Valid because it holds, in the end, of every possible

argument. But the objection disappears when we recognise

the genuine character of the process. This consists in

the correction by the Whole of an attempted isolation on

the part of its members. And, whether you begin from the

side of Existence or of Thought, the process will remain

essentially the same. There is a subject and a

predicate, and there is the internal necessity, on each

side, of identity with the other side. But, since in

this consummation the division as such is transcended,

neither the predicate nor the subject is able to

survive. They are each preserved, but transmuted.

There is another point on which, in conclusion, it is

well to insist. If by reality we mean existence as a

presented event, then to be real, in this sense, marks a

low type of being. It needs no great advance in the

scale of reality and truth, in order to make a thing too

good for existence such as this. And I will illustrate

my meaning by a kind of bastard use of the ontological

proof. Every idea,

it is certain, possesses a sensible side or

aspect. Beside being a content, it, in other words, must

be also an event. Now to describe the various existences

of ideas, as psychical events, is for the most part a

task falling outside metaphysics. But the question possesses a certain

bearing here. The existence of an idea can be, to a

greater or to a less degree, incongruous with its

content; and to predicate the second of the first would

involve various amounts of inconsistency. The thought of

a past idea, for example, is a present state of mind;

the idea of a virtue may be moral vice; and the horse,

as judged to exist, cannot live in the same field with

the actual horse-image. On the other hand,

at least in most cases, to think of anger is, to however

slight an extent, to be angry; and, usually, ideas of

pleasures and pains are, as events, themselves pleasures

and pains in fact. Wherever the idea can be merely one

aspect of a single presentation, there we can say that

the ideal content exists, and is an actual event. And it

is possible, in such cases, to apply a semblance of the

ontological proof. Because, that is, the existence of

the fact is necessary, as a basis and as a condition,

for the idea, we can go from the presence of the idea to

the presence of the fact. The most striking instance

would be supplied by the idea of "this" or "mine."

Immediate contact with Reality can obviously, as a fact,

never fail us; and so, when we use the idea of this

contact, we take it always from the fact as, in some

form, that appears. It is therefore impossible that,

given the idea, its existence should be lacking.

But, when we consider such a case more closely,

its spuriousness is manifest. For (a), in the

first place, the ideal content is not moved from within.

It does not of itself seek completion through existence,

and so imply that by internal necessity. There is no intrinsic connection, there is

but a mere found conjunction, between the two sides of

idea and existence. And hence the argument, to be valid

here, must be based on the mediation of a third element,

an element co-existing with, but of itself extraneous

to, both sides. But with this the essence of the

ontological argument is wanting. And (b), in the second

place, the case we are considering exhibits another

gross defect. The idea, which it predicates of the Real,

possesses hardly any truth, and has not risen above the

lowest level of worth and reality. I do not mean merely

that the idea, as compared with its own existence, is

abstract, and so false. For that objection, although

valid, is relatively slight. I mean that, though the

argument starting from the idea may exhibit existence,

it is not able to show either truth or reality. It

proves on the other hand, contrary to its wish, a vital

failure in both. Neither the subject, nor again the

predicate, possesses really the nature assigned to it.

The subject is taken as being merely a sensible event,

and the predicate is taken as one feature included in

that fact. And in each of these assumptions the argument

is grossly mistaken. For the genuine subject is Reality,

while the genuine predicate asserts of this every

character contained in the ostensible predicate and

subject. The idea, qualified as existing in a certain

sensible event, is the predicate, in other words, which

is affirmed of the Absolute. And since such a predicate

is a poor abstraction, and since its essence, therefore,

is determined by what falls outside its own being, it

is, hence, inconsistent with itself, and contradicts its

proper subject. We have in brief, by

considering the spurious ontological proof, been led

once more to the conclusion that existence is not

reality.

Existence is not reality, and reality must exist.

Each of these truths is essential to an understanding of

the whole, and each of them, necessarily in the end, is

implied in the other. Existence is, in other words, a

form of the appearance of the Real. And we have seen

that to appear, as such, in one or in many events, is to

show therefore a limited and low type of development.

But, on the other hand, not to appear at all in the

series of time, not to exhibit one's nature in the field

of existence, is to be false and unreal. And to be more

true, and to be more real, is, in some way or other, to

be more manifest outwardly. For the truer always is

wider. There is a fair presumption that any truth, which

cannot be exhibited at work, is for the most part

untrue. And, with this understanding, we may take our

leave of the ontological proof. Our inspection of it,

perhaps, has served to confirm us in the general

doctrine arrived at in our chapter. It is only a view

which asserts degrees of reality and truth, and which

has a rational meaning for words such as "higher" and

"lower"--it is only such a view which can do justice

alike to the sides of idea and existence.

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CHAPTER XXV

GOODNESS

IN a former chapter I tried to show, briefly, that the

existence of evil affords no good ground for an

objection against our Absolute. Evil and good are not

illusions, but they are most certainly appearances. They

are one-sided aspects, each over-ruled and transmuted in

the Whole. And, after the discussions of our last

chapter, we should be better able to appreciate their

position and value. As with truth and error, so with

good and bad, the opposition is not absolute. For, to

some extent and in some manner, perfection is everywhere

realized. And yet, upon the other hand, the distinction

of degrees is no less vital. The interval which exists

between, and which separates, the lower and the higher,