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Information, and can discover with my own ears no trace

of harmony, I am forced to conclude to a partial

deafness in others. And hence a relation, we must say,

without qualities is nothing.

But how the relation can stand to the qualities is,

on the other side, unintelligible. If it is nothing to

the qualities, then they are not related at all; and, if

so, as we saw, they have ceased to be qualities, and

their relation is a nonentity. But if it is to be

something to them, then clearly we now shall require a

new connecting relation. For the relation hardly can be

the mere adjective of one or both of its terms; or, at

least, as such it seems indefensible. And, being

something itself, if it does not itself bear a relation

to the terms, in what intelligible way will it succeed

in being anything to them? But here again we are

hurried off into the eddy of a hopeless process, since

we are forced to go on finding new relations without

end. The links are united by a link, and this bond of

union is a link which also has two ends; and these

require each a fresh link to connect them with the old.

The problem is to find how the relation can stand to its

qualities; and this problem is insoluble. If you take

the connection as a solid thing, you have got to show,

and you cannot show, how the other solids are joined to

it. And, if you take it as a kind of medium or

unsubstantial atmosphere, it is a connection no longer.

You find, in this case, that the whole question of the

relation of the qualities (for they certainly in some

way are related) arises now outside it, in precisely the

same form as before. The original relation, in short,

has become a nonentity, but, in becoming this, it has

removed no element of the problem.

I will bring this chapter to an end. It would be

easy, and yet profitless, to spin out its argument with

ramifications and refinements. And for me to attempt to

anticipate the reader's objections would probably be

useless. I have stated the case, and I must leave it.

The conclusion to which I am brought is that a

relational way of thought--any one that moves by the

machinery of terms and relations--must give appearance,

and not truth. It is a makeshift, a device, a mere

practical compromise, most necessary, but in the end

most indefensible. We have to take reality as many, and

to take it as one, and to avoid contradiction. We want

to divide it, or to take it, when we please, as

indivisible; to go as far as we desire in either of

these directions, and to stop when that suits us. And we

succeed, but succeed merely by shutting the eye, which

if left open would condemn us; or by a perpetual

oscillation and a shifting of the ground, so as to turn

our back upon the aspect we desire to ignore. But

when these inconsistencies are forced together,

as in metaphysics they must be, the result is an open

and staring discrepancy. And we cannot attribute this to

reality; while, if we try to take it on ourselves, we

have changed one evil for two. Our intellect, then, has

been condemned to confusion and bankruptcy, and the

reality has been left outside uncomprehended. Or rather,

what is worse, it has been stripped bare of all

distinction and quality. It is left naked and without a

character, and we are covered with confusion.

The reader who has followed and has grasped the

principle of this chapter, will have little need to

spend his time upon those which succeed it. He will have

seen that our experience, where relational, is not true;

and he will have condemned, almost without a hearing,

the great mass of phenomena. I feel, however, called on

next to deal very briefly with Space and Time.

--------------------------------------------------------

CHAPTER IV

SPACE AND TIME

THE object of this chapter is far from being an attempt

to discuss fully the nature of space or of time. It will

content itself with stating our main justification for

regarding them as appearance. It will explain why we

deny that, in the character which they exhibit, they

either have or belong to reality. I will first show this

of space.

We have nothing to do here with the psychological

origin of the perception. Space may be a product

developed from non-spatial elements; and, if so, its

production may have great bearing on the question of its

true reality. But it is impossible for us to consider

this here. For, in the first place, every attempt so to

explain its origin has turned out a clear failure.

And, in the second place, its reality would not be

necessarily affected by the proof of its development.

Nothing can be taken as real because, for psychology, it

is original; or, again, as unreal, because it is

secondary. If it were a legitimate construction

from elements that were true, then it might be derived

only for our knowledge, and be original in fact. But so

long as its attempted derivation is in part obscure and

in part illusory, it is better to regard this whole

question as irrelevant.

Let us then, taking space or extension simply as it

is, enquire whether it contradicts itself. The reader

will be acquainted with the difficulties that have

arisen from the continuity and the discreteness of

space. These necessitate the conclusion that space is

endless, while an end is essential to its being. Space

cannot come to a final limit, either within itself or on

the outside. And yet, so long as it remains something

always passing away, internally or beyond itself, it is

not space at all. This dilemma has been met often by the

ignoring of one aspect, but it has never been, and it

will never be, confronted and resolved. And naturally,

while it stands, it is the condemnation of space.

I am going to state it here in the form which

exhibits, I think, most plainly the root of the

contradiction, and also its insolubility. Space is a

relation--which it cannot be; and it is a quality or

substance--which again it cannot be. It is a peculiar

form of the problem which we discussed in the last

chapter, and is a special attempt to combine the

irreconcilable. I will set out this puzzle

antithetically.

1. Space is not a mere relation. For any space must

consist of extended parts, and these parts clearly are

spaces. So that, even if we could take our space as a

collection, it would be a collection of solids. The

relation would join spaces which would not be mere

relations. And hence the collection, if taken as a mere

inter-relation, would not be space. We should be brought

to the proposition that space is nothing but a relation

of spaces. And this proposition contradicts itself.

Again, from the other side, if any space is taken

as a whole, it is evidently more than a

relation. It is a thing, or substance, or quality (call

it what you please), which is clearly as solid as the

parts which it unites. From without, or from within, it

is quite as repulsive and as simple as any of its

contents. The mere fact that we are driven always to

speak of its parts should be evidence enough. What could

be the parts of a relation?

2. But space is nothing but a relation. For, in the

first place, any space must consist of parts; and, if

the parts are not spaces, the whole is not space. Take

then in a space any parts. These, it is assumed, must be

solid, but they are obviously extended. If extended,

however, they will themselves consist of parts, and

these again of further parts, and so on without end. A

space, or a part of space, that really means to be

solid, is a self-contradiction. Anything extended is a

collection, a relation of extendeds, which again are

relations of extendeds, and so on indefinitely. The

terms are essential to the relation, and the terms do

not exist. Searching without end, we never find anything

more than relations; and we see that we cannot. Space is

essentially a relation of what vanishes into relations,

which seek in vain for their terms. It is lengths of

lengths of--nothing that we can find.

And, from the outside again, a like conclusion is

forced on us. We have seen that space vanishes

internally into relations between units which never can

exist. But, on the other side, when taken itself as a

unit, it passes away into the search for an illusory

whole. It is essentially the reference of itself to

something else, a process of endless passing beyond

actuality. As a whole it is, briefly, the relation of

itself to a non-existent other. For take space as large

and as complete as you possibly can. Still, if it has

not definite boundaries, it is not space; and to make it

end in a cloud, or in nothing, is mere blindness

and our mere failure to perceive. A space limited, and

yet without space that is outside, is a self-

contradiction. But the outside, unfortunately, is

compelled likewise to pass beyond itself; and the end

cannot be reached. And it is not merely that we fail to

perceive, or fail to understand, how this can be

otherwise. We perceive and we understand that it cannot

be otherwise, at least if space is to be space. We

either do not know what space means; and, if so,

certainly we cannot say that it is more than appearance.

Or else, knowing what we mean by it, we see inherent in

that meaning the puzzle we are describing. Space, to be

space, must have space outside itself. It for ever

disappears into a whole, which proves never to be more

than one side of a relation to something beyond. And

thus space has neither any solid parts, nor, when taken

as one, is it more than the relation of itself to a new

self. As it stands, it is not space; and, in trying to

find space beyond it, we can find only that which passes

away into a relation. Space is a relation between terms,

which can never be found.

It would not repay us to dwell further on the

contradiction which we have exhibited. The reader who

has once grasped the principle can deal himself with the

details. I will refer merely in passing to a

supplementary difficulty. Empty space--space without

some quality (visual or muscular) which in itself is

more than spatial--is an unreal abstraction. It cannot

be said to exist, for the reason that it cannot by

itself have any meaning. When a man realizes what he has

got in it, he finds that always he has a quality which

is more than extension (cp. Chapter i.). But, if so, how

this quality is to stand to the extension is an

insoluble problem. It is a case of "inherence," which we

saw (Chapter ii.) was in principle unintelligible. And,

without further delay, I will proceed to consider time.

I shall in this chapter confine myself almost

entirely to the difficulties caused by the discretion

and the continuity of time. With regard to change, I

will say something further in the chapter which follows.

Efforts have been made to explain time

psychologically--to exhibit, that is to say, its origin

from what comes to the mind as timeless. But, for the

same reason which seemed conclusive in the case of

space, and which here has even greater weight, I shall

not consider these attempts. I shall inquire simply as

to time's character, and whether, that being as it is,

it can belong to reality.

It is usual to consider time under a spatial form. It

is taken as a stream, and past and future are regarded

as parts of it, which presumably do not co-exist, but

are often talked of as if they did. Time, apprehended in

this way, is open to the objection we have just urged

against space. It is a relation--and, on the other side,

it is not a relation; and it is, again, incapable of

being anything beyond a relation. And the reader who has

followed the dilemma which was fatal to space, will not

require much explanation. If you take time as a relation

between units without duration, then the whole time has

no duration, and is not time at all. But, if you give

duration to the whole time, then at once the units

themselves are found to possess it; and they thus cease

to be units. Time in fact is "before" and "after" in

one; and without this diversity it is not time. But

these differences cannot be asserted of the unity; and,

on the other hand and failing that, time is helplessly

dissolved. Hence they are asserted under a relation.

"Before in relation to after" is the character of time;

and here the old difficulties about relation and quality

recommence. The relation is not a unity, and yet the

terms are nonentities, if left apart. Again, to import

an independent character into the terms is to make

each somehow in itself both before and after.

But this brings on a process which dissipates the terms