
- •Table of Contents
- •Foreword
- •OECD Journal on Budgeting
- •Board of Advisors
- •Preface
- •Executive Summary
- •Sharp differences exist in the legal framework for budget systems
- •Public finance and legal theories do not explain inter-country differences in budget system laws
- •Political variables and legal culture help explain the inter-country differences
- •Norms for budget systems have been issued and many should be in budget system laws
- •Budget system laws are adopted to strengthen the powers of the legislature or the executive
- •Country studies reveal a multiplicity of reasons for adopting budget-related laws
- •Conclusions
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Budget processes
- •2.1. Budgeting: a five-stage process
- •Figure I.1. The roles of Parliament and the executive in the budget cycle
- •2.2. How are the different legal frameworks for budget systems organised?
- •Figure I.2. Different models for organising the legal framework of budget systems
- •3. Can economic theory explain the differences?
- •3.1. New institutional economics
- •3.2. Law, economics and public choice theory
- •3.3. Constitutional political economy: budgetary rules and budgetary outcomes
- •3.4. Can game theory help?
- •4. Can comparative law explain the differences?
- •4.1. Families of legal systems and the importance of the constitution
- •Box I.2. Purposes of constitutions and characteristics of statutes
- •4.2. Absence of norms for constitutions partly explains differences in budget system laws
- •4.3. Hierarchy within primary law also partly explains differences in budget-related laws
- •Box I.3. Hierarchy of laws: The example of Spain
- •4.4. Not all countries complete all steps of formal law-making processes
- •Box I.4. Steps in making law
- •4.5. Greater use is made of secondary law in some countries
- •Table I.1. Delegated legislation and separation of powers
- •4.6. Decisions and regulations of the legislature are particularly important in some countries
- •4.8. Are laws “green lights” or “red lights”?
- •5. Forms of government and budget system laws
- •5.1. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchies
- •5.2. Presidential and semi-presidential governments
- •5.3. Parliamentary republics
- •5.4. Relationship between forms of government and budget system law
- •Table I.2. Differences in selected budgetary powers of the executive and the legislature
- •Figure I.3. Separation of powers and the need to adopt budget-related laws
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Introduction
- •Figure II.1. Density of legal framework for budget systems in 25 OECD countries
- •Table II.1. Legal frameworks for budget systems: 13 OECD countries
- •2. Different purposes of the legal frameworks for budget systems
- •Box II.1. Purposes of budget system laws
- •2.1. Legal necessity?
- •Figure II.2. Budget reforms and changes in budget laws
- •2.2. Budget reform: when is law required?
- •2.3. Elaborating on the budget powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive
- •3. Differences in the legal framework for the main actors in budget systems
- •3.1. Legislatures
- •3.2. Executives
- •Box II.2. New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988
- •3.3. Judiciary
- •3.4. External audit offices
- •Table II.3. External audit legal frameworks: Selected differences
- •3.5. Sub-national governments
- •3.6. Supra-national bodies and international organisations
- •4. Differences in the legal framework for budget processes
- •4.1. Budget preparation by the executive
- •Table II.4. Legal requirements for the date of submission of the budget to the legislature
- •Box II.3. France: Legal requirements for budget information
- •4.2. Parliamentary approval of the budget
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting systems
- •Box II.4. Finland: Legal requirements for annual report and annual accounts
- •Table II.5. Legal requirements for submission of annual report to the legislature: Selected countries
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Have standards for the legal framework of budget systems been drawn up?
- •1.1. Normative and positive approaches to budget law
- •1.2. Limited guidance from normative constitutional economics
- •2. Who should set and monitor legally binding standards?
- •2.1. Role of politicians and bureaucrats
- •2.2. International transmission of budget system laws
- •2.3. International organisations as standard setters
- •Box III.1. The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- •Box III.2. Constitutional norms for external audit: Extracts from the INTOSAI “Lima Declaration”
- •2.4. Monitoring standards
- •3. Principles to support the legal framework of budget systems
- •Box III.3. Ten principles for a budget law
- •3.1. Authoritativeness
- •Table III.1. Stages of the budget cycle and legal instruments
- •3.2. Annual basis
- •3.3. Universality
- •3.4. Unity
- •3.5. Specificity
- •3.6. Balance
- •3.7. Accountability
- •Box III.4. Possible minimum legal norms for budget reporting
- •Box III.5. Ingredients of legal norms for external audit
- •3.8. Transparency
- •Box III.6. Ingredients of legal norms for government agencies
- •3.9. Stability or predictability
- •3.10. Performance (or efficiency, economy, and effectiveness)
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Canada: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Canada: Main provisions of the Spending Control Act 1992
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Canada: Major transfers from the federal to the provincial governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Canada: Key steps in the annual budgeting process
- •Box 5. Canada: Major contents of the main estimates
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. France: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Germany: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 2. Germany: Public agencies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 3. Germany: Budget processes in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit17
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Japan: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Japan: Main contents of the 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Act
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Japan: Grants from central government to local governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Japan: The timetable for the budget process
- •Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Korea: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Korea: Major acts governing the fiscal relationship across government levels
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Korea: Legal requirements for the timetable for budget preparation and deliberation
- •Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
- •Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
- •Box 4. New Zealand: Information required to support the first appropriation act
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Nordic Countries: The main budget system laws or near-laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The constitutions of the four countries
- •Table 1. Nordic countries: Age and size of constitutions
- •3.2. Legislatures
- •Table 2. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the legislatures
- •3.3. The political executive
- •Table 3. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the political executive
- •3.4. Ministries and executive agencies
- •3.5. Civil service
- •3.6. Sub-national governments
- •4. Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting
- •4.1. Authority of Parliament
- •Table 4. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the authority of Parliament
- •4.2. Timing of submission of the annual budget
- •4.3. Non-adoption of the annual budget before the year begins
- •4.4. Content of the budget and types of appropriations
- •4.5. Documents to accompany the draft budget law
- •4.6. Parliamentary committees and budget procedures in Parliament
- •4.7. Parliamentary amendment powers, coalition agreements, two-stage budgeting and fiscal rules
- •4.8. Supplementary budgets
- •4.10. Cancellation of appropriations and contingency funds
- •4.11. Government accounting
- •4.12. Other fiscal reporting and special reports
- •Table 5. Nordic countries: Constitutional requirements for external audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Spain: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
- •Box 3. Spain: The major content of medium-term budget plans
- •Box 4. Spain: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United Kingdom: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system law
- •Box 2. United Kingdom: Reforms of the budget system in the past 20 years
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 3. United Kingdom: Executive agencies and other bodies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 4. United Kingdom: Budget processes in Parliament
- •Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •Table 2. United Kingdom: Transfers of budgetary authority
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United States: Main federal budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. United States: Major transfers between different levels of government
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
- •Box 5. United States: Other information required by law
- •4.2. Budget process in the legislature
- •Box 6. United States: Legal and internal deadlines for congressional budget approval
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •5. Sanctions and non-compliance
- •Notes
- •Bibliography

IV. GERMANY
Duration of budget system law. The budget system laws are permanent laws, unless they are repealed or amended. Whereas the HGrG needs the consent of the both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat to enact amendments, the federal Constitution and the Federal Budget Code require the consent only of the Bundestag, although the Bundesrat may lodge objections.
Notes
1.The 1969 laws originally applied to West Germany. Following the Unification Treaty of 1990, the HGrG was amended to apply to East Germany, after which each eastern Land adopted an individual budget code.
2.Another of the aims of the StWG was to take the burden of policy adjustment off monetary policy and to make fiscal policy more fast-acting. To this end, new short-term fiscal policy instruments (counter-cyclical funds, limitations on borrowing, and rapid tax increases or decreases) could be implemented by ordinance, thereby avoiding the need for parliamentary approval of new laws. See Hunter (1978) for a fuller discussion.
3.It is not good use of government money to borrow on the capital markets and, at the same time, build up unremunerated government deposits at the central bank. Such a policy provides a hidden subsidy to the central bank.
4.Coverage of entities performing general government functions is incomplete to the extent that private law institutions using commercial accounting are excluded from reporting requirements (see IMF, 2003, paragraph 4).
5.For example, the 1994 coalition agreement stated that the new government aimed to reduce public expenditure to below the pre-unification level of 46% of GDP. However, after 1994, public expenditure continued to grow (see Wurzel, 2003, Figure 21).
6.Agreements reached in the Financial Planning Council, including specific targets for total expenditures of the Federation, each Land, and each social security organisation, could be made legally binding. Nonetheless, expenditure targets do not guarantee the achievement of the aggregate deficit target (IMF, 2003, paragraph 80).
7.Although medium-term financial planning was institutionalised in the late 1960s, annual budget plans were not derived from medium-term plans. According to Derlien (1995, p. 82), it has been the contrary: medium-term plans were updated on the basis of the annual budget.
8.Cameralistic cash accounting for public sector use was invented in Austria some 250 years ago and is primarily used in Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands (Lüder, 2002, footnote 3).
9.See Derlien, 1995, for results of a survey of willingness to serve whatever government is in power.
10.See Table 1 of Wurzel, 2003, for the distribution of functional spending by level of government.
11.The intergovernmental fiscal system is described in several publications, including the Finance Report (Finanzbericht) and a brochure available on the
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IV. GERMANY
Internet site of the Federal Ministry of Finance, www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/ Anlage20651/Finanzbeziehungen-Bund-und-Laender.pdf.
12.A description of the definition is contained in the administrative regulations on the budget classification of the Federation (Verwaltungsvorschriften zur Haushaltssystematik des Bundes, Allgemeine Hinweise zum Gruppierungsplan und zum Funktionenplan, paragraph 3.8.1).
13.Services are reported as a government activity if they are carried out by a government agency, but are not reported if they are carried out by a publicly owned company established under private law. Since the latter are included in the definitions in the national accounts, further coverage adjustments are necessary to convert the official statistical definition of “consolidated government” to that of “general government” as defined in the government finance statistics of the IMF or the system of national accounts (SNA). Wurzel (2003, paragraph 31) discusses some of the differences between official German and European classification norms.
14.Those at federal level are listed in the 2003 Finance Report (Finanzbericht) and in footnote 29 of IMF, 2003.
15.See p. 14 of Creel, 2003, for additional references on this debate.
16.The Council of Experts (“three wise men”) and their reporting responsibilities are specified in the 1963 Law concerning the Appointment of a Council of Experts.
17.This section is largely based on “Mandates of Supreme Audit Institutions – Germany”, www.bundesrechnungshof.de/en/veroeffentlichung/brh_frame_veroeffentlichung.html.
18.Exceptions are made in agreement with the Federal Ministry of Finance and the Federal Court of Audit, on condition that: 1) the public law body does not have a substantial impact on federal government finances; and 2) where the institution is responsible for health, long-term care, accident or pension insurance, if it does not receive any federal grants or if a guarantee obligation by the federal government is not in principle justified (BHO, ss. 111-112).
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Bundesrechnunghof (2002), The Bundesrechnunghof and its Regional Audit Offices, Public Information Service of the German Federal Audit Office, Bonn, www.bundesrechnungshof.de/en/veroeffentlichung/brh_frame_veroeffentlichung.html.
Bundestag (2003), German Bundestag: Legislation, German National Parliament, Berlin,
www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/legislat/index.html (summary information available in
English).
Burmeister, Kerstein (1997), Außerbudgetäe Aktivitäten des Bundes. Eine Analyse der Nebenhaushalte de Bundes unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der finanzhistorischen Entwicklung, Lang, Frankfurt.
Creel, Jérôme (2003), “Ranking Fiscal Policy: the Golden Rule of Public Finance”, Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (OFCE), Economic Research Department, No. 2003-04, OFCE, Paris, July.
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Derlien, Hans-Ulrich (1995), “Public Administration in Germany: Political and Societal Relations”, in Jon Pierre (ed.), Bureaucracy in the Modern State, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, United Kingdom.
Döhler, Marian and Werner Jann (2003), “Germany”, Distributed Public Governance: Agencies, Authorities and other Government Bodies, OECD, Paris, pp. 97-112.
Federal Ministry of Finance (1995), Haushaltsrecht des Bundes (available in translation as Federal German Budget Legislation), Bundesministerium der Finanzen, Bonn, April.
Federal Ministry of Finance (2000), The Budget System of the Federal Republic of Germany, Bundesministerium der Finanzen, Berlin, October.
Federal Ministry of Finance (2004), Accountability and Control in the Federal Republic of Germany, Bundesministerium der Finanzen, Berlin, January.
Hunter, J.S.H. (1978), “The West German Economic Stability and Growth Law”, in P. Bernd Spahn (ed.), Principles of Federal Policy Coordination in the Federal Republic of Germany: Basic Issues and Annotated Legislation, Research Monograph No. 25, Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, The Australian National University, Canberra.
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Lüder, Klaus (2002), “Government Budgeting and Accounting Reform in Germany”, in
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Sturm, Roland and Markus M. Müller (1999), Public Deficits: A Comparative Study of their Economic and Political Consequences in Britain, Canada, Germany and the United States, Pearson Education Limited, Essex, United Kingdom.
Sturm, Roland and Markus M. Müller (2003), “Tempering the Rechtsstaat: Managing Expenditure in Re-unified Germany”, in John Wanna, Lotte Jensen and Jouke de Vries (eds.), Controlling Public Expenditure: The Changing Roles of Central Budget Agencies – Better Guardians?, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, United Kingdom.
Tschentscher, Axel (2002), The Basic Law (Grundgesetz), Jurisprudentia Verlag,
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Wehner, Joachim (2001), “Reconciling Accountability and Fiscal Prudence: A Case Study of the Budgetary Role and Impact of the German Parliament”, The Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2, summer.
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Overview...................................................................................... |
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Principles underlying budget system laws .................................. |
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Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors |
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in the budget system.................................................................... |
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Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle ..................... |
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*This study has benefited from helpful comments from Yutaka Sunayama of the Budget Bureau of the Ministry of Finance, Hideaki Tanaka of the Australian National University, and OECD colleagues.
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