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Будущее Африки. Борьба новых и старых акторов. Материалы международной научной конференции. Москва, 13-14 марта 2012 г.

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21
Вступительное слово
judges” and warns against a tendency to look over our shoulders all the time, worried about what the European and American investors will say. He further argues that what is critical for the African Renaissance is that our primary concern should be what we do among ourselves; he says Africa needs to put in place massive programmes for its renewal – economic, political, social and intellectual.
I conclude that, for all of Fantu Cheru and Joel Netshitenzhe’s obviously
correct conclusions – Africa needs to build its institutions.
I wish you all a fruitful conference.
Джоэл Кату Нетшитензе (ЮАР)
AFRICA’S NEW DEVELOPMENT TRAJECTORY
AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR GLOBAL
PARTNERSHIPS
The framing of discussions on Africa has historically been as important
as the content of the discussions themselves.
In many capitals of Europe, North America, Asia and Australasia
strategies for Africa abound. These have constantly been revised, especially
in the past two decades:
• as the Cold War ended, and with it the geo-political
competition between the forces of capitalism and socialism,
led respectively by the United States of America and the Soviet
Union;
• as Africa’s new growth and development trajectory started
to take shape more clearly and the vastness of extant natural
endowments became clearer;
• as players such as China, Russia, Brazil, India and Turkey
enhanced their involvement;
• as new dynamics in global security considerations such as
“the war on terror” started to play themselves out.
Given their experiences over many centuries, the people of Africa may be forgiven their sense of déjá vu at these developments, reminded of the General Act of the 1884 Berlin Conference which, for the rst time, in an international statute, referred to the notion of ‘spheres of inuence’1.
This is because that paradigm in relating to Africa continues to this day. It is an approach that proceeds from the premise that the continent is a
passive object of other countries’ and regions’ geo-strategic interests.
There is an alternative, more humane and thus more sustainable para­digm. This is informed by a recognition that Africa is populated by a think­ing and self-driven people, perfectly capable of pursuing their own strate-
gic objectives and of relating to the world within the context of their own interests.
1
www.bbc.co.uk
Джоэл Кату Нетшитензе
23
Africa is stepping onto a new and higher growth and development tra-
jectory. The signals may still be faint. The new trend may be edgling; and
there may yet be zigzags and detours. But there is no gainsaying that a new
era is upon the continent; and those who wish to succeed in their relations
with it will need to frame their approach having fully appreciated and em­braced this reality.
It is in the context of this paradigm of partnerships rather than others’
geo-strategic interests, that this brief paper will attempt to address develop-
ments in Africa and opportunities for partnerships.
Africa’s growth trajectory and prospects
Virtually all research on socio-economic developments on the conti-
nent does conrm a step-change in the fortunes of Africa’s people.
Perhaps more striking in this regard is the recent rendition of The Eco
nomist, which a few years ago had branded Africa as a hopeless continent with societies which “for reasons buried in their cultures, seem especially susceptible” to “brutality, despotism and corruption”2.
In a backtracking masterstroke, twelve years later, The Economist
wrote:
“From Ghana in the west to Mozambique in the south, Africa’s econo mies are consistently growing faster than those of almost any other region of the world. At least a dozen have expanded by more than 6% a year for six or more years. Ethiopia will grow by 7,5% this year, without a drop of oil to export. Once a byword for famine, it is now the world’s tenthlargest producer of livestock...
Severe income disparities persist through much of the continent; but a genuine middle class is emerging. According to Standard Bank, which operates throughout Africa, 60m African households have annual incomes greater than $3,000 at market exchange rates. By 2015, that number is expected to reach 100m—almost the same as in India now”3.
There are variations in performance in various countries and regions.
But other macro-economic indicators have conrmed this trend. Since 2000, African trade with the rest of the world increased by 200%; ination dropped from 22% in the decade before that to 8%; foreign debts declined by 25%; and labour productivity is growing by about 2,7% per annum4. In Sub-Saharan Africa, on average real GDP per capita was declining by 0,2%
2
Hopeless Africa // The Economist. May 11, 2000.
3
Africa’s hopeful economies // The Economist. December 3, 2011.
4
Ibidem.
24
Africa’s New Development Trajectory and Opportunities
between 1980 and 1994; but this had changed to positive growth of 2,3%
between 1995 and 20095.
While these indicators do reect a new economic storyline for Africa,
it is their meaning for human development in general that is even more
encouraging. The 2010 and 2011 United Nations Reports, assessing prog­ress towards the 2015 Millennium Development Goals indicate that in sub-
Saharan Africa6:
• the proportion of the working population with income of less than US$1.25 a day decreased from 67% in 1998 to 58% in 2008;
• rural poverty was reduced by 5.1% between 1998 and 2008;
• the unemployment rate declined from 9% in 1990 to 8% in 2007 (with a rapidly growing labour force);
• primary education enrolment was at 58% in 2000 and improved to 74% in 2007 and this is increasingly reecting gender demographics;
• under-ve mortality rates declined from 165 deaths per 1 000 live births in 1990 to 118 in 2009 – about 20% in 20 years.
As in other parts of the world, the global economic crisis has damp­ened improvement in some of the indicators. In 2009, for instance, the proportion of the working population on less than $1,25 a day slipped back from 58% the previous year to 64%. But the general trend is one of resil­ience. The World Bank projects growth in Africa in 2012 at 5,3% and 5,6%
in 2013. Foreign Direct Investment into Africa “was forecast, by Ernst & Young, to reach $150 billion by 2015 from $84 billion in 2010”7.
On the medium to long-term outlook, the McKinsey Global Institute8
projects that:
• Africa’s collective GDP, at roughly equal to Brazil’s or Russia’s ($1,6 trillion) in 2008, would grow to $2,6 trillion by 2020;
• in the same period, the combined consumer spending would increase from $860 bn to $1,4 trillion;
5
IMF. Sub-Saharan Africa: Resilience and Risks. October 2010.
6
UN. Assessing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium Development Goals
(2011); The Millennium Development Goals Report, 2009 – http://www.un.org
7
http://www.polity.org.za
8
Lions on the move: The progress and potential of African economies.
McKinsey Global Institute. 2010.
25
Джоэл Кату Нетшитензе
• the agricultural sector would massively improve as Africa
has a 60% share of the world’s total amount of uncultivated arable
land.
Beyond these detailed gures, what is the overarching narrative to
Africa’s socio-economic trends?
Firstly, it is that the continent has successfully embarked on programmes
to build its infrastructure including energy, ICT, rail, water, refurbishment
and expansion of properties in its cities and towns and so on. While most
of the supplies for these projects are imported, there is great potential
for the continent to build a manufacturing capacity on the back of these initiatives.
Secondly, while most of the analysis of the African growth story focusses on the extractive industry, the continent’s economic performance in the past decade was spread across sectors such as tourism, nancial intermediation, transport and telecommunications, construction, utilities
and resources – roughly in this order.
Thirdly, the virtuous cycle of growth that entails more employed people and a burgeoning ‘middle class’, and thus consumer spending, is bound
to drive further growth in retail and services sectors as well as attendant
manufacturing capacity. Further, as Asia climbs up the manufacturing sophistication ladder, many opportunities would open up for Africa to ll
the gap.
Fourthly, as demonstrated by the rapid expansion of access to telecommunications and such related services as banking, Africa has the
potential to leapfrog some stages in the logic of industrialisation. For companies with the dexterity innovatively to adapt applications to African
conditions, the possibilities will multiply many-fold.
Contextual underpinnings of the new narrative
The International Monetary Fund and others point to improvements in economic governance as the critical driver to Africa’s improving performance.
But, beyond the number-crunching of technical economics, is there a
broader contextual underpinning to these developments? Is this not a false dawn? What are the objective conditions and subjective factors that have spawned these changes?
At a global level, the coincidence of a variety of factors in the 1990s
presented for Africa both opportunities and challenges. These include: the end
of the Cold War, the rise of globalisation, productivity in developed countries that massively outperforms consumption, the ubiquity of information and communications technologies (ICT), the rise of new economic powers,
26
Africa’s New Development Trajectory and Opportunities
growing activism by mass movements for equitable global relations, and
migration. Some of these issues are elaborated in the next section.
Within Africa itself, the circumstances were changing.
Firstly, the liberation of South Africa provided an opportunity for a continent-wide critical self-examination. With the defeat of colonialism across the length and breadth of the continent, continental solidarity
and partnership started to revolve around issues of democracy and development.
Secondly, a new corps of leaders was emerging in this period, prepared
to stake their credibility and legitimacy on the improvement of Africans’
human condition, ranging from democratic governance to inclusive
economic growth.
Thirdly, African civil society, including the intellectual community, was slowly starting to stir, demanding a place in the sun for Africa’s people.
Fourthly, as a consequence of interventions from the rest of the continent, many of Africa’s domestic and regional conicts were being
resolved.
By the turn of the century, a critical mass of countries and leaders had
resolved to launch onto a new path. This congealed in the New Partnership
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the reconguration of continental
institutions such as the Organisation of African Unity into the African Union (AU) with a new mission and statutes.
It can therefore be argued that both objective conditions and subjective factors had combined to afford Africa an auspicious moment for the launch of its renaissance.
Progress, though, is not given. Conicts and tensions still dog parts of the continent. Improvements in democratisation, economic governance and anti-corruption measures are, in many countries, still tenuous. Though impressive, the economic growth is from a low base. Over-reliance in some countries on mineral endowments does present its own dangers, both in terms of the destabilising effect of the global scramble as well as the ‘Dutch
disease’ of overvalued currencies and displacement of other industries. The demographic dividend of a youthful population presents great possibilities
for economic activity; but also dangers of social instability if young people
cannot access opportunities. As the hitistes and shabab atileen showed in
Tunisia and Egypt respectively, young people are bound to revolt against marginalisation, corruption and undemocratic rule.
Critically, the continent is still at the starting blocks in relation to intra­African trade. The World Bank paper on ‘de-fragmenting Africa’ makes the
correct observations that:
27
Джоэл Кату Нетшитензе
“…African countries lag signicantly behind other regions in key areas such as customs, infrastructure, competence in logistics, and timeliness of exports and imports…
“[A] common feature in Africa is that the cost of moving goods between countries is high, transit times uncertain and delays exceptionally long. Unless all the factors leading to these symptoms are addressed, [Sub Saharan Africa’s] trade competitiveness will remain compromised…
“Clearly there is a need to scale up the levels of investment in trade related infrastructure… However, infrastructure improvements alone, though important, will neither signicantly reduce trade transaction costs nor improve reliability…
“What is needed therefore is to ensure that upgrading of hard infra structure is coordinated with improvements to the “soft” infrastructure, such as institutional and regulatory reforms that deliver the competitive provision of high quality transport and logistics services”9.
Therefore, the progress going forward depends on a multiplicity of factors, critical among which is the consolidation of the positive trends identied above and dogged attention to the weaknesses. Further, the per­formance of the ‘growth locomotives’ in the various regions, the resilience of countries that are emerging from periods of debilitating conict, and the management of remaining conicts will stand the continent in good stead.
Thus would it be possible for Africa irreversibly to launch onto a higher
growth and development trajectory, in a Continental Democratic Revolu­tion that combines the development of productive forces, improvement in people’s socio-economic conditions and humane governance based on an
abiding culture of human rights.
Will the global environment afford Africa the platform to pursue its ideals?
The global context
The growing self-assertion of Africa on the world stage proceeds, among others, from the perspective that the continent cannot continue to attribute its current difculties solely to its history of colonial subjugation, nor on the neo-colonial machinations of the post-independence era. There
is much that African leaders themselves did or did not do that precipitated
the pre-2000 decline.
However, current and future global realities – ranging from the
trajectory of the capitalist system to the emergence of new global economic
9
De-fragmenting Africa: Deepening Regional Trade Integration in Goods and
Services. The World Bank. 2012.
28
Africa’s New Development Trajectory and Opportunities
powers – do have and will continue having a signicant impact on Africa’s
fortunes.
In 1992 Marguerite Michaels of Time Magazine proclaimed that the
“United States has been retreating from Job’s continent since the implosion of the Soviet Union set America free to pursue its own interests in Africa – and it found it did not have any…”10. But this has proven to be a mirage.
In this regard, the observation by Karl Marx et al in 1848 remains
relevant to this day:
“The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere…”11.
As V.I. Lenin was later to opine, the capitalist system would mature to include the emergence of nance capital, the export of capital rather than just commodities, “the formation of international monopolist capitalist
associations which share the world among themselves and … the territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers”12.
The capitalist system has been rened over the years, regenerating itself and adapting to changing circumstances. But its essence, as described by Marx and Lenin, remains. In the current period, and in relation to Africa,
elements of this essence include:
Rapid development of productive forces: This encom­passes, among other factors, the rapid development of information and communications technologies (ICT), which make it easier for
transnational corporations to disperse elements of their production
chains across the globe, in a world economy “whose core com ponents have the institutional, organizational, and technological capacity to work as a unit in real time, or in chosen time, on a planetary scale”13.
Constant migration of production sites: In relation to the above, there is a permanent search for locations that afford the lowest costs and the highest returns. At the same time, as reected in today’s China, these locations do gradually climb up the manu­facturing sophistication ladder, leading to constant migrations of
10
Michaels Marguerite (Nairobi Bureau Chief of Time magazine, Foreign
Affairs). Retreat from Africa.
11
Manifesto of the Communist Party. 1848.
12
Lenin V.I. Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism.
13
Castells Manuel. The rise of the network society (Second Edition). John Wiley
& Sons, 2009.
29
Джоэл Кату Нетшитензе
production facilities. In Asia, locations such as Vietnam and Ban­gladesh currently provide these platforms. But, in time, this is bound to change; and Africa is steadily coming into the sights of
these corporations.
Inequality and short-termism: While much progress has
been made across the globe in the past two decades in reducing ab-
solute poverty, particularly in Asia, Latin America and Africa, in­equality has largely increased. Even in celebrated China, the Gini coefcient had increased to 0,47 in 2010: “…income of the top
10% of the richest Chinese was 23 times that of the bottom 10% in the country in 2007, as compared with 1998, when the gap was only 7,3 times”14.
Paul Krugman captures this succinctly in relation to the developed world
and the United States in particular: “Over the past 30 years.., according to Fortune magazine, the average real annual compensation of the top 100 CEO’s went from $1,3 million – 39 times the pay of an average worker – to $37,5 million, more than 1,000 times the pay of ordinary workers…”15.
At the same time, the tendency towards short-termism has grown mas­sively, especially in the private sector, across the globe. In the name of maximising returns for shareholders, executives are required on a quar­terly basis to produce positive results, leading precisely to the maladies that
have sparked the current global economic crisis. Quoting Dominic Barton
of McKinsey, the Financial Times asserts that there has been “a wider drop in trust in business since the global nancial crisis, which would require capitalism to adopt a longerterm perspective, freeing executives from run ning their companies merely to hit quarterly earnings targets”16.
Continuing search for markets for nancial capital: In-
creasing interest in Africa is also reected in the nancial and stock
markets. In the words of the Financial Times:
“With many of its 48 economies rebounding from the crisis faster than the rest of the world, subSaharan Africa is increasingly viewed as an op portunity rather than a burden. It is rising rapidly up the agenda for global investment managers and is talked about as never before in almost every big nancial centre”17.
14
Chen Jia. Country’s wealth divide past warning level // China Daily. May 12,
2010 (also quoting Prof. Li Shi of Beijing Normal University).
15
Krugman Paul. For Richer // New York Times Magazine. October 20, 2002.
16
Financial Times. July 11, 2011.
17
Ripe for reappraisal // Financial Times. May 19, 2011.
30
Africa’s New Development Trajectory and Opportunities
An even bigger thirst for raw materials: These range
from minerals and rare earths to oil and agricultural products. In
a 2011 scenario exercise, the European Commission expressed
concern about the European Union being “highly dependent on imports of raw materials which are increasingly affected by mar ket distortions”18. Concerns expressed included supply risks due to
concentration of some of these resources in places such as China, Congo, Russia, Brazil and South Africa.
The US on the other hand has in the past decade paid attention,
among others, to its increasing dependence on African oil, especially
in West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea in particular. This also applies to resources such as Platinum Group Metals concentrated in South Africa
and Zimbabwe, which are critical for the nascent Hydrogen Economy and
fuel cell technology.
An advisory Team, the African Oil Policy Initiative Group, estimates
that, by 2007, the US was importing more oil from Africa than from Saudi
Arabia. It further observed:
“For too long Washington has been gripped by the perception that the United States has no vital interests in SubSaharan Africa. Nothing could be further from the truth… African oil is emerging as a clear direction U.S. policy could take to provide a secure source of energy”19.
A Nigerian publication on oil and gas presents this US approach more clearly:
“The reevaluation which has taken place in US foreign policy and energy policy with the coming of President Barack Obama has not in any way changed the basis [sic] thrust of those policies towards the Gulf of Guinea. In that context, Obama’s trip to Ghana was seen as informed by Washington’s strategy of working with regional allies in West Africa to develop relationships which will secure US energy security in the long term”20.
Rivalries among major powers: While the post-World War II alliances have seen greater co-operation among the ‘western’ powers, rivalries continue. But more pertinent in current strategies
18
European Commission (Enterprise and Industry) Workshop “Exploring
Success Scenario for 2030”. EU Raw Materials Initiative. January 2011.
19
African Oil Policy Initiative Group, References from Symposium on African
Oil: A Priority for U.S. National Security and African Development. January 2002.
20
Obasa Roland. US, China: Contending Interests in the Gulf of Guinea //
Nigeria’s Oil & Gas Monthly.
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