It has doubtless a positive character, but, excluding

distinctions, it is not, in one sense, coincidence at

all. In observing, we are compelled to observe in the

form of relations. But these internal relations properly

do not belong to the "this" itself. For its character

does not admit of separation and distinction. Hence to

distinguish elements within this whole, and to predicate

a relation of co-existence, is self-contradictory. Our

operation, in its result, has destroyed what it acted

on; and the product which has come out, was, as such,

never there. Thus, in claiming to own a relation of co-

existence and a distinction of content, the mere "this"

commits suicide.

From another point of view, doubtless, the observed

is a mere coincidence, when compared, that is, with a

purer way of understanding. The relation is true,

subject to the condition of a confused context,

which is not comprehended. And hence the connection

observed is, to this extent, bare conjunction and mere

co-existence. Or it is chance, when you measure it by a

higher necessity. It is a truth conditioned by our

ignorance, and so contingent and belonging to the

"this." But, upon the other side, we have seen that the

"this" can hold nothing. As soon as a relation is made

out, that is universal knowledge, and has at once

transcended presentation. For within the merely "this"

no relation, taken as such, is possible. The content, if

you distinguish it, is to that extent set free from felt

unity. And there is no "what" which essentially adheres

to the bare moment. So far as any element remains

involved in the confusion of feeling, that is but due to

our defect and ignorance. Hence, to repeat, the "this,"

considered as mere feeling, is certainly positive. As

the absence of universal relations, the "this" again is

negative. But, as an attempt to make and to retain

distinctions of content, the "this" is suicidal.

It is so too with the "mere mine." We hear in

discussions on morality, or logic, or ‘sthetics, that a

certain detail is "subjective," and hence irrelevant.

Such a detail, in other words, belongs to the "mere

mine." And a mistake may be made, and we may imagine

that there is matter which, in itself, is

contingent. It may be supposed

that an element, such perhaps as pleasure, is a fixed

part of something called the "this-me." But there is no

content which, as such, can belong to the "mine." The

"mine" is my existence taken as immediate fact, as an

integral whole of psychical elements which simply are.

It is my content, so far as not freed from the feeling

moment. And it is merely my content, because it is not

subordinate to this or that ideal whole. If I regard a

mental fact, say, from the side of its

morality, then whatever is, here and now, not relevant

to this purpose, becomes bare existence. It is something

which is not the appearance of the ideal matter in hand.

And yet, because it exists somehow, it exists as a fact

in the mere "mine." The same thing happens also, of

course, with ‘sthetics, or science, or religion. The

same detail which, in one respect, was essential and

necessary, may, from another point of view, become

immaterial. And then at once, so far, it falls back into

the merely felt or given. It exists, but, for the end we

are regarding, it is nothing.

This is still more evident, perhaps, from the side of

psychology. No particle of my existence, on the one

hand, falls outside that science; and yet, on the other

hand, for psychology the mere "mine" remains. When I

study my events so as to trace a particular connection,

no matter of what kind, then at any moment the psychical

"given" contains features which are irrelevant. They

have no bearing on the point which I am endeavouring to

make good. Hence the fact of their co-existence is

contingent, and it is by chance that they accompany what