. Parts II to IV of the Code contain provisions relating to municipalities, departments, and regions respectively. For each of these three levels of local government, the Code specifies revenue and expenditure assignments, budgeting and accounting arrangements (see Box 3), and special arrangements for large cities or specific local governments.
4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
4.1.1. Institutional coverage of the budget
The LOLF relates only to annual budget laws covering “the State”. It does not define the institutional units covered by the budget. In practice, the State budget covers only a portion of central government institutional units, namely central administrative directorates, administrations under national competence, and local services of central government (services déconcentrés) (OECD, 2003, Table 15). Public establishments and local authorities are excluded from the State budget, although transfers to them are included.
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Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
●Establishes co-ordination arrangements – a local government finance committee.
●Details revenue assignments and shared revenues.
●Specifies in detail the compulsory expenditure assignments for each level of government (L2321, L3321, and L4321).
●Allows an unallocated reserve of up to 7.5% of total budgeted expenditure that permits local governments to meet unforeseen expenditures.
●Requires regional and departmental budgets to be voted by councils.
●Requires municipal budgets to be voted by 31 March by municipal councils.
●Specifies that separate budgets be prepared for current and capital expenditures. Budget nomenclature is to be established by the Ministers of Local Government and of Finance.
●Establishes a “golden rule”: current spending must be fully covered by revenue.
●Specifies that borrowing for investment is not restricted by central government.
●Allows public services at local level to be contracted out.
●Applies for all local governments the principle of the separation of ordonnateurs (mayors and presidents of regional councils) and comptables.
●Designates that all accountants of local governments are central government employees appointed by the MINEFI. They collect local taxes and make payments.
●Specifies that regional Chambers of Accounts perform external audit functions.
4.1.2. Extrabudgetary funds and earmarking of revenues
The 2001 LOLF retained a number of the articles of the 1959 Ordonnance devoted to the earmarking of revenues, budget annexes and special accounts. However, compared with the 1959 law, expenditures from the cost-sharing contributions (fonds de concours) are to be appropriated by Parliament and included in total expenditure aggregates (Art. 17) rather than escaping parliamentary control. Moreover, missions and programmes have to be developed (a framework was established for them in 2004) for the budget annexes and the special accounts. The LOLF allows the executive to spend excess revenues in earmarked accounts (comptes d’affectation spéciale) – those higher than foreseen in budgetary projections – subject to informing Parliament (Art. 21).
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IV. FRANCE
The health and social security funds are not governed by the LOLF and are not part of the State budget. The Organic Law No. 96-646 of July 1996 relating to the Financing of Social Security (LOLFSS) provides a framework for parliamentary approval of the expected revenues (mostly payroll taxes26), the objectives for spending, and the financing of the social security funds. Discussion in Parliament of the annual law for financing social security must take place in conjunction with the discussion of the annual budget law (loi de finances) of the State. The LOLFSS does, however, define the compulsory schemes and associated organisations. Binding expenditure limits are not established for each sector and Parliament votes on only seven categories of social security revenues. This inhibits, for example, establishing health spending priorities. In 2001, to address some of the shortcomings of the 1996 LOLFSS, the Senate presented a revised organic law (www.senat.fr/leg/pp100-268.html). However, it was not adopted.
4.1.3. Definition of budget aggregates
The 2001 LOLF and the 1996 LOLFSS do not begin with a comprehensive list of definitions, although some terms are defined in individual articles of the text. For example, the LOLF specifies that total inflows (ressources) include budget revenues and financing inflows, and total outflows (charges) include budget expenditures and financing outflows (Art. 2-6). The LOLF also defines the financial inflows and outflows (Art. 25) and requires the financing of the budget balance to be shown in a table of the annual budget (Art. 34.I.8).
The Constitution requires the financial balances of the social security funds to be shown in the annual law for financing social security. The concept of financial balance is not clearly defined in the LOLFSS. More importantly, the overall balance of general government is not defined by law, even though fiscal policies and the budgetary strategy are formulated on the basis of this balance.
4.1.4. Fiscal rules
Under a constitutional amendment (Art. 88-2), France consents to transfer competencies necessary for the establishment of the European Economic and Monetary Union. However, domestic laws were not changed to include quantitative fiscal rules proposed by the European Union. Nonetheless, the LOLF (Art. 50) requires that budgetary projections are to be drawn up “taking into consideration its European obligations” – an indirect reference to EU directives such as the Maastricht criteria on deficits and debt and the Stability and Growth Pact’s obligation for “at least a balanced budget over the cycle”. A “golden rule” is not established for the State budget. However, the Local Government Code imposes such a rule on local governments’ budgets.27
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4.1.5. The timetable for budget preparation and presentation to Parliament
The LOLF establishes the first Tuesday of October as the latest day that the draft annual State budget is to be submitted to Parliament (Art. 39). The fiscal year begins on 1st January (LOLF, Art. 1). To meet the October deadline, the budget preparation process begins in the previous December, with an update of the multi-year medium-term budget framework. There are internal non-legally-binding deadlines for the key steps in budget preparation (OECD, 2003, Table 16).
4.1.6. Approval process within the executive
The Constitution states that the Prime Minister is responsible before Parliament for the government’s programme (Art. 39). The LOLF (Art. 38) specifies that the Minister of Finance prepares the draft budget law, under the authority of the Prime Minister. The timing and most procedures for preparing and approving the draft budget law within the executive are determined internally. The President of the Republic can also play a role in shaping the draft annual budget law. In particular, the LOLF states that the draft budget law is discussed in the Council of Ministers, which is headed by the President (Constitution, Art. 9). In practice, the roles of the President, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance are dependent on the political situation. In normal times, the President of the Republic makes final decisions when budget clashes occur in the Council of Ministers (which happens rarely). In contrast, in times of cohabitation – when the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister are from different political groupings – final budget decisions are taken by the Prime Minister in meetings with Council ministers not attended by the President of the Republic.
4.1.7. Documents to accompany the budget law
Medium-term macroeconomic framework and fiscal strategy. In submitting the draft annual budget law to the two houses of Parliament, the LOLF (Art. 48 and 50) requires the government to present a report on the national economic situation, including:
●Macroeconomic projections, based on national accounts. These are to include the hypotheses on which they are based and projection methods.
●Medium-term developments, covering at least four years following the year in which the draft budget is submitted – of consolidated revenues, expenditures and balance for general government, with disaggregation by subsectors. Medium-term projections of revenues (ressources) and expenditures (charges) of the State budget, with the latter disaggregated by main functions,
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IV. FRANCE
are required by the LOLF. The LOLFSS also requires medium-term projections of revenues and expenditures.
●The main orientations of economic and budgetary policies, considering France’s European commitments.
New measures versus existing expenditure policies. The 1959 Ordonnance on annual budget laws distinguished expenditures based on existing policies and those based on new policies. The budget was adopted on this basis – with a single vote on existing expenditures. This distinction was abolished by the 2001 LOLF: new measures are henceforth to be introduced in the context of specific programmes, which will be re-examined each year in the context of justifying every euro. For enhancements in general measures regarding civil servants, a provision is foreseen; only the global amount is proposed in the budget. Once Parliament adopts the budget, the executive allocates the salary increases by programme.
Performance-related information. The fiscal strategy report annexed to the draft budget must contain a list of missions and programmes, as well as programme performance indicators relating to the next year’s budget (Art. 48). Draft performance plans for each programme are to be annexed to the budget, including objectives, costs, and past and expected results as measured by performance indicators (Art. 51).
Tax expenditures, contingent liabilities and fiscal risks. An explanatory annex on projected tax expenditures is required to be presented with the budget (Art. 51). The LOLF requires parliamentary approval of new debt guarantees as well as the take-over by the State of debts issued by public or private bodies (Art. 34). All existing government guarantees are required to be established by law by end-2004; the budget execution report for 2004 is to contain an annex with all guarantees granted by the government but unknown by Parliament (Art. 61). The LOLF does not require that any other explicit, and any implicit, contingent liabilities be annexed to the draft annual budget. Nor is there a legal obligation to provide a statement of fiscal risks.
Other information required by law. The LOLF (Art. 51) details other information to be annexed to the draft annual budget. This includes the earmarking of taxes benefiting public entities outside “the State”, an analysis of the impact of changes in budget presentation, and the schedule of expected annual payments associated with multi-year authorisations for expenditure commitments. Details of projected State employment, by category or by type of contract, inclusive of justifications for variations, must also be annexed.
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