Inconsistent and defective. And we have perceived, on

the other side, that thought, completed, is forced to

transcend itself. It has then to become one thing with

sense and feeling. And, since these conditions of its

perfection are partly alien to itself, we cannot say

either that, by itself, it can arrive at completion, or

that, when perfected, it, as such, any longer exists.

And, with this, we may advance to the consideration

of several questions. We found (Chapter xxii.) that

parts of the physical world might exist, and yet might

exist, for us, only in the shape of thought. But we

realized also that in the Absolute, where the contents

of all finite selves are fused, these thought-existences

must, in some way, be re-combined with sense. And the

same conclusion held good also with psychical

dispositions (Chapter xxiii.). These, in their proper

character, have no being except in the world of thought.

For they, as we saw, are conditional; and the

conditional, as such, has not actual existence. But once

more here the ideas--how in detail we cannot say--must

find their complement in the Whole. With the addition of

this other side they will make part of the concrete

Reality.

Our present chapter, perhaps, may have helped us to

see more clearly on these points. For we have found that

ideal conditions, to be complete and in this way to

become real, must transcend themselves. They have to

pass beyond the world of mere thought. And we

have seen, in the second place, that every idea must

possess a certain amount both of truth and reality. The

ideal content must appear in the region of existence;

and we have found that we have no right ever to regard

it as unreal, because it is unable, as such, to show

itself and to occupy a place there. We may now apply

this principle both to the capacities of the soul, and

to the unseen part of Nature. The former cannot properly

exist, and the latter (so far as we saw) certainly need

not do so. We may consider them each to be, as such,

incapable of appearance. But this admission (we now have

learnt) does not weaken, by itself, their claim to be

real. And the amount of their reality, when our standard

is applied, will depend on their importance, on the

influence and bearing which each of them possesses in

the universe.

Each of them will fall under the head of "potential

existence," and we may pass on to consider the meaning

of this phrase. The words "potential," and "latent," and

"nascent," and we may add "virtual" and "tendency," are

employed too often. They are used in order to imply that

a certain thing exists; and this, although either we

ought to know, or know, that the thing certainly does

not exist. It would be hard to over-estimate the service

rendered by these terms to some writers on philosophy.

But that is not our business here. Potential existence

means a set of conditions, one part of which is present

at a certain point of space or time, while the other

part remains ideal. It is used generally without any

clear perception as to how much is wanted in order to

make these conditions complete. And then the whole is

spoken of, and is regarded, as existing at the point

where actually but a portion of its factors are present.

Such an abuse clearly is indefensible.

"Potential existence" is fairly applicable in the

following sense. We may mean by it that

something somehow appears already in a given point of

time, although it does not as yet appear fully or in its

own proper character. I will try to show later the

positive conditions required for this use, but it is

better to begin by pointing out where it is quite