APPEARANCE AND REALITY

A METAPHYSICAL ESSAY

BY

F. H. BRADLEY

Second Edition (Revised), with an Appendix

1897

Scanned and Edited by Robert Bamford

Golden Gale Electronic Books

1995

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FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE AUTHOR

FULL NAME: Francis Herbert Bradley

BORN: 30 January 1846, Clapham

DIED: 18 September 1924, Oxford, aged 78

AGE WHEN THIS BOOK WRITTEN: About 46

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PUBLISHING HISTORY

First published 1893.

Second edition (revised) 1897.

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The following notice applies to this computer program:

Copyright 1995 Robert W. Bamford.

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HOW TO CONTACT THE PUBLISHER

By Internet email: rbamford@acslink.net.au

By post: P.O. Box 894, Sandy Bay, TAS 7006, Australia

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TO MY FRIEND

E---- R----

THIS UNWORTHY VOLUME

IS RESPECTFULLY

DEDICATED

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PREFACE (1893)

I HAVE described the following work as an essay in

metaphysics. Neither in form nor extent does it carry

out the idea of a system. Its subject indeed is central

enough to justify the exhaustive treatment of every

problem. But what I have done is incomplete, and what

has been left undone has often been omitted arbitrarily.

The book is a more or less desultory handling of perhaps

the chief questions in metaphysics.

There were several reasons why I did not attempt a

more systematic treatise, and to carry out even what I

proposed has proved enough for my powers. I began this

more systematic treatise, and to carry out even what I

proposed has proved enough for my powers. I began this

book in the autumn of 1887, and, after writing the first

two fifths of it in twelve months, then took three years

with the remainder. My work has been suspended several

times through long intervals of compulsory idleness, and

I have been glad to finish it when and how I could. I do

not say this to obviate criticism on a book now

deliberately published. But, if I had attempted more, I

should probably have completed nothing.

And in the main I have accomplished all that lay

within my compass. This volume is meant to be a critical

discussion of first principles, and its object is to

stimulate enquiry and doubt. To originality in any other

sense it makes no claim. If the reader finds that on any

points he has been led once more to reflect, I shall not

have failed, so far as I can, to be original. But I

should add that my book is not intended for the

beginner. Its language in general I hope is not over-

technical, but I have sometimes used terms intelligible

only to the student. The index supplied is not an index

but a mere collection of certain references.

My book does not design to be permanent, and will be

satisfied to be negative, so long as that word implies

an attitude of active questioning. The chief need of

English philosophy is, I think, a sceptical study of

first principles, and I do not know of any work which

seems to meet this need sufficiently. By scepticism is

not meant doubt about or disbelief in some tenet or

tenets. I understand by it an attempt to become aware of

and to doubt all preconceptions. Such scepticism is the

result only of labour and education, but it is a

training which cannot with impunity be neglected. And I

know no reason why the English mind, if it would but

subject itself to this discipline, should not in our day

produce a rational system of first principles. If I have

helped to forward this result, then, whatever form it

may take, my ambition will be satisfied.

The reason why I have so much abstained from

historical criticism and direct polemics may be briefly

stated. I have written for English readers, and it would

not help them much to learn my relation to German

writers. Besides, to tell the truth, I do not know

precisely that relation myself. And, though I have a

high opinion of the metaphysical powers of the English

mind, I have not seen any serious attempt in English to

deal systematically with first principles. But things

among us are not as they were some few years back. There

is no established reputation which now does much harm to

philosophy. And one is not led to feel in writing that

one is face to face with the same dense body of stupid

tradition and ancestral prejudice. Dogmatic

Individualism is far from having ceased to flourish, but

it no longer occupies the ground as the one accredited

way of "advanced thinking." The present generation is

learning that to gain education a man must study in more

than one school. And to criticise a writer of whom you

know nothing is now, even in philosophy, considered to

be the thing that it is. We owe this improvement mostly

to men of a time shortly before my own, and who insisted

well, if perhaps incautiously, on the great claims of

Kant and Hegel. But whatever other influences have

helped, the result seems secured. There is a fair field

for any one now, I believe, who has anything to say. And

I feel no desire for mere polemics, which can seldom

benefit oneself, and which seem no longer required by

the state of our philosophy. I would rather keep my

natural place as a learner among learners.

If anything in these pages suggests a more dogmatic

frame of mind, I would ask the reader not hastily to

adopt that suggestion. I offer him a set of opinions and

ideas in part certainly wrong, but where and how much I

am unable to tell him. That is for him to find out, if

he cares to and if he can. Would it be better if I

hinted in effect that he is in danger of expecting more,

and that I, if I chose, perhaps might supply it? I have

everywhere done my best, such as it is, to lay bare the

course of ideas, and to help the reader to arrive at a

judgment on each question. And, as I cannot suppose a

necessity on my part to disclaim infallibility, I have

not used set phrases which, if they mean anything, imply

it. I have stated my opinions as truths whatever

authority there may be against them, and however hard I

may have found it to come to an opinion at all. And, if

this is to be dogmatic, I certainly have not tried to

escape dogmatism.

It is difficult again for a man not to think too much

of his own pursuit. The metaphysician cannot perhaps be

too much in earnest with metaphysics, and he cannot, as

the phrase runs, take himself too seriously. But the

same thing holds good with every other positive function

of the universe. And the metaphysician, like other men,

is prone to forget this truth. He forgets the narrow

limitation of his special province, and, filled by his

own poor inspiration, he ascribes to it an importance

not its due. I do not know if anywhere in my work I may

seem to have erred thus, but I am sure that such excess

is not my conviction or my habitual mood. And to restore

the balance, and as a confession possibly of equal

defect, I will venture to transcribe some sentences from

my note-book. I see written there that "Metaphysics is

the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon

instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an

instinct." Of Optimism I have said that "The world is

the best of all possible worlds, and everything in it is

a necessary evil." Eclecticism I have found preach that

"Every truth is so true that any truth must be false,"

and Pessimism that "Where everything is bad it must be

good to know the worst," or "Where all is rotten it is a

man's work to cry stinking fish." About the Unity of

Science I have set down that "Whatever you know it is

all one," and of Introspection that "The one self-

knowledge worth having is to know one's mind." The

reader may judge how far these sentences form a Credo,

and he must please himself again as to how seriously he

takes a further extract: "To love unsatisfied the world

is mystery, a mystery which love satisfied seems to

comprehend. The latter is wrong only because it cannot

be content without thinking itself right."

But for some general remarks in justification of

metaphysics I may refer to the Introduction.

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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

IT is a pleasure to me to find that a new edition of

this book is wanted. I am encouraged to hope that with

all its defects it has helped to stimulate thought on

first principles. And it has been a further pleasure to

me to find that my critics have in general taken this

work in the spirit in which it was offered, whether they

have or have not found themselves in agreement with its

matter. And perhaps in some cases sympathy with its

endeavour may have led them to regard its shortcomings

too leniently. I on my side have tried to profit by

every comment, though I have made no attempt to

acknowledge each, or to reply to it in detail. But I

fear that some criticisms must have escaped my notice,

since I have discovered others by mere chance.

For this edition I have thought it best not to make

many alterations; but I have added in an Appendix,

beside some replies to objections, a further explanation

and discussion of certain difficulties.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION (1-7)

Preliminary objections to metaphysics answered. The

task is not impossible (2), or indefensible (3-7).

BOOK I--APPEARANCE

I. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES (11-18)

Attempt to explain error by taking primary qualities

alone as real (11). The secondary shown to be unreal

(12-14). But the primary have no independent existence

(14-17), save as useful fictions (17-18).

II. SUBSTANTIVE AND ADJECTIVE (19-24)

Problem of Inherence. Relation between the thing and

its qualities is unintelligible (19-24).

III. RELATION AND QUALITY (25-34)

I. Qualities without relations are unintelligible.

They cannot be found (26-27). They cannot be got bare

legitimately (27-28), or at all (28-30).

II. Qualities with relations are unintelligible. They

cannot be resolved into relations (30), and the

relations bring internal discrepancies (31).

III. Relations with, or without, qualities are

unintelligible (32-34).

IV. SPACE AND TIME (35-43)

Their psychological origin is irrelevant (35). Space

is inconsistent because it is, and is not, a relation

(36-38), and its connection with other content is

unintelligible (38).

Time, as usually taken, has the same vices (39, 40).

And so has Time taken otherwise, for the "now" is self-

inconsistent (40-43)

V. MOTION AND CHANGE AND ITS PERCEPTION (44-53)

Motion is inconsistent; is not so fundamental as

Change (44, 45). Change is a new instance of our dilemma

and is unintelligible (45-49).

Perception of Succession is not timeless (49-51). Its

true nature (51-53).

VI. CAUSATION (54-61)

Effort to avoid the contradiction of Change. But the

Cause and its Effect are not compatible (54, 55).

Illusory attempt at explanation (55, 56). The Cause

spreads to take in all the conditions, and yet cannot be

complete (56-58). Its relation to its effect is

unintelligible (58).

Causal sequence must be, and cannot be, continuous

(58-61).

VII. ACTIVITY (62-70)

Whether an original datum, or not, is irrelevant

(62). It has a meaning which implies change in time

(63), and self-caused change (64, 65). Passivity what

and how connected with Activity. Occasion what (65).

Condition and Sum of Conditions (66-68).

Activity and Passivity imply one another, but are

inconsistent (68-70).

VIII. THINGS (71-74)

Our previous results have ruined Things (71). Things

must have identity which is ideal, and so appearance

(72, 73). Everyday confusion as to Things' identity (73-

74).

IX. THE MEANINGS OF SELF (75-102)

The Self at last, but what does it mean? (75, 76).

Self as body excluded (77). I. Self as total contents of

experience at one moment (77). II. Self as average

contents of experience, (77-79). III. Essential self

(80, 81). Personal identity (81-86). IV. Self as Monad

(86-87). V. Self as what interests (88). VI. Self as

opposed to Not-self (88-96). Each is a concrete group

(89, 90). But does any content belong solely to self

(90, 91), or to Not-self (91, 92)? Doubtful cases (92-

94). Self and Not-self on the whole are not fixed (95,

96). Perception of Activity, its general nature (96-

100). VII. Self as Mere Self (100-101).

X. THE REALITY OF SELF (103-120)

Self is doubtless a fact, but, as it appears, can it

be real? (103-104). (a) Self as Feeling proves for

several reasons untenable (104-107). (b) Nor is self-

consciousness in better case (107-111). (c) Personal

Identity useless, and so also functional unity of self

(112-114). (d) Self as Activity, Force, or Will (114-

117). (e) Self as Monad (117, 118). Conclusion (119,

120).

XI. PHENOMENALISM (121-126)

Result so far (121). Phenomenalism as a remedy (121,

122). But it does not include the facts, itself for one

(122). And its elements are unintelligible (123). And

difficulty as to past and future and Identity (123,

124). And what are Laws (124, 125)? Final dilemma (125,

126).

XII. THINGS IN THEMSELVES (127-132)

Separation of Universe into two hemispheres is

indefensible (127-129), and only doubles our

difficulties (129-131). Appearances are facts, which

somehow must qualify reality (131, 132).

BOOK II--REALITY

XIII. THE GENERAL NATURE OF REALITY (135-143)

Result, so far, mainly negative (135); but we have an

absolute criterion (136). Objection based on development

(137). Our criterion is supreme, and not merely

negative. It gives positive knowledge about reality

(137-140). Further, the Real is one substantially.

Plurality of Reals is not possible (140-143).

XIV. THE GENERAL NATURE OF REALITY (cont.) (144-161)

The Absolute is one system, and its matter is

Experience (144-147). But has it more than theoretical

perfection (147, 148)? No answer from any practical

postulate (148-155). Ontological Argument (149, 150).

Practical and theoretical Axioms (151-154).

But, indirectly, theoretical perfection seems to

imply perfection on all sides (155-158).

Our knowledge of the Absolute is incomplete, but

positive. Its sources (159-161).

XV. THOUGHT AND REALITY (162-183)

Nature of Ideality (162, 163). This visible in

judgment through contrast of predicate with subject

(161-165). Truth what (165); is based on Ideality of the

Finite (165-167).

Puzzle about the relation of thought to reality

(167). Thought is dualistic, and its subject and

predicate are different (168-170). And if thought

succeeded in transcending dualism, it would perish as

thought (170-172). But why should it not do so? (173-

175).

But can we maintain an Other to thought (175, 176)?

Yes, if this Other is what thought itself desires and

implies. And that is the case, (176-180). The relational

form implies a completion beyond itself (180-182). Our

Absolute is no Thing-in-itself (183).

XVI. ERROR (184-196)

A good objection must be founded on something

discrepant, not merely something unexplained (184-186).

Problem of Error. It involves a dilemma (186). Error is

Appearance and false Appearance (187, 188). It is

rejected by Reality because it makes that discordant

(188-191). But it belongs to Reality somehow (191).

Error can be made truth by division and rearrangement

(192-194). And its positive discordance can be absorbed

(194-196). This possible solution must be real (196).

XVII. EVIL (197-204)

Main difficulties made by an error (197). Several

senses of evil. Evil as pain (198-200); as failure to

realize End (200, 201); and as immorality (201-203). In

no sense is it incompatible with the Absolute. And no

diversity is lost there (203, 204).

XVIII. TEMPORAL AND SPATIAL APPEARANCE (205-222)

Time and space are inexplicable, but not incompatible

with our Absolute (205). Question of origin irrelevant,

and appeal to "fact of consciousness" idle (206).

Time points to something beyond itself in several

ways (207-210). It is transcended (210).

Unity of Time. There is none (210-214). My "real"

world--what (212). Direction of Time. There is none, or

rather there may be any number (214-218). Sequence in

Causation is but appearance (218-220).

Space, whatever is its origin, transcends itself

(221, 222).

XIX. THE THIS AND THE MINE (223-240)

Their general nature (223). They are positive and

negative (224). Feeling as immediate experience of

reality (224, 225). The This as feeling of reality, and

as positive fragmentariness (226, 227).

The This as negative. It transcends itself (227,

228). The This as unique and as Self-Will (228, 229).

Is there more than content in the This? (230-233).

Does any content stick in the This? (233). No, it only

seems to do so through our failure (234-240). The

"merely mine," what (237).

XX. RECAPITULATION (241-246)

Result so far (241, 242). Individuality and

Perfection, are they merely negative? (243-245).

Perfection and quantity (245). There is but one perfect

being (246).

XXI. SOLIPSISM (247-260)

Problem stated (247, 248). The Experience appealed to

is Direct or Indirect (248).

I. Direct Experience does not give my self as sole

substantive (248-250).

II. But can we transcend direct experience at all? Or

is the this-mine "unique"? No, not in sense of

"exclusive," and we are forced to go beyond (251-254).

Then, if so, can we stop at our past and future self, or

must we conclude also to other souls (254, 255)? Neither

can be demonstrated, but both depend on the same

argument (255-258). Nor would unreality of other selves

prove Solipsism (258). Everything is, and also is not,

my experience (258, 259). Truths contained in Solipsism

(260).

XXII. NATURE (261-294)

Nature--meaning of, and origin of for us (261, 262).

In its essence there is an Antinomy. It is relation of

unknown to unknown (263-265). It is a mere system of the

conditions of some phenomena, and an inconsistent

abstraction (266, 267).

Is all Nature extended (267-269)? Is any part of

Nature inorganic (270-272)? Is it all relative to finite

souls (273-280)? These questions not important (280,

281). Identity of Nature (281-283). Position of physical

science (283-286). Unity of Nature (286-288). Solidity

(288-290). Infinity of Nature (290-292). Its Uniformity

(292). Nature is contingent, in what sense (293, 294).

XXIII. BODY AND SOUL (295-358)

They are phenomenal and furnish no ground for an

objection (295-297). Body, what (297, 298). Soul, what

(298). It is not the same as experience. This shown from

point of view of the individual (299-304); and of the

Absolute (305-307).

Objections discussed. (1) If phenomenal, is the soul

a mere appendage to the organism? Problem of continuity

and of dispositions. The soul an ideal construction

(307-316). (2) Does the series imply a transcendent Ego

(316)? (3) Are there psychical facts which are not

events (317-323)?

Relation of Body and Soul. They are not one thing

(323, 358). They are causally connected (324, 325). One

is not the idle adjective of the other (326-331). The

true view stated (333-335); but the connection remains

inexplicable (336, 337). How far can body or soul be

independent (337-342)?

Communication between Souls, its nature (342-347).

Identity of diverse souls, its nature and action

(347-352). Identity within one soul, and how far it

transcends the mechanical view (353-357).

XXIV. DEGREES OF TRUTH AND REALITY (359-400)

The Absolute has no degrees, but this not true of

Existence (359, 360). Truth--nature of (360, 361). It

remains conditional (361). Hence no total truth or

error, only more or less of Validity (362, 363).

The Standard, what. It has two features which are

essentially connected (363-365). Approach to this

measures degree of relative truth (365). All thought,

even mere imagination, has some truth (365-370). The

Standard further specified, in relation to mere

phenomena (370), and to higher appearances (370-372). No

other standard possible (372-374). And ours is

applicable everywhere (375-377). The world of Sense, its

proper place. Neither mere Sense nor mere Thought is

real (378-381). The truer and more real must appear

more; but in what sense (381, 382)?

Complete conditions not same as Reality (383). Unseen

Nature and psychical Dispositions (383, 384). Potential

Existence, what (384-387). Possibility and Chance and

external Necessity, relative and absolute (387-394).

Degrees of Possibility (394). The Ontological Proof, its

failure and justification (395-397). Bastard form of it

(398, 399). Existence necessary, in what sense (400).

XXV. GOODNESS (401-454)

Good and Evil and their degrees are not illusions,

but still are appearances (401, 402). Goodness, what

(402). The merely pleasant, why not good (403). Pleasure

by itself not good (404-407). Good is not the satisfied

will, but is in general the approved (407, 408). How far

is it "desirable" (408, 409)?

Goodness is a one-sided inconsistent aspect of

perfection (409, 410). The Absolute both is and is not

good (411, 412).

Goodness, more specially, as Self-realization (412,

413). Its double aspect as Self-sacrifice and Self-

assertion (414). What these are (415-418). They come

together but are transcended in the Absolute (419). But

popular Ethics asserts each as ultimate, and hence

necessarily fails (420-429). Relativity of Goodness

(429, 430).

Goodness as inner Morality (431, 432). Is

inconsistent and ends in nothing or in evil (432-436).

The demands of Morality carry it beyond itself into

Religion (436-438). What this is, and how it promises

satisfaction (439-442). It proves inconsistent, and is

an appearance which passes beyond itself (442-448); but

it is no illusion (448-450). The practical problem as to

religious truth (450-453). Religion and Philosophy (453,

454).

XXVI. THE ABSOLUTE AND ITS APPEARANCES (455-510)

Object of this Chapter (455-457). The chief modes of

Experience; they all are relative (458). Pleasure,

Feeling, the Theoretical, the Practical, and the

AEsthetic attitude are each but appearance (458-466).

And each implies the rest (466-468).

But the Unity is not known in detail. Final

inexplicabilities (468-470). The universe cannot be

reduced to Thought and Will (469). This shown at length

(470-482). The universe--how far intelligible (482,

483). The primacy of Will a delusion (483-485).

Appearance, meaning of the term (485, 486).

Appearances and the Absolute (486-489). Nature, is it

beautiful and adorable (490-495)? Ends in Nature--a

question not for Metaphysics (496, 497). Philosophy of

Nature what (496-499).

Progress, is there any in the Absolute (499-501); or

any life after death (501-510)?

XXVII. ULTIMATE DOUBTS (511-552)

Is our conclusion merely possible (512)? Preliminary

statement as to possibility and doubt. These must rest

on positive knowledge (512-518).

This applied to our Absolute. It is one (518-522). It

is experience (522-526). But it does not (properly

speaking) consist of souls (536-530); nor is it

(properly) personal (531-533). Can the Absolute be

called happy (533-535)? Knowledge is conditional or

absolute, and so is impossibility (535-538). Finite

knowledge is all conditional (539-542). It varies in

strength and in corrigibility (542, 543).

In the end not even absolute truth is quite true, and

yet the distinction remains (544, 545). Relation of

truth to reality (545-547).

Our result reconciles extremes, and is just to our

whole nature (547-549). Error and illusion (549, 550).

The presence of Reality in all appearances, but to

different degrees, is the last word of philosophy (550-

552).

APPENDIX--

Introduction (553)

Note A. Contradiction and the Contrary (562)

Note B. Relation and Quality (572)

Note C. Identity (585)

Explanatory Notes (598)

INDEX (623)

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INTRODUCTION

THE writer on metaphysics has a great deal against him.

Engaged on a subject which more than others demands

peace of spirit, even before he enters on the

controversies of his own field, he finds himself

involved in a sort of warfare. He is confronted by

prejudices hostile to his study, and he is tempted to

lean upon those prejudices, within him and around him,

which seem contrary to the first. It is on the

preconceptions adverse to metaphysics in general that I

am going to make some remarks by way of introduction. We

may agree, perhaps, to understand by metaphysics an

attempt to know reality as against mere appearance, or

the study of first principles or ultimate truths, or

again the effort to comprehend the universe, not simply

piecemeal or by fragments, but somehow as a whole. Any

such pursuit will encounter a number of objections. It

will have to hear that the knowledge which it desires to

obtain is impossible altogether; or, if possible in some

degree, is yet practically useless; or that, at all

events, we can want nothing beyond the old philosophies.

And I will say a few words on these arguments in their

order.

(a) The man who is ready to prove that metaphysical

knowledge is wholly impossible has no right here to any

answer. He must be referred for conviction to the body

of this treatise. And he can hardly refuse to go there,

since he himself has, perhaps unknowingly, entered the

arena. He is a brother metaphysician with a rival theory

of first principles. And this is so plain that I

must excuse myself from dwelling on the point. To say

the reality is such that our knowledge cannot reach it,

is a claim to know reality; to urge that our knowledge

is of a kind which must fail to transcend appearance,

itself implies that transcendence. For, if we had no

idea of a beyond, we should assuredly not know how to

talk about failure or success. And the test, by which we

distinguish them, must obviously be some acquaintance

with the nature of the goal. Nay, the would-be sceptic,

who presses on us the contradictions of our thoughts,

himself asserts dogmatically. For these contradictions

might be ultimate and absolute truth, if the nature of

the reality were not known to be otherwise. But this

introduction is not the place to discuss a class of

objections which are themselves, however unwillingly,

metaphysical views, and which a little acquaintance with

the subject commonly serves to dispel. So far as is

necessary, they will be dealt with in their proper

place; and I will therefore pass to the second main

argument against metaphysics.

(b) It would be idle to deny that this possesses

great force. "Metaphysical knowledge," it insists, "may

be possible theoretically, and even actual, if you

please, to a certain degree; but, for all that, it is

practically no knowledge worth the name." And this

objection may be rested on various grounds. I will state

some of these, and will make the answers which appear to

me to be sufficient.

The first reason for refusing to enter on our field

is an appeal to the confusion and barrenness which

prevail there. "The same problems," we hear it often,

"the same disputes, the same sheer failure. Why not

abandon it and come out? Is there nothing else more

worth your labour?" To this I shall reply more fully

soon, but will at present deny entirely that the

problems have not altered. The assertion is about as

true and about as false as would be a statement

that human nature has not changed. And it seems

indefensible when we consider that in history

metaphysics has not only been acted on by the general

development, but has also reacted. But, apart from

historical questions, which are here not in place, I am

inclined to take my stand on the admitted possibility.

If the object is not impossible, and the adventure suits

us--what then? Others far better than ourselves have

wholly failed--so you say. But the man who succeeds is

not apparently always the man of most merit, and even in

philosophy's cold world perhaps some fortunes go by

favour. One never knows until one tries.

But to the question, if seriously I expect to

succeed, I must, of course, answer, No. I do not

suppose, that is, that satisfactory knowledge is

possible. How much we can ascertain about reality will

be discussed in this book; but I may say at once that I

expect a very partial satisfaction. I am so bold as to

believe that we have a knowledge of the Absolute,

certain and real, though I am sure that our

comprehension is miserably incomplete. But I dissent

emphatically from the conclusion that, because