1. The first point which will engage us is the unity

of time. We have no reason, in my opinion, to regard

time as one succession, and to take all phenomena as

standing in one temporal connection. We have a tendency,

of course, to consider all times as forming parts of a

single series. Phenomena, it seems clear, are all alike

events which happen; and, since they happen, we go on to a

further conclusion. We regard them as members in one

temporal whole, and standing therefore throughout to one

another in relations of "before" and "after" or

"together." But this conclusion has no warrant. For

there is no valid objection to the existence of any

number of independent time-series. In these the internal

events would be interrelated temporarily, but each

series, as a series and as a whole, would have no

temporal connection with anything outside. I mean that

in the universe we might have a set of diverse

phenomenal successions. The events in each of these

would, of course, be related in time, but the series

themselves need not have temporal relation to one

another. The events, that is, in one need not be after,

or before, or together with, the events in any other. In

the Absolute they would not have a temporal unity or

connection; and, for themselves, they would not possess

any relations to other series.

I will illustrate my meaning from our own human

experience. When we dream, or when our minds go

wandering uncontrolled, when we pursue imaginary

histories, or exercise our thoughts on some mere

supposed sequence--we give rise to a problem. There is a

grave question, if we can see it. For within these

successions the events have temporal connection, and

yet, if you consider one series with another, they have

no unity in time. And they are not connected in time

with what we call the course of our "real" events.

Suppose that I am asked how the occurrences in the tale

of Imogen are related in time to each adventure of

Sindbad the Sailor, and how these latter stand to my

dream-events both of last night and last year--such

questions surely have no meaning. Apart from the chance

of local colour we see at once that between these

temporal occurrences there is no relation of time. You

cannot say that one comes before, or comes after, the

other. And again to date these events by their

appearance in my mental world would be surely

preposterous. It would be to arrange all events, told of

by books in a library, according to the various dates of

publication--the same story repeating itself in fact

with every edition, and to-day's newspaper and history

simultaneous throughout. And this absurdity perhaps may

help us to realize that the successive need have no

temporal connection.

"Yes, but," I may be told, "all these series,

imaginary as well as real, are surely dated as events in

my mental history. They have each their place there, and

so beyond it also in the one real time-series. And,

however often a story may be repeated in my mind, each

occasion has its own date and its temporal relations."

Indubitably so, but such an answer is quite

insufficient. For observe first that it admits a great

part of what we urge. It has to allow plainly that the

times within our "unreal" series have no temporal

interrelation. Otherwise, for instance, the time-

succession, when a story is repeated, would infect the

contents, and would so make repetition impossible. I

wish first to direct notice to this serious and fatal

admission.

But, when we consider it, the objection breaks down

altogether. It is true that, in a sense and more or

less, we arrange all phenomena as events in one series.

But it does not follow that in the universe, as a whole,

the same tendency holds good. It does not follow that

all phenomena are related in time. What is true of my

events need not hold good of all other events; nor again

is my imperfect way of unity the pattern to which the

Absolute is confined.

What, to use common language, I call "real" events

are the phenomena which I arrange in a continuous time-

series. This has its oneness in the identity of my

personal existence. What is presented is "real," and

from this basis I construct a time-series, both

backwards and forwards; and I use as binding links the

identical points in any content suggested. This construction I call the "real" series,

and whatever content declines to take its place in my

arrangement, I condemn as unreal. And the process is

justifiable within limits. If we mean only that there is

a certain group of phenomena, and that, for reality

within this group, a certain time-relation is essential,

that doubtless is true. But it is another thing to

assert that every possible phenomenon has a place in

this series. And it is once more another thing to insist

that every time-series has a temporal unity in the

Absolute.

Let us consider the first point. If no phenomenon is

"real," except that which has a place in my temporal

arrangement, we have, first, left on our hands the whole

world of "Imagination." The fact of succession there

becomes "unreal," but it is not got rid of by the

application of any mere label. And I will mention in

passing another difficulty, the disruption of my "real"

series in mental disease. But--to come to the principle

--it is denied that phenomena can exist unless they are

in temporal relation with my world. And I am able to

find no ground for this assumption. When I ask why, and

for what reason, there cannot be changes of event,

imperceptible to me and apart from my time-series, I can

discover no answer. So far as I can see, there may be

many time-series in the Absolute, not related at all for

one another, and for the Absolute without any unity of

time.

And this brings us to the second point. For phenomena

to exist without interconnection and unity, I agree is

impossible. But I cannot perceive that this unity must

either be temporal or else nothing. That would be to

take a way of regarding things which even we

find imperfect, and to set it down as the one way which

is possible for the Absolute. But surely the Absolute is

not shut up within our human limits. Already we have

seen that its harmony is something beyond relations.

And, if so, surely a number of temporal series may,

without any relation in time to one another, find a way

of union within its all-inclusive perfection. But, if

so, time will not be one, in the sense of forming a

single series. There will be many times, all of which

are at one in the Eternal--the possessor of temporal

events and yet timeless. We have, at all events, found

no shred of evidence for any other unity of time.