- •Table of contents
- •Abbreviations and Acronyms
- •Executive summary
- •Introduction
- •Institutional arrangements for tax administration
- •Key points
- •Introduction
- •The revenue body as an institution
- •The extent of revenue body autonomy
- •Scope of responsibilities of the revenue body
- •Special governance arrangements
- •Special institutional arrangements for dealing with taxpayers’ complaints
- •Bibliography
- •The organisation of revenue bodies
- •Getting organised to collect taxes
- •Office networks for tax administration
- •Large taxpayer operations
- •Managing the tax affairs of high net worth individuals taxpayers
- •Bibliography
- •Selected aspects of strategic management
- •Key points and observations
- •Managing for improved performance
- •Reporting revenue body performance
- •Summary observations
- •Managing and improving taxpayers’ compliance
- •Bibliography
- •Human resource management and tax administration
- •Key points
- •Aspects of HRM Strategy
- •Changes in policy in aspects of HRM within revenue bodies
- •Staff metrics: Staff numbers and attrition, age profiles and qualifications
- •Resources of national revenue bodies
- •Key points and observations
- •The resources of national revenue bodies
- •Impacts of recent Government decisions on revenue bodies’ budgets
- •Overall tax administration expenditure
- •Measures of relative costs of administration
- •International comparisons of administrative expenditure and staffing
- •Bibliography
- •Operational performance of revenue bodies
- •Key points and observations
- •Tax revenue collections
- •Refunds of taxes
- •Taxpayer service delivery
- •Are you being served? Revenue bodies’ use of service delivery standards
- •Tax verification activities
- •Tax disputes
- •Tax debts and their collection
- •Bibliography
- •The use of electronic services in tax administration
- •Key points
- •Provision and use of modern electronic services
- •Bibliography
- •Tax administration and tax intermediaries
- •Introduction
- •The population and work volumes of tax intermediaries
- •Regulation of tax intermediaries
- •The services and support provided to tax intermediaries
- •Bibliography
- •Legislated administrative frameworks for tax administration
- •Key findings and observations
- •Introduction
- •Taxpayers’ rights and charters
- •Access to tax rulings
- •Taxpayer registration
- •Collection and assessment of taxes
- •Administrative review
- •Enforced collection of unpaid taxes
- •Information and access powers
- •Tax offences (including policies for voluntary disclosures)
- •Bibliography
178 – 5. RESOURCES OF NATIONAL REVENUE BODIES
Measures of relative costs of administration
The cost of collection ratio
It has become a fairly common practice for revenue bodies to compute and publish (e.g. in their annual reports) a “cost of collection” ratio as a surrogate measure of the efficiency/effectiveness of their administration.3 The ratio is computed by comparing the annual costs of administration incurred by a revenue body, with the total revenue collected (after refunds) over the course of a fiscal year, and is often expressed as a percentage or as the cost of collecting 100 units of revenue. Most revenue bodies tend to publish the ratio for a number of years and, all other things being equal, changes in the ratio over time should reflect movements in relative efficiency and/or effectiveness. This arises from the fact that the ratio is derived from a comparison of inputs (i.e. administrative costs) to outputs (i.e. tax revenue collections); initiatives that reduce relative costs (i.e. improve efficiency) or improve compliance and revenue (i.e. improve effectiveness) will impact on the ratio. In practice, however, there are a number of factors that may influence the cost/ revenue relationship, but which have nothing to do with relative efficiency or effectiveness. Examples of such factors are elaborated in Box 5.1. Clearly, any analysis of movements in the trend of the ratio over time should pay regard to such factors.
Box 5.1. The cost of collection ratio as an indicator of efficiency and/or effectiveness
Observed over time, a downward trend in the “cost of collection” ratio can constitute evidence of a reduction in relative costs (i.e. improved efficiency) and/or improved tax compliance (i.e. improved effectiveness). However, experience has also shown that there are many factors that can influence the ratio which are not related to changes in a revenue authority’s efficiency and/or effectiveness:
Changes in tax rates: The legislated rates of tax are an important factor in determining the cost/revenue relationship. In theory, a policy decision to increase the overall tax burden should, all other things being equal, improve the ratio by a corresponding amount, but this has nothing to do with improved operational efficiency or effectiveness.
Macroeconomic changes: Abnormal changes in rates of economic growth etc. or inflation over time are likely to impact on the overall revenue collected by the tax administration and the cost/revenue relationship. This is especially likely to occur in countries that are prone to considerable volatility in the movement of such indicators.
Abnormal expenditure of the revenue authority: From time to time, a tax authority may be required to undertake an abnormal level of investment (e.g. the building of a new information technology infrastructure, acquisition of more expensive new accommodation). Such investments are likely to increase overall operating costs over the medium term, and short of off-setting efficiencies, will impact on the cost/revenue relationship. The introduction of new taxes may also present additional up front administrative costs that initially impact on the cost/revenue ratio, but which are dissipated over time. (The use of accrual accounting may reduce the impact of these expenditures on the cost/revenue relationship.)
Changes in the scope of taxes collected by a revenue body: From time to time, governments decide to shift responsibility for the collection of particular taxes from one agency to another. For example, in Bulgaria, responsibility for the collection of most social contributions was moved from social security bodies to the newly formed National Revenue Authority in 2006.
As the “cost of collection” ratio takes account of total revenue collections, there has been a tendency by some observers to use it as an indicator of effectiveness. However, its usefulness in this regard is limited for one fundamental reason. The difference between the amount of tax actually collected and the maximum potential revenue is commonly referred to in tax literature as the “tax gap”. Put another way, the amount of revenue collected compared with the maximum potential revenue, expressed as a percentage, is the overall level of compliance or effectiveness achieved by the tax administration. All other things being equal, initiatives that improve compliance with the laws (i.e. improve effectiveness) will impact on the cost/revenue relationship. However, because the cost/revenue ratio ignores the revenue potential of the tax system, its value as an indicator of effectiveness is extremely limited. This is particularly relevant in the context of international comparisons – countries with similar cost/revenue ratios can be poles apart in terms of their relative effectiveness.
TAX ADMINISTRATION 2013: COMPARATIVE INFORMATION ON OECD AND OTHER ADVANCED AND EMERGING ECONOMIES – © OECD 2013
5. RESOURCES OF NATIONAL REVENUE BODIES – 179
A summary of computed cost of collection ratios covering an extended (seven year) timeframe to highlight trends for surveyed revenue bodies is provided in Table 5.3.4 The table highlights a few countries where the computed ratio is impacted negatively, in comparison with those of other countries, due to one or more “abnormal” factors (e.g. the exclusion of SSC and the inclusion of customs operations). Important observations are as follows:
Cost of collection ratios vary widely across revenue bodies, significantly influenced by structural and other factors unrelated to relative efficiency, of the kind described throughout this series (e.g. a country’s legislated tax burden and the taxes collected).
For the majority of revenue bodies, a statistically significant upwards movement in the ratio occurred in 2009 in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in late calendar year 2008 that led to a serious deterioration in tax revenues in many countries – examples here include Austria, Canada, Chile, Czech Rep., France, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Russia, Spain, and the United States.
For a few revenue bodies, there have been significant changes in the ratio calculated as a result of “structural” factors (e.g. responsibilities involving the collection of new revenue streams (e.g. SSC)).
Taken as a whole, the data presented emphasise the need for considerable care when undertaking cross-country comparisons of the cost of collection ratio in the context of assessments of relative efficiency in order to avoid erroneous conclusions. (This matter is discussed in further detail later in this chapter.)
Ratio of administrative expenditure to GDP
The relative size and trend of a revenue body’s tax-related administrative expenditure over time can also be viewed by way of comparison with a country’s aggregate GDP (as is the practice for observing the trend of country aggregate tax burdens over a number of years). In other words, what proportion of a country’s resources (expressed in terms of GDP) is expended by Government each year to administer tax laws?
Such a comparison removes the impact of changes in the legislated tax burden and economic factors that are inherent in the “cost of collection” ratio, and is particularly relevant in times of austerity when Government budgets are under strain. However, the ratio and its trend can be influenced by some abnormal factors (e.g. major new investments in technology, costs associated with implementing a new tax) that also need to be recognised. Computations of this ratio are set out in Table 5.4, with the key observations as follows:
The computed ratios for tax-related expenditure as a proportion of GDP vary significantly but there is a concentration (around one third) of revenue bodies with a ratio generally in the region of 0.15 to 0.25% of GDP for most/all of the period covered.
Relatively low ratios (i.e. less than 0.120%) are consistently displayed for revenue bodies in 10 countries (i.e. Chile, Colombia, Estonia, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and United States); with minor exception, these are all low tax burden countries and/or the revenue body does not administer the full range of major taxes covered by this series.
TAX ADMINISTRATION 2013: COMPARATIVE INFORMATION ON OECD AND OTHER ADVANCED AND EMERGING ECONOMIES – © OECD 2013
180 – 5. RESOURCES OF NATIONAL REVENUE BODIES
Table 5.3. Cost of collection ratios (administrative costs/net revenue)/1
|
Administrative costs for tax administration/net revenue collected %/2 |
Significant factors affecting |
||||||
Countries |
2005 |
2006 |
2007 |
2008 |
2009 |
2010 |
2011 |
comparability between countries’ ratios |
OECD countries |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Australia |
1.04 |
0.99 |
0.93 |
0.95 |
1.00 |
1.05 |
0.99 |
|
Austria |
0.66 |
0.66 |
0.64 |
0.79 |
0.85 |
0.70 |
0.66 |
SSC not included |
Belgium |
1.43 |
1.57 |
1.39 |
1.27 |
1.40 |
1.29 |
1.36 |
SSC not included |
Canada |
1.32 |
1.32 |
1.22 |
1.13 |
1.31 |
1.36 |
1.31 |
|
Chile |
0.69 |
0.63 |
0.60 |
0.67 |
0.91 |
0.77 |
0.68 |
Costs exclude debt collection |
Czech Rep. |
1.29 |
1.38 |
n.a. |
1.18 |
1.46 |
1.27 |
1.34 |
SSC and excises not included |
Denmark |
0.74 |
0.63 |
0.61 |
0.64 |
0.67 |
0.76 |
0.71 |
|
Estonia/3 |
1.02 |
0.88 |
0.86 |
0.38 |
0.40 |
0.35 |
0.34 |
|
Finland |
0.78 |
0.79 |
0.77 |
0.80 |
0.88 |
0.84 |
0.80 |
Excises not included |
France |
1.08 |
1.28 |
0.96 |
1.17 |
1.31 |
1.25 |
1.20 |
SSC and excises not included |
Germany |
1.66 |
1.55 |
1.38 |
1.36 |
1.46 |
1.50 |
1.40 |
SSC and excises not included |
Greece |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
|
Hungary |
0.99 |
1.11 |
1.15 |
1.17 |
1.20 |
1.20 |
1.12 |
|
Iceland |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.28/3 |
0.32/3 |
0.62 |
0.60 |
|
Ireland |
0.82 |
0.78 |
0.79 |
0.95 |
1.08 |
1.26 |
1.14 |
Costs include customs |
Israel |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.74 |
0.79 |
1.01 |
0.90 |
|
Italy |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
1.08/3 |
1.20/3 |
1.08/3 |
1.00/3 |
(See footnote indicated) |
Japan |
1.65 |
1.52 |
1.50 |
1.49 |
1.71 |
1.93 |
1.75 |
SSC not included |
Korea/3 |
0.80 |
0.78 |
0.70 |
0.79 |
0.84 |
0.81 |
0.76 |
SSC not included |
Luxembourg |
1.42 |
1.25 |
1.17 |
1.01 |
1.13 |
0.84 |
0.84 |
SSC not included |
Mexico |
0.55 |
0.52 |
0.48 |
0.43 |
0.58 |
0.71 |
0.70 |
SSC not included |
Netherlands |
1.36 |
1.14 |
1.12 |
0.99 |
1.11 |
1.02 |
0.97 |
|
New Zealand |
0.76 |
0.71 |
0.75 |
0.76 |
0.88 |
0.81 |
0.89 |
Excises not included |
Norway |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
|
Poland |
1.94 |
1.75 |
1.42 |
1.59 |
1.72 |
3.04 |
2.73 |
SSC and excises not included |
Portugal |
1.34/3 |
1.22/3 |
1.18/3 |
1.27/3 |
1.57/3 |
1.55 |
1.37 |
SSC and excises not included |
Slovak Rep. |
2.43 |
2.49 |
2.41 |
n.a. |
n.a. |
3.06 |
3.04 |
SSC and excises not included |
Slovenia |
0.95 |
0.97 |
0.84 |
0.81 |
0.90 |
0.96 |
0.93 |
Excises not included |
Spain |
0.74 |
0.68 |
0.64 |
0.82 |
0.97 |
0.88 |
0.86 |
SSC not included, costs include |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
customs (2008-11) |
Sweden |
0.38 |
0.39 |
n.a. |
0.39 |
0.40 |
0.41 |
0.40 |
Costs exclude debt collection |
Switzerland |
0.30 |
0.29 |
n.a. |
0.45 |
0.46 |
0.37 |
0.38 |
VAT administration only |
Turkey |
0.87 |
0.84 |
0.83 |
0.85 |
0.93 |
0.78 |
0.76 |
|
United Kingdom |
1.10 |
1.09 |
1.11 |
0.90 |
0.91 |
0.98 |
0.83 |
|
United States/3 |
0.52 |
0.47 |
0.45 |
0.49 |
0.61 |
0.66 |
0.62 |
|
Non-OECD countries |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Argentina |
0.89 |
1.01 |
1.08 |
0.93 |
1.14 |
1.32 |
1.25 |
|
Brazil |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
1.02 |
0.91 |
costs include Customs |
Bulgaria |
3.19 |
1.69 |
1.13 |
1.18 |
1.20 |
1.41 |
1.34 |
Excises not included |
China |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
|
Colombia |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.93 |
0.68 |
|
Cyprus |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a |
0.78/3 |
0.94/3 |
1.25 |
1.23 |
SSC not included |
Hong Kong, China |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.85 |
0.75 |
Excises not included |
India |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.76 |
0.75 |
0.61 |
0.55 |
Data for direct taxes only |
Indonesia |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.64 |
0.58 |
0.48 |
0.55 |
Excises not included |
Latvia |
1.20 |
1.14 |
1.29 |
1.04 |
1.41 |
0.78 |
0.70 |
|
Lithuania |
1.40 |
1.23 |
1.14 |
1.06 |
1.18 |
1.06 |
0.98 |
|
Malaysia |
1.20 |
1.14 |
1.29 |
1.04 |
1.41 |
1.27 |
1.09 |
Data for direct taxes only |
Malta |
1.14 |
1.09 |
0.97 |
n.a. |
n.a |
1.15 |
1.02 |
|
Romania |
0.63 |
0.72 |
0.91 |
0.81 |
0.72 |
0.50 |
0.87 |
|
Russia |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
1.10 |
0.90 |
|
Saudi Arabia |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
1.06 |
1.26 |
1.38 |
1.57 |
Very limited range of taxes |
Singapore |
1.02 |
0.93 |
0.83 |
0.77 |
0.80 |
0.89 |
0.87 |
SSC and excises not included |
South Africa |
1.20 |
1.21 |
0.99 |
1.05 |
1.11 |
0.82 |
0.80 |
costs include Customs |
For notes indicated by “/ (number)”, see Notes to Tables section at the end of the chapter, p. 191. Source: CIS survey responses.
TAX ADMINISTRATION 2013: COMPARATIVE INFORMATION ON OECD AND OTHER ADVANCED AND EMERGING ECONOMIES – © OECD 2013
5. RESOURCES OF NATIONAL REVENUE BODIES – 181
Table 5.4. Tax administration expenditure/gross domestic product (GDP)
|
Administrative costs for tax administration/gross domestic product %/1 |
Significant factors affecting |
||||||
Country |
2005 |
2006 |
2007 |
2008 |
2009 |
2010 |
2011 |
comparability between countries’ ratios |
OECD countries |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Australia |
0.229 |
0.220 |
0.197 |
0.204 |
0.205 |
0.190 |
0.182 |
|
Austria |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.146 |
0.193 |
0.196 |
0.160 |
0.154 |
|
Belgium/1 |
0.384 |
0.357 |
0.341 |
0.344 |
0.352 |
0.331 |
0.345 |
|
Canada |
0.226 |
0.226 |
0.215 |
0.210 |
0.241 |
0.230 |
0.227 |
|
Chile |
0.109 |
0.100 |
0.105 |
0.116 |
0.124 |
0.121 |
0.118 |
Costs exclude debt collection |
Czech Rep. |
0.221 |
0.219 |
0.197 |
0.186 |
0.204 |
0.186 |
0.198 |
|
Denmark |
0.367 |
0.303 |
0.293 |
0.296 |
0.308 |
0.210 |
0.202 |
|
Estonia |
n.a. |
n.a. |
3.688 |
1.913 |
1.857 |
1.821 |
0.106 |
|
Finland |
0.209 |
0.205 |
0.199 |
0.208 |
0.227 |
0.213 |
0.206 |
|
France |
0.263 |
0.250 |
0.239 |
0.231 |
0.237 |
0.231 |
0.226 |
|
Germany |
0.298 |
0.294 |
0.281 |
0.279 |
0.294 |
0.292 |
0.284 |
|
Greece |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
|
Hungary |
0.298 |
0.333 |
0.397 |
0.392 |
0.398 |
0.420 |
0.375 |
|
Iceland |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.074 |
0.077 |
0.163 |
0.157 |
|
Ireland |
0.238 |
0.237 |
0.236 |
0.269 |
0.286 |
0.258 |
0.247 |
Costs include customs |
Israel |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.182 |
0.178 |
0.153 |
0.145 |
|
Italy/2 |
0.272 |
0.264 |
0.294 |
0.192 |
0.205 |
0.185 |
0.174 |
Some major costs not included |
Japan |
0.139 |
0.136 |
0.137 |
0.141 |
0.149 |
0.143 |
0.142 |
|
Korea |
0.120 |
0.121 |
0.111 |
0.121 |
0.122 |
0.114 |
0.111 |
|
Luxembourg |
0.246 |
0.223 |
0.219 |
0.230 |
0.253 |
0.225 |
0.221 |
|
Mexico |
0.093 |
0.088 |
0.074 |
0.073 |
0.078 |
0.070 |
0.069 |
|
Netherlands |
0.419 |
0.413 |
0.391 |
0.349 |
0.365 |
0.351 |
0.330 |
|
New Zealand |
0.202 |
0.199 |
0.199 |
0.210 |
0.232 |
0.192 |
0.204 |
|
Norway |
0.188 |
0.179 |
0.169 |
0.157 |
0.177 |
0.170 |
0.162 |
|
Poland |
0.306 |
0.289 |
0.277 |
0.236 |
0.228 |
0.272 |
0.248 |
|
Portugal |
0.257 |
0.249 |
0.247 |
0.249 |
0.270 |
0.269 |
0.255 |
|
Slovak Rep. |
0.215 |
0.195 |
0.174 |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.176 |
0.181 |
|
Slovenia |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.263 |
0.265 |
0.281 |
0.292 |
0.289 |
|
Spain |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.126 |
0.130 |
0.134 |
0.134 |
0.130 |
Costs include customs |
Sweden |
0.185 |
0.187 |
0.188 |
0.182 |
0.184 |
0.175 |
0.173 |
Costs exclude debt collection |
Switzerland |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.028 |
0.028 |
0.029 |
0.023 |
0.023 |
VAT administration only |
Turkey |
0.161 |
0.152 |
0.151 |
0.149 |
0.169 |
0.149 |
0.149 |
|
United Kingdom |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.338 |
0.283 |
0.290 |
0.268 |
0.237 |
|
United States |
0.084 |
0.081 |
0.077 |
0.080 |
0.084 |
0.086 |
0.082 |
|
Non-OECD countries |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Argentina |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.257 |
0.254 |
0.306 |
0.326 |
0.321 |
|
Brazil |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.206 |
0.196 |
Costs include customs |
Bulgaria |
0.334 |
0.245 |
0.214 |
0.222 |
0.236 |
0.240 |
0.226 |
|
China |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
|
Colombia |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.072 |
0.061 |
|
Cyprus |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.179/2 |
0.189/2 |
0.246 |
0.248 |
|
Hong Kong, China |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.060 |
0.057 |
|
India |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.042 |
0.043 |
n.a. |
n.a. |
Direct taxes only |
Indonesia |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.064 |
0.053 |
0.041 |
0.050 |
|
Latvia |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.352 |
0.358 |
0.344 |
0.228 |
0.226 |
|
Lithuania |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.229 |
0.220 |
0.212 |
0.173 |
0.157 |
|
Malaysia |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.139 |
0.115 |
0.161 |
0.081 |
0.084 |
Costs exclude indirect taxes |
Malta |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.406 |
0.360 |
|
Romania |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.253 |
0.229 |
0.196 |
0.126 |
0.227 |
|
Russia |
n.a. |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.224 |
0.226 |
0.187 |
0.160 |
|
Saudi Arabia |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.011 |
0.009 |
0.013 |
0.013 |
0.015 |
Limited range of taxes in place |
Singapore |
0.088 |
0.079 |
0.071 |
0.083 |
0.089 |
0.086 |
0.092 |
|
South Africa |
n.a. |
n.a. |
0.255 |
0.271 |
0.295 |
0.187 |
0.185 |
Costs include customs |
For notes indicated by “/ (number)”, see Notes to Tables section at the end of the chapter, p. 192. Source: CIS survey responses, OECD Statistics Database, Eurostat and World Bank Statistics.
TAX ADMINISTRATION 2013: COMPARATIVE INFORMATION ON OECD AND OTHER ADVANCED AND EMERGING ECONOMIES – © OECD 2013