Irrational. For the assertion, "I am sure that I am

everywhere fallible," contradicts itself, and would

revive a familiar Greek dilemma. And if we modify the

assertion, and instead of "everywhere" write "in

general," then the desired conclusion will not follow.

For unless, once more falsely, we assume that all truths

are much the same, and that with regard to every point

error is equally probable, fallibility in general need

not affect a particular result. In short

within theory we must decline to consider the chance of

a fundamental error. Our assertion of fallibility may

serve as the expression of modest feeling, or again of

the low estimate we may have formed of the intellect's

value. But such an estimate or such a feeling must

remain outside of the actual process of theory. For,

admitted within, they would at once be inconsistent and

irrational.

2. An asserted possibility in the next place must

have some meaning. A bare word is not a possibility, nor

does any one ever knowingly offer it as such. A

possibility always must present us with some actual

idea.

3. And this idea must not contradict itself, and so

be self-destructive. So far as it is seen to be so, to

that extent it must not be taken as possible. For a

possibility qualifies the Real, and must therefore not conflict with

the known character of its subject. And it is useless to

object here that all appearance is self-contradictory.

That is true, but, as self-contradictory and so far as

it is so, appearance is not a real or possible predicate

of Reality. A predicate which contradicts itself is, as

such, not possibly real. In order to be real, its

particular nature must be modified and corrected. And

this process of correction, and of making good,

may in addition totally transform and entirely dissipate

its nature (Chapter xxiv.).

4. It is impossible rationally to doubt where you

have but one idea. You may doubt psychically, given two

ideas which seem two but are one. And, even without this

actual illusion, you may feel uneasy in mind and may

hesitate. But doubt implies two ideas, which in their

meaning and truly are two; and, without these ideas,

doubt has no rational existence.

5. Where you have an idea and cannot doubt, there

logically you must assert. For everything (we have seen

throughout) must qualify the Real. And if an idea does

not contradict itself, either as it is or as taken with

other things (Chapter xvi.), it is at once true and

real. Now clearly a sole possibility cannot so

contradict itself;

and it must therefore be affirmed. Psychical failure and

confusion may here of course stand in the way. But such

confusion and failure can in theory count for nothing.

6. "But to reason thus," it may be objected, "is to

rest knowledge on ignorance. It is surely the grounding

of an assertion on our bare impotence." No objection

could be more mistaken, since the very essence of our

principle consists in the diametrical opposite. Its

essence lies in the refusal to set blank ignorance in

the room of knowledge. He who wishes to doubt, when he

has not before him two genuine ideas, he who talks of a

possible which is not based on actual knowledge about

Reality--it is he who takes his stand upon sheer

incapacity. He is the man who, admitting his emptiness,

then pretends to bring forth truth. And it is against

this monstrous pretence, this mad presumption in

the guise of modesty, that our principle

protests. But, if we seriously consider the matter, our

conclusion grows plain. Surely an idea must have a

meaning; surely two ideas are required for any rational

doubt; surely to be called possible is to be affirmed to

some extent of the Real. And surely, where you have no

alternative, it is not right or rational to take the

attitude of a man who hesitates between diverse courses.

7. I will consider next an argument for general doubt

which might be drawn from reflection on the privative

judgment. In such a judgment the Reality

excludes some suggestion, but the basis of the rejection

is not a positive quality in the known subject. The

basis on the contrary is an absence; and a mere absence

implies the qualification of the subject by its

psychical setting in us. Or we may say that, while the

known subject is assumed to be complete, its limitations

fall outside itself and lie in our incapacity. And it

may be urged here that with Reality this is always the

case. The universe, as we know it, in other words is

complete only through our ignorance; and hence it may be

said for our real knowledge to be incomplete always. And

on this ground, it may be added, we can decline to

assert of the universe any one possibility, even when we

are able to find no other.