I will append to this Note a warning about the

Principle of Ideal Identity. This principle does not of

course guarantee the original truth or intelligibility

of a synthesis, and it is a very serious

misunderstanding to take it as used in this sense. It

merely insists that any truth, because not existence, is

therefore true everywhere in existence and through all

changes of context. For Identity see further Notes B and

C.

Note to Chapters vii and viii. I have left these

chapters unaltered, but I will ask the reader to

remember that I am not urging that the ideas criticised

are not perfectly valid and even objectively necessary.

I am condemning them so far as they taken as ultimate

answers to the question, What is Reality?

p. 65. I am not saying that we may not have a sense and

even a rudimentary perception of passivity without

having any perception of activity in the proper sense.

The question, raised on p. 97, as to the possible

absence of an outside not-self in activity, applies with

its answer mutatis mutandis to passivity also.

pp. 72-4. See Note to p. 48.

p. 79. As to what is and is not individually necessary

we are fortunately under the sway of beneficent

illusion. The one necessary individual means usually the

necessity for an individual more or less of the same

kind. But there is no need to enlarge on this point

except in answer to some view which would base a false

theoretical conclusion on an attitude, natural and

necessary in practice, but involving some illusion.

p. 83. On Memory compare the passages referred to in the

Index. That Memory, in the ordinary sense of the word,

is a special development of Reproduction I take to be

beyond doubt, and that Reproduction, in its proper

sense, is Redintegration through ideal identity is to my

mind certain. The nature of the psychological difference

between the memory of the past on one side, and on the

other side the imagination of the same or the inference

(proper) thereto, is a question, I venture to think, of

no more than average difficulty. It seems to me, in

comparison with the problem of Reproduction in general

(including the perception of a series), to be neither

very hard nor very important. It is a matter however

which I cannot enter on here. I have discussed the

subject of Memory in Mind, N.S. Nos. 30 and 66.

I would add here that to assume the infallibility of

Memory as an ultimate postulate, seems to me wholly

superfluous, to say nothing of its bringing us (as it

does) into collision with indubitable facts. There is of

course a general presumption that memory is to be

trusted. But our warrant for this general presumption is

in the end our criterion of a harmonious system. Our

world is ordered most harmoniously by taking what is

remembered as being in general remembered truly,

whatever that is to mean. And this secondary character

of memory's validity is, I submit, the only view which

can be reconciled with our actual logical practice.

pp. 96-100. The view as to the perception of activity

laid down in these pages has been criticised by Mr.

Stout in his excellent work on Psychology, Vol. i, pp.

173-7. With regard to Mr. Stout's own account I shall

not venture to comment on it here, partly because I have

not yet been able to give sufficient attention to it,

and partly because I do not take it to be offered as

metaphysical doctrine. I shall confine myself therefore

to some remarks in defence of my own position.

These pages, I must admit, were too short, and yet,

if lengthened, I feared they would be too long; and it

might have been better to have omitted them. But, after

they have been censured, I cannot withdraw them; and I

have left them, apart from a few verbal alterations, as

they stood. The symbols that were perhaps misleading

have, I hope, been amended. But I would ask the reader

to depend less on them than on what follows in this

Note.

With regard to the alleged confusion in my mind

"between the fact of activity and the mere experience of

being active on the one hand, and the idea or perception

of activity on the other" (p. 174), I think that this

confusion neither existed nor exists. I should have said

on the other hand that, from first to last throughout

this controversy, it was I that kept this distinction

clearly in mind and strove in vain to get it recognized.

This, right or wrong, is at least the view which the

facts force me to take. The question, What is the

content of activity as it appears to the soul at first,