- •I have been glad to finish it when and how I could. I do
- •Imperfect, it is worthless. And I must suggest to the
- •Interest, or when they show no longer any tendency to
- •Its part to supersede other functions of the human mind;
- •Intellectual effort to understand the universe is a
- •It, may be a harder self-surrender. And this appears to
- •It matters very little how in detail we work with it.
- •Visual, it must be coloured; and if it is tactual, or
- •Indisputable. Extension cannot be presented, or thought
- •Intelligible. We find the world's contents grouped into
- •I presume we shall be answered in this way. Even
- •Indefensible. The qualities, as distinct, are always
- •Information, and can discover with my own ears no trace
- •Into relations, which, in the end, end in nothing. And
- •Incomprehensible. And then this diversity, by itself,
- •In which it disappears. The pieces of duration, each
- •If you want to take a piece of duration as present and
- •Is felt to be not compatible with a. Mere a would still
- •It is only our own way of going on, the answer is
- •If we require truth in any strict sense, we must confine
- •In any given case we seem able to apply the names
- •It never would have done if left to itself--suffers a
- •Inner nature which comes out in the result, activity has
- •It is hard to say what, as a matter of fact, is
- •2. The congeries inside a man at one given moment
- •Its individual form. His wife possibly, or his child,
- •3. Let us then take, as before, a man's mind,
- •Identity, and any one who thinks that he knows what he
- •Is important, but the decision, if there is one, appears
- •Is there any more cause for doubt? Surely in every case
- •Introspection discloses this or that feature in
- •Inconsistent internally. If the reader will recall the
- •Itself, or generally the self-apprehension of the self
- •Intend to consider it, the result is the same. The
- •If self-consciousness is no more than you say, do we
- •Indeed serve to show that certain views were not true;
- •It as we cannot, would leave us simply with a very
- •Issue. Of those who take their principle of
- •Its most consistent form, I suppose, it takes its
- •Is the world of experience and knowledge--in every sense
- •Irrelevant excuse for neglecting our own concerns.
- •Is there an absolute criterion? This question, to my
- •Information. If we think, then certainly we are not
- •It at length. For the test in the main lies ready to our
- •In idea unless also it were real. We might
- •It is in some ways natural to suppose that the
- •It is not proved that all pain must arise from an
- •In our experience the result of pain is disquietude and
- •Is that some feature in the "what" of a given fact
- •Is aiming at suicide. We have seen that in judgment we
- •It, there would be no difference left between your
- •Itself in a mirror, or, like a squirrel in a cage, to
- •Impossibility, if it became actual, would still leave us
- •In immediacy. The subject claims the character of a
- •Incomplete form. And in desire for the completion of
- •Itself even in opposition to the whole--all will be
- •It is free from self-contradiction. The justification
- •Information, and it need imply nothing worse than
- •Is not false appearance, because it is nothing. On the
- •I confess that I shrink from using metaphors, since
- •Includes and overrides. And, with this, the last
- •I will for the present admit the point of view which
- •Itself." This would be a serious misunderstanding. It is
- •In the reality. Thus a man might be ignorant of the
- •It will be objected perhaps that in this manner we do
- •1. The first point which will engage us is the unity
- •2. I will pass now to another point, the direction of
- •If apprehended, show both directions harmoniously
- •It is not hard to conceive a variety of time-series
- •It runs--this is all matter, we may say, of individual
- •It, a change has happened within X. But, if so, then
- •Is no objection against the general possibility. And
- •Implied in the last word. I am not going to inquire here
- •Individual character. The "this" is real for us in a
- •In whatever sense you take it. There is nothing there
- •It has doubtless a positive character, but, excluding
- •Is essential. They exist, in other words, for my present
- •It may be well at this point perhaps to look back on the
- •In our First Book we examined various ways of taking
- •Is it possible, on the other side, to identify reality
- •Increase of special internal particulars. And so we
- •In our nineteenth chapter, that a character of this kind
- •Is, for each of us, an abstraction from the entire
- •It as it is, and as it exists apart from them. And we
- •Views the world as what he must believe it cannot be.
- •Interrelation between the organism and Nature, a mistake
- •In its bare principle I am able to accept this
- •Independence which would seem to be the distinctive mark
- •View, we shall surely be still less inclined to
- •Insufficient. We can think, in a manner, of sensible
- •Is, as we should perceive it; but we need not rest our
- •Imperceptibles of physics in any better case. Apart from
- •Invited to state his own. But I venture to think that,
- •Illusive, and exists only through misunderstanding. For
- •Ideas, inconsistent but useful--will they, on that
- •Inability to perceive that, in such a science, something
- •In the Absolute these, of course, possess a unity, we
- •It is certain first of all that two parts of one
- •In life this narrow view of Nature (as we saw) is not
- •In a later context. We shall have hereafter to discuss
- •Very largely, ideal. It shows an ideal process which,
- •Immediate unity of quality and being which comes in the
- •Is to have the quality which makes it itself. Hence
- •Is, with souls, less profoundly broken up and destroyed.
- •Is appearance, and any description of it must
- •2. We have seen, so far, that our phenomenal view of
- •Vicious dilemma. Because in our life there is more than
- •Is to purge ourselves of our groundless prejudice, and
- •It is perhaps necessary, though wearisome, to add
- •Its detail as one undivided totality, certainly then the
- •Instructions. To admit that the sequence a--b--c does
- •It is a state of soul going along with a state of body,
- •It is only where irregularity is forced on our
- •Interval, during which it has ceased to exist, we have
- •In the course of events, some matter might itself result
- •Is personal to the mind of another, would in the end be
- •Identity of our structure that this is so; and our
- •Is opaque to the others which surround it. With regard
- •Inapplicable to the worlds we call internal. Nor again,
- •Indivisible, even in idea. There would be no meaning in
- •Identity is unreal. And hence the conclusion, which more
- •Is to keep any meaning, as soon as sameness is wholly
- •Identity always implies and depends upon difference; and
- •In the working of pleasure and pain, that which operates
- •In fact, to that problem of "dispositions," which we
- •Insisted that, none the less, ideal identity between
- •Ideas, self-consistent and complete; and by this
- •Validity. I do not simply mean by this term that, for
- •Imperfections, in other words, we should have to make a
- •Ideally qualifies Reality. To question, or to doubt, or
- •Idea must be altered. More or less, they all require a
- •Is necessary to take account of laws. These are more and
- •Is to fall short of perfection; and, in the end, any
- •Included reality. And we have to consider in each case
- •Intellectual standard? And I think we are driven to this
- •View of truth and reality such as I have been
- •Is lacking. You may measure the reality of anything by
- •In other words transcendence of self; and that which
- •Is, once more, drawn from this basis. But the error now
- •Insubordinate. And its concrete character now evidently
- •Inconsistent and defective. And we have perceived, on
- •Inadmissible. We ought not to speak of potential
- •Its own existing character. The individuality, in other
- •Is given by outer necessity. But necessary relation of
- •Inclusion within some ideal whole, and, on that basis,
- •Is simply this, that, standing on one side of such a
- •Idea must certainly somehow be real. It goes beyond this
- •Valid because it holds, in the end, of every possible
- •Is measured by the idea of perfect Reality. The lower is
- •Insist that the presence of an idea is essential to
- •Implication, deny, is the direction of desire in the end
- •It manifests itself throughout in various degrees of
- •I am about, in other words, to invite attention to
- •Individual being must inevitably in some degree suffer.
- •If so, once more we have been brought back to the
- •Internally inconsistent and so irrational. But the
- •Itself as an apotheosis of unreason or of popular
- •Is worthless, has opened that self to receive worth from
- •Inner discrepancy however pervades the whole field of
- •Inconsistent emptiness; and, qualified by his relation
- •It is then driven forwards and back between both, like a
- •In religion it is precisely the chief end upon which we
- •Itself but appearance. It is but one appearance
- •Its disruption. As long as the content stands for
- •In the next chapter I shall once more consider if it is
- •Internally that has undistinguished unity. Now of these
- •Immediate unity of a finite psychical centre. It means
- •Influence the mass which it confronts, so as to lead
- •Vanished. Thus the attitude of practice, like all the
- •It has also an object with a certain character, but yet
- •Intelligence and will. Before we see anything of this in
- •Vagueness, and its strength lies in the uncertain sense
- •Is produced by will, and that, so far as it is, it is an
- •Ideal distinction which I have never made, may none the
- •Very essence of these functions, and we hence did not
- •Idea desired in one case remains merely desired, in
- •In their essences a connection supplied from without.
- •I feel compelled, in passing, to remark on the alleged
- •Inherent in their nature. Indeed the reply that
- •Indefensible. We must, in short, admit that some
- •In what sense, the physical world is included in the
- •Is no beauty there, and if the sense of that is to fall
- •View absolute, and then realize your position.
- •I will end this chapter with a few remarks on a
- •Variety of combinations must be taken as very large, the
- •Irrational. For the assertion, "I am sure that I am
- •I have myself raised this objection because it
- •Isolation are nothing in the world but a failure to
- •In a new felt totality. The emotion as an object, and,
- •In itself, and as an inseparable aspect of its own
- •In view of our ignorance this question may seem
- •In the second place, there is surely no good reason. The
- •Ignorant, but of its general nature we possess
- •Indifference but the concrete identity of all extremes.
- •Inconceivable, according and in proportion as it
- •Invisible interposition of unknown factors. And there is
- •It is this perfection which is our measure. Our
- •VI. With regard to the unity of the Absolute we know
- •X. The doctrine of this work has been condemned as
- •Is really considerable.
- •In its nature is incapable of conjunction and has no way
- •Includes here anything which contains an undistinguished
- •Independently, but while you keep to aspects of a felt
- •Inner nature do not enter into the relation, then, so
- •Internal connection must lie, and out of which from the
- •Ignoratio elenchi.
- •Is, to know perfectly his own nature would be, with that
- •Ignorance.
- •It involves so much of other conditions lying in the
- •In their characters the one principle of identity, since
- •In some cases able to exist through and be based on a
- •Internal difference, has so far ceased to be mere
- •It would of course be easy to set this out
- •Itself. How are its elements united internally, and are
- •I will append to this Note a warning about the
- •In distinction from it as it is for an outside observer,
- •Internal diversity in its content. This experience, he
- •If, one or more, they know the others, such knowledge
- •It is therefore most important to understand (if
- •Interesting book on Pleasure and Pain, and the admirable
- •Individuals are an appearance, necessary to the
- •Indirectly and through the common character and the
- •Itself. And a--b in the present case is to be a relation
- •Is false and unreal, and ought never to have been
- •It again happen quite uncaused and itself be effectless?
- •Idea realizes itself, provided that the idea is not
- •In the shape of any theoretical advantage in the end
I will for the present admit the point of view which
first supposes ends in Nature, and then objects that
they are failures. And I think that this objection is
not hard to dispose of. The ends which fail, we may
reply, are ends selected by ourselves and selected more
or less erroneously. They are too partial, as we have
taken them, and, if included in a larger end to which
they are relative, they cease to be failures. They, in
short, subserve a wider scheme, and in that they are
realized. It is here with evil as it was before with
error. That was lost in higher truth to which
it was subordinate, and in which, as such, it vanished.
And with partial ends, in Nature or in human lives, the
same principle will hold. Idea and existence we find not
to agree, and this discord we call evil. But, when these
two sides are enlarged and each taken more widely, both
may well come together. I do not mean, of course, that
every finite end, as such, is realized. I mean that it
is lost, and becomes an element, in a wider idea which
is one with existence. And, as with error, even our
onesidedness, our insistence and our disappointment, may
somehow all subserve a harmony and go to perfect it. The
aspects of idea and of existence may be united in one
great whole, in which evil, and even ends, as such,
disappear. To verify this consummation, or even to see
how in detail it can be, are both impossible. But, for
all that, such perfection in its general idea is
intelligible and possible. And, because the Absolute is
perfect, this harmony must also exist. For that which is
both possible and necessary we are bound to think real.
III. Moral evil presents us with further
difficulties. Here it is not a question simply of
defect, and of the failure in outward existence of that
inner idea which we take as the end. We are concerned
further with a positive strife and opposition. We have
an idea in a subject, an end which strives to gain
reality; and on the other side, we have the existence of
the same subject. This existence not merely fails to
correspond, but struggles adversely, and the collision
is felt as such. In our moral experience we find this
whole fact given beyond question. We suffer within
ourselves a contest of the good and bad wills and a
certainty of evil. Nay, if we please, we may add that
this discord is necessary, since without it morality
must wholly perish.
And this necessity of discord shows the road into the
centre of our problem. Moral evil exists only
in moral experience, and that experience in its essence
is full of inconsistency. For morality desires
unconsciously, with the suppression of evil, to become
wholly non-moral. It certainly would shrink from this
end, but it thus unknowingly desires the existence and
perpetuity of evil. shall have to return later to this
subject (Chapter xxv.), and for the present we need keep
hold merely of this one point. Morality itself, which
makes evil, desires in evil to remove a condition of its
own being. It labours essentially to pass into a super-
moral and therefore a non-moral sphere.
But, if we will follow it and will frankly adopt this
tendency, we may dispose of our difficulty. For the
content, willed as evil and in opposition to the good,
can enter as an element into a wider arrangement. Evil,
as we say (usually without meaning it), is overruled and
subserves. It is enlisted and it plays a part in a
higher good end, and in this sense, unknowingly is good.
Whether and how far it is as good as the will which is
moral, is a question later to be discussed. All that we
need understand here is that "Heaven's design," if we
may speak so, can realize itself as effectively in
"Catiline or Borgia" as in the scrupulous or innocent.
For the higher end is super-moral, and our moral end
here has been confined, and is therefore incomplete. As
before with physical evil, the discord as such
disappears, if the harmony is made wide enough.
But it will be said truly that in moral evil we have
something additional. We have not the mere fact of
incomplete ends and their isolation, but we have in
addition a positive felt collision in the self. And this
cannot be explained away, for it has to fall within the
Absolute, and it makes there a discord which remains
unresolved. But our old principle may still serve to
remove this objection. The collision and the strife may
be an element in some fuller realization. Just as in a
machine the resistance and pressure of the
parts subserve an end beyond any of them, if regarded by
itself--so at a much higher level it may be with the
Absolute. Not only the collision but that specific
feeling, by which it is accompanied and aggravated, can
be taken up into an all-inclusive perfection. We do not
know how this is done, and ingenious metaphors (if we
could find them) would not serve to explain it. For the
explanation would tend to wear the form of qualities in
relation, a form necessarily (as we have seen)
transcended in the Absolute. Such a perfect way of
existence would, however, reconcile our jarring
discords; and I do not see how we can deny that such a
harmony is possible. But, if possible, then, as before,
it is indubitably real. For, on the one side, we have an
overpowering reason for maintaining it; while upon the
other side, so far as I can see, we have nothing.
I will mention in passing another point, the unique
sense of personality which is felt strongly in evil. But
I must defer its consideration until we attack the
problem of the "mine" and the "this" (Chapter xix.). And
I will end here with some words on another source of
danger. There is a warning which I may be allowed to
impress on the reader. We have used several times
already with diverse subject-matters the same form of
argument. All differences, we have urged repeatedly,
come together in the Absolute. In this, how we do not
know, all distinctions are fused, and all relations
disappear. And there is an objection which may probably
at some point have seemed plausible. "Yes," I may be
told, "it is too true that all difference is gone. First
with one real existence, and then afterwards with
another, the old argument is brought out and the old
formula applied. There is no variety in the solution,
and hence in each case the variety is lost to the
Absolute. Along with these distinctions all
character has wholly disappeared, and the Absolute
stands outside, an empty residue and bare Thing-in-