2. I will pass now to another point, the direction of

time. Just as we tend to assume that all phenomena form

one series, so we ascribe to every series one single

direction. But this assumption too is baseless. It is

natural to set up a point in the future towards which

all events run, or from which they arrive, or which may

seem to serve in some other way to give direction to the

stream. But examination soon shows the imperfection of

this natural view. For the direction, and the

distinction between past and future, entirely depends

upon our experience. That side, on which fresh sensations

come in, is what we mean by the future. In our

perception of change elements go out, and something new

comes to us constantly; and we construct the time-series

entirely with reference to this experience. Thus,

whether we regard events as running forwards from the

past, or as emerging from the future, in any case we use

one method of taking our bearings. Our fixed direction

is given solely by the advent of new arrivals.

But, if this is so, then direction is

relative to our world. You may object that it is fixed

in the very nature of things, and so imparts its own

order to our special sphere. Yet how this assumption can

be justified I do not understand. Of course there is

something not ourselves which makes this difference

exist in our beings, something too which compels us to

arrange other lives and all our facts in one order. But

must this something, therefore, in reality and in

itself, be direction? I can find no reason for thinking

so. No doubt we naturally regard the whole world of

phenomena as a single time-series; we assume that the

successive contents of every other finite being are

arranged in this construction, and we take for granted

that their streams all flow in one direction. But our

assumption clearly is not defensible. For let us

suppose, first, that there are beings who can come in

contact in no way with that world which we experience.

Is this supposition self-contradictory, or anything but

possible? And let us suppose, next, that in the Absolute

the direction of these lives runs opposite to our own. I

ask again, is such an idea either meaningless or

untenable? Of course, if in any way I could experience

their world, I should fail to understand it. Death would

come before birth, the blow would follow the wound, and

all must seem to be irrational. It would seem to me so,

but its inconsistency would not exist except for my

partial experience. If I did not experience their order,

to me it would be nothing. Or, if I could see it from a

point of view beyond the limits of my life, I might find

a reality which itself had, as such, no direction. And I

might there perceive characters, which for the several

finite beings give direction to their lives, which, as

such, do not fall within finite experience, and which,