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Хэ Вэйпин
ble its 2006 assistance to Africa by 2009, provide $3 billion of preferential
loans and $2 billion of preferential buyer’s credits to Africa, debt cancellation and establishment of trade and economic cooperation zones in Africa,
and establish a development fund of $5 billion to encourage Chinese rms
to invest in Africa, etc.
At the 4th FOCAC meeting wrapped up in Egypt in early Novem-
ber 2009, a package of new development assistance to Africa from China
has been issued which put more emphasis on the projects that closely link
with people’s livelihood and environmental protection, such as establishing 100 clean energy projects in Africa, providing $10 billion concessional
loans, setting up a $1 billion special loan for small and medium-sized African businesses, and further opening up China’s market to African products
(zero-tariff treatment to 95% of African products and starting with 60% of
the products within 2010) in the next three years
194
.
FOCAC: A new initiative for promoting Sino-African relations
The emergence of a unilateral world order after the Cold War became
an immediate concern for the vast majority of developing countries. The
need to establish a new, fair and reasonable international political and
economic order, so as to deal with the challenges of economic globalisation
and safeguard its legitimate rights and interests, was an overriding objective
for the developing world to assert its independent voice in global affairs
and extend its relations more broadly to include strategic partners from the
South, especially in light of the experience of the Cold War. Seemingly,
then, strengthening and institutionalizing relations between China and
Africa was considered necessary to reect the new impulses in the global
South.
Hence the birth of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)
in 2000. At the end of the 1990s, some African countries proposed that as
the US, Britain, France, Japan and Europe had established mechanisms
for contact with Africa. It was necessary for China and Africa to establish
a similar mechanism to t in with the need to strengthen relations. After
earnest study, China decided to echo the suggestions of African countries,
and proposed to hold the Forum in 2000.
Since the holding of its rst ministerial-level meeting in Beijing in
2000, which marked the establishment of the forum, four ministeriallevel meetings have so far been convened under the dialogue mechanism,
194
Premier Wen Jiabao’s speech at the opening ceremony of the 4th FOCAC
meeting in Sharm ElSheikh, Egypt on 9th November, 2011 – http://gb.cri.cn/27824/2
009/11/09/2225s2670969.htm
132
China-Africa Relations
with the third one staged at the Beijing Summit in November 2006. In the
past 10 years, FOCAC has proved a win-win type of partnership which
distinguished by three key words each starting with letter C: strategic
Condence, win-win Cooperation and pragmatic Concretization.
The growing Sino-African ties in the past decade also have proved
inseparable from the principle of “pragmatic cooperation” advocated
by the FOCAC mechanism. As the world’s largest developing nation
and a responsible word power, China has, from the beginning, adopted
a series of concrete measures to reduce Africa’s debts and increase its
aid to African countries. It has also strived to expand its investments in
Africa and to adopt zero tariffs on commodities from the continent. To
help African countries resolve their food security issues, some concrete
quantitative targets were set at previous forums with the aim of promoting
Sino-African agricultural cooperation, human resource training, as well as
bilateral cooperation on medical care, health and education. These efforts
are an indication of China’s desire to address some of the continent’s most
urgent problems.
The accomplishments of the FOCAC prove that the forum can
contribute to mutual trust and bilateral pragmatic cooperation. Different
policies and measures adopted by China at previous forums have indicated
the continuity and innovativeness of the country’s Africa policy. At the
rst ministerial-level meeting in Beijing, China’s commitments to reduce
African debts proved positive in helping the impoverished continent reduce
its colossal debts. The personnel training programs China introduced
at the second forum held in Ethiopia in December 2003 helped African
countries cultivate their labor forces for much-needed economic and social
development. The measures put forward by China to promote Sino-African
cooperation at the 2006 Beijing Summit, including debt reduction, China’s
investment in and assistance to Africa, and improvement of African people’s
livelihood, proved to be a big boost to bilateral ties.
A new series of Africa Policy measures were introduced at the 4th
Ministerial Conference of FOCAC in Egypt in 2009, to counter concerns
put forward by the international community over some of China’s previous
efforts. The measures included aiding the continent’s environmental
protection endeavors, the development of clean energy, as well as the
promotion of bilateral scientic and technological cooperation and support
nancing for local middle and small-sized enterprises.
Furthermore, the FOCAC has played a positive role in prompting the
international community to pay more attention to Africa and to increase
its aid to the underdeveloped continent. Africa has been drawing the
133
Хэ Вэйпин
world’s attention in the past decade as the situation on the continent
gradually improved and its resources and market potential showed growing
signicance.
Take a closer look and one will see that the “Africa fever” was not
the result of its own rising status alone but of increased cooperation with
emerging Asian economies, particularly with China, and its “look-east”
policy as well.
Right after the China-Africa Summit in November 2006, South
Korea immediately invited African heads of state to Seoul and held the
rst Korea-Africa Summit (6 African heads of state and over 20 ministers
participated).
Then, in December 2007, the second EU-Africa Summit held in Lisbon
after seven years of the rst one in Egypt in 2000. And that followed with
the rst India-Africa Summit and the fourth Japan-Africa Summit as well
as the annual G8 meeting.
On every occasion, the host country all announced a package of
economic assistance and cooperative programs with Africa. Frankly
speaking, all these efforts have improved the external environment and
offered good opportunities for African development.
Challenges ahead
Even though Sino-African relations has been enjoying sound and rapid development, it is imperative that we pay great attention to the new
problems and challenges facing the development of China-Africa relations
and consider the ways and means to deal with them. In suming up, the
challenges ahead are the main following:
1. No Inherent Advantage
Similar to measuring relations between people, we often use time and
space in measuring relations between countries. Compared to the WestAfrica relations, China-Africa relations do not enjoy any advantage in these
two terms. As for time, even though the earliest contact between China and
Africa can be traced to Han dynasty around 200 BC, but the practical and
regular contacts between China and Africa started only after 1949, when
the People’s Republic of China was founded.
Essentially, China-Africa contacts have spanned only 60 years. In
contrast, the West has been present in Africa since XVth century, with
hundreds of years of colonial rule. As a result, the West has left extensive
and deep inuence in Africa’s political, economic and cultural spheres.
Speaking of space, the West (especially European countries) is separated
from Africa only by Mediterranean Sea, with many viewing Africa as their
backyard. Many European scholars on African issues that I know, when
134
China-Africa Relations
they talk about research trips to Africa, it sounds like a walk in the backyard
for them, which they could perform with ease and freedom.
Comparatively, China is separated from Africa by tens of thousands
of miles. Many Chinese still view Africa as a distant and mysterious continent. Chinese scholars on African issues rarely have opportunities to do
research in Africa. And when such an opportunity does arise, it is often
sponsored by Western funding sources, and can only happen after a lengthy
and difcult project validation and planning process.
2. Unfriendly International Media Environment
Naturally, the rapid development of China-Africa relations has made
the Western countries jittery, as they still view Africa as their backyard.
Some Western politicians, media and NGOs put the Chinese government,
enterprises or even individual business people under scrutiny, focusing
on every move and observing any possible blemish of the Chinese in
Africa.
Some isolated cases involving negative practices of Chinese enterprises are blown up as sweeping behavior of a nation. The normal operation of
natural resources extraction is described as “resource plundering”. When
Chinese enterprises participate in global competition and win bids with
high efciency and low costs, they are accused of “backroom dealing” or
“receiving government support behind the scenes”, etc.
In addition, there are also allegations and criticisms against China’s
stead fast principle of non-interference in other countries’ affairs, saying
this principle is actually a disguise in support of “rogue” or “failed” states,
not conducive to the progress of “democracy and human rights causes or
anti-totalitarianism and anti-corruption campaigns”advocatedby the West-
ern countries in Africa.
3. Trade Frictions and Conicts of Economic Interests
It is held by certain African scholars that China’s economic development constitutes both tempting opportunities and terrible threats to Afri-
195
ca
. For example, take textile trade. The sustained increase of export
from China to the US and the EU, the two largest markets for textile products, and the great increase of Chinese products to African countries where textile and apparel is the pillar industry has, to a certain extent, eroded
the international market share of these countries, thus affecting the deve-
195
Represented by Mr. Moeletsi Mbeki, Deputy Director of the South African
Institute of International Affairs. See: China’s Journey to Africa // on-line US
magazine of Yale Globalization (January 3rd, 2005).
135
Хэ Вэйпин
lopment of the textile industry in the local area and leading to bankruptcies
and unemployment.
Indeed, with the ever expanding economic and trade cooperation bet-
ween China and Africa, conicts in trade and investment between the two
sides are also becoming more prominent. China’s absolute advantage in labor cost and resources has rendered the textile and light industries in some
African countries into a helpless position. For example, in South Africa,
a pair of pants made in China only costs $1 which includes long-distance
transportation charge and customs, while the same product locally produ-
ced costs ten times as much
196
.
Besides, certain African scholars including some from South Africa
deem China-African trade relations a kind of unequal mode of “northsouth economic relations” for the reason that Africa mainly exports raw
materials and imports manufactured goods. Indeed, although in the past
decade, trade volume between China and Africa has increased so rapidly,
yet the trade structure where China exports machinery, electronic products, textile and light industry products to Africa and imports oil, timber, mineral products and other raw materials from Africa has not been
changed.
4. Differences in Political Understanding and Concepts of Values
In recent years the process of political development and democracy is
quite rapid in Africa. In government papers and daily talk of the ordinary
people, words like democracy and human rights are frequently on their
lips. The development of NGOs and the civil society is also quite fast, of
which the Africans are very proud. This may lead to some misunderstanding on the part of the Africans about China’s democracy and human rights
conditions. Some even think that China has not paid due attention to the
development of democracy and human rights in Africa
197
.
Western countries went even further, claiming that China only pursues
selsh interests in conducting economic and trade relations with Africa
while neglecting the democracy and human rights conditions of recipient
countries. They argue that China’s unconditional economic aid has objec-
tively supported the so-called “failed states” in Africa, and that it is detrimental to the promotion of “good governance” by Western countries in
196
See: Zhishen Lin. Africa, Competition not only from China. Special report on
Cankaoxiaoxi: “Friction, the Pain of Chinese Textile Products” (June 30th, 2005).
197
See: Gros JeanGermain. Chinese Economic Success and Lessons for Africa:
Possibilities and Limits // Nkrumaist Review, May 2005.
136
China-Africa Relations
Africa as well as to the progress of anti-corruption and human rights cause
in Africa
198
.
How Far Can China Go in Africa?
While marveling at the great development of China-Africa relations
today, China needs tobe aware of the potential challenges and have a sense
of crises. At present, being Chinese, we should clearly recognize that the
rise of the trade volume does not equate to the synchronized rise of the
economic competitiveness. In other words, trade structure, technical advancement in economic and trade cooperation, environment protection,
capacity for sustainable development, and also the training and cultivation
of a large number of legal and other experts are all essential for economic
competitiveness. To enhance China’s political inuence, economic competitiveness, moral appeal and diplomatic relations in Africa, we still have
a lot of potentials to cultivate and a long way to go.
In fact, how far can China really go in Africa depends on how we deal
with the sensitive issues in Africa, such as strengthening management localization, local staff employment, textile competition, local infant industry protection, product quality and raising corporate social responsibility in
the Chinese enterprises. The solution lies in how China responds to these
concerns and how China can think from the African perspective when en-
tering Africa, for true realization of mutual benet and win-win.
Strengthening mutual understanding between China and Africa is also
an important factor in determining how far China can go in Africa. Dur-
ing one of my research trips to Zambia, Ethiopia and Ghana in September 2009, some African scholars I talked all noted that due to hundreds of
years of colonial history and an earlier start in African studies, the West has
conducted more extensive and in-depth researches on Africa. As a result,
the West and Africa have better mutual understanding than between China
and Africa. At the same time, they also pointed out that while the Western
countries know Africa well they do not stand with or speak for Africa.
While China stands with Africa on many issues, regrettably, China does not
know Africa well enough.
Strengthening China-Africa mutual understanding is not something that
can be done overnight. Instead it has to be fostered gradually and actively in
both China and Africa. In China, a “China-Africa Research Fund” should be
set up to support and promote institutions and individuals in African studies,
so researchers can take their research to the target countries for observation
198
Africa: China’s great leap into the continent – IRIN@irinnews.org
(03.23.2006)
О.С. Кулькова
137
and research. In Africa, similar investment should be assigned to research
institutions and think-tanks. Concerning the African scholars who have studied in China and returned to their home countries particularly, efforts should
be made to realize their full potential as a bridge between the two sides.
It is only through continual strengthening of mutual understanding can the
friendly relations between China and Africa go further and further.
О.С. Кулькова, к.и.н. (Институт Африки РАН)
ГЕОСТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИЕ ИНТЕРЕСЫ
СТРАН ЗАПАДА В АФРИКЕ
(на примере Великобритании)
Великобритания – один из самых активных геополитических игроков на африканском континенте. У нее, как и у других стран Запада,
есть здесь свои геостратегические интересы. Рассмотрим, как Великобритания отстаивает их в Африке на современном этапе, то есть
при правительстве Д. Кэмерона.
Следует отметить, что геостратегические интересы различных
стран Запада и новых игроков в Африке весьма схожи, и они зачастую
соперничают между собой на континенте. В круг этих интересов входят «борьба за ресурсы и рынки, за сохранение или завоевание экономических и политических позиций»
политические и иные проблемы Африки также влияют на ситуацию в
других странах мира.
Страны Африки, занимая «периферийное» положение в мировой
экономике, вместе с тем играют важную роль в мировой политике (это
более четверти членов ООН, например). К тому же, несмотря на свои
социально-экономические проблемы, усугубленные кризисом, Африка
вот уже ряд десятилетий является ресурсной и даже финансовой (из-за
стабильного оттока финансовых ресурсов в виде прибылей, процентов
по кредитам, условиям предоставления «связанной помощи» и бегства
199
. Вместе с тем, социально-
199
Васильев А.М., Фитуни Л.Л. Африка – зона столкновения геостратеги-
ческих интересов полицентричного мира // Хрестоматия «Россия в глобальном
мире 2000–2011». Российский совет по международным делам. М., 2012. Том 4.
Раздел 12. С. 1317.
138
Геостратегические интересы стран Запада в Африке
капитала) подпиткой для развитых экономик мира
200
. Африка – континент с огромным потенциалом разного рода ресурсов, и это определяет ее значимость для будущего международных отношений.
Геостратегически важна также борьба за рынки сбыта
201
. А.М. Васильев и Л.Л. Фитуни в своей работе отмечали, что одним из основных
мотивов пересмотра геополитических реалий было и остается стремление обеспечить контроль над ресурсами – «кому-то на глобальном,
кому-то на региональном, а кому-то на секторальном или отраслевом
уровне»
202
. Это обусловлено тем, что, по прогнозам, глобальный спрос
на сырье в середине века возрастет на 50–60%.
Переходя к конкретному примеру Великобритании, можно выде-
лить такие геостратегические интересы в отношении Африки:
1. Прежде всего, это контроль над африканскими минерально-сырьевыми ресурсами (нефть, газ, минералы, необходимые западной промышленности, в т.ч. высокотехнологичной). В перспективе – осво ение африканских источников
возобновляемой энергии (имеется в виду солнечная энергия,
энергия ветра, приливов, биотопливо).
2. Во-вторых, это стремление проникнуть на африканские
рынки, предоставлять больше услуг, поставлять больше британских товаров. Одним из важнейших пунктов британского
экспорта, кстати, является оружие, в изобилии поставляемое
на континент. Британия стремится добиться от африканских
стран содействия интересам британского бизнеса, особенно
крупного. Вместе с тем зачастую создаются препятствия для
проникновения на британский (и общеевропейский рынок) для
африканских товаров – кампания под экологическими лозунгами «покупай местное, снижай выбросы углекислого газа»
«Общая политика ЕС в области сельского хозяйства»
204
203
.
3. В-третьих, это стремление расширить свою сферу влияния в Африке, в т.ч. за счет соперничества (тайного или явно-
,
200
Васильев А.М., Фитуни Л.Л. Африка – зона столкновения геостратеги-
ческих интересов полицентричного мира // Хрестоматия «Россия в глобальном
мире 2000–2011». Российский совет по международным делам. М., 2012. Том 4.
Раздел 12. С. 1318.
201
Там же. С. 1319.
202
Там же. С. 1320.
203
Hennig R.C. Africa to pay for Europe’s “green policies” – http://www.afrol.
com/features/24556
204
Common Agricultural Policy.
139
О.С. Кулькова
го) с другими значимыми акторами (например, Китаем, Францией).
4. В-четвертых, стремление защитить интересы британских граждан на континенте, обеспечить приток квалифицированных кадров из африканских стран и вместе с тем уменьшить число нежелательных африканских мигрантов. Большое
значение имеет также распространение английского языка,
пропаганда английской культуры и образа жизни, использование лингвокультурного фактора в политических интересах.
Я остановлюсь подробнее на первых трех группах интересов.
Великобритания как высокоиндустриальная страна является крупным потребителем минерально-сырьевых ресурсов, однако многие
собственные запасы природного сырья практически исчерпаны. В то
же время, согласно прогнозам, население Великобритании в последующие годы должно возрасти
205
.
Именно в связи с этим еще правительство Т. Блэра сформулировало в «Белой книге» (февраль 2003 г.) энергетическую стратегию
«Наше энергетическое будущее – создание низкоуглеродной экономики».
В «Белой книге» были определены четыре новые цели британской
энергетической политики
206
:
- сокращение выбросов парниковых газов,
- обеспечение надежных поставок энергии,
- поддержка конкурентоспособных энергетических рынков в Ве-
ликобритании и за ее пределами,
- обеспечение адекватного и доступного отопления в каждом
британском доме.
«Белая книга» была предназначена для ответа на три основных
вызова, стоявших в тот период перед энергетической системой Великобритании.
Это, во-первых, проблема изменения климата. Во-вторых, перед
Великобританией остро стояла проблема снижения ее внутренних
энергоресурсов. Страна уже импортирует почти половину используемого ею угля, стала нетто-импортером газа к 2006 г. и нетто-импор-
205
Highley D.E., Chapman G.R., Bonel K.A. The Economic importance of
minerals to the UK. British Geological Survey Commissioned Report, CR/04/070N.
Keyworth, Nottingham British Geological Survey. 2004.
206 Our energy future – creating a low carbon economy. February 2003,
p.75–107 – http://www.managenergy.net/download/r189.pdf
140
Геостратегические интересы стран Запада в Африке
тером нефти к 2010 г. Статус импортера энергии требует новых подходов, чтобы сократить резкие колебания цен и сохранить политическую стабильность. В-третьих, перед британским правитель ством
стоит задача сохранения энергетической инфраструктуры страны
с учетом меняющихся технологий и потребностей. Значительную
часть этой инфраструктуры необходимо будет обновлять в ближайшие 20 лет
207
.
Как мы видим, на данном этапе активное освоение и эксплуатация
африканских углеводородов соответствует заявленным целям британской энергетической политики. Эксперты британской Комиссии
по отслеживанию прогресса Африки (Africa Progress Panel) полагают, что у Африки – большое будущее, если она применит стратегию
«зеленого роста», то есть станет использовать свои богатые ресурсы
солнечного света, гидроэнергии, энергии ветра, термальных источников и биомассы, привлекая зарубежные инвестиции к проектам по их
освоению. В условиях глобального изменения климата такая роль Африки может принести ей процветание
208
.
Однако пока африканские страны в основном интересуют Великобританию в энергетическом плане как поставщики нефти и газа.
Британская структура энергобезопасности во многом опирается на
энергетические ресурсы Африки.
Среди стран Северной Африки это Ливия, Алжир, Египет, Тунис
и Марокко.
Следует подробнее сказать о ситуации в Ливии.
Правительство Т. Блэра (1997–2007 гг.) сумело наладить политический диалог с М. Каддафи. В результате т.н. сделки в пустыне между М. Каддафи и Т. Блэром в 2004 г. ливийская сторона заключила
соглашение с компанией «Шелл», касающееся разработки газовых
месторождений на ливийском побережье и строительства завода по
производству сжиженного газа. В мае 2007 г. «Национальная ливийская нефтяная компания» подписала контракт с британской компанией «Бритиш петролеум» (BP) на сумму $900 млн относительно ведения разведки на углеводороды на территории Джамахирии и в ее оф-
207
Ward G. British Energy Policy and Markets // First Magazine. L. Winter,
2003
208
Keating M. “Green growth” strategy viable for African economy. http://blogs.
reuters.com/great-debate-uk/2009/06/12/green-growth-strategy-viable-for-african-
economy/
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