Insist that the presence of an idea is essential to

goodness.

And for this reason we must not admit that the

pleasant, as such, is good. The good is pleasant, and

the better, also, is in proportion more pleasant. And we

may add, again, that the pleasant is generally good, if

we will leave out "as such." For the pleasant will

naturally become desired, and will therefore on the

whole be good. But we must not assert that everything

pleasant is the satisfaction of a desire, or even always

must imply desire or approval. And hence, since an idea

may be absent, the pleasant sometimes may be not

properly good.

And against the identification of bare pleasure, as

such, with the good we may unhesitatingly pronounce.

Such a view separates the aspect of pleasure, and then

denies that anything else in the world is worth anything

at all. If it merely asserted that the more pleasant and

the better were one, its position would be altered. For,

since pleasure goes with everything that is free from

discord, or has merged discord in fuller harmony,

naturally the higher degree of individuality will be

therefore more pleasant. And we have included pleasure as an

essential element in our idea of perfection

(Chapter xx.). But it will hardly follow from this that

nothing in the universe except pleasure is good, and

that, taking this one aspect as the end, we may regard

all else as mere means. Where everything is connected in

one whole, you may abstract and so may isolate any one

factor. And you may prove at your ease that, without

this, all the rest are imperfect and worthless; and you

may show how, this one being added, they all once more

gain reality and worth. And hence of every one alike you

may conclude that it is the end for the sake of which

all the others exist. But from this to argue, absolutely

and blindly, that some one single aspect of the world is

the sole thing that is good, is most surely illogical.

It is to narrow a point of view, which is permissible

only so long as it is general, into a one-sided mistake.

And thus, in its denial that anything else beside

pleasure is good, Hedonism must be met by a decided

rejection.

Is a thing desired always, because it is first

pleasant, or is it ever pleasant rather, on the other

hand, because we desire it?

And we may ask the same question as to the relation of

the desired to the good. But, again, is anything true

because I am led to think it, or am I rather led to

think it because of its truth? And, once more, is it

right because I ought, or does the "because" only hold

in the opposite direction? And is an object

beautiful because it affects me, or is, on the other

hand, my emotion the result of its beauty? In each of

these cases we first have made a separation which is too

rigid, and on this foundation are built questions which

threaten us with a dilemma. We set down upon each side,

as a fact and as presupposed, what apart from the other

side, at least sometimes, would have no existence. If

good is the satisfaction of desire, you may take desire

as being its condition; but, on the other hand, you

would desire hardly anything at all, unless in some

sense it had given satisfaction already. Certainly the

pleasant, as we have seen, may, for a time and at a low

level, be not approved of or desired. But it is another

thing to assert that goodness consists in, or is a mere

result from, pleasure.

That which consistent Hedonism would, at least by