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In the next chapter I shall once more consider if it is

possible to doubt this, but for the present I

shall assume it as a truth which has held good. Under

what main aspects then, let us ask, is experience found?

We may say, speaking broadly, that there are two great

modes, perception and thought on the one side, and will

and desire on the other side. Then there is the ‘sthetic

attitude, which will not fall entirely under either of

these heads; and again there is pleasure and pain which

seem something distinct from both. Further we have

feeling, a term which we must take in two senses. It is

first the general state of the total soul not yet at all

differentiated into any of the preceding special

aspects. And again it is any particular state so far as

Internally that has undistinguished unity. Now of these

psychical modes not any one is resolvable into the

others, nor can the unity of the Whole consist in one or

another portion of them. Each of them is incomplete and

one-sided, and calls for assistance from without. We

have had to perceive this in great part already through

former discussions, but I will briefly resume and in

some points supplement that evidence here. I am about to

deal with the appearances of the Absolute mainly from

their psychical side, but a full psychological

discussion is impossible, and is hardly required. I

would ask the reader, whose views in certain ways may be

divergent from mine, not to dwell on divergencies except

so far as they affect the main result.

(1) If we consider first of all the aspect of

pleasure and pain, it is evident that this cannot be the

substance or foundation of Reality. For we cannot regard

the other elements as adjectives of, or dependents on,

this one; nor again can we, in any way or in any sense,

resolve them into it. Pleasure and pain, it is obvious,

are not the one thing real. But are they real at all, as

such, and independently of the rest? Even this we are

compelled to deny. For pleasure and pain are

antagonistic; and when in the Whole they have come

together with a balance of pleasure, can we be

even sure that this result will be pleasure as

such? There is however a far more serious objection to

the reality of pleasure and pain. For these are mere

abstractions which we separate from the pleasant and the

painful; and to suppose that they are not connected with

those states and processes, with which they are always

conjoined, would be plainly irrational. Indeed pleasure

and pain, as things by themselves, would contradict

their known character. But, if so, clearly they cannot

be real in themselves, and their reality and essence

will in part fall beyond their own limits. They are but

appearances and one-sided adjectives of the universe,

and they are real only when taken up into and merged in

that totality.

(2) From mere pleasure and pain we may pass on to

feeling, and I take feeling in the sense of the