
- •Table of Contents
- •Foreword
- •OECD Journal on Budgeting
- •Board of Advisors
- •Preface
- •Executive Summary
- •Sharp differences exist in the legal framework for budget systems
- •Public finance and legal theories do not explain inter-country differences in budget system laws
- •Political variables and legal culture help explain the inter-country differences
- •Norms for budget systems have been issued and many should be in budget system laws
- •Budget system laws are adopted to strengthen the powers of the legislature or the executive
- •Country studies reveal a multiplicity of reasons for adopting budget-related laws
- •Conclusions
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Budget processes
- •2.1. Budgeting: a five-stage process
- •Figure I.1. The roles of Parliament and the executive in the budget cycle
- •2.2. How are the different legal frameworks for budget systems organised?
- •Figure I.2. Different models for organising the legal framework of budget systems
- •3. Can economic theory explain the differences?
- •3.1. New institutional economics
- •3.2. Law, economics and public choice theory
- •3.3. Constitutional political economy: budgetary rules and budgetary outcomes
- •3.4. Can game theory help?
- •4. Can comparative law explain the differences?
- •4.1. Families of legal systems and the importance of the constitution
- •Box I.2. Purposes of constitutions and characteristics of statutes
- •4.2. Absence of norms for constitutions partly explains differences in budget system laws
- •4.3. Hierarchy within primary law also partly explains differences in budget-related laws
- •Box I.3. Hierarchy of laws: The example of Spain
- •4.4. Not all countries complete all steps of formal law-making processes
- •Box I.4. Steps in making law
- •4.5. Greater use is made of secondary law in some countries
- •Table I.1. Delegated legislation and separation of powers
- •4.6. Decisions and regulations of the legislature are particularly important in some countries
- •4.8. Are laws “green lights” or “red lights”?
- •5. Forms of government and budget system laws
- •5.1. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchies
- •5.2. Presidential and semi-presidential governments
- •5.3. Parliamentary republics
- •5.4. Relationship between forms of government and budget system law
- •Table I.2. Differences in selected budgetary powers of the executive and the legislature
- •Figure I.3. Separation of powers and the need to adopt budget-related laws
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Introduction
- •Figure II.1. Density of legal framework for budget systems in 25 OECD countries
- •Table II.1. Legal frameworks for budget systems: 13 OECD countries
- •2. Different purposes of the legal frameworks for budget systems
- •Box II.1. Purposes of budget system laws
- •2.1. Legal necessity?
- •Figure II.2. Budget reforms and changes in budget laws
- •2.2. Budget reform: when is law required?
- •2.3. Elaborating on the budget powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive
- •3. Differences in the legal framework for the main actors in budget systems
- •3.1. Legislatures
- •3.2. Executives
- •Box II.2. New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988
- •3.3. Judiciary
- •3.4. External audit offices
- •Table II.3. External audit legal frameworks: Selected differences
- •3.5. Sub-national governments
- •3.6. Supra-national bodies and international organisations
- •4. Differences in the legal framework for budget processes
- •4.1. Budget preparation by the executive
- •Table II.4. Legal requirements for the date of submission of the budget to the legislature
- •Box II.3. France: Legal requirements for budget information
- •4.2. Parliamentary approval of the budget
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting systems
- •Box II.4. Finland: Legal requirements for annual report and annual accounts
- •Table II.5. Legal requirements for submission of annual report to the legislature: Selected countries
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Have standards for the legal framework of budget systems been drawn up?
- •1.1. Normative and positive approaches to budget law
- •1.2. Limited guidance from normative constitutional economics
- •2. Who should set and monitor legally binding standards?
- •2.1. Role of politicians and bureaucrats
- •2.2. International transmission of budget system laws
- •2.3. International organisations as standard setters
- •Box III.1. The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- •Box III.2. Constitutional norms for external audit: Extracts from the INTOSAI “Lima Declaration”
- •2.4. Monitoring standards
- •3. Principles to support the legal framework of budget systems
- •Box III.3. Ten principles for a budget law
- •3.1. Authoritativeness
- •Table III.1. Stages of the budget cycle and legal instruments
- •3.2. Annual basis
- •3.3. Universality
- •3.4. Unity
- •3.5. Specificity
- •3.6. Balance
- •3.7. Accountability
- •Box III.4. Possible minimum legal norms for budget reporting
- •Box III.5. Ingredients of legal norms for external audit
- •3.8. Transparency
- •Box III.6. Ingredients of legal norms for government agencies
- •3.9. Stability or predictability
- •3.10. Performance (or efficiency, economy, and effectiveness)
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Canada: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Canada: Main provisions of the Spending Control Act 1992
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Canada: Major transfers from the federal to the provincial governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Canada: Key steps in the annual budgeting process
- •Box 5. Canada: Major contents of the main estimates
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. France: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Germany: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 2. Germany: Public agencies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 3. Germany: Budget processes in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit17
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Japan: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Japan: Main contents of the 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Act
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Japan: Grants from central government to local governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Japan: The timetable for the budget process
- •Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Korea: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Korea: Major acts governing the fiscal relationship across government levels
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Korea: Legal requirements for the timetable for budget preparation and deliberation
- •Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
- •Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
- •Box 4. New Zealand: Information required to support the first appropriation act
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Nordic Countries: The main budget system laws or near-laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The constitutions of the four countries
- •Table 1. Nordic countries: Age and size of constitutions
- •3.2. Legislatures
- •Table 2. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the legislatures
- •3.3. The political executive
- •Table 3. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the political executive
- •3.4. Ministries and executive agencies
- •3.5. Civil service
- •3.6. Sub-national governments
- •4. Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting
- •4.1. Authority of Parliament
- •Table 4. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the authority of Parliament
- •4.2. Timing of submission of the annual budget
- •4.3. Non-adoption of the annual budget before the year begins
- •4.4. Content of the budget and types of appropriations
- •4.5. Documents to accompany the draft budget law
- •4.6. Parliamentary committees and budget procedures in Parliament
- •4.7. Parliamentary amendment powers, coalition agreements, two-stage budgeting and fiscal rules
- •4.8. Supplementary budgets
- •4.10. Cancellation of appropriations and contingency funds
- •4.11. Government accounting
- •4.12. Other fiscal reporting and special reports
- •Table 5. Nordic countries: Constitutional requirements for external audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Spain: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
- •Box 3. Spain: The major content of medium-term budget plans
- •Box 4. Spain: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United Kingdom: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system law
- •Box 2. United Kingdom: Reforms of the budget system in the past 20 years
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 3. United Kingdom: Executive agencies and other bodies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 4. United Kingdom: Budget processes in Parliament
- •Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •Table 2. United Kingdom: Transfers of budgetary authority
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United States: Main federal budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. United States: Major transfers between different levels of government
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
- •Box 5. United States: Other information required by law
- •4.2. Budget process in the legislature
- •Box 6. United States: Legal and internal deadlines for congressional budget approval
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •5. Sanctions and non-compliance
- •Notes
- •Bibliography

IV. GERMANY
reporting requirement. They have to prepare accounts as close as possible to those of federal ministries (BHO, s. 87).
4.5. External audit17
The Federal Court of Audit (Bundesrechnungshof), including its nine regional audit offices, performs the external audit functions at federal level. The legal basis for the Federal Court of Audit and its working procedures are mainly contained in the Constitution, the BHO and the 1985 Bundesrechnungshof Act. Independent courts of audit also exist at Länder level – they perform at Länder level a role similar to that of the Federal Court of Audit at federal level. Their legal basis is established in Länder constitutions and laws; these are not covered in this sub-section.
4.5.1. Managerial, financial and operational independence
The Federal Court of Audit is not part of the legislative, judicial or executive branches of government. It has an independent status and is subject only to the law. This special feature distinguishes the external audit body from internal audit bodies that are integrated into ministries and various agencies. Functionally, the Federal Court of Audit provides assistance to the federal Parliament and the federal government (Bundesrechnungshof Act, s. 1).
Upon a proposal of the federal government, Parliament elects the president and vice-president of the Federal Court of Audit, for a non-renewable period of 12 years (Bundesrechnungshof Act, s. 5). The staff of the Federal Court of Audit – about 700 established posts – is made up of members (president, vice-president, senior audit directors and audit directors), audit managers, auditors and support staff. The Constitution specifies that the members of the Federal Court of Audit enjoy the same independence as judges (GG, Art. 114). In respect to their duties, they are governed by the same regulations as those applied to the judges of federal supreme courts (Bundesrechnungshof Act, s. 3). Internally, decisions are made collegially, including by “colleges” and a “senate”, whose composition and functions are outlined in the Bundesrechnungshof Act.
In the budget preparation procedure, the budget of the Federal Court of Audit enjoys the same protection as the budgets of other constitutional bodies. If a draft budget adopted by the federal government diverges from the estimates of the Federal Court of Audit without the latter having agreed to the changes, the estimates of the Federal Court of Audit must be presented to the Parliament unchanged (BHO, s. 29.3). Parliament is thereby informed of the differences of opinion between the Federal Court of Audit and the federal government. The accounts pertaining to the annual budget of the Federal Court of Audit are examined each year by the two chambers of Parliament, who grant discharge (BHO, Art. 101).
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The president of the Federal Court of Audit is responsible for general management (Bundesrechnungshof Act, s. 6), including recruitment of staff. However, members must be qualified for a career in audit and at least onethird of members must be qualified to hold judicial office (s. 3).
4.5.2. Institutional coverage of audits
The Federal Court of Audit has very broad audit responsibilities, covering “the entire financial management of the Federation, including its separate property funds” (BHO, s. 88). This authority covers nearly all public law corporations and social security institutions established under federal law,18 and enterprises established under private law in which the Federation is a stakeholder (HGrG, ss. 53 and 55; BHO, ss. 104 and 111). In addition, the Federal Court of Audit may audit bodies outside the federal administration if they implement parts of the federal budget or have been reimbursed by the Federation, or receive federal grants (BHO, s. 91). The Federal Court of Audit may restrict its audit coverage at its own discretion. Joint audits with Länder audit courts take place when responsibilities overlap (BHO, s. 93).
4.5.3. Types of audit
The Constitution requires the Federal Court of Audit to audit the accounts and determine whether public finances have been properly and efficiently administered (GG, Art. 114). Audits examine whether the regulations and principles of correct financial management have been observed (BHO, s. 90). The BHO specifies:
●financial audits (“whether the budget act has been adhered to”);
●compliance audits (“receipts and payments have been properly substantiated by vouchers”);
●value-for-money audits (“funds are administered efficiently and economically” and “functions might be performed with fewer human or material resources, or more effectively by other means”).
Besides audit, the Federal Court of Audit is charged with advisory responsibilities. First, it has to be consulted prior to the issuance of administrative regulations for implementing the Federal Budget Code (BHO, s. 103). This affects particularly regulations concerning financial transactions and accounting systems. For their part, the federal authorities are required to inform the Federal Court of Audit, without delay, whenever there are new federal regulations relating to the management of federal budget funds or affecting federal receipts and payments (BHO, s. 102). Second, the Federal Court of Audit participates in budget negotiations between the Federal Ministry of Finance and departments [BHO, s. 27(2)]. Third, the Federal Court of Audit provides testimony to Parliament in the course of preparatory talks with
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the chairs of the parliamentary Appropriations Committee and during that committee’s deliberations. There is no legislation requiring this involvement of the Federal Court of Audit in the parliamentary deliberations on the budget, which represents a special case of advising the Parliament. The Federal Court of Audit serves as a valuable source of information for the Appropriations Committee, as it informs and advises the rapporteurs of all the parliamentary political parties in a professional and politically neutral manner.
4.5.4. Powers of investigation
The Federal Court of Audit is authorised to obtain all the necessary information for carrying out its functions: all documents must be provided within the prescribed time periods (BHO, s. 95).
4.5.5. Reporting obligations and publication
The Constitution requires the Federal Court of Audit to submit an annual report directly to the federal government as well as to the Bundestag and the Bundesrat (GG, Art. 114). The BHO elaborates: “the Federal Court of Audit shall compile annual observations for the two chambers of Parliament, including the results necessary for the discharge of the federal government in respect to the budget and capital accounts.” Any confidential observations shall be transmitted to a more limited audience (BHO, s. 97). Besides an annual report, the Federal Court of Audit may at any time inform both chambers of Parliament of matters of particular importance, provided it informs the federal government at the same time (BHO, s. 99). The law does not require publication, although as a rule, these reports are disclosed to the public. In addition to reports to Parliament, the Federal Court of Audit carries out about 600 audit missions each year, providing relevant report findings to the audited bodies.
4.5.6. Enforcement of findings
The Bundestag shall, with due regard to the comments of the Bundesrat, ascertain the substantial matters raised in the annual report of the Federal Court of Audit and shall decide on the action to be taken (BHO, s. 114). The Federal Court of Audit has no independent powers to enforce its findings – it must convince parliamentary committees by the force of its arguments. Parliament must ensure follow-up: the Bundestag sets a date by which the federal government must report back to Parliament on the action taken. When such action has failed to achieve the desired result, either chamber may take up the matter again (BHO, s. 114). As a practice (not a legal requirement), the Federal Court of Audit issues an audit impact report stating whether and how the audit recommendations have been supported by Parliament and what remedial action has been taken.
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