- •Table of Contents
- •Foreword
- •OECD Journal on Budgeting
- •Board of Advisors
- •Preface
- •Executive Summary
- •Sharp differences exist in the legal framework for budget systems
- •Public finance and legal theories do not explain inter-country differences in budget system laws
- •Political variables and legal culture help explain the inter-country differences
- •Norms for budget systems have been issued and many should be in budget system laws
- •Budget system laws are adopted to strengthen the powers of the legislature or the executive
- •Country studies reveal a multiplicity of reasons for adopting budget-related laws
- •Conclusions
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Budget processes
- •2.1. Budgeting: a five-stage process
- •Figure I.1. The roles of Parliament and the executive in the budget cycle
- •2.2. How are the different legal frameworks for budget systems organised?
- •Figure I.2. Different models for organising the legal framework of budget systems
- •3. Can economic theory explain the differences?
- •3.1. New institutional economics
- •3.2. Law, economics and public choice theory
- •3.3. Constitutional political economy: budgetary rules and budgetary outcomes
- •3.4. Can game theory help?
- •4. Can comparative law explain the differences?
- •4.1. Families of legal systems and the importance of the constitution
- •Box I.2. Purposes of constitutions and characteristics of statutes
- •4.2. Absence of norms for constitutions partly explains differences in budget system laws
- •4.3. Hierarchy within primary law also partly explains differences in budget-related laws
- •Box I.3. Hierarchy of laws: The example of Spain
- •4.4. Not all countries complete all steps of formal law-making processes
- •Box I.4. Steps in making law
- •4.5. Greater use is made of secondary law in some countries
- •Table I.1. Delegated legislation and separation of powers
- •4.6. Decisions and regulations of the legislature are particularly important in some countries
- •4.8. Are laws “green lights” or “red lights”?
- •5. Forms of government and budget system laws
- •5.1. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchies
- •5.2. Presidential and semi-presidential governments
- •5.3. Parliamentary republics
- •5.4. Relationship between forms of government and budget system law
- •Table I.2. Differences in selected budgetary powers of the executive and the legislature
- •Figure I.3. Separation of powers and the need to adopt budget-related laws
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Introduction
- •Figure II.1. Density of legal framework for budget systems in 25 OECD countries
- •Table II.1. Legal frameworks for budget systems: 13 OECD countries
- •2. Different purposes of the legal frameworks for budget systems
- •Box II.1. Purposes of budget system laws
- •2.1. Legal necessity?
- •Figure II.2. Budget reforms and changes in budget laws
- •2.2. Budget reform: when is law required?
- •2.3. Elaborating on the budget powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive
- •3. Differences in the legal framework for the main actors in budget systems
- •3.1. Legislatures
- •3.2. Executives
- •Box II.2. New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988
- •3.3. Judiciary
- •3.4. External audit offices
- •Table II.3. External audit legal frameworks: Selected differences
- •3.5. Sub-national governments
- •3.6. Supra-national bodies and international organisations
- •4. Differences in the legal framework for budget processes
- •4.1. Budget preparation by the executive
- •Table II.4. Legal requirements for the date of submission of the budget to the legislature
- •Box II.3. France: Legal requirements for budget information
- •4.2. Parliamentary approval of the budget
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting systems
- •Box II.4. Finland: Legal requirements for annual report and annual accounts
- •Table II.5. Legal requirements for submission of annual report to the legislature: Selected countries
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Have standards for the legal framework of budget systems been drawn up?
- •1.1. Normative and positive approaches to budget law
- •1.2. Limited guidance from normative constitutional economics
- •2. Who should set and monitor legally binding standards?
- •2.1. Role of politicians and bureaucrats
- •2.2. International transmission of budget system laws
- •2.3. International organisations as standard setters
- •Box III.1. The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- •Box III.2. Constitutional norms for external audit: Extracts from the INTOSAI “Lima Declaration”
- •2.4. Monitoring standards
- •3. Principles to support the legal framework of budget systems
- •Box III.3. Ten principles for a budget law
- •3.1. Authoritativeness
- •Table III.1. Stages of the budget cycle and legal instruments
- •3.2. Annual basis
- •3.3. Universality
- •3.4. Unity
- •3.5. Specificity
- •3.6. Balance
- •3.7. Accountability
- •Box III.4. Possible minimum legal norms for budget reporting
- •Box III.5. Ingredients of legal norms for external audit
- •3.8. Transparency
- •Box III.6. Ingredients of legal norms for government agencies
- •3.9. Stability or predictability
- •3.10. Performance (or efficiency, economy, and effectiveness)
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Canada: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Canada: Main provisions of the Spending Control Act 1992
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Canada: Major transfers from the federal to the provincial governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Canada: Key steps in the annual budgeting process
- •Box 5. Canada: Major contents of the main estimates
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. France: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Germany: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 2. Germany: Public agencies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 3. Germany: Budget processes in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit17
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Japan: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Japan: Main contents of the 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Act
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Japan: Grants from central government to local governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Japan: The timetable for the budget process
- •Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Korea: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Korea: Major acts governing the fiscal relationship across government levels
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Korea: Legal requirements for the timetable for budget preparation and deliberation
- •Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
- •Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
- •Box 4. New Zealand: Information required to support the first appropriation act
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Nordic Countries: The main budget system laws or near-laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The constitutions of the four countries
- •Table 1. Nordic countries: Age and size of constitutions
- •3.2. Legislatures
- •Table 2. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the legislatures
- •3.3. The political executive
- •Table 3. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the political executive
- •3.4. Ministries and executive agencies
- •3.5. Civil service
- •3.6. Sub-national governments
- •4. Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting
- •4.1. Authority of Parliament
- •Table 4. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the authority of Parliament
- •4.2. Timing of submission of the annual budget
- •4.3. Non-adoption of the annual budget before the year begins
- •4.4. Content of the budget and types of appropriations
- •4.5. Documents to accompany the draft budget law
- •4.6. Parliamentary committees and budget procedures in Parliament
- •4.7. Parliamentary amendment powers, coalition agreements, two-stage budgeting and fiscal rules
- •4.8. Supplementary budgets
- •4.10. Cancellation of appropriations and contingency funds
- •4.11. Government accounting
- •4.12. Other fiscal reporting and special reports
- •Table 5. Nordic countries: Constitutional requirements for external audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Spain: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
- •Box 3. Spain: The major content of medium-term budget plans
- •Box 4. Spain: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United Kingdom: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system law
- •Box 2. United Kingdom: Reforms of the budget system in the past 20 years
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 3. United Kingdom: Executive agencies and other bodies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 4. United Kingdom: Budget processes in Parliament
- •Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •Table 2. United Kingdom: Transfers of budgetary authority
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United States: Main federal budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. United States: Major transfers between different levels of government
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
- •Box 5. United States: Other information required by law
- •4.2. Budget process in the legislature
- •Box 6. United States: Legal and internal deadlines for congressional budget approval
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •5. Sanctions and non-compliance
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
IV. SPAIN
report includes: an analysis of the accounts of the State and the public sector; a view on the financial management of the State and the public sector; comments on observance of the Constitution, legislation and regulations governing public sector economic activity; compliance with the provisions of the budget (local, regional and national); the efficiency and economy of public spending; the activities of the State corporations and also the application of other public subsidies; and a statement of the COA’s jurisdictional proceedings during the year in question (United Kingdom National Audit Office, 2001).
4.5.6. Enforcement of findings
The recommendations of the report are enforced by parliamentary consideration, whose role is delegated to the Joint Committee for the relationship with the COA, consisting of 48 members of both houses. For the report on the General Account of the State, Parliament considers and resolves to accept the accounts and can ask for more information. The COA does not issue a separate report but expects the government to act on the recommendations made by the COA. Follow-up work is carried out by the COA in the most significant cases. Reports of the COA appear in the Official Gazettes and attract considerable media attention (United Kingdom National Audit Office, 2001).
The enforcement of the report’s recommendations is strengthened by the COA’s jurisdictional functions. These are confined to passing judgment on those responsible for managing public funds. Actions are aimed at determining the damage caused to the public treasury and demanding compensation but without the possibility of imposing any fines or penalties (OECD, 2003b). The COA examines cases referred to it by three sources: the prosecutor, the public administration affected or by a public petition, and makes judgments on referred cases. Where an individual public official is directly liable because he has willfully acted in a way that has resulted in loss or waste, he must repay the full amount of the loss. The liability for loss or waste of public money is personal (Art. 42, OACA). Where it is not feasible to prosecute the person directly liable, it may be possible to prosecute the person who could have prevented the act (Art. 43, OACA). This is known as secondary liability and arises particularly where the second person was negligent in carrying out supervisory duties (United Kingdom National Audit Office, 2001).
Notes
1.The Constitution has 169 articles, including several on budget-related issues; the General Budgetary Act 47/2003 has 182 articles; and the Standing Orders for the Congress of Deputies and the Senate have 206 articles and 196 articles respectively.
OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 4 – NO. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2004 |
401 |
|
IV. SPAIN
2.Organic laws are a specific type of statute regulated by the Constitution and are different from general legislation in two ways. First, matters relating to the implementation of fundamental rights and public freedoms, the Statutes of Autonomy and the general electoral system and other laws provided for in the Constitution must be legislated for by an organic law [s. 81(1)]. Furthermore, the approval, amendment or repeal of organic laws requires an overall majority of members of the Congress of Deputies in a final vote on the bill as a whole (s. 82(2)].
3.See also the Statement of Purpose of the GABS written by Parliament in 2001.
4.According to constitutional provisions, the State has exclusive competence over matters concerning the basic rules and co-ordination of general economic planning (13) and the basic rules of the legal system of public administrations and the status of their officials which shall, in any case, guarantee that all persons under the said administrations will receive equal treatment and the application of common administrative procedures, without prejudice to the special features of the SGCs’ own organisations (18).
5.See the Statement of Purpose of the GBA written by Parliament in 2003 for further information.
6.Budgetary stability is defined as “a balanced or surplus situation in terms of financing capacity pursuant to the definition set out in the European System for National and Regional Accounts and the terms established for each State administration (for the public sector in Art. 2.1 of the GABS)”.
7.The State sector also is divided into three categories by the GBA (Art. 3): the administrative public sector (for example, the general State administration, autonomous bodies); the semi-commercial public sector (for example, semicommercial public enterprises, State commercial entities); and the public foundation sector (for example, foundations in the State sector).
8.State debt is defined in the GBA as the entirety of capital borrowed by the State through public issues, agreements for loan transactions, subrogation to the debts of a third party, and any other transaction that finances State expenses (Art. 92).
9.Spending includes expenditures for staff, current and capital transfer, capital investment and debt servicing (this type of spending is called “non-financial spending” in the Spanish budget). Financing items (known as “financial spending”), such as the purchase of financial assets and payment of financial liabilities, are excluded.
10.For the audit of SGCs, a distinction should be made as to whether they have their own external controlling body (a regional COA). Regional COAs established in nine out of 17 SGCs, without prejudice to the competence of the COA, certify the accounts of SGCs and present a report to the local councils. For the remaining SGCs, this task is carried out by the COA. The COA therefore carries out less direct work in the SGCs that have their own COA but it still has oversight and can carry out follow-up work. The COA can delegate some of its jurisdictional functions to a regional COA, but only the actions related to accountancy responsibility, never the audit itself. See United Kingdom National Audit Office (2001) and Kraan (2004) for more information on this matter.
11.The COA’s structure comprises: the President, the Full Session, the Ruling Committee, the Auditing Section, the Trial Section, the Board of Audit, the Prosecutor’s Office, and the General Secretariat (Art. 19).
402 |
OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 4 – NO. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2004 |
|
IV. SPAIN
Bibliography
Cabrero, Olga (2002), A Guide to the Spanish Legal System, Law Library Resource Xchange, www.llrx.com/features/spain.htm.
Daban, Teresa, et al. (2003), Rules-Based Fiscal Policy in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, IMF Occasional Paper No. 225, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.
Kraan, Dirk-Jan (2004), “Off-budget and Tax Expenditures”, OECD Journal on Budgeting, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 121-142.
OECD (2001), OECD Economic Surveys: Spain, OECD, Paris.
OECD (2002), Budget Practices and Procedures Survey, OECD and World Bank, Paris, http:/ /ocde.dyndns.org.
OECD (2003a), OECD Economic Surveys: Spain, OECD, Paris.
OECD (2003b), “Case study: Spain”, unpublished paper presented at OECD expert meeting on Accountability and Control in the Public Sector, Paris, 29-30 October.
United Kingdom National Audit Office (2001), “Spain”, State Audit in the European Union, National Audit Office, London, www.nao.org.uk/publications/state_audit/st_spain.pdf.
Zapico Goni, Eduardo (2002), Budgeting for Results in Spain: Lessons learned after two decades of reform, OECD, Paris.
Zapico Goni, Eduardo, and Mario Garces (2002), “Spain”, in Distributed Public Governance: Agencies, Authorities and Other Government Bodies, OECD, Paris, pp. 161-180.
OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 4 – NO. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2004 |
403 |
|
ISSN 1608-7143
OECD Journal on Budgeting – Volume 4 – No. 3 © OECD 2004
United Kingdom*
|
Structure of the Case Study |
|
1. |
Overview...................................................................................... |
406 |
2. |
Principles underlying budget system laws .................................. |
409 |
3. |
Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors |
|
|
in the budget system.................................................................... |
410 |
4. |
Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle ..................... |
416 |
*This study has benefited from comments from several offices of H.M. Treasury, the Cabinet Office and the Debt Management Office (co-ordinated by Gary Hansman), from Simon Henderson of the National Audit Office, and from OECD colleagues including David Turner of the Economics Department.
OECD JOURNAL ON BUDGETING – VOLUME 4 – NO. 3 – ISSN 1608-7143 – © OECD 2004 |
405 |
|