Античный скептицизм и философия науки. Диалог сквозь два тысячелетия. Монография

Ancient skepticism putting everything in doubt, to be consistent, have to doubt isostenia itself, i.e. to equate it to the very equality it expresses. In this case the thesis that «skeptics only seek» (i.e. neither state nor negate anything but only doubt), on the one hand, will not turn out dogmatism. And on the other hand, it will avoid an inner contradiction. Thus one of the widespread arguments against skepticism claiming that it’s either a kind of negative dogmatism or a self-contradictory philosophical construction will be neutralized. Here lies one of the essential differences between skepticism and traditional types and forms of philosophical thinking: skeptical «world view» is fundamentally mobile and plastic and, consequently, skeptical philosophical constructions don’t lead to any definite results and, simultaneously, they are open to different points of view, therefore they are alien to arbitrary and, in the end, unfoundedly accepted theses, they put nothing «into brackets», and this helps them to see the rightness (as well as wrongness) of any philosophical idea. This is why skepticism is the very quest for truth, not the denial of the possibility to reach it as it’s fairly often being interpreted.