- •Table of Contents
- •Foreword
- •OECD Journal on Budgeting
- •Board of Advisors
- •Preface
- •Executive Summary
- •Sharp differences exist in the legal framework for budget systems
- •Public finance and legal theories do not explain inter-country differences in budget system laws
- •Political variables and legal culture help explain the inter-country differences
- •Norms for budget systems have been issued and many should be in budget system laws
- •Budget system laws are adopted to strengthen the powers of the legislature or the executive
- •Country studies reveal a multiplicity of reasons for adopting budget-related laws
- •Conclusions
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Budget processes
- •2.1. Budgeting: a five-stage process
- •Figure I.1. The roles of Parliament and the executive in the budget cycle
- •2.2. How are the different legal frameworks for budget systems organised?
- •Figure I.2. Different models for organising the legal framework of budget systems
- •3. Can economic theory explain the differences?
- •3.1. New institutional economics
- •3.2. Law, economics and public choice theory
- •3.3. Constitutional political economy: budgetary rules and budgetary outcomes
- •3.4. Can game theory help?
- •4. Can comparative law explain the differences?
- •4.1. Families of legal systems and the importance of the constitution
- •Box I.2. Purposes of constitutions and characteristics of statutes
- •4.2. Absence of norms for constitutions partly explains differences in budget system laws
- •4.3. Hierarchy within primary law also partly explains differences in budget-related laws
- •Box I.3. Hierarchy of laws: The example of Spain
- •4.4. Not all countries complete all steps of formal law-making processes
- •Box I.4. Steps in making law
- •4.5. Greater use is made of secondary law in some countries
- •Table I.1. Delegated legislation and separation of powers
- •4.6. Decisions and regulations of the legislature are particularly important in some countries
- •4.8. Are laws “green lights” or “red lights”?
- •5. Forms of government and budget system laws
- •5.1. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchies
- •5.2. Presidential and semi-presidential governments
- •5.3. Parliamentary republics
- •5.4. Relationship between forms of government and budget system law
- •Table I.2. Differences in selected budgetary powers of the executive and the legislature
- •Figure I.3. Separation of powers and the need to adopt budget-related laws
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Introduction
- •Figure II.1. Density of legal framework for budget systems in 25 OECD countries
- •Table II.1. Legal frameworks for budget systems: 13 OECD countries
- •2. Different purposes of the legal frameworks for budget systems
- •Box II.1. Purposes of budget system laws
- •2.1. Legal necessity?
- •Figure II.2. Budget reforms and changes in budget laws
- •2.2. Budget reform: when is law required?
- •2.3. Elaborating on the budget powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive
- •3. Differences in the legal framework for the main actors in budget systems
- •3.1. Legislatures
- •3.2. Executives
- •Box II.2. New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988
- •3.3. Judiciary
- •3.4. External audit offices
- •Table II.3. External audit legal frameworks: Selected differences
- •3.5. Sub-national governments
- •3.6. Supra-national bodies and international organisations
- •4. Differences in the legal framework for budget processes
- •4.1. Budget preparation by the executive
- •Table II.4. Legal requirements for the date of submission of the budget to the legislature
- •Box II.3. France: Legal requirements for budget information
- •4.2. Parliamentary approval of the budget
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting systems
- •Box II.4. Finland: Legal requirements for annual report and annual accounts
- •Table II.5. Legal requirements for submission of annual report to the legislature: Selected countries
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Have standards for the legal framework of budget systems been drawn up?
- •1.1. Normative and positive approaches to budget law
- •1.2. Limited guidance from normative constitutional economics
- •2. Who should set and monitor legally binding standards?
- •2.1. Role of politicians and bureaucrats
- •2.2. International transmission of budget system laws
- •2.3. International organisations as standard setters
- •Box III.1. The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- •Box III.2. Constitutional norms for external audit: Extracts from the INTOSAI “Lima Declaration”
- •2.4. Monitoring standards
- •3. Principles to support the legal framework of budget systems
- •Box III.3. Ten principles for a budget law
- •3.1. Authoritativeness
- •Table III.1. Stages of the budget cycle and legal instruments
- •3.2. Annual basis
- •3.3. Universality
- •3.4. Unity
- •3.5. Specificity
- •3.6. Balance
- •3.7. Accountability
- •Box III.4. Possible minimum legal norms for budget reporting
- •Box III.5. Ingredients of legal norms for external audit
- •3.8. Transparency
- •Box III.6. Ingredients of legal norms for government agencies
- •3.9. Stability or predictability
- •3.10. Performance (or efficiency, economy, and effectiveness)
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Canada: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Canada: Main provisions of the Spending Control Act 1992
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Canada: Major transfers from the federal to the provincial governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Canada: Key steps in the annual budgeting process
- •Box 5. Canada: Major contents of the main estimates
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. France: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Germany: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 2. Germany: Public agencies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 3. Germany: Budget processes in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit17
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Japan: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Japan: Main contents of the 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Act
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Japan: Grants from central government to local governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Japan: The timetable for the budget process
- •Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Korea: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Korea: Major acts governing the fiscal relationship across government levels
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Korea: Legal requirements for the timetable for budget preparation and deliberation
- •Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
- •Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
- •Box 4. New Zealand: Information required to support the first appropriation act
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Nordic Countries: The main budget system laws or near-laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The constitutions of the four countries
- •Table 1. Nordic countries: Age and size of constitutions
- •3.2. Legislatures
- •Table 2. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the legislatures
- •3.3. The political executive
- •Table 3. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the political executive
- •3.4. Ministries and executive agencies
- •3.5. Civil service
- •3.6. Sub-national governments
- •4. Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting
- •4.1. Authority of Parliament
- •Table 4. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the authority of Parliament
- •4.2. Timing of submission of the annual budget
- •4.3. Non-adoption of the annual budget before the year begins
- •4.4. Content of the budget and types of appropriations
- •4.5. Documents to accompany the draft budget law
- •4.6. Parliamentary committees and budget procedures in Parliament
- •4.7. Parliamentary amendment powers, coalition agreements, two-stage budgeting and fiscal rules
- •4.8. Supplementary budgets
- •4.10. Cancellation of appropriations and contingency funds
- •4.11. Government accounting
- •4.12. Other fiscal reporting and special reports
- •Table 5. Nordic countries: Constitutional requirements for external audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Spain: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
- •Box 3. Spain: The major content of medium-term budget plans
- •Box 4. Spain: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United Kingdom: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system law
- •Box 2. United Kingdom: Reforms of the budget system in the past 20 years
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 3. United Kingdom: Executive agencies and other bodies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 4. United Kingdom: Budget processes in Parliament
- •Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •Table 2. United Kingdom: Transfers of budgetary authority
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United States: Main federal budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. United States: Major transfers between different levels of government
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
- •Box 5. United States: Other information required by law
- •4.2. Budget process in the legislature
- •Box 6. United States: Legal and internal deadlines for congressional budget approval
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •5. Sanctions and non-compliance
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
IV. UNITED KINGDOM
justice, and finance and central services. To guide aspects of budget processes, the Scottish Parliament adopted a Public Finance and Accountability (Scotland) Act in 2000.15 It provides a legal framework for public resources and finances (including payments out of the Scottish Consolidated Fund) and specifies the responsibilities of Audit Scotland and Accountable Officers. Most resources for the Scottish budget come from a block grant appropriated in the annual budget of the United Kingdom. The Scottish Parliament is solely responsible for the allocation of the Scottish budget, including making transfers to its councils (local governments). It also has the power to vary basic income tax rates in Scotland, although at least until 2004, it had chosen not to exercise this power.
A different situation prevails in Wales, which does not have full legislative authority, where the Assembly is only empowered to adopt secondary legislation needed to meet distinct Welsh needs. Thus, although the Assembly for Wales adopts an annual budget, it does not have a public finance and accountability law as in Scotland. However, it has adopted Local Government (Wales) secondary legislation.
Throughout the United Kingdom, local governments are run by locally elected councillors. In some cases there are a number of tiers of local government, each with different responsibilities. Local government acts and other United Kingdom legislation specify the statutory functions of local authorities. Local authorities prepare and approve their own budgets, which are funded in part by local property taxation and by other local incomes such as fees and charges for services. Education, social services and housing are the largest locally provided services. Since expenditure assignments are well in excess of local revenues, local authorities are heavily dependent on central government transfers, voted in the central government budget.
4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
The financial procedures of the United Kingdom consist of three largely separate but connected cycles. First, the budget cycle which sets out the broad financial details, the management of the economy and the authorisation of taxation. This culminates in a finance bill, which combines changes in tax policies with those in the administration of the tax system. Its passage puts into law the elements that the Chancellor outlines in his/her budget material. It represents the culmination of the revenue side of the process. Second, the estimates, which follow the budget, culminate with the authorisation of public spending. The spending framework is embedded in the fiscal framework, with fiscal rules approved by the government determining the overall spending envelope. Third, the reporting cycle, which provides
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information to Parliament and the public on what public money has been spent on, and how effectively it has been used.
4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
There is no framework law for guiding budget preparation, where H.M. Treasury plays a crucial role. A draft budget is prepared by H.M. Treasury and forwarded to Cabinet for approval (via a sub-committee). The Chancellor of the Exchequer presents the budget to the House of Commons in a formal speech on “budget day”. The tax measures announced in the budget are traditionally introduced in the House of Commons in a single, comprehensive finance bill, which is published some time after budget day.
4.1.1. Institutional coverage of the budget
The expenditure estimates of the draft budget cover the use of resources and the cash needs of all central government departments (including agencies under departments), the two houses of Parliament, the NAO, the Ombudsman, the Electoral Commission, transfers to local governments (including to the devolved Assemblies in Scotland and Wales and local councils in England), hospitals and other healthcare organisations, and some NDPBs. The institutional units covered in the estimates are decided by H.M. Treasury, not by statute.
4.1.2. Extrabudgetary funds and earmarking of revenues
Unlike some countries, pension and social security funds are included in the budget. The annual supply estimates include the net resources for various unfunded public pension schemes, including those covering teachers, NHS workers, the judiciary, the armed forces, and civil servants. These schemes derive their funds from the Consolidated Fund. The detailed estimates include
– as “non budget” outlays – government expenditure funded from nonConsolidated Fund sources, especially the National Insurance Fund (NIF). The various regimes for social security benefits are governed by various laws, especially the Social Security Act 1986 (which provides the government with extensive powers to make regulations, including for contributions paid by employers and employees), the Contributions and Benefits Act 1992, and various pension acts. Thus, although the NIF has separate statutory authority, its resource needs are shown explicitly in the annual budget. These greatly exceed net cash needs from the Consolidated Fund, since most funding is from contributions paid into the NIF.
In contrast, the financing and accounting of trading funds is outside the system of resource estimates and accounting. It is expected that a trading fund will entirely cover its costs by charging for the service it provides (see Government Accounting, s. 7.2 for detail). For each department the annual
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estimates of expenditure also provide authorisation to retain certain income in aid of spending. This is known as “appropriations-in-aid” (see below). However, Parliament approves these net resources.
4.1.3. Definition of budget aggregates
Aggregate revenues, expenditures and fiscal balance are not defined in the law. Under the Finance Act, 1998 (s. 56), the contents of any documents that H.M. Treasury lays before Parliament must conform to relevant provisions of the Code for Fiscal Stability, which is also drawn up by the Treasury (s. 55). Thus, by law, H.M. Treasury is given full discretion to define the key budget aggregates. The annual financial statement and budget report (FSBR) and annual economic and fiscal strategy report (EFSR) show budget aggregates used by H.M. Treasury for budget preparation and monitoring of the overall fiscal situation. Total revenues and expenditures conform to revenues and expenditures as defined in national accounts – the ESA 1995 (EUROSTAT, 1996).
In budget reports such as the FSBR, a distinction is made between current and capital budgets, in part so as to be able to monitor the fiscal rules (see below). Key aggregates monitored closely are:
Current budget balance (= current receipts minus current expenditures inclusive of depreciation)
+ Net investment (= gross investment minus asset sales minus depreciation) = Net borrowing.
For expenditure control purposes, H.M. Treasury has defined various expenditure aggregates, which have varied over the past few decades (Parry and Deakin, 2003). Since 1998, H.M. Treasury has controlled expenditure by two main aggregates: the departmental expenditure limit (DEL) and annually managed expenditure (AME). DEL is spending that is planned and controlled for three years in biennial spending reviews. AME is expenditure that cannot reasonably be subject to firm, multi-year limits in the same way as DEL. It includes social security benefits, local authorities’ self-financed expenditure, central government gross debt interest, payments to EU institutions and some non-cash items.
Total managed expenditure (TME):
= DEL + AME = Current expenditures + depreciation + net investment.
4.1.4. Fiscal rules
Two fiscal rules have been defined and actively used by the government since 1997. Parliament has never adopted a statute to endorse the two rules, which are contained in the government’s 1998 EFSR (see www.archive.officialdocuments.co.uk/document/cm39/3978/chap3.htm#fiscal). The first rule is a “golden rule”: it requires over the cycle that the government will borrow only to invest
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and not to fund current spending. Second, the sustainable investment rule requires that public sector net debt as a proportion of GDP will be held at a stable and prudent level – currently defined as below 40% of GDP over the economic cycle. H.M. Treasury is responsible for defining and measuring the concepts, such as “investment” and “net debt”.
4.1.5. The timetable for budget preparation and presentation to Parliament
The timetable for the preparation of revenue and expenditure estimates, and the fiscal strategy is at the discretion of the Cabinet and H.M. Treasury. The only date written into an official document to guide Cabinet and/or the Treasury is that found in the House of Commons Standing Orders, namely 5 August. This is the last day on which the expenditure estimates debate in the House of Commons is to be concluded. In practice Cabinet approves the budget shortly before the Chancellor’s budget day speech, which in recent years has been held in March or April.16
4.1.6. Approval process within the executive
The budget approval process within the executive is not laid down in law. H.M. Treasury’s Budget Directorate sets the agenda and guidelines for technical discussion of departmental demands for money for the upcoming year. The draft budget is approved by the Cabinet Committee on Expenditure, which is chaired by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, then endorsed by the Cabinet as a whole. As from the 1990s, H.M. Treasury’s management and control of the public expenditure system (PES) became more formalised. Internal rules and procedures may be found in Government Accounting.
4.1.7. Documents to accompany the budget law
There is no legal obligation to present analytic budget documents to accompany draft annual budget laws, that is, finance acts, consolidated fund acts and appropriations acts. The adoption of these laws – at nonsynchronised times for revenues and expenditures – is a legal formality that endorses the government’s annual budgetary decisions. In contrast, the law requires H.M. Treasury to prepare documents to accompany the Chancellor’s budget speeches. The discussion below relates to these documents.
Medium-term macroeconomic framework and fiscal strategy. Under the Finance Act, 1998 (s. 156), for each financial year, H.M. Treasury (not the Chancellor of the Exchequer) is required to lay before Parliament a pre-budget report (PBR); and a debt management report. In addition, H.M. Treasury publishes the annual FSBR and EFSR. These are not required by the Finance Act.
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Under the 1998 Act, H.M. Treasury (not Parliament) decides on both the content of the documents and the occasions on which those documents are laid before Parliament. The CFS provides the framework for the Treasury (s. 155, Finance Act 1988). Technically, the code itself is not a law since it was not approved by the Lords (it formed part of the Finance Act 1998 which, as a money measure, was not considered by the Lords), although it was approved by resolution in the House of Commons. The CFS requires the government to state and explain its fiscal policy objectives over the life of the Parliament, in conformity with the principles of the code. These objectives, and the accompanying operating rules, shall be restated in each budget (s. 9, CFS). The code also sets out the conditions under which the government may change its fiscal policy objectives and operating rules (s. 11).
The code includes some details on the contents of the various reports. H.M. Treasury is required to publish the PBR at least three months before presentation of the main budget. Only one PBR is required each year, even if there is more than one budget. The PBR is consultative in nature – it provides proposals for significant changes in fiscal policy under consideration by the government. The PBR is also required to include an economic and fiscal projection and an analysis of the impact of the economic cycle on the key economic aggregates.
The FSBR must be published by H.M. Treasury at the time of the budget. Minimum requirements are specified in the CFS (ss. 18, 20-25). These include economic and fiscal projections and an explanation of significant fiscal policy measures introduced in the budget. The projection period is specified to be not less than two full financial years following the date of publication (which means two years beyond the budget year), as well as the publication of comparative data for key fiscal aggregates covering the two previous years.
The EFSR is also required to be published annually by H.M. Treasury, usually (but not necessarily) at the time of the budget. The CFS specifies that the contents of the EFSR include:
●The government’s long-term economic and fiscal strategy, including any long-term objectives for key fiscal aggregates.
●An assessment of recent short-term outcomes against this long-term strategy.
●The consistency of the short-term outlook and the long-term strategy with European commitments.
●Illustrative projections of the outlook for the key fiscal aggregates for a period not less than the next 10 years, based on plausible assumptions, so
as to shed light on the intergenerational impact and sustainability of fiscal policy.17
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●Analysis of the impact of the economic cycle on key fiscal aggregations, including estimates of the cyclically adjusted position.
For the debt management report, the CFS specifies that the government shall report annually on the structure and cost of government debt, giving sufficient information to allow the public to scrutinise the conduct of its debt management policy. The CFS also specifies that the government shall set remits for its agents in the annual debt management report, including a forecast of net funding through National Savings, the overall size of the gilts issuance programme, the planned maturity structure, the proportions of index-linked and conventional gilts, and the gilt auction calendar.
New measures versus existing expenditure policies. There is no law requiring a distinction between new and current programmes. No new service can attract resources without Parliament voting the resources through the supply procedure. The CFS requires the FSBR to explain significant fiscal policy measures introduced in the budget and, if necessary, how these measures restore the path of the public finances to a position consistent with fiscal policy objectives and operating rules, and European commitments.
Performance-related information. Neither statute law nor the CFS requires programme performance indicators to accompany budget submissions to Parliament. However, since 1991, each department has been providing Parliament with annual reports that outline not only recent past activity, but also short-term future expenditure plans. The new government of 1998 renewed the emphasis on performance, given the identified need to improve the provision of public services. The government required each department to prepare a public service agreement (PSAs) that lay out the aims and objectives of each department as well as performance indicators. The government’s review in 2000 resulted in revised PSAs. Emphasis was given to departmental outcomes, including executive agencies’ contribution to such outcomes. These are specified in service delivery agreements (SDAs), which are more detailed documents to support the outcome-oriented PSAs (Ellis and Mitchell, 2002). The PSAs and SDAs are not legally binding documents. As in other areas of budget management, H.M. Treasury plays a dominant role in providing oversight.18 The NAO is responsible for validating the data systems used to report progress against the PSAs.
Tax expenditures, contingent liabilities and fiscal risks. The CFS requires that the fiscal projections contain “an analysis of risk surrounding the economic and fiscal outlook, including government decisions and other circumstances that have still to be quantified with certainty, other material contingent liabilities and an indication of past forecast errors for key fiscal and economic aggregates”.
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