Indivisible, even in idea. There would be no meaning in

sameness, unless it were the identity of differences,

the unity of elements which it holds together, but must

not confound. And in the same way difference, while it

denies, presupposes identity. For difference must depend

on a relation, and a relation is possible only on a

basis of sameness. It is not common sense that

has any desire to reject such truths, and blindly to

stand upon difference to the exclusion of identity. In

ordinary science no one would question the reality of

motion, because it makes one thing the same throughout

diverse times and spaces. That things to be the same

must always be different, and to be different must be,

therefore, the same--this is not a paradox, until it is

paradoxically stated. It does not seem absurd, unless,

wrongly, it is taken to imply that difference and

sameness themselves are actually not different. And, apart from such misunderstanding, the

ground and reason of the antagonism to identity is

furnished merely by one-sided and uncritical

metaphysics.

This mistaken opposition is based upon a truth, a

truth that has been misapprehended and perverted into

error. What has been perceived, or dimly felt, is in

fact a principle that, throughout this work, has so

often come before us. The Real in the end is self-

subsistent, and contained wholly in itself; and its

being is therefore not relative, nor does it admit a

division of content from existence. In short relativity

and self-transcendence, or, as we may call it, ideality,

cannot as such be the character of ultimate Reality.

And, so far as this goes, we are at one with the

objectors to identity. But the question really is about

the conclusion which follows from this premise. Our

conclusion is that finite existence must, in the end,

not be real; it is an appearance which, as such, is

transformed in the Absolute. But such a result obviously

does not imply that, within the world of phenomena,

Identity is unreal. And hence the conclusion, which more

or less explicitly is drawn by our opponents, differs

widely from ours. From the self-subsistent nature of the

Real they have inferred the reality of diverse

existences, beings in any case several and finite, and

without community of essence. But this conclusion, as we have seen, is wholly

untenable. For plurality and separateness themselves

exist only by means of relations (Chapter iii.). To be

different from another is to have already transcended

one's own being; and all finite existence is thus

incurably relative and ideal. Its quality falls, more or

less, outside its particular "thatness"; and, whether as

the same or again as diverse, it is equally made what it

is by community with others. Finite elements are joined

by what divides, and are divided by what joins them, and

their division and their junction alike are ideal. But,

if so, and unless some answer is found to this

contention, it is impossible to deny that identity is a

fact. It is not real ultimately,

we are agreed, but then facts themselves are not

ultimate, and the question is confined to the realm of

phenomenal existence. For difference itself is but

phenomenal, and is itself assuredly not ultimate. And we

may end, I think, with this reply. Show us (we may urge)

a region of facts which are neither different nor yet

the same; show us how quality without relation, or how

mere being, can differentiate; point out how difference