In any given case we seem able to apply the names

almost, or quite, at discretion. It is not unusual to

call the last thing which happens the cause of the

process which ensues. But this is really just as we

please. The body fell because the support was taken

away; but probably most men would prefer to call this

"cause" a condition of a certain kind. But apparently we

may gratify whatever preference we feel. And the well-

meant attempt to get clear by defining the cause as the

"sum of the conditions" does not much enlighten us. As

to the word "sum," it is, I presume, intended to carry a

meaning, but this meaning is not stated, and I doubt if

it is known. And, further, if the cause is taken as

including every single condition, we are met by a former

difficulty. Either this cause, not existing through any

part of duration, is really non-existent; or else a

condition will be wanted to account for its change and

its passing into activity. But if the cause already

includes all, then, of course, none is available

(Chapter vi.). But, to pass this point by, what do you

mean by these conditions, that all fall within the

cause, so as to leave none outside? Do you mean that

what we commonly call the "conditions" of an event are

really complete? In practice certainly we leave out of

the account the whole background of existence; we

isolate a group of elements, and we say that, whenever

these occur, then something else always happens; and in

this group we consider ourselves to possess the "sum of

the conditions." And this assumption may be

practically defensible, since the rest of existence may,

on sufficient ground, be taken as irrelevant. We can

therefore treat this whole mass as if it were inactive.

Yes, but that is one thing, and it is quite another

thing to assert that really this mass does nothing.

Certainly there is no logic which can warrant such a

misuse of abstraction. The background of the whole world

can be eliminated by no sound process, and the furthest

conclusion which can be logical is that we need not

consider it practically. As in a number of diverse cases

it seems to add nothing special, we may for each purpose

consider that it adds nothing at all. But to give out

this working doctrine as theoretically true is quite

illegitimate.

The immediate result of this is that the true "sum of

conditions" must completely include all the contents of

the world at a given time. And here we run against a

theoretical obstacle. The nature of these contents seems

such as to be essentially incomplete, and so the "sum"

to be nothing attainable. This appears fatal so far,

and, having stated it, I pass on. Suppose that you have

got a complete sum of the facts at one moment, are you

any nearer a result? This entire mass will be the "sum

of conditions," and the cause of each following event.

For there is no process which will warrant your taking

the cause as less. Here there is at once another

theoretical trouble, for the same cause produces a

number of different effects; and how will you deal with

that consequence? But, leaving this, we are practically

in an equal dilemma. For the cause, taken so widely, is

the cause of everything alike, and hence it can tell us

nothing about anything special; and, taken less widely,

it is not the sum, and therefore not the cause. And by

this time it is obvious that our doctrine must be given

up. If we want to discover a particular cause (and

nothing else is a discovery), we must make a

distinction in the "sum." Then, as before, in every case

we have conditions beside the cause; and, as before, we

are asked for a principle by which to effect the

distinction between them. And, for myself, I return to

the statement that I know of none which is sound. We

seem to effect this distinction always to suit a certain

purpose; and it appears to consist in our mere adoption

of a special point of view.

But let us return to the consideration of passivity

and activity. It is certain that nothing can be active

without an occasion, and that what is active, being made

thus by the occasion, is so far passive. The occasion,

again, since it enters into the causal process--a thing