In religion it is precisely the chief end upon which we

are not clear. And, on the basis of this confused

disagreement, a rational discussion is not possible. We

want to get some idea as to the doctrines really

requisite for religion; and we begin without having

examined the end for which the doctrines are required,

and by which obviously, therefore, they must be judged.

From time to time this or that man finds that a certain

belief, or set of beliefs, seems to lie next his heart.

And on this at once he cries aloud that, if these

particular doctrines are not true, all religion is at an

end. And this is what the public admires, and what it

calls a defence of religion.

But if the problem is to be, I do not say solved, but

discussed rationally at all, we must begin by an enquiry

into the essence and end of religion. And to

that enquiry, I presume, there are two things

indispensable. We must get some consistent view as to

the general nature of reality, goodness, and truth, and

we must not shut our eyes to the historical facts of

religion. We must come, first, to some conclusion about

the purpose of religious truths. Do they exist for the

sake of understanding, or do they subserve and are they

ancillary to some other object? And, if the latter is

true, what precisely is this end and object, which we

have to use as their criterion? If we can settle this

point we can then decide that religious truths, which go

beyond and which fall short of their end, possess no

title to existence. If, in the second place again, we

are not clear about the nature of scientific truth, can

we rationally deal with any alleged collision between

religion and science. We shall, in fact, be unable to

say whether there is any collision or none; or again,

supposing a conflict to exist, we shall be entirely at a

loss how to estimate its importance. And our result so

far is this. If English theologians decline to be in

earnest with metaphysics, they must obviously speak on

some topics, I will not say ignorantly, but at least

without having made a serious attempt to gain knowledge.

But to be in earnest with metaphysics is not the affair

of perhaps one or two years; nor did any one ever do

anything with such a subject without giving himself up

to it. And, lastly, I will explain what I mean by

attention to history. If religion is a practical matter,

it would be absurd wholly to disregard the force of

continuous occupancy and possession. But history, on the

other hand, supplies teachings of a different order. If,

in the past and the present, we find religion appearing

to flourish in the absence of certain particular

doctrines, it is not a light step to proclaim these

doctrines as essential to religion. And to do this

without discussion and dogmatically, and to begin one's

work by some bald assumption, perhaps about the

necessity of a "personal" God, is to trifle

indecently with a subject which deserves some respect.

What is necessary, in short, is to begin by looking

at the question disinterestedly and looking at it all

round. In this way we might certainly expect to arrive

at a rational discussion, but I do not feel any right to

assume that we should ever arrive at more. Perhaps the

separation of the accidental from the essential in

religion can be accomplished only by a longer and a

ruder process. It must be left, perhaps, to the blind

competition of rival errors, and to the coarse struggle

for existence between hostile sects. But such a

conclusion, once more, should not be accepted without a

serious trial. And this is all that I intend to say on

the practical problem of religion.

I will end this chapter with a word of warning

against a dangerous mistake. We have seen that religion

is but appearance, and that it cannot be ultimate. And

from this it may be concluded, perhaps, that the

completion of religion is philosophy, and that in

metaphysics we reach the goal in which it finds its

consummation. Now, if religion essentially were

knowledge, this conclusion would hold. And, so far as

religion involves knowledge, we are again bound to

accept it. Obviously the business of metaphysics is to

deal with ultimate truth, and in this respect,

obviously, it must be allowed to stand higher than

religion. But, on the other side, we have found that the

essence of religion is not knowledge. And this certainly

does not mean that its essence consists barely in

feeling. Religion is rather the attempt to express the

complete reality of goodness through every aspect of our

being. And, so far as this goes, it is at once something

more, and therefore something higher, than philosophy.

Philosophy, as we shall find in our next chapter, is