
- •Table of Contents
- •Foreword
- •OECD Journal on Budgeting
- •Board of Advisors
- •Preface
- •Executive Summary
- •Sharp differences exist in the legal framework for budget systems
- •Public finance and legal theories do not explain inter-country differences in budget system laws
- •Political variables and legal culture help explain the inter-country differences
- •Norms for budget systems have been issued and many should be in budget system laws
- •Budget system laws are adopted to strengthen the powers of the legislature or the executive
- •Country studies reveal a multiplicity of reasons for adopting budget-related laws
- •Conclusions
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Budget processes
- •2.1. Budgeting: a five-stage process
- •Figure I.1. The roles of Parliament and the executive in the budget cycle
- •2.2. How are the different legal frameworks for budget systems organised?
- •Figure I.2. Different models for organising the legal framework of budget systems
- •3. Can economic theory explain the differences?
- •3.1. New institutional economics
- •3.2. Law, economics and public choice theory
- •3.3. Constitutional political economy: budgetary rules and budgetary outcomes
- •3.4. Can game theory help?
- •4. Can comparative law explain the differences?
- •4.1. Families of legal systems and the importance of the constitution
- •Box I.2. Purposes of constitutions and characteristics of statutes
- •4.2. Absence of norms for constitutions partly explains differences in budget system laws
- •4.3. Hierarchy within primary law also partly explains differences in budget-related laws
- •Box I.3. Hierarchy of laws: The example of Spain
- •4.4. Not all countries complete all steps of formal law-making processes
- •Box I.4. Steps in making law
- •4.5. Greater use is made of secondary law in some countries
- •Table I.1. Delegated legislation and separation of powers
- •4.6. Decisions and regulations of the legislature are particularly important in some countries
- •4.8. Are laws “green lights” or “red lights”?
- •5. Forms of government and budget system laws
- •5.1. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchies
- •5.2. Presidential and semi-presidential governments
- •5.3. Parliamentary republics
- •5.4. Relationship between forms of government and budget system law
- •Table I.2. Differences in selected budgetary powers of the executive and the legislature
- •Figure I.3. Separation of powers and the need to adopt budget-related laws
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Introduction
- •Figure II.1. Density of legal framework for budget systems in 25 OECD countries
- •Table II.1. Legal frameworks for budget systems: 13 OECD countries
- •2. Different purposes of the legal frameworks for budget systems
- •Box II.1. Purposes of budget system laws
- •2.1. Legal necessity?
- •Figure II.2. Budget reforms and changes in budget laws
- •2.2. Budget reform: when is law required?
- •2.3. Elaborating on the budget powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive
- •3. Differences in the legal framework for the main actors in budget systems
- •3.1. Legislatures
- •3.2. Executives
- •Box II.2. New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988
- •3.3. Judiciary
- •3.4. External audit offices
- •Table II.3. External audit legal frameworks: Selected differences
- •3.5. Sub-national governments
- •3.6. Supra-national bodies and international organisations
- •4. Differences in the legal framework for budget processes
- •4.1. Budget preparation by the executive
- •Table II.4. Legal requirements for the date of submission of the budget to the legislature
- •Box II.3. France: Legal requirements for budget information
- •4.2. Parliamentary approval of the budget
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting systems
- •Box II.4. Finland: Legal requirements for annual report and annual accounts
- •Table II.5. Legal requirements for submission of annual report to the legislature: Selected countries
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Have standards for the legal framework of budget systems been drawn up?
- •1.1. Normative and positive approaches to budget law
- •1.2. Limited guidance from normative constitutional economics
- •2. Who should set and monitor legally binding standards?
- •2.1. Role of politicians and bureaucrats
- •2.2. International transmission of budget system laws
- •2.3. International organisations as standard setters
- •Box III.1. The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- •Box III.2. Constitutional norms for external audit: Extracts from the INTOSAI “Lima Declaration”
- •2.4. Monitoring standards
- •3. Principles to support the legal framework of budget systems
- •Box III.3. Ten principles for a budget law
- •3.1. Authoritativeness
- •Table III.1. Stages of the budget cycle and legal instruments
- •3.2. Annual basis
- •3.3. Universality
- •3.4. Unity
- •3.5. Specificity
- •3.6. Balance
- •3.7. Accountability
- •Box III.4. Possible minimum legal norms for budget reporting
- •Box III.5. Ingredients of legal norms for external audit
- •3.8. Transparency
- •Box III.6. Ingredients of legal norms for government agencies
- •3.9. Stability or predictability
- •3.10. Performance (or efficiency, economy, and effectiveness)
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Canada: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Canada: Main provisions of the Spending Control Act 1992
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Canada: Major transfers from the federal to the provincial governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Canada: Key steps in the annual budgeting process
- •Box 5. Canada: Major contents of the main estimates
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. France: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Germany: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 2. Germany: Public agencies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 3. Germany: Budget processes in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit17
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Japan: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Japan: Main contents of the 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Act
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Japan: Grants from central government to local governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Japan: The timetable for the budget process
- •Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Korea: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Korea: Major acts governing the fiscal relationship across government levels
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Korea: Legal requirements for the timetable for budget preparation and deliberation
- •Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
- •Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
- •Box 4. New Zealand: Information required to support the first appropriation act
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Nordic Countries: The main budget system laws or near-laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The constitutions of the four countries
- •Table 1. Nordic countries: Age and size of constitutions
- •3.2. Legislatures
- •Table 2. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the legislatures
- •3.3. The political executive
- •Table 3. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the political executive
- •3.4. Ministries and executive agencies
- •3.5. Civil service
- •3.6. Sub-national governments
- •4. Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting
- •4.1. Authority of Parliament
- •Table 4. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the authority of Parliament
- •4.2. Timing of submission of the annual budget
- •4.3. Non-adoption of the annual budget before the year begins
- •4.4. Content of the budget and types of appropriations
- •4.5. Documents to accompany the draft budget law
- •4.6. Parliamentary committees and budget procedures in Parliament
- •4.7. Parliamentary amendment powers, coalition agreements, two-stage budgeting and fiscal rules
- •4.8. Supplementary budgets
- •4.10. Cancellation of appropriations and contingency funds
- •4.11. Government accounting
- •4.12. Other fiscal reporting and special reports
- •Table 5. Nordic countries: Constitutional requirements for external audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Spain: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
- •Box 3. Spain: The major content of medium-term budget plans
- •Box 4. Spain: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United Kingdom: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system law
- •Box 2. United Kingdom: Reforms of the budget system in the past 20 years
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 3. United Kingdom: Executive agencies and other bodies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 4. United Kingdom: Budget processes in Parliament
- •Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •Table 2. United Kingdom: Transfers of budgetary authority
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United States: Main federal budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. United States: Major transfers between different levels of government
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
- •Box 5. United States: Other information required by law
- •4.2. Budget process in the legislature
- •Box 6. United States: Legal and internal deadlines for congressional budget approval
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •5. Sanctions and non-compliance
- •Notes
- •Bibliography

IV. NEW ZEALAND
mixture of both tied and general grants by central government. Other sources of revenues for territorial authorities are fines and receipts from operations.
4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
4.1.1. Institutional coverage of the budget
The budget estimates are defined as “a statement of the proposed expenses and liabilities to be incurred by the Crown” (s. 2, PFA). The PFA defines the Crown to mean Her Majesty, inclusive of all ministers of the Crown and all departments. Offices of Parliament, Crown entities and SOEs are excluded from the Crown, as are local authorities governed by the LGA. The budget presented to the Parliament includes forecasts covering all departments and agencies in the central government and requests for appropriations by the Crown, departments and offices of Parliament.
4.1.2. Extrabudgetary funds and earmarking of revenues
The scope of the annual appropriations act is limited to the Crown. There are various funds and legal entities whose budgets are approved by bodies other than Parliament. This is the case notably for Crown entities and other public organisations. The Crown Entities Act 2004 classifies Crown entities into various categories. Separate legislation has established most of these, including the New Zealand Superannuation Fund, the Earthquake Commission, and the Accident Compensation Corporation. While the Crown’s purchases of services from Crown entities and capital injections into them are included in the Appropriation Act, their own revenues and expenditures are not included in appropriations. However, all Crown entities, other public bodies (including the central bank), and SOEs are included in the government’s forecasts of total operating revenues and expense, shown in its fiscal and budget strategy documents.
Some revenues – for example income taxes – are not earmarked for specific expenditures. However, net budgeting – the retention of own revenues by departments and the entities under them – is authorised by the PFA (see below). For example, the levies collected by the Accident Compensation Corporation are retained for its use.
4.1.3. Definition of budget aggregates
In its list of definitions, the PFA does not define fiscal aggregates such as “total operating revenues” and “total operating expenses” which are required for fiscal strategy reports and other documents. However, the definition and coverage are made clear in accounting requirements. In particular, the PFA, as amended in 2004, specifies that annual consolidated financial statements of
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“the Government” include, in addition to government departments, all Crown entities, all organisations listed in another schedule to the act, all offices of Parliament (this includes the Auditor General’s Office), all SOEs (named in the schedule to the SOEA), and the Central (Reserve) Bank of New Zealand.2
4.1.4. Fiscal rules
Qualitative fiscal rules are embedded in the FRA. These rules focus on the levels of debt and net worth, as well as fiscal risk and medium-term macrofiscal stability (Box 2). The size of the operating balance (the most important budget balance under accrual accounting) is the main fiscal policy aggregate used for achieving public debt targets.
The law permits the government to depart from these principles and objectives, but only if a departure is temporary and provided that the Minister of Finance specifies: i) the reasons for departure; ii) the approach the government intends to take to return to those principles; and iii) the period of time that the government expects to take to return to those principles.
4.1.5. The timetable for budget preparation and presentation to Parliament
The FRA requires a budget policy statement (BPS) to be presented to the HR not later than 31 March. The BPS sets out the overarching policy goals that will guide the government’s forthcoming budget decisions, the policy areas it will focus on and how the budget will accord with the most recent FSR. The PFA specifies that the date for presenting the budget to the HR – in the form of a first appropriation act – is before the end of the first month after the start of the financial year. A resolution by the HR could require a different date. In practice, the government typically presents the budget to the HR a month before the start of the fiscal year (which begins on 1st July). The entire budget timetable (Box 3) is decided by the government – the PFA’s deadline is barely relevant to actual practice.
4.1.6. Approval process within the executive
Since the adoption of the FRA in 1994, the above budget preparation calendar is conditioned by the requirement for the minister to present to the BPS no later than 31 March (i.e. three months before the beginning the fiscal year). The amendments to the PFA in 2004 resulted in the BPS becoming more focused on budget priorities, consistent with the government’s fiscal strategy report (see below). Following the BPS – which is a pre-budget statement – Cabinet makes final budget decisions.
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Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
●Reducing total debt to prudent levels,* so as to provide a buffer against factors that may impact adversely on the total level of debt. When the FRA was first passed in 1994, New Zealand’s public debt level was judged to be too high. The act required the achievement of operating surpluses on government transactions until prudent levels of debt were achieved. Since debt reduction was to be attained by running operating surpluses, the government was prevented from achieving prudent debt levels simply by selling assets.
●Once prudent levels of total debt have been achieved, maintaining total debt at prudent levels by ensuring that, on average, over a reasonable period of time, total operating expenses do not exceed total operating revenues. The principle implies that once prudent levels of debt have been achieved, the government should not borrow to cover operating expenses. This principle is applied over the medium to long term. In the short term, cyclical factors may result in temporary operating surpluses or deficits.
●Achieving levels of net worth that provide a buffer against factors that impact adversely on net worth, that is, to ensure that if the economy is subject to adverse events, the government is able to borrow without undue risk of moving into an unsustainable net worth position. This objective acknowledges that the government’s financial strength depends on its overall balance sheet position, not just debt.
●Managing prudently the risks facing the government, that is, to recognise risk and where possible to take steps to manage it. The objective requires that governments should actively reduce risks inherent in their assets, liabilities, and off-balance sheet items such as guarantees. Governments should also look to reduce the risks around their operating flows, by actively protecting the tax base and managing expenditure risks.
●Pursuing policies that are consistent with a reasonable degree of predictability about the level and stability of tax rates for future years, that is, to avoid surprises about future tax rates. The objective reflects the importance of stability in tax rates for private sector planning and hence growth.
*The definition of a “prudent” level of debt is not specified in legislation. It is left to the government to specify this in its budget policy statement and fiscal strategy report, and to justify interpretations to Parliament and the public. This allows the government to change its definition of “prudent” in line with determining factors, including the structure of the economy, vulnerability to shocks, demographic pressures, the cost of debt servicing, and the structure of the Crown’s balance sheet.
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Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
August-November: Strategic phase. Ministers determine the budget strategy objectives for the coming three years. The Cabinet considers the relative importance of the outcomes the government wants to achieve for the coming budget. Ministers identify priorities for departmental chief executives to guide preparation of budget submissions. Decisions taken during the strategic phase are the basis for the budget policy statement.
December-February: Preparation of vote budgets and development of budget initiatives. Ministers and chief executives prepare draft budgets and “purchase agreements” for the coming year and make budget plans for the following two years.
February-April: Review of budget baselines. Departments refine budget proposals. The mix of inputs may be changed so long as total expenses do not exceed approved baselines. Cabinet considers ministers’ requests and proposed budget documents. Ministers are expected to keep total expenses for each vote within approved levels. Ministers may request Cabinet to change to baseline projections.
Budget day (no later than 31 July): Presentation of budget documents to the House of Representatives (HR). In practice, the budget is often presented in May or June.
July-September: Finance and Expenditure Committee of the HR reviews budget documents and reports to the House by 30 September.
September-October: House debates Finance and Expenditure Committee’s report. HR must pass the appropriation bill within three months of the delivery of the budget by the government.
4.1.7. Documents to accompany the budget law
On budget day, to accompany the first appropriation (estimates) bill for the new fiscal year, the Minister of Finance must present to the HR the following documents (s. 2, FRA):
●Information that supports the first appropriation bill, including some detail on each vote, each appropriation for expenses, and each appropriation for capital expenditure (see Box 4).
●A fiscal strategy report.
●An economic and fiscal update.
●The future operating intentions of each department, with more detailed information required for the first future financial year.
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