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Unit 19. How language problems bedevil the response to crises
Самым популярным среди других языков оказался испанский (12,6 процента). За ним следовали португальский (10,3 процента), традиционный
китайский (шесть процентов) и французский (три процента) языки. Также
авторы обнаружили ряд публикаций на итальянском, немецком, корейском,
японском и шведском языках – ни в одном случае они не дублировались на
английском. По мнению ученых, такая тенденция препятствует коммуникации
сообщества, причем с обеих сторон.
Кроме того, языковой барьер может быть опасным, особенно в случае
исследований в области экологии и медицины. Авторы приводят пример с
отчетами о динамике распространения свиного и птичьего гриппов в Китае:
впервые эти документы были опубликованы на китайском языке, из-за чего
некоторое время оставались незамеченными Всемирной организацией здравоохранения (ВОЗ) и Организацией объединенных наций (ООН). Основным
языком последних является английский.
По мнению ученых, языковой барьер – проблема, требующая решения
общими силами. Например, они предложили публиковать основные тезисы
англоязычных статей на нескольких дополнительных языках (испанском, португальском, китайском), а руководству научных учреждений и инвесторам –
поощрять осуществление таких переводов. Участники проекта Conservation
Evidence также сформировали группу для ведения базы лучших неанглоязычных публикаций [27].
Стригун Денис
Naked Science, Интернет-издание
30 декабря, 2016 г.
121
Unit
20
Read and translate the article
Egypt’s path from autocracy to revolution—and back again
In 2005 a middle-aged Egyptian army officer arrived in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
While taking classes at the US Army War College, the officer, a devout Muslim,
sometimes led Friday prayers at the local mosque. During campus debates he
took exception to those who claimed that political Islam was incompatible with
democracy. In his final paper he argued that Arab democracies must include
Islamists, even “radical ones”.
So when the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s main Islamist movement, won the
country’s first free and fair elections in 2011–12, the officer, Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi,
seemed keen to work with the group. He was appointed defence minister and
quickly gained the trust of the new president, Muhammad Morsi, a Brotherhood
leader. Mr. Sisi would show up at meetings with his sleeves rolled up and hands
wet, as though he had been washing himself for prayer. Yet, less than two years
later, he ousted Mr Morsi, slaughtered hundreds of his followers and imprisoned
what was left of the Brotherhood’s leadership.
Egypt, where a quarter of Arabs live, has always been something of an
enigma. Despite the public’s disenchantment with Hosni Mubarak, the long-term
dictator, few predicted the revolution of 2011 that laid the groundwork for Mr.
Morsi’s election and Mr. Sisi’s subsequent coup. “Nothing is going to happen in
Egypt,” editors at the New York Times told David Kirkpatrick when he took over the
paper’s Cairo bureau at the start of 2011. Weeks later Mr. Mubarak was toppled
and the political order was thrown into disarray. In the years that followed, soldiers,
Islamists, liberals and the old elite jostled for power. None could be trusted.
In his new book, “Into the Hands of the Soldiers”, Mr. Kirkpatrick describes
these tumultuous times in compelling detail. The author is honest about how hard
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Unit 20. Egypt’s path from autocracy to revolution – and back again
it was to interpret events, grasp the motives of people such as Mr. Sisi and Mr.
Morsi and predict the direction in which Egypt was heading. “I brought with me the
standard Western assumptions,” he admits. “Almost all of it was wrong.” But Mr.
Kirkpatrick, who dodged bullets and official harassment, deciphered the mystery.
The same cannot be said of the foreign powers, especially America, that watched
as Egypt’s democracy crumbled.
The Islamist riddle
The Brotherhood was Egypt’s biggest puzzle. “For a supposedly secret
society, they were easy to spot,” writes Mr. Kirkpatrick. Often middle-aged and
middle-class, they kept their beards trimmed and wore chinos and button-down
shirts. But, before the revolution, their intentions were difficult to discern. When
Hassan al-Banna founded the group in 1928 he was fuzzy on whether it should
be militant or peaceful, political or spiritual, democratic or authoritarian. Egypt’s
dictators by turns persecuted, embraced and tolerated the Brotherhood. America,
which lavishes military aid on Egypt, followed their lead.
Opponents of the Brotherhood warned foreign journalists that the group
wanted to “Islamise” Egypt. But to Mr. Kirkpatrick—and your reviewer, a former
Cairo correspondent—the Brothers said all the right things. They advocated the
separation of mosque and state, free expression and equality for women and nonMuslims. These views were more liberal than those of mainstream Egyptians.
Moreover, to avoid a backlash, the group said during the uprising that it would
not seek more than a third of parliamentary seats; later it said it would not field a
presidential candidate in the polls following the revolution.
But when those elections came around, the Brotherhood contested most of
the seats, winning nearly half and also the presidency. After his victory, Mr. Morsi
installed Brothers in powerful positions. Months later he issued a decree holding
himself above judicial review and pushed through a constitution opposed by
liberals. “We thought we were losing our country,” one young Egyptian told The
Economist. Millions took to the streets in 2013 calling for Mr. Morsi to go. Egypt’s
so-called liberals saw those protests as a rerun of the 2011 revolution – another
organic uprising; another chance for democracy, as they defined it.
They were nothing of the sort. Egypt’s liberals were not taking back the
country – the army was. A slow-motion coup had been in the works since Mr. Morsi
was elected. Egypt’s generals did not even want to recognise his victory. Mubarakera judges duly dissolved the parliament. The president’s own foreign minister,
a non-Islamist, admitted to poisoning other governments against him, while the
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intelligence services worked covertly to bring the Brotherhood down. The United
Arab Emirates, whose authoritarian rulers fear democracy, especially if it has an
Islamic tint, funnelled millions of dollars to the supposedly grassroots opposition to
Mr. Morsi. Much of it went through Mr. Sisi’s defence ministry.
The coup befuddled America. As Mr. Morsi teetered, “Washington did not speak
with a single, credible voice,” writes Mr. Kirkpatrick. Barack Obama, then America’s
president, opposed the takeover and leant on Mr. Morsi to make concessions to
save his skin. (Mr. Morsi did invite the opposition for talks – they declined.) But
many American officials seemed resigned to, or even encouraged, a military powergrab. Chuck Hagel, then secretary of defence, told Mr. Sisi: “I don’t live in Cairo,
you do. You do have to protect your security, protect your country.” John Kerry, then
secretary of state, said later that the generals “were restoring democracy”.
American officials couldn’t get their facts right. James Mattis, then the
commander of American forces in the region, blamed the Brotherhood alone for
Egypt’s troubles. He later claimed that the constitution backed by Mr. Morsi had
been “rejected immediately by over 60% of the people”. In fact, about two-thirds of
voters approved the charter, which is similar to the one Egypt has now. Mr. Mattis
and Michael Flynn, then head of the Defence Intelligence Agency, lumped the
Brotherhood in with the jihadists of al-Qaeda and Islamic State, even though the
Brothers repeatedly condemned those groups and opposed violence. Both men
were given top jobs by Donald Trump.
It is true that the roots of al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups can be traced
back to Egyptian jails, which began filling with resentful Islamists in the 1960s.
Now the jails are bursting again, so much so that new ones have had to be built.
The Islamists have been joined by liberals, who quickly soured on Mr. Sisi’s inept
and draconian rule. Egypt now holds about 30,000 political prisoners, including
many journalists. Your reviewer was berated by the foreign ministry for, among
other things, referring to Mr. Sisi’s takeover as a coup (a label America refused to
apply). Mr. Kirkpatrick had it worse. Talk-show hosts denounced him on air as an
enemy of the state.
The coup also fuelled a jihadist insurgency in Sinai that continues to
torment Egypt. Yet American officials, citing renewed “stability”, argued that
the Brotherhood’s overthrow was the least bad option. The alternative “wasn’t
Jeffersonian democracy”, Mr. Kerry tells the author. “Over whatever number of
years we have put about $80bn into Egypt. Most of the time, this is the kind of
government they had – almost all of the time. And the reality is, no matter how
much I wish it was different, it ain’t going to be different tomorrow.”
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Unit 20. Egypt’s path from autocracy to revolution – and back again
Today’s American administration does not even wish it were different. To
them, Mr. Sisi has said all the right things. He wants to moderate Islam and reform
the economy. He calls Mr. Trump “a unique personality that is capable of doing
the impossible”. Mr. Trump, in turn, celebrates Mr. Sisi’s tough leadership and
calls him “a fantastic guy”. Like so many others, the American president seems
unconcerned that autocracy is again breeding misery and extremism in Egypt.
[51]
This article appeared in the Books and arts section of the print edition under
the headline “Brothers, generals and suckers”
The Economist
August 9, 2018
Vocabulary Practice
1. Give Russian equivalents to the following words and phrases from the article.
Prayer, mosque, incompatible, disenchantment, subsequent coup, to topple,
disarray, to jostle, tumultuous times, to grasp, to decipher, to crumble, intention,
to discern, to lavish, backlash, tint, to funnel, be fuddled, takeover, to lump,
condemned, breeding misery.
2. Read the article again and fill the gaps with appropriate words.
1) He was ……………… defence minister and quickly ……………… the trust
of the new president/
2) /has always been something of an ……………….
3) /was ……………… and the political order was thrown into ……………….
4) /who ……………… bullets and official harassment/
5) /as though he had been ……………… himself for prayer.
6) /he was fuzzy on whether it should be ……………… or peaceful/
7) /describes these ……………… times in compelling ……………….
8) /they kept their beards ……………… and wore chinos and
button-……………… shirts.
9) /while the ……………… services worked covertly to bring the Brotherhood
down.
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Перевод и реферирование общественно-политических текстов из средств массовой информации
10) /the roots of al-Qaeda and other ……………… groups can be traced back
to Egyptian ………………/
3. Fill the gaps with the missing prepositions in the following wordings.
1) show … … meetings … his sleeves rolled … and hands wet
2) incompatible … democracy
3) the old elite jostled … power
4) was left … the Brotherhood’s leadership
5) when those elections came …
6) he took … the paper’s Cairo bureau … the start of 2011
7) pushed … a constitution opposed … liberals
8) which lavishes military aid … Egypt
9) blamed the Brotherhood alone … Egypt’s troubles
10) equality … women and non-Muslims
4. Look for words and expressions in the article which are suitable for the following
explanations.
1) a Muslim place of worship
2) killing of a large number of people in an extremely violent way
3) a feeling of disappointment about someone or something you previously
respected or admired
4) preliminary or basic work
5) a state of disorganization or untidiness
6) a thing that is accepted as true or as certain to happen, without proof
7) aggressive pressure or intimidation
8) express complete disapproval of smth. or someone, typically in public
5. Write a summary of the article.
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Unit 20. Egypt’s path from autocracy to revolution – and back again
6. Translate the text into English.
Президентские выборы в Египте:
фарс или безальтернативный референдум
Эпоха военных
Египтяне слишком долго жили под управлением военных. Доверие к военным у них уже в менталитете, так как несколько поколений людей успело
вырасти при президентах, вышедших из кадровых офицеров. Военные – это
особая, элитная каста в стране: интеллигентные, грамотные, с высшим образованием, с хорошим социальным пакетом, имеющие твердую почву под
ногами. Поэтому неслучайно, наверное, все главы государства имеют за плечами опыт военной службы.
И в нынешней кампании, по оценкам наблюдателей, у ас-Сиси мог быть
лишь один реальный соперник в лице генерала Сами Анана. Он возглавлял
генштаб вооруженных сил Египта еще при Мубараке в период с 2005 по 2011
год. Ему отчасти приписывают заслугу в том, что в дни январских массовых
антиправительственных выступлений армия не пошла против народа и не
начала стрелять.
После приведших к отставке Мубарака революционных событий Анан
стал вторым человеком в армейском командовании после фельдмаршала
Хусейна Тантауи. Его авторитет рос, и зарубежные наблюдатели прочили
ему одну из центральных ролей в будущем правительстве. Но в 2012 году
избранный президент от «Братьев-мусульман» Мухаммед Мурси отправил
в отставку и Тантауи, и Анана. С тех пор о них практически ничего не было
слышно. В 2015 году Анан основал и зарегистрировал Партию арабского
Египта, уже тогда подготавливая почву для своего выдвижения на пост президента. Но баллотироваться ему на выборах не дали, официально отстранив от участия в них.
А дело все в том, что командование вооруженных сил Египта обвинило
Анана в «серьезном нарушении закона», поскольку генерал заявил о планах
податься в политику, оставаясь на военной службе. Военная прокуратура
начала в отношении него расследование, которое в случае доказательства
вины грозит реальным тюремным сроком. Тем более прецедент уже имеется.
Полковник Ахмед Кансауи, заявивший еще до Анана о планах баллотироваться на президентских выборах, был осужден месяц назад за нарушение
воинской присяги на шесть лет.
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Перевод и реферирование общественно-политических текстов из средств массовой информации
К слову, когда президент Абдель Фаттах ас-Сиси, кадровый военный и
бывший министр обороны, только готовился выдвинуться на пост президента
в 2014 году, он официально объявил о своей отставке и уходе из рядов ВС.
И тогда эта церемония «снятия военного кителя и перехода на гражданский
костюм» была обставлена с большой помпой.
Президентские выборы в Египте запланированы на 16−18 марта. Безусловно, таких очередей, какие выстраивались у участков во время первых
альтернативных выборов после отставки Мубарака в 2012 году, ожидать не
приходится. Часть избирателей вновь, как в давние времена, вернулась в
состояние политической апатии, другие убеждены, что в нынешних условиях,
когда необходимо поднимать страну, альтернативы ас-Сиси просто нет. В
любом случае уже сейчас прогнозируется низкая явка на выборах.
Но на всякий случай решило подстраховать ситуацию «Дар аль-Ифтаа»
(управление муфтия) – орган ученых религиозных мужей, выносящих решения по общественным и частным вопросам, связанным с религией. Они
выпустили религиозное предписание, в котором четко говорится, что те, кто
игнорирует выборы и не участвует в голосовании, по исламу считаются грешниками [20].
Пьяных Дина
ТАСС, Информационное агентство
1 февраля, 2018 г.
128
Unit
21
Read and translate the article
Why Spain had to overlook its painful history
Amid the cypresses and palms that adorn the small municipal cemetery of
Paterna on the outskirts of Valencia a blue and white tarpaulin protects a two-metre
deep hole from autumn rain. It is one of many unmarked mass graves scattered
among the flower-decked tombs. That morning Alejandro Vila, an archaeologist,
and his team exhumed a skeleton from the hole, the 266th since they began work
at the cemetery in March. In an adjoining office, the bones of each are carefully
arranged on a tray and a DNA sample taken for matching with that of surviving
relatives.
Valencia was the last bastion of the doomed Republic during the Spanish civil
war of 1936–39. After their military triumph, General Francisco Franco’s Nationalist
forces unleashed a reign of terror. At Paterna alone, some 2,000 civilians
were summarily shot and their bodies dumped. Many of the relatives – mainly
grandchildren now – take a close interest. “There was a long night of silence,” says
Mr Vila. “They feel a burden removed.”
On December 6th Spain will commemorate the 40th anniversary of the
democratic constitution that followed Franco’s death. In this period, the country
has changed out of all recognition. It is more than twice as rich, socially tolerant
and a vibrant democracy fully integrated into Europe. But its dark past still
occasionally tugs at the present. “The tragic thing is that we went from dictatorship
to a democracy with no reparations [for the victims],” says Rosa Pérez, a left-wing
representative in Valencia’s provincial parliament who has promoted the Paterna
exhumations.
That was because of the circumstances of the transition to democracy. Unlike
Hitler or Mussolini, to whom he is often compared, Franco was a winner who
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Перевод и реферирование общественно-политических текстов из средств массовой информации
died in his bed. Nasty though it was, his regime eventually presided over Spain’s
economic development and the creation of a middle class. When he died in 1975,
there was no rupture, as with the contemporaneous demise of dictatorships in
Portugal or Greece. The transition was negotiated between reformers in the regime
and moderates in the opposition, pushed along from above by King Juan Carlos,
and from below by popular pressure. Conventional wisdom holds that it involved
an enduring “pact of forgetting” about the civil war and the dictatorship, and that
this was a bad thing.
Both halves of that statement are questionable. Rather than a “pact of
forgetting” there was a sweeping amnesty (a long-standing demand of both
Socialists and Communists) and a tacit political consensus not to use the past
as a partisan political weapon in the present. There were two reasons for that.
Unlike Portugal or Greece (or indeed Nazi Germany), Spain suffered a civil war.
Because Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union all intervened, and because it
proved to be a dress rehearsal for the second world war, the civil war was often
portrayed as a purely anti-fascist or purely anti-communist struggle between
good and bad.
In fact, although Fascists played a part in Franco’s regime at the outset, its
defining character was a Catholic, nationalist and military authoritarianism, as
Santos Juliá, a historian, explains. By the 1960s Spaniards had come to view
the war as a fratricidal catastrophe in which both sides committed atrocities
(though Franco, the victor, committed more). The transition involved “a consensus
of ‘never again a civil war’, not a pact of forgetting”, as Enrique Moradiellos, a
younger historian, says. Indeed, Spanish society has “remembered” copiously, in a
flood of publications and commemorations. The other reason is that the transition
involved a political bargain in which the regime accepted democracy in return for
no reprisals. That outcome was favourable to the opposition. There was nothing
inevitable about it: largely thanks to eta, the Basque terrorist group, and franquista
diehards in the army the Spanish transition saw more violence than others in
southern Europe. It could easily have been reversed, at least temporarily.
In giving priority to peace and democracy rather than holding the past to
account, Spain flouted the demands of what is now called transitional justice. This
sees a failure to confront the past, through trials and/or a “truth commission”, as
denying the rights of victims and as inimical to consolidating the rule of law and
democratic values. Its handmaiden is a cult of “historical memory”, which is at
best an oxymoron (memory is subjective and personal) and at worst a pretext for
rewriting history.
130
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