Is personal to the mind of another, would in the end be

unmeaning. Thus souls, in a sense at least, are

separate; but, upon the other hand, they are able to act

on one other. And I will begin by enquiring how, in

fact, they exercise this influence.

The direct action of soul on soul is, for all we

know, possible; but we have, at the same time, no reason

for regarding it as more. That which influences, and

that which acts, is, so far as we know, always the

outside of our bodies. Nor, even if we admit abnormal

perception and influence at a distance, need we modify

this result. For here the natural inference would be to

a medium extended in space, and of course, like "ether,"

quite material. And in this way the abnormal connection,

if it exists, does not differ in kind from what is

familiar. Again the inside of one organism might, I

presume, act directly on the inside of another. But, if

this is possible, we need not therefore consider it as

actual. Nor do such enquiries possess genuine

metaphysical interest. For the influence of the

internal, whether body or soul, is not less effective

because it operates through, and with, the outside; nor

would it gain in reality by becoming direct. And with

this we may dismiss an idea, misemployed by

superstition, but from which no conclusion of the

smallest importance could follow. A direct connection

between souls we cannot say is impossible, but, on the

other hand, we find no good reason for supposing it to

exist. The possibility seems, in addition, to be devoid

of all interest.

We may assume then that souls do not influence each

other, except through their bodies. And hence it is only

by this way that they are able to communicate.

Alterations of the phenomenal group which I call my

body, produce further changes in the physical

environment. And thus, indirectly or directly,

other organisms are altered, with consequent effects on

the course of their accompanying souls. This account,

which is true of my soul, holds good also with others.

The world is such that we can make the same intellectual

construction. We can, more or less, set up a scheme, in

which every one has a place, a system constant and

orderly, and in which the relations apprehended by each

percipient coincide. Why and how this comes about we in

the end cannot understand; but it is such an Uniformity

of Nature which makes communication possible.

But this may suggest to us a doubt. If such

alterations of bodies are the sole means which we

possess for conveying what is in us, can we be sure in

the end that we really have conveyed it? For suppose

that the contents of our various souls differed

radically, might we not still, on the same ground, be

assured of their sameness? The objection is serious, and

must be admitted in part to hold good. I do not think we

can be sure that the sensible qualities we perceive are

for every one the same. We infer from the apparent