In their characters the one principle of identity, since

all their parts are self-transcendent and are only

themselves by making a whole. And I will once more point

out that, apart from distinctions which, I presume, we

must call qualitative, space and time do not exist. In

mere space or mere time there are no distinctions nor

any possibility of finding them. Without up and down,

right and left, incoming and outgoing, space and time

disappear; and it seems to me that these distinctions

must be called qualitative. And surely again time and

space are real only in limited spaces and durations. But

what is it which limits and so makes a space or a time,

except that it ends here and not somewhere else, and

what does that mean except that its quality goes to a

certain point and then ceases by becoming another

quality? There is absolutely no meaning in "one time"

unless it is the time of one somewhat, and any time that

is the time of one somewhat is so far present

and is one time. And, if so, space and time are not

alien from quality; and we have seen that their unity

and identity is everywhere ideal.

I may be told, doubtless, that this is irrelevant,

and I cannot say that it is not so, and I will pass

rapidly to another point. I think it likely that the

alleged chasm between quality and space and time may

rest on the supposed absolute exclusivity of the two

latter. If two things are the same or different by

belonging to the same or different spaces or times,

these samenesses and differences, it will be said, are

something quite apart and unique. They are not

attributable to a "what," but merely to "existence." In

meeting this objection I will permit myself to repeat

some of the substance of Chapter xix.

Certainly the diversity of space, and again of time,

has a character of its own. Certainly this character,

though as we have seen it is nothing when bare, on the

other hand is not merely the same with other characters

and cannot be resolved into them. All this is true, but

it hardly shows that the character of space or time is

not a character, or that this character is not an

instance of the one principle of identity in difference.

And hence it is, I presume, the exclusiveness of space

and time on which stress is to be laid. Now utterly

exclusive the parts of space and time are admitted not

to be, for, ex hyp., they admit other characters and

serve to differentiate them, and again one space or one

time is taken to be the real identity of the other

characters which it includes. Nor again can space and

time be taken truly as barely external to the other

qualities which they further qualify. They may remain so

relatively and for our knowledge, just as in a

qualitative whole the connection of qualities may remain

relatively external. But a merely external

qualification, we have seen, is but appearance and in

the end is not rational or real (See Notes A and B).

The exclusiveness of a space or a time is to hold

then, I presume, only against other times and spaces,

and it is only as viewed in this one way that it is

taken as absolute. Each part of space or time as against

any other part is a repellent unit, and this its unity,

and internal identity, is taken to lie merely in its

"existence." But apparently here it is forgotten that

the exclusiveness depends on the whole. It is only

because it is in "this" series that the "this" is

unique, and, if so, the "this," as we have seen, is not

merely exclusive but has a self-transcendent character.

So that, if there were really but one series of space or

of time, and if in this way uniqueness were absolute, I

cannot perceive how that could found an objection

against identity. For inside the series, even if unique,

there is a unity and identity which is ideal, and

outside the series, if unique, there would be

no exclusiveness in space or time, but simply in

quality. And all this again is but hypothetical, since

in space or time it is not true that there is really but

one series, and any such idea is a superstition which I

venture to think is refuted in this work. There are many

series in time and space, and the unity of all these is

not temporal and spatial. And from this it follows that,

so far as we know, there might be counterparts, one or

more, of anything existing in space or in time, and

that, considered spatially or temporally, there would be

between these different things absolutely no difference

at all or any possibility of distinction. They would

differ of course, and their respective series would

differ, but that difference would not consist in space

or time but merely in quality. And with this I

will end what I have to say here on the chim‘ra of a

difference in mere "existence."

And obviously, as it seems to me, the objector to

identity advances nothing new, when he brings forward

the continuity of a thing in space or in time. The idea

I presume is, as before, that in space or time we have a

form of identity in difference which is in no sense an

identity of character, but consists merely of

"existence," and that a thing is qualified by being

placed externally in this form. But the mere external

qualification by the form, and the "existence" of a form

or of anything else which is not character, we have seen

are alike indefensible; and, when the principle is

refuted, it would seem useless to insist further on

detail. Hence, leaving this, I will go on to consider a

subsidiary mistake.

For the identity in time of an existing thing (as in

this work I have mentioned) you require both temporal

continuity and again sameness in the thing's proper

character. And mutatis mutandis what is true here about

temporal continuity is true also about spatial, and not

to perceive this would be an error. Now whether a wholly

unbroken continuity in time or space is requisite for

the singleness of a thing, is a question I here pass

by; but some unbroken

duration obviously is wanted if there is to be duration

at all. And the maintenance of its character by the

thing seems to me also to be essential. The character of

course may change, but this change must fall outside of

that which we take to be the thing's essential quality.

For otherwise ipso facto we have a breach in continuity.

And, though this matter may seem self-evident,

I have noticed with regard to it what strikes me as at

least a want of clearness.

What, let us ask, is a breach in the continuous

existence of a thing? It does not lie in mere

"existence," for that is nothing at all; and it cannot

again be spatial or temporal merely, for a breach there

is impossible. A time, for instance, if really broken,

would not be a broken time, but would have become two

series with no temporal relation, and therefore with no

breach. A breach therefore is but relative, and it

involves an unbroken whole in which it takes place. For

a temporal breach, that is, you must have first one

continuous duration. Now this duration cannot consist,

we have seen, of bare time, but is one duration because

it is characterized throughout by one content--let us

call it A. Then within this you must have also another

content--let us call it b; only b is not to qualify the

whole of A, but merely a part or rather parts of it. The

residue of A, qualified not by b but by some other

character which is negative of b, is that part of

duration which in respect of b can constitute a breach.

And the point which I would emphasize is this, that

apart from qualification by one and the same character

b, and again partial qualification by another character

hostile to b, there is simply no sense or meaning in

speaking of the duration of b, rather than that of

something else, or in speaking of a temporal end to or

of a breach in b's existence. The duration of a thing,

unless the thing's quality is throughout identical, is

really nonsense.

I do not know how much of the above may to the reader

seem irrelevant and useless. I am doing my best to help

him to meet objections to the fundamental sameness of

all identity. These objections, to repeat, seem to me to

rest on the superstition that, because there are diverse

identities, these cannot have one underlying character,

and the superstition again that there is a foreign

existence outside character and with a chasm between the

two. Such crude familiar divisions of common sense are

surely in philosophy mere superstitions. And I would

gladly argue against something better if I knew where to

find it.

But, despite my fear of irrelevancy, I will add some

words on "numerical" identity and difference. I venture

to think this in one way a very difficult matter. I do

not mean that it is difficult in principle, and that its

difficulty tends to drive one to the sameness and

difference of mere "existence," or to distinction

without difference, or to any other chim‘ra. If indeed

we could assume blindly, as is often assumed, that the

character of numerical sameness is at bottom temporal or

spatial, there would be little to say beyond what has

been said already.

Numerical distinction is not distinction without

difference, for that once more is senseless, but it may

be called distinction that abstracts from and

disregards any special difference. It may be called the

residual aspect of distinctness without regard for its

"what" and "how." Whether the underlying difference is

temporal, spatial, or something else, is wholly ignored

so long as it distinguishes. And, wherever I can so

distinguish, I can as a matter of fact count, and am

possessed of units. Units proper doubtless do not exist

apart from the experience of quantity, and I do not mean

to say that apart from quantity no distinction is

possible, or again that quantity could be developed

rationally from anything more simple than itself. And I

have emphasized the words "as a matter of fact" in order

to leave these questions on one side, since they can be

neglected provisionally. Numerical sameness, in the same

way, is the persistence of any such bare distinction

through diverse contexts, no matter what these contexts

are. And of course it follows that, so long as and so

far as sameness and difference are merely numerical,

they are not spatial or temporal, nor again in any

restricted sense are they qualitative.

But then ensues a problem which to me, rightly or

wrongly, seems an extremely hard one. In fact my

difficulty with regard to it has led me to avoid talking

about numerical sameness. I have preferred rather to

appear as one of those persons (I do not think that we

can be many) who are not aware of or who at least

practically cannot apply this familiar distinction. And

my difficulty is briefly this. Without difference in

character there can be no distinction, and the opposite

would seem to be nonsense. But then what in the end is

that difference of character which is sufficient to

constitute numerical distinction? I do not mean by this,

What in the end is the relation of difference to

distinction?, but, setting that general question here on

one side, I ask, In order for distinction to exist, what

kind or kinds of diversity in character must be

presupposed? Or again we may put what is more or less

the same question thus, What and of what sort is the

minimum of diversity required for numerical difference

and sameness, these being taken in the widest sense? And

to this question I cannot return a satisfactory answer.

It is easy of course to reply that all distinction is

at bottom temporal, or again that all is spatial, or

again perhaps that all is both. And I am very far from

suggesting that such views are irrational and

indefensible. As long as they do not make a vicious

abstraction of space and time from quality, or attempt

to set up space and time as forms of "existence" and not

of character, there is nothing irrational in such views.

But whether they are right or wrong, in either case to

me they are useless, while they remain assertions which

take no account of my difficulties. And the main

difficulty to me is this. In feeling I find as a fact

wholes of diversity in unity, and about some of these

wholes I can discover nothing temporal or spatial. In

this I may doubtless be wrong, but to me this

is how the facts come. And I ask why it is impossible

that a form or forms of non-temporal and non-spatial

identity in difference should serve as the basis of, and

should underlie, some distinction. It may be replied

that without at least succession in time one would never

get to have distinction at all. Yet if in fact this is

so--and I do not contest it--I still doubt the

conclusion. I am not sure that it follows, because

without succession comes no distinction, that all

distinction, when you have got it, must be in its

character successive. The fact of non-temporal and non-

spatial diversity in unity seems at least to exist. The

distinctions which I can base on this diversity have, to

me at least, in some cases no discoverable character of

time or space. And the question is whether the temporal

(or, if you will, the spatial) form, which we will take

as necessary for distinction in its origin, must

essentially qualify it. Is it not possible that, however

first got, the form of distinction may become at least