Idea realizes itself, provided that the idea is not

formally contrary to a present resolve of the subject"--

so much seems certain. But there is uncertainty about

the further proviso, "Provided also that the idea is not

too contrary materially to the substance of the self."

Probably, the meaning of "will" being really unfixed,

there is no way of fixing it at a certain point except

arbitrarily.

Since the above was written an enquiry into the

nature of volition, with a discussion of many questions

concerning conation. activity, agency, and attention,

has appeared in Mind. See Nos. 40, 41, 43, 44, 46, 49,

and parts of 51.

p. 513. With regard to the "familiar Greek dilemma," the

attentive reader will not have failed to observe that,

when I later on, p. 544, maintain that no possible truth

is quite true, I have explained that this want of truth

is not the same thing as intellectual falsehood or

fallibility. The "sceptical" critic therefore who still

desires to show that I myself have fallen into this

dilemma, will, I think, do well still to ignore pp. 544-

7.

A probability, I may here go on to remark, of many

millions to one against the truth of some statement may

be a very good and sufficient reason for our putting

that, for some purpose or purposes, on one side and so

treating it as nothing. But no such probability does or

can justify us in asserting the statement not to be

true. That is not scepticism at all, but on the contrary

it is mere dogmatism. Further I would here repeat that

any probability in favour of general scepticism which

rests on psychological grounds, must itself be based on

an assumption of knowledge with regard to those grounds.

Hence if you make your sceptical conclusion universal

here, you destroy your own premises. And, on the other

side, if you stop short of an universal conclusion,

perhaps the particular doctrine which you wish to doubt

is more certain by far than even your general

psychological premises. I have (p. 137) remarked on this

variety of would-be scepticism, and I find that a critic

in the Psychological Review, Vol. i., No. 3, Mr.

A. Hodder, has actually treated these remarks as an

attempted refutation on my part of scepticism in

general. It probably did not occur to him that, in thus

triumphantly proving my incompetence, he was really

giving the measure of his own insight into the subject.

With reference to another "sceptical" criticism by

another writer I may perhaps do well to emphasize the

fact that for me that which has no meaning is most

certainly not possible. I had, I even thought, succeeded

in laying this down clearly. See for instance p. 503.

p. 520. The reader will recall here that, so far as

diversity does not imply actual relations, it involves

presence as a mere aspect in a felt totality. See

pp. 141-3 and Note B.

pp. 527-8. With regard to this question of some element

of Reality falling outside of finite centres I find but

little to add. The one total experience, which is the

Absolute, has, as such, a character which, in its

specific aspect of qualitative totality, must be taken

not to fall within any finite centre. But the elements,

which in their unity make and are this specific

"quality," need not, so far as I see, to the least

extent fall outside of finite centres. Such processes of

and relations between centres, as more or less are not

experienced by those particular centres, may, for all we

know, quite well be experienced by others. And it seems

more probable that in some form or other they are so

experienced. This seems more probable because it appears

to involve less departure from given fact, and because

we can find no good reason for the additional departure