It, a change has happened within X. But, if so, then

apparently we require a further permanent. But if, on

the other side, to avoid this danger, we take Xa not to

change, we are otherwise ruined. For we have somehow to

predicate of X both elements at once, and where is the

succession? The successive elements co-exist

unintelligibly within X, and succession somehow is

degraded to mere appearance.

To put it otherwise, we have the statement "X is

first Xa, and later also Xb." But how can "later also b"

be the truth, if before mere a was true? Shall we answer

"No, not mere a; it is not mere Xa, but

Xa(given c), which is later also b"? But this reply

leaves us still face to face with a like obstacle; for,

if Xa(c) is X later b, then how separate these terms? If

there is a difference between them, or if there is none,

our assertion in either case is untenable. For we cannot

justify the difference if it exists, or our making it,

if it does not exist. Hence we are led to the conclusion

that subject and predicate are identical, and that the

separation and the change are only appearance. They are

a character assuredly to be added to the whole, but

added in a way beyond our comprehension. They somehow

are lost except as elements in a higher identity.

Or, again, say that the present state of the world is

the cause of that total state which follows next on it.

Here, again, is the same self-contradiction. For how can

one state a become a different state b? It must either

do this without a reason, and that seems absurd; or else

the reason, being additional, forthwith constitutes a

new a, and so on for ever. We have the differences of

cause and effect, with their relation of time, and we

have no way in which it is possible to hold these

together. Thus we are drawn to the view that causation

is but partial, and that we have but changes of mere

elements within a complex whole. But this view gives no

help until we carry it still further, and deny that the

whole state of the world can change at all. So we glide

into the doctrine that partial changes are no change,

but counterbalance one another within a whole which

persists unaltered. And here certainly the succession

remains as an appearance, the special value of which we

are unable to explain. But the causal sequence has

drifted beyond itself and into a reality which

essentially is timeless. And hence, in attempting an

objection to the eternity of the Absolute, causation

would deny a principle implied in its own nature.

At the end of this chapter, I trust, we may

have reached a conviction. We may be convinced, not

merely as before, that time is unreal, but that its

appearance also is compatible with a timeless universe.

It is only when misunderstood that change precludes a

belief in eternity. Rightly apprehended it affords no

presumption against our doctrine. Our Absolute must be;

and now, in another respect, again, it has turned out

possible. Surely therefore it is real.

I shall conclude this chapter with a few remarks on

the nature of space. In passing to this from time, we meet with

no difficulties that are new, and a very few words seem

all that is wanted. I am not attempting here to explain

the origin of space; and indeed to show how it comes to

exist seems to me not possible. And we need not yet ask

how, on our main view, we are to understand the physical

world. That necessary question is one which it is better

to defer. The point here at issue is this, Does the form

of space make our reality impossible? Is its existence a

thing incompatible with the Absolute? Such a question,

in my judgment, requires little discussion.

If we could prove that the spatial form were a

development, and so secondary, that would give us little

help. The proof could in no degree lessen the reality of

a thing which, in any case, does exist. It would at most

serve as an indication that a further growth in

development might merge the space-form in a higher mode

of perception. But it is better not to found arguments

upon that which, at most, is hardly certain.

What I would stand upon is the essential nature of

space. For that, as we saw in our First Book, is

entirely inconsistent. It attempts throughout to

reach something which transcends its powers. It

made an effort to find and to maintain a solid self-

existence, but that effort led it away into the infinite

process both on the inside and externally. And its

evident inability to rest within itself points to the

solution of its discords. Space seeks to lose itself in

a higher perception, where individuality is gained

without forfeit of variety.

And against the possibility of space being in this

way absorbed in a non-spatial consummation, I know of

nothing to set. Of course how in particular this can be,

we are unable to lay down. But our ignorance in detail