- •I have been glad to finish it when and how I could. I do
- •Imperfect, it is worthless. And I must suggest to the
- •Interest, or when they show no longer any tendency to
- •Its part to supersede other functions of the human mind;
- •Intellectual effort to understand the universe is a
- •It, may be a harder self-surrender. And this appears to
- •It matters very little how in detail we work with it.
- •Visual, it must be coloured; and if it is tactual, or
- •Indisputable. Extension cannot be presented, or thought
- •Intelligible. We find the world's contents grouped into
- •I presume we shall be answered in this way. Even
- •Indefensible. The qualities, as distinct, are always
- •Information, and can discover with my own ears no trace
- •Into relations, which, in the end, end in nothing. And
- •Incomprehensible. And then this diversity, by itself,
- •In which it disappears. The pieces of duration, each
- •If you want to take a piece of duration as present and
- •Is felt to be not compatible with a. Mere a would still
- •It is only our own way of going on, the answer is
- •If we require truth in any strict sense, we must confine
- •In any given case we seem able to apply the names
- •It never would have done if left to itself--suffers a
- •Inner nature which comes out in the result, activity has
- •It is hard to say what, as a matter of fact, is
- •2. The congeries inside a man at one given moment
- •Its individual form. His wife possibly, or his child,
- •3. Let us then take, as before, a man's mind,
- •Identity, and any one who thinks that he knows what he
- •Is important, but the decision, if there is one, appears
- •Is there any more cause for doubt? Surely in every case
- •Introspection discloses this or that feature in
- •Inconsistent internally. If the reader will recall the
- •Itself, or generally the self-apprehension of the self
- •Intend to consider it, the result is the same. The
- •If self-consciousness is no more than you say, do we
- •Indeed serve to show that certain views were not true;
- •It as we cannot, would leave us simply with a very
- •Issue. Of those who take their principle of
- •Its most consistent form, I suppose, it takes its
- •Is the world of experience and knowledge--in every sense
- •Irrelevant excuse for neglecting our own concerns.
- •Is there an absolute criterion? This question, to my
- •Information. If we think, then certainly we are not
- •It at length. For the test in the main lies ready to our
- •In idea unless also it were real. We might
- •It is in some ways natural to suppose that the
- •It is not proved that all pain must arise from an
- •In our experience the result of pain is disquietude and
- •Is that some feature in the "what" of a given fact
- •Is aiming at suicide. We have seen that in judgment we
- •It, there would be no difference left between your
- •Itself in a mirror, or, like a squirrel in a cage, to
- •Impossibility, if it became actual, would still leave us
- •In immediacy. The subject claims the character of a
- •Incomplete form. And in desire for the completion of
- •Itself even in opposition to the whole--all will be
- •It is free from self-contradiction. The justification
- •Information, and it need imply nothing worse than
- •Is not false appearance, because it is nothing. On the
- •I confess that I shrink from using metaphors, since
- •Includes and overrides. And, with this, the last
- •I will for the present admit the point of view which
- •Itself." This would be a serious misunderstanding. It is
- •In the reality. Thus a man might be ignorant of the
- •It will be objected perhaps that in this manner we do
- •1. The first point which will engage us is the unity
- •2. I will pass now to another point, the direction of
- •If apprehended, show both directions harmoniously
- •It is not hard to conceive a variety of time-series
- •It runs--this is all matter, we may say, of individual
- •It, a change has happened within X. But, if so, then
- •Is no objection against the general possibility. And
- •Implied in the last word. I am not going to inquire here
- •Individual character. The "this" is real for us in a
- •In whatever sense you take it. There is nothing there
- •It has doubtless a positive character, but, excluding
- •Is essential. They exist, in other words, for my present
- •It may be well at this point perhaps to look back on the
- •In our First Book we examined various ways of taking
- •Is it possible, on the other side, to identify reality
- •Increase of special internal particulars. And so we
- •In our nineteenth chapter, that a character of this kind
- •Is, for each of us, an abstraction from the entire
- •It as it is, and as it exists apart from them. And we
- •Views the world as what he must believe it cannot be.
- •Interrelation between the organism and Nature, a mistake
- •In its bare principle I am able to accept this
- •Independence which would seem to be the distinctive mark
- •View, we shall surely be still less inclined to
- •Insufficient. We can think, in a manner, of sensible
- •Is, as we should perceive it; but we need not rest our
- •Imperceptibles of physics in any better case. Apart from
- •Invited to state his own. But I venture to think that,
- •Illusive, and exists only through misunderstanding. For
- •Ideas, inconsistent but useful--will they, on that
- •Inability to perceive that, in such a science, something
- •In the Absolute these, of course, possess a unity, we
- •It is certain first of all that two parts of one
- •In life this narrow view of Nature (as we saw) is not
- •In a later context. We shall have hereafter to discuss
- •Very largely, ideal. It shows an ideal process which,
- •Immediate unity of quality and being which comes in the
- •Is to have the quality which makes it itself. Hence
- •Is, with souls, less profoundly broken up and destroyed.
- •Is appearance, and any description of it must
- •2. We have seen, so far, that our phenomenal view of
- •Vicious dilemma. Because in our life there is more than
- •Is to purge ourselves of our groundless prejudice, and
- •It is perhaps necessary, though wearisome, to add
- •Its detail as one undivided totality, certainly then the
- •Instructions. To admit that the sequence a--b--c does
- •It is a state of soul going along with a state of body,
- •It is only where irregularity is forced on our
- •Interval, during which it has ceased to exist, we have
- •In the course of events, some matter might itself result
- •Is personal to the mind of another, would in the end be
- •Identity of our structure that this is so; and our
- •Is opaque to the others which surround it. With regard
- •Inapplicable to the worlds we call internal. Nor again,
- •Indivisible, even in idea. There would be no meaning in
- •Identity is unreal. And hence the conclusion, which more
- •Is to keep any meaning, as soon as sameness is wholly
- •Identity always implies and depends upon difference; and
- •In the working of pleasure and pain, that which operates
- •In fact, to that problem of "dispositions," which we
- •Insisted that, none the less, ideal identity between
- •Ideas, self-consistent and complete; and by this
- •Validity. I do not simply mean by this term that, for
- •Imperfections, in other words, we should have to make a
- •Ideally qualifies Reality. To question, or to doubt, or
- •Idea must be altered. More or less, they all require a
- •Is necessary to take account of laws. These are more and
- •Is to fall short of perfection; and, in the end, any
- •Included reality. And we have to consider in each case
- •Intellectual standard? And I think we are driven to this
- •View of truth and reality such as I have been
- •Is lacking. You may measure the reality of anything by
- •In other words transcendence of self; and that which
- •Is, once more, drawn from this basis. But the error now
- •Insubordinate. And its concrete character now evidently
- •Inconsistent and defective. And we have perceived, on
- •Inadmissible. We ought not to speak of potential
- •Its own existing character. The individuality, in other
- •Is given by outer necessity. But necessary relation of
- •Inclusion within some ideal whole, and, on that basis,
- •Is simply this, that, standing on one side of such a
- •Idea must certainly somehow be real. It goes beyond this
- •Valid because it holds, in the end, of every possible
- •Is measured by the idea of perfect Reality. The lower is
- •Insist that the presence of an idea is essential to
- •Implication, deny, is the direction of desire in the end
- •It manifests itself throughout in various degrees of
- •I am about, in other words, to invite attention to
- •Individual being must inevitably in some degree suffer.
- •If so, once more we have been brought back to the
- •Internally inconsistent and so irrational. But the
- •Itself as an apotheosis of unreason or of popular
- •Is worthless, has opened that self to receive worth from
- •Inner discrepancy however pervades the whole field of
- •Inconsistent emptiness; and, qualified by his relation
- •It is then driven forwards and back between both, like a
- •In religion it is precisely the chief end upon which we
- •Itself but appearance. It is but one appearance
- •Its disruption. As long as the content stands for
- •In the next chapter I shall once more consider if it is
- •Internally that has undistinguished unity. Now of these
- •Immediate unity of a finite psychical centre. It means
- •Influence the mass which it confronts, so as to lead
- •Vanished. Thus the attitude of practice, like all the
- •It has also an object with a certain character, but yet
- •Intelligence and will. Before we see anything of this in
- •Vagueness, and its strength lies in the uncertain sense
- •Is produced by will, and that, so far as it is, it is an
- •Ideal distinction which I have never made, may none the
- •Very essence of these functions, and we hence did not
- •Idea desired in one case remains merely desired, in
- •In their essences a connection supplied from without.
- •I feel compelled, in passing, to remark on the alleged
- •Inherent in their nature. Indeed the reply that
- •Indefensible. We must, in short, admit that some
- •In what sense, the physical world is included in the
- •Is no beauty there, and if the sense of that is to fall
- •View absolute, and then realize your position.
- •I will end this chapter with a few remarks on a
- •Variety of combinations must be taken as very large, the
- •Irrational. For the assertion, "I am sure that I am
- •I have myself raised this objection because it
- •Isolation are nothing in the world but a failure to
- •In a new felt totality. The emotion as an object, and,
- •In itself, and as an inseparable aspect of its own
- •In view of our ignorance this question may seem
- •In the second place, there is surely no good reason. The
- •Ignorant, but of its general nature we possess
- •Indifference but the concrete identity of all extremes.
- •Inconceivable, according and in proportion as it
- •Invisible interposition of unknown factors. And there is
- •It is this perfection which is our measure. Our
- •VI. With regard to the unity of the Absolute we know
- •X. The doctrine of this work has been condemned as
- •Is really considerable.
- •In its nature is incapable of conjunction and has no way
- •Includes here anything which contains an undistinguished
- •Independently, but while you keep to aspects of a felt
- •Inner nature do not enter into the relation, then, so
- •Internal connection must lie, and out of which from the
- •Ignoratio elenchi.
- •Is, to know perfectly his own nature would be, with that
- •Ignorance.
- •It involves so much of other conditions lying in the
- •In their characters the one principle of identity, since
- •In some cases able to exist through and be based on a
- •Internal difference, has so far ceased to be mere
- •It would of course be easy to set this out
- •Itself. How are its elements united internally, and are
- •I will append to this Note a warning about the
- •In distinction from it as it is for an outside observer,
- •Internal diversity in its content. This experience, he
- •If, one or more, they know the others, such knowledge
- •It is therefore most important to understand (if
- •Interesting book on Pleasure and Pain, and the admirable
- •Individuals are an appearance, necessary to the
- •Indirectly and through the common character and the
- •Itself. And a--b in the present case is to be a relation
- •Is false and unreal, and ought never to have been
- •It again happen quite uncaused and itself be effectless?
- •Idea realizes itself, provided that the idea is not
- •In the shape of any theoretical advantage in the end
In other words transcendence of self; and that which
appears at any one moment, is, as such, self-
contradictory. And, from the other side, the less a
character is able, as such, to appear--the less its
necessary manifestation can be narrowed in time or in
space--so much the more is it capable of both expansion
and inner harmony. But these two features, as we saw,
are the marks of reality.
And the second of the mistakes is like the first.
Appearance, once more, is falsely identified with
presentation, as such, to sense; and a wrong conclusion
Is, once more, drawn from this basis. But the error now
proceeds in an opposite direction. Because the highest
principles are, obviously and plainly, not perceptible
by sense, they are taken to inhabit and to have their
being in the world of pure thought. And this other
region, with more or less consistency, is held to
constitute the sole reality. But here, if excluded
wholly from the serial flow of events, this world of
thought is limited externally and is internally
discordant. While, if, further, we attempt to qualify
the universe by our mere ideal abstract, and to attach
this content to the Reality which appears in perception,
the confusion becomes more obvious. Since the sense-
appearance has been given up, as alien to truth, it has
been in consequence set free, and is entirely
Insubordinate. And its concrete character now evidently
determines, and infects from the outside, whatever mere
thought we are endeavouring to predicate of the Real.
But the union in all perception of thought with sense,
the co-presence everywhere in all appearances of fact
with ideality--this is the one foundation of truth. And,
when we add to this the saving distinction that to have
existence need not mean to exist, and that to be
realized in time is not always to be visible by any
sense, we have made ourselves secure against the worst
of errors. From this we are soon led to our principle of
degrees in truth and reality. Our world and our life
need then no longer be made up arbitrarily. They need
not be compounded of the two hemispheres of fact and
fancy. Nor need the Absolute reveal itself
indiscriminately in a chaos where comparison and value
are absent. We can assign a rational meaning to the
distinctions of higher and lower. And
we have grown convinced that, while not to appear is to
be unreal, and while the fuller appearance marks the
fuller reality, our principle, with but so much, is only
half stated. For comparative ability to exist,
individually and as such, within the region of sense, is
a sign everywhere, so far as it goes, of degradation in
the scale of being.
Or, dealing with the question somewhat less
abstractly, we may attempt otherwise to indicate the
true position of temporal existence. This, as we have
seen, is not reality, but it is, on the other hand, in
our experience one essential factor. And to
suppose that mere thought without facts could either be
real, or could reach to truth, is evidently absurd. The
series of events is, without doubt, necessary for our
knowledge, since this series supplies the one
source of all ideal content. We may say, roughly and
with sufficient accuracy, that there is nothing in
thought, whether it be matter or relations, except that
which is derived from perception. And, in the second
place, it is only by starting from the presented basis
that we construct our system of phenomena in space and
time. We certainly perceived (Chapter xviii.) that any
such constructed unity was but relative, imperfect, and
partial. But, none the less, less, a building up of the
sense-world from the ground of actual presentation is a
condition of all our knowledge. It is not true that
everything, even if temporal, has a place in our one
"real" order of space or time. But, indirectly or
directly, every known element must be connected with its
sequence of events, and, at least in some sense, must
show itself even there. The test of truth after all, we
may say, lies in presented fact.
We should here try to avoid a serious mistake.
Without existence we have perceived that thought is
incomplete; but this does not mean that, without
existence, mere thought in itself is complete fully, and
that existence to this super-adds an alien but necessary
completion. For we have found in principle that, if
anything were perfect, it would not gain by an addition
made from the outside. And, here in particular,
thought's first object, in its pursuit of actual fact,
is precisely the enlarging and making harmonious of its
own ideal content. And the reason for this, as soon as
we consider it, is obvious. The dollar, merely thought
of or imagined, is comparatively abstract and void of
properties. But the dollar, verified in space, has got
its place in, and is determined by, an enormous
construction of things. And to suppose that the concrete
context of these relations in no sense qualifies its
inner content, or that this qualification is a matter of
indifference to thought, is quite indefensible.
A mere thought would mean an ideal content held apart
from existence. But (as we have learnt) to hold a
thought is always somehow, even against our will, to
refer it to the Real. Hence our mere idea, now standing
in relation with the Real, is related also to the
phenomenal system of events in time. It is related to
them, but without any connection with the internal order
and arrangements of their system. But this means that
our mere idea is determined by that system entirely from
the outside. And it will therefore itself be permeated
internally, and so destroyed, by the contingency forced
into its content through these chaotic relations.
Considered from this side, a thought, if it actually
were bare, would stand at a level lower than the, so-
called, chance facts of sense. For in the latter we
have, at least, some internal connection with the
context, and already a fixed relation of universals,
however impure.
All reality must be revealed in the world of events;
and that is most real which, within such an order or
orders, finds least foreign to itself. Hence, if other
things remain equal, a definite place in, and connection
with, the temporal system gives increase of reality. For
thus the relations to other elements, which must in any
case determine, determine, at least to some extent,
internally. And thus the imaginary, so far, must be
poorer than the perceptible fact; or, in other words, it
is compulsorily qualified by a wider area of alien and
destructive relations. I have emphasized "if other
things remain equal," for this restriction is important.
There is imagination which is higher, and more true, and
most emphatically more real, than any single fact
of sense. And this brings us back to our old
distinction. Every truth must appear, and must
subordinate existence; but this appearance is not the
same thing as to be present, properly and as such,
within given limits of sense-perception. With the
general principles of science we may perhaps see this at
once. And again, with regard to the necessary
appearances of art or religion, the same conclusion is
evident. The eternal experience, in every case, fails to
enter into the series of space or of time; or it enters
that series improperly, and with a show which in various
ways contradicts its essence. To be nearer the central
heart of things is to dominate the extremities more
widely; but it is not to appear there except
incompletely and partially through a sign, an
unsubstantial and a fugitive mode of expression. Nothing
anywhere, not even the realized and solid moral will,
can either be quite real, as it exists in time, or can
quite appear in its own essential character. But still
the ultimate Reality, where all appearance as such is
merged, is in the end the actual identity of idea and
existence. And, throughout our world, whatever is
individual is more real and true; for it contains within
its own limits a wider region of the Absolute, and it
possesses more intensely the type of self-sufficiency.
Or, to put it otherwise, the interval between such an
element and the Absolute is smaller. We should require
less alteration, less destruction of its own special
nature, in order to make this higher element completely
real.
We may now pass from this general principle to notice
various points of interest, and, in the first place, to
consider some difficulties handed on to this chapter.
The problems of unperceived Nature, of dispositions in
the soul, and the meaning in general of "potential"
existence, require our attention. And I must begin by
calling attention to an error. We have seen
that an idea is more true in proportion as it approaches
Reality. And it approaches Reality in proportion as it
grows internally more complete. And from this we
possibly might conclude that thought, if completed as
such, would itself be real; or that the ideal
conditions, if fully there, would be the same as actual
perfection. But such a conclusion would not hold; for we
have found that mere thought could never, as such, be
completed; and it therefore remains internally