- •Table of Contents
- •Foreword
- •OECD Journal on Budgeting
- •Board of Advisors
- •Preface
- •Executive Summary
- •Sharp differences exist in the legal framework for budget systems
- •Public finance and legal theories do not explain inter-country differences in budget system laws
- •Political variables and legal culture help explain the inter-country differences
- •Norms for budget systems have been issued and many should be in budget system laws
- •Budget system laws are adopted to strengthen the powers of the legislature or the executive
- •Country studies reveal a multiplicity of reasons for adopting budget-related laws
- •Conclusions
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Budget processes
- •2.1. Budgeting: a five-stage process
- •Figure I.1. The roles of Parliament and the executive in the budget cycle
- •2.2. How are the different legal frameworks for budget systems organised?
- •Figure I.2. Different models for organising the legal framework of budget systems
- •3. Can economic theory explain the differences?
- •3.1. New institutional economics
- •3.2. Law, economics and public choice theory
- •3.3. Constitutional political economy: budgetary rules and budgetary outcomes
- •3.4. Can game theory help?
- •4. Can comparative law explain the differences?
- •4.1. Families of legal systems and the importance of the constitution
- •Box I.2. Purposes of constitutions and characteristics of statutes
- •4.2. Absence of norms for constitutions partly explains differences in budget system laws
- •4.3. Hierarchy within primary law also partly explains differences in budget-related laws
- •Box I.3. Hierarchy of laws: The example of Spain
- •4.4. Not all countries complete all steps of formal law-making processes
- •Box I.4. Steps in making law
- •4.5. Greater use is made of secondary law in some countries
- •Table I.1. Delegated legislation and separation of powers
- •4.6. Decisions and regulations of the legislature are particularly important in some countries
- •4.8. Are laws “green lights” or “red lights”?
- •5. Forms of government and budget system laws
- •5.1. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchies
- •5.2. Presidential and semi-presidential governments
- •5.3. Parliamentary republics
- •5.4. Relationship between forms of government and budget system law
- •Table I.2. Differences in selected budgetary powers of the executive and the legislature
- •Figure I.3. Separation of powers and the need to adopt budget-related laws
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Introduction
- •Figure II.1. Density of legal framework for budget systems in 25 OECD countries
- •Table II.1. Legal frameworks for budget systems: 13 OECD countries
- •2. Different purposes of the legal frameworks for budget systems
- •Box II.1. Purposes of budget system laws
- •2.1. Legal necessity?
- •Figure II.2. Budget reforms and changes in budget laws
- •2.2. Budget reform: when is law required?
- •2.3. Elaborating on the budget powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive
- •3. Differences in the legal framework for the main actors in budget systems
- •3.1. Legislatures
- •3.2. Executives
- •Box II.2. New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988
- •3.3. Judiciary
- •3.4. External audit offices
- •Table II.3. External audit legal frameworks: Selected differences
- •3.5. Sub-national governments
- •3.6. Supra-national bodies and international organisations
- •4. Differences in the legal framework for budget processes
- •4.1. Budget preparation by the executive
- •Table II.4. Legal requirements for the date of submission of the budget to the legislature
- •Box II.3. France: Legal requirements for budget information
- •4.2. Parliamentary approval of the budget
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting systems
- •Box II.4. Finland: Legal requirements for annual report and annual accounts
- •Table II.5. Legal requirements for submission of annual report to the legislature: Selected countries
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Have standards for the legal framework of budget systems been drawn up?
- •1.1. Normative and positive approaches to budget law
- •1.2. Limited guidance from normative constitutional economics
- •2. Who should set and monitor legally binding standards?
- •2.1. Role of politicians and bureaucrats
- •2.2. International transmission of budget system laws
- •2.3. International organisations as standard setters
- •Box III.1. The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- •Box III.2. Constitutional norms for external audit: Extracts from the INTOSAI “Lima Declaration”
- •2.4. Monitoring standards
- •3. Principles to support the legal framework of budget systems
- •Box III.3. Ten principles for a budget law
- •3.1. Authoritativeness
- •Table III.1. Stages of the budget cycle and legal instruments
- •3.2. Annual basis
- •3.3. Universality
- •3.4. Unity
- •3.5. Specificity
- •3.6. Balance
- •3.7. Accountability
- •Box III.4. Possible minimum legal norms for budget reporting
- •Box III.5. Ingredients of legal norms for external audit
- •3.8. Transparency
- •Box III.6. Ingredients of legal norms for government agencies
- •3.9. Stability or predictability
- •3.10. Performance (or efficiency, economy, and effectiveness)
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Canada: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Canada: Main provisions of the Spending Control Act 1992
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Canada: Major transfers from the federal to the provincial governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Canada: Key steps in the annual budgeting process
- •Box 5. Canada: Major contents of the main estimates
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. France: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Germany: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 2. Germany: Public agencies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 3. Germany: Budget processes in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit17
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Japan: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Japan: Main contents of the 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Act
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Japan: Grants from central government to local governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Japan: The timetable for the budget process
- •Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Korea: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Korea: Major acts governing the fiscal relationship across government levels
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Korea: Legal requirements for the timetable for budget preparation and deliberation
- •Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
- •Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
- •Box 4. New Zealand: Information required to support the first appropriation act
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Nordic Countries: The main budget system laws or near-laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The constitutions of the four countries
- •Table 1. Nordic countries: Age and size of constitutions
- •3.2. Legislatures
- •Table 2. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the legislatures
- •3.3. The political executive
- •Table 3. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the political executive
- •3.4. Ministries and executive agencies
- •3.5. Civil service
- •3.6. Sub-national governments
- •4. Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting
- •4.1. Authority of Parliament
- •Table 4. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the authority of Parliament
- •4.2. Timing of submission of the annual budget
- •4.3. Non-adoption of the annual budget before the year begins
- •4.4. Content of the budget and types of appropriations
- •4.5. Documents to accompany the draft budget law
- •4.6. Parliamentary committees and budget procedures in Parliament
- •4.7. Parliamentary amendment powers, coalition agreements, two-stage budgeting and fiscal rules
- •4.8. Supplementary budgets
- •4.10. Cancellation of appropriations and contingency funds
- •4.11. Government accounting
- •4.12. Other fiscal reporting and special reports
- •Table 5. Nordic countries: Constitutional requirements for external audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Spain: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
- •Box 3. Spain: The major content of medium-term budget plans
- •Box 4. Spain: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United Kingdom: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system law
- •Box 2. United Kingdom: Reforms of the budget system in the past 20 years
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 3. United Kingdom: Executive agencies and other bodies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 4. United Kingdom: Budget processes in Parliament
- •Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •Table 2. United Kingdom: Transfers of budgetary authority
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United States: Main federal budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. United States: Major transfers between different levels of government
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
- •Box 5. United States: Other information required by law
- •4.2. Budget process in the legislature
- •Box 6. United States: Legal and internal deadlines for congressional budget approval
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •5. Sanctions and non-compliance
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
IV. SPAIN
In the State budget, transfers may be made to SGCs in proportion to the volume of State services and activities for which they assume responsibility [Art. 158(1)]. Transfers are aimed at safeguarding solidarity between the SGCs. They are partly unconditional and are designed to offset the discrepancy (positive or negative) between each SGC’s spending responsibilities and their own revenues. The SGCs also receive conditional transfers so that they can guarantee a minimum provision of health and education services throughout their territory and correct regional economic imbalances. The share of these conditional transfers has been reduced to less than 2% of total receipts, compared to about 45% under the previous system.
4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
4.1.1. Institutional coverage of the budget
To understand the institutional coverage of the budget, the distinction between the State sector and the public sector should be borne in mind. The GBA, mainly governing the State budget, is applicable to the State sector, defined as “the general State administration (ministries), autonomous bodies that belong to the general State administration, semi-commercial public entities that are part of the general State administration or any other public bodies linked to it, entities which are part of social security system, State commercial enterprises, and certain other entities” (Art. 2).7 The State budget covers all ministries, agencies, public corporations, and public entities financed by the State budget, including Parliament, the judiciary, the COA, and other constitutional organisations. However, it excludes the SGCs.
In contrast, the GABS, which requires the setting of medium-term budgetary stability objectives, is applicable to “the public sector”, which has a broader definition than the State sector. The public sector includes not only entities listed in the State sector but also the administrations of the SGCs, those bodies and agencies subordinated to the SGCs, and local councils (Art. 2.1).
4.1.2. Extrabudgetary funds and earmarking of revenues
Spain has few extrabudgetary funds with earmarked revenues, which have to be approved by law (Kraan, 2004). One example is the use of the proceeds of goods confiscated due to drug seizures, which are by law earmarked for the prevention of illegal drug use programme. EU financial aid for regional governments is another example of extrabudgetary funds.
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IV. SPAIN
4.1.3. Definition of budget aggregates
Budget aggregates are defined by law (Art. 13, GABS). The MTBP defines budget aggregates as the maximum spending limit with which the public sector should comply within the annual budget allocation process. The annual State budget must conform to the medium-term stability objective and aim at achieving the objective established in the MTBP.
4.1.4. Fiscal rules
The GABS provides fiscal rules to achieve economic and budgetary stability (see above). When budgets show a deficit, the government is required to submit an economic-financial plan to Parliament to correct such an imbalance, which includes revenue and expenditure measures required to correct the situation over the next three budgetary years (Arts. 14 and 17.1). In the case of a surplus, the State administration will either reduce its net indebtedness or allocate it to the Social Security Reserve Fund for the future needs of the social security system (Art. 17.2).
Local councils, in the area of their powers, are required to adjust their budgets to comply with the budgetary stability objectives, notwithstanding the budgetary powers vested in the SGCs (Art. 19). The GABS allows the government to determine the budgetary stability objective for the local councils (Art. 20). Local councils which have not achieved the budgetary stability objective are obliged to prepare within three months after the approval or settlement of the budget a medium-term economic-financial plan to correct any deficits. This plan is subject to the approval of the local council authorities and will in turn be submitted to the MOEF, which is charged with monitoring corrections to deficits (Art. 22).
4.1.5. The timetable for budget preparation and presentation to Parliament
The GBA provides the MOEF with the legal authority to issue the order (guidelines) for budget preparation (Art. 36). While the timetable for the internal procedures is stated in the guidelines, the GBA only requires the State budget bill to be submitted to the Parliament before 1st October (Art. 37). The government agreement on budget stability objectives should be made before 1st April (see Box 2). The GBA details the major contents of the guidelines, which include:
●Guidelines for the allocation of spending, including criteria for preparing the draft budget, quantitative limits and policy priorities to be determined by the MOEF. To ensure conformity with the criteria, the Spending Policies Commission is constituted, the composition of which is determined by order of the MOEF.
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Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
●January: presentation of main framework of budget formulation to the Council of Ministers.
●Before 31 January: government agreement on budget stability objectives (BSOs); transmission of BSO proposal to the TFC.
●Before 1st March: meeting of the TFC and National Council of Local Government (reporting on BSO proposal to regional and local governments).
●Mid-March: approval of BSO by Council of Ministers and agreement sent to Parliament.
●Before 30 April: parliamentary approval or rejection of the BSO, which fixes legal limits on spending aggregates.
●Early May: budget guidelines sent to ministries by MOEF.
●May: meeting of the Spending Policies Commission.
●June: approval of budget scenarios for a three-year period.
●Late July: formulation of draft budget.
●Early August and early September: debates within the Council of Ministers.
●Before 1st October: draft budget approved by the executive and sent to Parliament.
●Before 31 December: debate and approval by Parliament of annual State budget law.
Source: Zapico Goni, 2002.
●Ministries and other State entities must submit their respective draft budgets to the MOEF, which requires conformity to the ceilings established in the guidelines. The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs must prepare the draft bill for the social security budget, in co-operation with the Ministry of Health and Consumption, and submit it to the MOEF. As part of this procedure, an order of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs specifies how to prepare the budget of the social security system. The MOEF and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs submit the draft bill for the social security budget to the Council of Ministers for approval.
●For each programme, a report on annual objectives within the allocation limits under the MTBP.
The revenue budget shall be prepared by the MOEF in a manner consistent with the allocation of resources under the MTBP and in compliance with the objectives for economic policy set forth annually by the government.
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IV. SPAIN
4.1.6. Approval process within the executive
After being negotiated between the MOEF and line ministries, the MOEF submits the State budget bill to the Council of Ministers for approval. Should no agreement be reached between line ministries and the MOEF, the dispute is resolved by an appeal process through the Secretary of State for the Budget, the MOEF, or the Council of Ministers. In general, agreement is achieved informally prior to meetings of the Council of Ministers, according to the interests of all the ministries involved and, if necessary, in the presence of the President who has the final decision.
4.1.7. Documents to accompany the budget law
The GBA requires the State budget bill to contain articles, annexes and detailed statements on revenues and expenditure (Art. 37). The following information is required (Art. 33, GBA):
●The maximum financial obligations of the State sector.
●Revenues, expenditures, and investment and financial operations to be performed by the semi-commercial and foundation State sector.
●The objectives to be achieved in the year by each of the entities responsible for the programmes.
●An estimate of tax expenditures.
Medium-term macroeconomic framework and fiscal strategy. The MOEF is responsible for elaborating the economic assumptions for the draft annual State budget and the MTBP. The GBA prescribes the basic framework for the MTBP in accordance with the budget stability objectives (Arts. 28-30). Prior to the preparation of the draft annual State budget, the MOEF drafts mediumterm revenue, expenditure and balance projections (Box 3). Line ministries are required to submit their MTBPs to the MOEF annually. The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs prepares a separate MTBP for the social security system. The MTBP has to be consistent with the budgetary stability objectives for the State and the social security system for the three following years, pursuant to the provisions of GABS. The detailed procedures of preparation and the structure of the MTBP are established by order of the MOEF. Once the MTBP is drafted by the MOEF, it is transmitted to the Council of Ministers for their decision prior to the submission of the draft State budget of each year. When there are changes in economic or social conditions that are not foreseen at the approval stage, the government may submit an amended plan to Parliament (Art. 14.2, GABS).
New measures versus existing expenditure policies. In the process of elaborating the MTBP, the MOEF implicitly makes the distinction between existing and new commitments, programmes or measures. Furthermore, the
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