
- •Table of Contents
- •Foreword
- •OECD Journal on Budgeting
- •Board of Advisors
- •Preface
- •Executive Summary
- •Sharp differences exist in the legal framework for budget systems
- •Public finance and legal theories do not explain inter-country differences in budget system laws
- •Political variables and legal culture help explain the inter-country differences
- •Norms for budget systems have been issued and many should be in budget system laws
- •Budget system laws are adopted to strengthen the powers of the legislature or the executive
- •Country studies reveal a multiplicity of reasons for adopting budget-related laws
- •Conclusions
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Budget processes
- •2.1. Budgeting: a five-stage process
- •Figure I.1. The roles of Parliament and the executive in the budget cycle
- •2.2. How are the different legal frameworks for budget systems organised?
- •Figure I.2. Different models for organising the legal framework of budget systems
- •3. Can economic theory explain the differences?
- •3.1. New institutional economics
- •3.2. Law, economics and public choice theory
- •3.3. Constitutional political economy: budgetary rules and budgetary outcomes
- •3.4. Can game theory help?
- •4. Can comparative law explain the differences?
- •4.1. Families of legal systems and the importance of the constitution
- •Box I.2. Purposes of constitutions and characteristics of statutes
- •4.2. Absence of norms for constitutions partly explains differences in budget system laws
- •4.3. Hierarchy within primary law also partly explains differences in budget-related laws
- •Box I.3. Hierarchy of laws: The example of Spain
- •4.4. Not all countries complete all steps of formal law-making processes
- •Box I.4. Steps in making law
- •4.5. Greater use is made of secondary law in some countries
- •Table I.1. Delegated legislation and separation of powers
- •4.6. Decisions and regulations of the legislature are particularly important in some countries
- •4.8. Are laws “green lights” or “red lights”?
- •5. Forms of government and budget system laws
- •5.1. Constitutional or parliamentary monarchies
- •5.2. Presidential and semi-presidential governments
- •5.3. Parliamentary republics
- •5.4. Relationship between forms of government and budget system law
- •Table I.2. Differences in selected budgetary powers of the executive and the legislature
- •Figure I.3. Separation of powers and the need to adopt budget-related laws
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Introduction
- •Figure II.1. Density of legal framework for budget systems in 25 OECD countries
- •Table II.1. Legal frameworks for budget systems: 13 OECD countries
- •2. Different purposes of the legal frameworks for budget systems
- •Box II.1. Purposes of budget system laws
- •2.1. Legal necessity?
- •Figure II.2. Budget reforms and changes in budget laws
- •2.2. Budget reform: when is law required?
- •2.3. Elaborating on the budget powers of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive
- •3. Differences in the legal framework for the main actors in budget systems
- •3.1. Legislatures
- •3.2. Executives
- •Box II.2. New Zealand’s State Sector Act 1988
- •3.3. Judiciary
- •3.4. External audit offices
- •Table II.3. External audit legal frameworks: Selected differences
- •3.5. Sub-national governments
- •3.6. Supra-national bodies and international organisations
- •4. Differences in the legal framework for budget processes
- •4.1. Budget preparation by the executive
- •Table II.4. Legal requirements for the date of submission of the budget to the legislature
- •Box II.3. France: Legal requirements for budget information
- •4.2. Parliamentary approval of the budget
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting systems
- •Box II.4. Finland: Legal requirements for annual report and annual accounts
- •Table II.5. Legal requirements for submission of annual report to the legislature: Selected countries
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Have standards for the legal framework of budget systems been drawn up?
- •1.1. Normative and positive approaches to budget law
- •1.2. Limited guidance from normative constitutional economics
- •2. Who should set and monitor legally binding standards?
- •2.1. Role of politicians and bureaucrats
- •2.2. International transmission of budget system laws
- •2.3. International organisations as standard setters
- •Box III.1. The OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency
- •Box III.2. Constitutional norms for external audit: Extracts from the INTOSAI “Lima Declaration”
- •2.4. Monitoring standards
- •3. Principles to support the legal framework of budget systems
- •Box III.3. Ten principles for a budget law
- •3.1. Authoritativeness
- •Table III.1. Stages of the budget cycle and legal instruments
- •3.2. Annual basis
- •3.3. Universality
- •3.4. Unity
- •3.5. Specificity
- •3.6. Balance
- •3.7. Accountability
- •Box III.4. Possible minimum legal norms for budget reporting
- •Box III.5. Ingredients of legal norms for external audit
- •3.8. Transparency
- •Box III.6. Ingredients of legal norms for government agencies
- •3.9. Stability or predictability
- •3.10. Performance (or efficiency, economy, and effectiveness)
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Canada: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Canada: Main provisions of the Spending Control Act 1992
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Roles and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Canada: Major transfers from the federal to the provincial governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Canada: Key steps in the annual budgeting process
- •Box 5. Canada: Major contents of the main estimates
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 6. Canada: The budget approval process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. France: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. France: Key features of the Local Government Code
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Germany: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 2. Germany: Public agencies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 3. Germany: Budget processes in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit17
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Japan: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •Box 2. Japan: Main contents of the 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Act
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Japan: Grants from central government to local governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Japan: The timetable for the budget process
- •Box 5. Japan: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Korea: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. Korea: Major acts governing the fiscal relationship across government levels
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. Korea: Legal requirements for the timetable for budget preparation and deliberation
- •Box 5. Korea: Other documents annexed to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. New Zealand: Fiscal responsibility (legal provisions)
- •Box 3. New Zealand: Key steps and dates for budget preparation by the government
- •Box 4. New Zealand: Information required to support the first appropriation act
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Nordic Countries: The main budget system laws or near-laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The constitutions of the four countries
- •Table 1. Nordic countries: Age and size of constitutions
- •3.2. Legislatures
- •Table 2. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the legislatures
- •3.3. The political executive
- •Table 3. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the political executive
- •3.4. Ministries and executive agencies
- •3.5. Civil service
- •3.6. Sub-national governments
- •4. Constitutional and other legal requirements for budgeting
- •4.1. Authority of Parliament
- •Table 4. Nordic countries: Constitutional provisions for the authority of Parliament
- •4.2. Timing of submission of the annual budget
- •4.3. Non-adoption of the annual budget before the year begins
- •4.4. Content of the budget and types of appropriations
- •4.5. Documents to accompany the draft budget law
- •4.6. Parliamentary committees and budget procedures in Parliament
- •4.7. Parliamentary amendment powers, coalition agreements, two-stage budgeting and fiscal rules
- •4.8. Supplementary budgets
- •4.10. Cancellation of appropriations and contingency funds
- •4.11. Government accounting
- •4.12. Other fiscal reporting and special reports
- •Table 5. Nordic countries: Constitutional requirements for external audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. Spain: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 2. Spain: The timetable for the budget process (based on the fiscal year 2003)
- •Box 3. Spain: The major content of medium-term budget plans
- •Box 4. Spain: Additional documents attached to the draft budget
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United Kingdom: Main budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system law
- •Box 2. United Kingdom: Reforms of the budget system in the past 20 years
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •Box 3. United Kingdom: Executive agencies and other bodies
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •4.2. Budget process in Parliament
- •Box 4. United Kingdom: Budget processes in Parliament
- •Table 1. United Kingdom: Format of appropriation adopted by Parliament for Department X
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •Table 2. United Kingdom: Transfers of budgetary authority
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •Box 5. United Kingdom: External audit arrangements
- •Notes
- •Bibliography
- •1. Overview
- •1.1. The legal framework governing budget processes
- •Box 1. United States: Main federal budget system laws
- •1.2. Reforms of budget system laws
- •2. Principles underlying budget system laws
- •3. Legal basis for the establishment and the powers of the actors in the budget system
- •3.1. The executive and the legislature
- •3.2. Role and responsibilities of sub-national governments
- •Box 3. United States: Major transfers between different levels of government
- •4. Legal provisions for each stage of the budget cycle
- •4.1. Budget preparation and presentation by the executive
- •Box 4. United States: Key steps in the annual budget process within the executive
- •Box 5. United States: Other information required by law
- •4.2. Budget process in the legislature
- •Box 6. United States: Legal and internal deadlines for congressional budget approval
- •4.3. Budget execution
- •4.4. Government accounting and fiscal reporting
- •4.5. External audit
- •5. Sanctions and non-compliance
- •Notes
- •Bibliography

IV. UNITED STATES
in violation of the law. He/she also reports on the adequacy and effectiveness of administrative audits of accounts and claims in an agency and on the inspections by an agency of offices and accounts. When the Comptroller General submits a report to Congress, he/she delivers copies of the report to the appropriations committees of each house, the Committee on Governmental Affairs (Senate), the Committee on Government Operations (House of Representatives), and the committee of Congress that requested information on the execution of a programme or activity of a department or other agency.
4.5.6. Enforcement of findings
When the Comptroller General makes a report that includes a recommendation to the head of an agency, the head of the agency must submit a written statement on action taken on the recommendation (s. 720). A 60-day limit for the submission of such statements to house committees is specified.
5. Sanctions and non-compliance
Titles 13 and 15 provide sanctions against overspending appropriations and provide penalties in case of non-compliance. First, a federal government officer may not make or authorise expenditures or obligations exceeding amounts available in an appropriation or fund. Nor may government employees involve the government in a contract or obligation for the payment of money before an appropriation is made unless authorised by law (s. 1341). Second, a government officer may not make or authorise an expenditure or obligation exceeding the amount apportioned by the OMB (s. 1517). Third, a government officer may not make or authorise an expenditure or obligation exceeding an allotment or sub-allotment (subdivisions of funds made by the Secretary of the Department below the OMB apportionment).
A government employee who violates s. 1341(a) is subject to administrative discipline including suspension from duty without pay or removal from office (s. 1349). If an officer or employee knowingly and willfully violates s. 1341(a), he/she can be fined up to a maximum of $5 000, imprisoned for up to two years, or both (s. 1350). The same rule applies to an officer or employee violating s. 1517.
Notes
1.This chapter is mainly limited to federal government budgeting processes. Each state has its own constitution and set of budget laws.
2.The Office of Management and Budget lists eight principal laws as the basic laws governing the federal budget process (OMB, 2004a): the Constitution; the Antideficiency Act 1905; Chapter 11 of Title 31, United States Code; the Congressional
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Budget and Impoundment Control Act 1974; the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act 1985; the Budget Enforcement Act 1990; the Federal Credit Reform Act 1990; and the Government Performance and Results Act 1993. By contrast, the Congressional Research Service lists 18 laws as governing financial management, budget and accounting in the federal budget, including most of the laws in Box 1 (CRS, 2001).
3.The BEA’s most important provisions, namely the caps on discretionary spending and the PAYGO rules for mandatory spending and revenue legislation expired at the end of fiscal year 2002 (30 September). The rest of the act is still an integral part of the federal budget process. See, for example, CBO, 2003.
4.The United States Code is the codification by subject matter of the general and permanent laws of the United States based on what is printed in the Statutes at Large. It is divided by broad subjects into 50 titles and published by the Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the House of Representatives. Hereinafter, all United States Code references are abbreviated to “Title X”.
5.For more information, see Schick, 2002, and Senate Budget Committee, 1998a.
6.In the early 1970s, President Nixon repeatedly asserted authority (as had many of his predecessors) to withhold from federal agencies money appropriated by Congress. By 1973, it was believed that the President had impounded “excessive” amounts of spending previously approved by Congress.
7.In 1987, the Supreme Court ruled that the provision of GRH Act that vested certain powers in the GAO violated the separation of powers doctrine of the Constitution. Congress enacted the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act which corrected the constitutional flaw in the GRH Act by assigning all the sequestration responsibilities to the OMB.
8.Initially set to expire in 1995, the procedures were extended twice – in 1993 and in 1997 – as part of two subsequent multi-year deficit-reduction agreements that also aimed at reducing or eliminating deficits. In each extension, the basic framework of the BEA was continued without major substantive changes.
9.Proposals include: reinstituting discretionary caps and PAYGO (excluding revenue legislation) for 2005-09, stricter standards for emergency designation in the BEA, changed requirements for the baseline, and line-item veto. Such proposals were included in the President’s 2005 budget proposal (www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/ fy2005/pdf/spec.pdf). See also CBO, 2003.
10.The PART consists of four sets of about 30 questions. The first set gauges whether programme design and purposes are clear and defensible. The second set involves strategic planning and weighs whether the agency sets valid annual and longterm goals for programmes. The third set rates agency management of programmes, including financial oversight and programme improvement efforts. The fourth set of questions focuses on programme results and reporting with accuracy and consistency.
11.In 1995, Congress passed the Line-Item Veto Act, which gave the President a statutory equivalent of a line-item veto. The act was challenged in the courts, and in June 1998 the Supreme Court ruled that the act violated the Constitution by permitting the President to unilaterally cancel spending without the agreement of Congress.
12.Including the Department of Homeland Security, created by the Homeland Security Act 2002 which is 187 pages long. The law’s length is an indicator of the
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extent to which Congress specifies functions and organisational structures in government.
13.See www.house.gov/rules/RX.htm for Rules of the House, and http://rules.senate.gov/ senaterules/rule25.htm for Standing Rules of the Senate.
14.For a discussion of state tax expenditures, see Mikesell, 2002.
15.For a more general discussion of contingent liabilities and other sources of fiscal risk, see GAO, 2003.
16.The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 added a new Title V to the CBA, notably the “Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990”. The four stated purposes of the FCRA are to: 1) measure more accurately the costs of federal programmes; 2) place the cost of credit programmes on a budgetary basis equivalent to other federal spending; 3) encourage the delivery of benefits in the form most appropriate to the needs of beneficiaries; and 4) improve the allocation of resources among credit programmes and other spending (s. 501).
17.CBA points of order are a device by which any member of Congress can object to an amendment or a piece of legislation on the grounds that it is not within the limits set out in the budget resolution. For more discussion on this issue, see Heniff, 2001a, and Heniff, 2001b.
18.The US Treasury has noted that this definition lacks economic coherence, as it includes government “debt” owed to itself, but does not include a full measure of the government’s unfunded liabilities. See National Debt fact sheet, www.ustreas.gov/education/faq/markets/national-debt.html#q1.
19.The original Impoundment Control Act permitted the President to defer funds for policy reasons.
20.For more information, see the Internet site of the Department of the Treasury, www.fms.treas.gov/aboutfms/welcometofms.html.
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OECD Journal on Budgeting
Special Issue
The Legal Framework for Budget Systems
AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
The legal basis for budget processes and budget actors varies enormously across OECD countries. For example, the United States has a dozen major laws to support federal government budget processes, while Denmark and Norway have never adopted any such law.
To understand this situation, this book compares legal frameworks for budgeting in 13 selected OECD countries. It presents detailed case studies of national budget system laws and identifies why the legal frameworks differ so much. The book also looks at theories of public finance and constitutional political economics, and discusses norms for an optimum legal framework.
With a focus on similarities and differences in formal laws (constitutions and statutes relating to the budget system), the comparative analysis will be useful for any government planning to reform its budget laws.
OECD’s books, periodicals and statistical databases are now available via
www.SourceOECD.org, our online library.
This book is available to subscribers to the following SourceOECD themes:
Finance and Investment/Insurance and Pensions Governance
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