- •Table of Contents
- •Foreword
- •OECD Journal on Budgeting
- •Board of Advisors
- •Preface
- •Executive Summary
- •Sharp differences exist in the legal framework for budget systems
- •Public finance and legal theories do not explain inter-country differences in budget system laws
- •Political variables and legal culture help explain the inter-country differences
- •Norms for budget systems have been issued and many should be in budget system laws
- •Budget system laws are adopted to strengthen the powers of the legislature or the executive
- •Country studies reveal a multiplicity of reasons for adopting budget-related laws
- •Conclusions
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Budget processes
- •2.1. Budgeting: a five-stage process
- •Figure I.1. The roles of Parliament and the executive in the budget cycle
- •2.2. How are the different legal frameworks for budget systems organised?
- •Figure I.2. Different models for organising the legal framework of budget systems
- •3. Can economic theory explain the differences?
- •3.1. New institutional economics
- •3.2. Law, economics and public choice theory
- •3.3. Constitutional political economy: budgetary rules and budgetary outcomes
- •3.4. Can game theory help?
- •4. Can comparative law explain the differences?
- •4.1. Families of legal systems and the importance of the constitution
- •Box I.2. Purposes of constitutions and characteristics of statutes
- •4.2. Absence of norms for constitutions partly explains differences in budget system laws
- •4.3. Hierarchy within primary law also partly explains differences in budget-related laws
- •Box I.3. Hierarchy of laws: The example of Spain
- •4.4. Not all countries complete all steps of formal law-making processes
- •Box I.4. Steps in making law
- •4.5. Greater use is made of secondary law in some countries
- •Table I.1. Delegated legislation and separation of powers
- •4.6. Decisions and regulations of the legislature are particularly important in some countries
- •4.8. Are laws “green lights” or “red lights”?
- •5. Forms of government and budget system laws
- •5.1. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchies
- •5.2. Presidential and semi-presidential governments
- •5.3. Parliamentary republics
- •5.4. Relationship between forms of government and budget system law
- •Table I.2. Differences in selected budgetary powers of the executive and the legislature
- •Figure I.3. Separation of powers and the need to adopt budget-related laws
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Introduction
- •Figure II.1. Density of legal framework for budget systems in 25 OECD countries
- •Table II.1. Legal frameworks for budget systems: 13 OECD countries
- •2. Different purposes of the legal frameworks for budget systems
- •Box II.1. Purposes of budget system laws
- •2.1. Legal necessity?
- •Figure II.2. Budget reforms and changes in budget laws
- •2.2. Budget reform: when is law required?
- •2.3. Elaborating on the budget powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive
- •3. Differences in the legal framework for the main actors in budget systems
- •3.1. Legislatures
- •3.2. Executives
- •Box II.2. New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988
- •3.3. Judiciary
- •3.4. External audit offices
- •Table II.3. External audit legal frameworks: Selected differences
- •3.5. Sub-national governments
- •3.6. Supra-national bodies and international organisations
- •4. Differences in the legal framework for budget processes
- •4.1. Budget preparation by the executive
- •Table II.4. Legal requirements for the date of submission of the budget to the legislature
- •Box II.3. France: Legal requirements for budget information
- •4.2. Parliamentary approval of the budget
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting systems
- •Box II.4. Finland: Legal requirements for annual report and annual accounts
- •Table II.5. Legal requirements for submission of annual report to the legislature: Selected countries
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Have standards for the legal framework of budget systems been drawn up?
- •1.1. Normative and positive approaches to budget law
- •1.2. Limited guidance from normative constitutional economics
- •2. Who should set and monitor legally binding standards?
- •2.1. Role of politicians and bureaucrats
- •2.2. International transmission of budget system laws
- •2.3. International organisations as standard setters
- •Box III.1. The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- •Box III.2. Constitutional norms for external audit: Extracts from the INTOSAI “Lima Declaration”
- •2.4. Monitoring standards
- •3. Principles to support the legal framework of budget systems
- •Box III.3. Ten principles for a budget law
- •3.1. Authoritativeness
- •Table III.1. Stages of the budget cycle and legal instruments
- •3.2. Annual basis
- •3.3. Universality
- •3.4. Unity
- •3.5. Specificity
- •3.6. Balance
- •3.7. Accountability
- •Box III.4. Possible minimum legal norms for budget reporting
- •Box III.5. Ingredients of legal norms for external audit
- •3.8. Transparency
- •Box III.6. Ingredients of legal norms for government agencies
- •3.9. Stability or predictability
- •3.10. Performance (or efficiency, economy, and effectiveness)
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Canada: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Canada: Main provisions of the Spending Control Act 1992
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Canada: Major transfers from the federal to the provincial governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Canada: Key steps in the annual budgeting process
- •Box 5. Canada: Major contents of the main estimates
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. France: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Germany: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 2. Germany: Public agencies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 3. Germany: Budget processes in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit17
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Japan: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Japan: Main contents of the 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Act
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Japan: Grants from central government to local governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Japan: The timetable for the budget process
- •Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Korea: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Korea: Major acts governing the fiscal relationship across government levels
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Korea: Legal requirements for the timetable for budget preparation and deliberation
- •Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
- •Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
- •Box 4. New Zealand: Information required to support the first appropriation act
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Nordic Countries: The main budget system laws or near-laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The constitutions of the four countries
- •Table 1. Nordic countries: Age and size of constitutions
- •3.2. Legislatures
- •Table 2. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the legislatures
- •3.3. The political executive
- •Table 3. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the political executive
- •3.4. Ministries and executive agencies
- •3.5. Civil service
- •3.6. Sub-national governments
- •4. Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting
- •4.1. Authority of Parliament
- •Table 4. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the authority of Parliament
- •4.2. Timing of submission of the annual budget
- •4.3. Non-adoption of the annual budget before the year begins
- •4.4. Content of the budget and types of appropriations
- •4.5. Documents to accompany the draft budget law
- •4.6. Parliamentary committees and budget procedures in Parliament
- •4.7. Parliamentary amendment powers, coalition agreements, two-stage budgeting and fiscal rules
- •4.8. Supplementary budgets
- •4.10. Cancellation of appropriations and contingency funds
- •4.11. Government accounting
- •4.12. Other fiscal reporting and special reports
- •Table 5. Nordic countries: Constitutional requirements for external audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Spain: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
- •Box 3. Spain: The major content of medium-term budget plans
- •Box 4. Spain: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United Kingdom: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system law
- •Box 2. United Kingdom: Reforms of the budget system in the past 20 years
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 3. United Kingdom: Executive agencies and other bodies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 4. United Kingdom: Budget processes in Parliament
- •Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •Table 2. United Kingdom: Transfers of budgetary authority
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United States: Main federal budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. United States: Major transfers between different levels of government
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
- •Box 5. United States: Other information required by law
- •4.2. Budget process in the legislature
- •Box 6. United States: Legal and internal deadlines for congressional budget approval
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •5. Sanctions and non-compliance
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
IV. UNITED KINGDOM
“appropriations-in-aid” (see below). Should actual fees collected or asset sales revenues be higher than projected, departments may not spend these revenues, unless Parliament provides authority through the adoption of a supplementary estimate.26
4.2.5. The nature, structure and duration of appropriations
It is a prerogative of H.M. Treasury to specify the structure, format and duration of the estimates and decide which totals are subject to parliamentary control. Parliament’s control totals are much more aggregated than those used by H.M. Treasury for expenditure control purposes. Since the adoption of resource-based accounts in 2001/02, the overall structure of the estimates, as adopted by the annual appropriations acts, is shown in Table 1.
Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
|
(1) |
(2) |
(3) |
(4) |
|
|
Grants out of |
||||
Estimate/Request |
Net resources |
Operating |
Non-operating |
||
Consolidated Fund (net |
|||||
|
authorised for use |
appropriations-in-aid |
appropriations-in-aid |
||
|
|
cash needs) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
“Programme 1” |
P1 |
|
A1 |
|
|
“Programme 2” |
P2 |
|
A2 |
|
|
“Programme 3” |
P3 |
|
A3 |
|
|
Etc. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
T1 = P1 + P2 + P3 |
T2 |
T3 = A1 + A2 + A3 |
T4 |
Parliament approves expenditures on two bases: first, the consumption of resources (authority to enter commitments that may not necessarily be paid for in the fiscal year) and second, the net cash requirement for all payments, taking into account cash receipts associated with appropriated income. Expenditure is on a net basis, that is, after deduction of revenues collected and retained by spending departments/agencies. The 1891 Public Accounts and Charges Act [s. 2(2)] authorises departmental fees to be appropriated in aid of their estimates; such fees are not paid into the Exchequer account at the Bank of England.
For current expenditures, “net resources used” (column 1) is the sum of administrative and other current expenses, and grants (all on an accrual basis) minus “operating appropriations-in-aid” (column 3). The latter is the amount that departments/agencies may spend from their own revenues. The retention of fees, etc., for spending is subject to oversight by H.M. Treasury (s. 2, GRA Act 2000). Since appropriations-in-aid are also approved on an accruals basis, the GRA Act 2000 makes provision for cash being received in a year other than that for which the appropriations-in-aid were approved. Should
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IV. UNITED KINGDOM
departments collect more revenues than shown in the appropriations act as appropriations-in-aid, they must return the excess to the Consolidated Fund as extra receipts.
Capital expenditures are also appropriated on a net basis, that is, after deduction of “non-operating appropriations-in-aid”, which are mainly proceeds from sales of departmental assets. All appropriations-in-aid are detailed comprehensively in footnotes to the estimates. Failure to include a relevant item in a footnote would mean that the income in question could not be applied as appropriations-in-aid.
The unit of appropriation in the supply process is the estimates for which the House of Commons takes a separate decision. For 2003/04, there were 58 estimates.27 When the supply estimates are presented to Parliament, for each department and for each “programme” (or Request for Resources, RfR), expenditure is broken down as follows:
a)Spending in DEL:
●Central government spending (with subheads).
●Support for local authorities (with subheads).
b)Spending in AME:
●Central government spending (with subheads).
●Support for local authorities (with subheads).
c)Non-budget.
4.2.6. Carryover of appropriations and borrowing of future appropriations
The budget year begins on 1st April. Expenditure and appropriations-in- aid are annual and, in principle, there is no borrowing against future income (see s. 1, GRA Act 2000). Besides the expenditure, which is controlled by Parliament, H.M. Treasury has its own internal expenditure controls. For the sub-total DEL, where expenditure limits are fixed for three years (and revised every two years), H.M. Treasury authorises departments unlimited carry forward within the three-year approved amounts. This is known as end-year flexibility. The objective is to encourage departments and their executive agencies to plan over the medium term and avoid wasteful end-year surges. Since AME is controlled annually, unspent provisions may not be carried over.
4.2.7. Public debt approval
There is no separate public debt act. Instead there are a number of statutes, several of which provide H.M. Treasury with considerable power in the management of public debt, including proposing debt limits to the government for fiscal management purposes and the issuing of securities under the 1877 Treasury Bills Act. The National Loans Act 1968 (itself an
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amendment of s. 21, E&AD Act 1866) establishes a statutory fund, the National Loans Fund (NLF), used to finance central government operations through borrowing. H.M. Treasury has wide discretion as to how to raise money by borrowing using the NLF.
The United Kingdom Debt Management Office manages the Debt Management Account, which was established under the Finance Act 1988, which amended the National Loans Act 1968. H.M. Treasury’s wide powers for acquiring, holding, transferring or redeeming securities are spelt out in Schedule 5A to the original 1968 Act. The Finance Act 2003 amended the National Loans Act 1968 to repeal the cap on borrowing by the Debt Management Office. However, overall government borrowing is limited by the government’s “golden rule” (see above). Annual debt/borrowing government guidelines are restated in each budget – a requirement of the CFS. Since 1997, successive budgets have restated the sustainable investment rule that net public debt will be maintained at below 40% of GDP over the economic cycle.
The Local Government Act 2003 allows local councils in England and Wales to borrow for capital expenditure, provided that the financing of expenditure is affordable from within local authority resources. The act requires each local authority to abide by a professional “prudential” code that requires them to determine that any proposed borrowing is both prudent and affordable through the setting of local prudential limits based on a range of financial indicators. Local authorities are not permitted to borrow for purposes other than for treasury management in the normal course of business.28 Local government borrowing in foreign currency requires H.M. Treasury approval. The government (not Parliament) and the National Assembly of Wales reserve power to override local authorities’ selfdetermined prudential limits should national economic circumstances require (s. 4).
Concerning debt guarantees, the CFS requires the economic and fiscal projections to include, inter alia, contingent liabilities. The granting of guarantees requires the consent of H.M. Treasury. Chapter 26 of Government Accounting provides guidance to departments and of the need to report to Parliament.
Finally, the CFS requires financial statements to include measurement of the government’s fiscal policy objectives and rules compared with the government’s European commitments, in particular the Stability and Growth Pact. Debt developments are also monitored in budget reports, using the Treaty of Maastricht’s general government gross debt limit of 60% of GDP as a reference.
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4.2.8. Promulgation, veto and publication of the adopted budget
Normal bills require a first reading, second reading, committee and report stages and a third reading before being passed to the other house where they go through the same process. With consolidated fund bills, however, second and third readings occur without any debate and there is no committee stage. The Lords’ consideration is purely formal and the bill becomes a consolidated fund act on royal assent. A similar procedure occurs for consolidated fund (appropriation) bills, which are introduced immediately after the related estimates debates, and provide a more detailed legislative request for supply, setting out the ambit and each request for resource.
4.2.9. Supplementary budgets (rectifying laws)
Supplementary estimates may be sought to either increase the amounts needed for existing services or to cover the cost of a service newly imposed upon the government by statute. There are no legal limits on the number of supplementary estimates. Typically, supplementary supply estimates, if necessary, are presented three times: in summer (June), winter (November) and spring (February). Formal statutory authority for extra funds may be provided in the summer, following the estimates day debates in the House of Commons, with extra spending being incorporated in the annual appropriation act. In contrast, if additional budgetary authority is sought in November or February, consolidated fund acts are used. For winter supplementary budgets, the same act that provides provisional legal authority to spend in year (+1) is used to approve supplementary spending for the remainder of year (0). In 2004, the House of Commons agreed to reform this process. As from the parliamentary session for 2004/05 there will be two appropriation acts, one in March appropriating the expenditure for the financial year just ending and one in July, as is currently the case.
If expenditure exceeds the annual estimate and it is too late to seek a supplementary estimate, the excess will appear in a department’s resource account and will be reported to the PAC by the C&AG (see section 4.5 below). Subject to PAC’s report, the necessary provision is sought in an excess vote. H.M. Treasury presents a statement of excesses to Parliament, usually in February. Ex post parliamentary authority for the overspending is then obtained (i.e. 10-11 months after the financial year has closed). It is rare for large amounts to be approved in this way.
4.2.10. Budgetary implications of other bills
A principle of constitutional propriety is that any new functions to be exercised on an ongoing basis and financed out of money provided by Parliament through the annual appropriation act should be authorised by a
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