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Richter R. 1989b. The Louvre Accord from the Viewpoint of the New Institu-

 

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Richter R., ed. 1990. Views and Comments on Bounded Rationality as Applied

 

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Richter R. 1992a. A Socialist Market Economy: Can It Work? Kyklos 45: 185-207.

 

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Wahrungsunion. Discussion Paper, Universitat des Saarlandes, Saarbrlicken.

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for the Study of the New Institutional Economics, Universitat des Saarlan-

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Richter R.

1994. «Stabilitatskultur» als Problem der Institutionenokonomik. In:

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