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Trauma intheSetting ofaPandemic
NielsD.Martin andLilyTung
60

Introduction

Care of trauma patients involves quick decision-making with incomplete information. Occasionally, our ability to care for trauma patients is challenged by pandemics, prompting a need to balance trauma care with preventing a worsening of the pandemic. Dened by Merriam-Webster as “an outbreak of a disease that occurs over a wide geographic area (such as multiple countries or continents) and typically affects a sig­nicant proportion of the population,” pandemics can affect trauma in unpredictable ways, making preparation for these events difcult. For instance, on March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a global pandemic. During this pandemic, societal lockdowns led to an overall decrease in traumas worldwide; however, some cities wit­nessed an increase in violent, penetrating traumas [112].
Hospitals often have contingency plans or disaster man-
agement plans for sudden inuxes of patients. When a pan-
demic is declared, there is a potential need to quickly transition to the mindset of disaster management as a pan­demic evolves. The difference between a pandemic and a natural disaster or bioterrorism is that a pandemic has an uncertain endpoint. With a new disease, particularly one on a global scale, there is a constant generation of new informa­tion for prevention, diagnosis, and treatment. In spite of the constantly evolving situation and increase in patients sec­ondary to the pandemic, it is still important to try to maintain conventional care for as long as possible before changing to “contingency care” or even “crisis care” under the stress of the pandemic.
In order to best approach adjusting the pandemic response to maintain trauma readiness and the highest possible level of care, there are four categories that are often described in traditional disaster management that must be addressed: staff, stuff, space, and systems [13] (Table60.1).
N. D. Martin University of Pennsylvania, Department of Surgery, Philadelphia, PA, USA e-mail: Niels.Martin@pennmedicine.upenn.edu
L. Tung (*) Royal Columbian Hospital, University of British Columbia, Department of Surgery, New Westminster, BC, Canada e-mail: lily.tung@fraserhealth.ca
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2025 L. Marshall Gillman, S. Widder (eds.), Trauma Team Dynamics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-86312-7_60
519
520
Table 60.1 Categories that need to be addressed in a pandemic: staff, stuff, space, and systems

Staff Stuff

Retraining and reassignment of staff Securing of PPE and supply chains Modular stafng Protocols detailing PPE use Regular monitoring and testing of staff Judicious use of blood products Most experienced staff performing high-exposure procedures Removal of high-risk staff from direct patient care (older,
immunocompromised, students) Limit in-person consults Monitoring of staff well-being
Space Systems
Hospital spaces can be recongured, repurposed, or reengineered to
adapt to new needs (e.g., OR ICU, clinic ED) Trauma bay: establish hot/warm/cold zones, limit trafc, prohibit
visitors OR: minimize staff, environmental contamination, OR time;
consider dedicated pandemic ORs and transport routes, recover in
OR and not PACU ICU/oor: cluster work to minimize entry/exit from patient room,
organize units by disease status, not service Clinic: switch to tele/video conferencing, screen for disease if
in-person visit advised
OR operating room, ICU intensive care unit, ED emergency department, PACU post-anesthetic care unit, PPE personal protective equipment
Guidance from national health authorities and trauma associations
Regularly scheduled meetings and updates at both regional and
hospital levels
Updates should be easily accessible online
Retraining of proper PPE use, N95 ttings
Disaster credentialing and privileging
N. D. Martin and L. Tung
Sta
Management of staff will depend on specics of the pan­demic itself; however, the over-arching focus remains the same—protecting staff while maintaining quality of patient care. As with any new disease, patient care will be constantly evolving as new information becomes available. Until a rapid and accurate diagnostic test is available, all trauma patients need to be presumed positive on arrival. Changes that need to be implemented include retraining and reassign­ment of staff, modular stafng, establishing protocols for tele-consults, and maintaining staff well-being.
Retraining/Reassignment
A potential bottleneck during a pandemic is a shortage of specialized staff. Specialties most likely to be affected include emergency medicine, intensive care, and infectious disease. In cities where the pandemic results in a rise in trauma, additional support for trauma services may be required. As certain specialties will likely have their prac­tices curtailed or even suspended, these physicians can be retrained and reassigned to assist with clinical coverage as surges occur or when staff become infected and are thus unable to continue to provide patient care. For instance, when elective cases are canceled, general surgeons can be retrained to cover trauma or emergency surgery [1, 1315]. Given the abbreviated retraining of these physicians, a tiered stafng strategy may be necessary. For example, should a mass casualty occur during the pandemic, one fellowship-
trained trauma surgeon may supervise multiple teams each consisting of a general surgeon, resident, and nurse. This allows general surgeons to utilize their transferrable skills to lead trauma resuscitations while having the content expert, the trauma surgeon, use their training and experience to safely run multiple resuscitations at once.
Furthermore, physicians of all specialties should also be updated to become more familiar with treatments or proce­dures that may become high in demand as a result of the pandemic. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, there was an increase in patients requiring intubation, so hos­pitals expanded their airway teams, developed protocols for proning patients in the intensive care unit (ICU), and imple­mented tracheostomy guidelines for the COVID-19 positive patients. Similarly, there was a decrease in available ventila­tors, thus necessitating retraining of staff to understand how to use BIPAP machines as a supportive modality [1]. Finally, if backup staff are limited or have already been exhausted, retired staff can be called upon for clinical duties. This, how­ever, should be a last resort and needs to be balanced with retirees being older and so potentially more susceptible to the pandemic [15].
Modular Stang
Given the infectious nature of a pandemic, even with proper application of personal protective equipment (PPE), health­care workers can become infected and unable to work. Besides the aforementioned retraining and reassignment of medical staff, schedules should be revised so that teams work
60 Trauma intheSetting ofaPandemic
Table 60.2 Example of modular stafng
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6 Team 1 Day shift Night shift Backup Day shift Night shift Backup Team 2 Night shift Backup Day shift Night shift Backup Day shift Team 3 Backup Day shift Night shift Backup Day shift Night shift
Team 1: physicians A and B, Team 2: physicians C and D, Team 3: physicians E and F.Teams are to remain intact with no exchanging of team members
521
in isolation from each other to prevent the spread of disease by minimizing in-person physician-to-physician interactions whenever possible [16]. Also, backup teams should be included in the event that a team needs to be isolated. One such method to accomplish this is modular stafng.
Modular stafng involves creating teams of providers such that there are the maximum number of teams with the minimum number of providers needed for patient care per team. The team members do not change to allow for contain­ment of any potential outbreaks, and better contact tracing and quarantining should the need arise [17, 18]. The teams should also be scheduled for shorter shifts with hand-offs being done remotely by phone or video conference [13, 18]. Shorter shifts may be necessary because of the increased risk of burnout from the stress associated with working during a pandemic and work with additional PPE on [13]. An exam­ple of a modular stafng schedule is shown in Table60.2.
Other ways to decrease exposure include having attend­ing physicians only perform high-exposure procedures, par­ticularly in patients who are known to be positive. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic when aerosoliza­tion was a potential mode of transmission, one Philadelphia hospital had only the most experienced person in-house per­form intubations, and all intubations were performed in the trauma bay rather than the operating room (OR) in order to further minimize potential exposure [1]. Also, for operative traumas, the operating team should be limited to attending physicians and senior residents. This serves to not only mini­mize exposure to junior trainees, but it allows for a faster surgery, thus decreasing potential exposure to the entire OR team. Similarly, damage control principles should be utilized to minimize exposure to the entire OR team [19].
Outside the OR, consider having one attending physician cover more than one service while in-house or allowing for attending physicians to take call from home as long as they are within a reasonable distance from the hospital. For exam­ple, in a setting where trauma and emergency surgery ser­vices are staffed by separate attendings, the decrease in trauma may allow for one in-house attending to cover both services. Alternatively, depending on the local patient popu­lation and common injury patterns, the trauma surgeon may take call from home and be called in depending on the sever­ity of the patient’s injuries, with an emergency medicine physician or other in-house attending physician available to stabilize and resuscitate until the trauma surgeon’s arrival.
Once diagnostic testing is available, consideration must be given for regular diagnostic testing and quarantining of healthcare workers to avoid larger level contamination [20,
21]. This also allows for more rapid containment of an entire
team should one member of a team test positive while asymp­tomatic. Similarly, in order to protect healthcare workers, once vaccinations are available, all healthcare workers should be immunized unless medically contraindicated.
Finally, healthcare workers who are older, immunocom­promised, or otherwise more susceptible to the disease may need to be withdrawn from clinical work that requires direct patient contact. Residents should return from satellite sites to their primary institutions to avoid commuting or travel that may contribute to inter-hospital spread. Medical students should be removed from clinical rotations to decrease risk of exposure and conserve PPE [20].
Consultants
Trauma patients are unique in that their injuries may require multiple different consultants. During a pandemic, protocols should be developed to allow for teleconsultations, with clear indications for when in-person consults would be nec­essary [1]. This would help further decrease potential expo­sures while still maintaining patient care. Similarly, the number of trauma team members allowed in the radiology suite should be limited to one to two providers to limit the exposure in the often small radiology reading rooms.
Sta Well-Being
The uncertainty and stressors of working in a pandemic can negatively impact healthcare workers’ mental health and well-being. Studies have shown that during a pandemic, healthcare workers experience an increased risk of burnout, anxiety, depression, and insomnia [14, 22]. The pandemic’s negative impact on healthcare workers can be due to a num­ber of causes such as an increase in stress and fatigue from working with high-risk or positive patients, concern about transmitting the disease to their family or colleagues, the additional PPE required at work, the lack of PPE at work, and the uncertainty of working in the presence of a novel pathogen, especially one with no available treatment [2224].
522
N. D. Martin and L. Tung
Mechanisms need to be put in place to monitor the psy­chological and emotional well-being of the team. Those who are exposed or test positive will need additional resources and support [18]. For those healthcare workers who choose to isolate themselves from their families to protect them, support for childcare, care of pets, or personal needs may help alleviate some stressors [13, 14]. Additional measures that may benet the team include well-being sessions, fre­quent check-ins, and designated areas within the hospital to decompress. Debriefs should also be encouraged to help staff process difcult events or situations [25].
Stu
Adequate PPE will be necessary to protect staff and avoid further spread of the pandemic. At the same time, careful conservation of PPE may be necessary as supply chains will need to be secured and manufacturers will require time to increase production to meet demands in both healthcare and public sectors. In order to ensure adequate stockpiles or emergency provisions, hospitals may need to reach out to local, provincial, or even federal governments for aid.
Furthermore, protocols may need to be developed to more clearly delineate the use of PPE.This is important particu­larly at the beginning of a pandemic when information is incomplete and there is increased anxiety among healthcare workers, which could lead to an overestimation of the risk of disease transmission and thus potential overuse of PPE.These concepts are especially important in trauma because of the invasive nature of the initial resuscitation exposing the pro­viders to many patient secretions. For this reason, many trauma centers have staff in full PPE appropriate to the pan­demic for every trauma resuscitation.
Finally, there may be potential shortages of blood prod­ucts during a pandemic due to fear of disease transmission, donation centers being closed, or prospective donors electing to remain at home [18, 19]. As such, transfusions should be given judiciously, conservation methods such as auto­transfusion employed, and the public encouraged to continue to donate blood while maintaining the proper precautions.

Space/Structure

Besides staff, space can quickly become a scarce resource during a pandemic. Hospital spaces may need to be recong­ured or repurposed to adapt to new needs. For instance, dur­ing the COVID-19 pandemic, engineers were engaged to create temporary negative pressure rooms in trauma bays, and ORs were repurposed to become ICUs. If the region a hospital is in has yet to be fully affected by the pandemic, then simulations to identify potential problems or bottle-
necks are recommended so that necessary changes to proce­dures and protocols can be made and new workows created and educated [1]. From a trauma perspective, there are four locations that may need to be addressed: trauma bay, OR, ICU, and clinics. Until cleared, trauma patients during a pan­demic should be treated as infected in all phases of care.
Trauma Bay
Trauma bays are where the trauma team rst encounters the patient. It is where resuscitation and life-saving procedures occur, which necessitates them to be fully equipped and in a space large enough to accommodate the entire trauma team. During a pandemic, trauma bays may need to be modied to better protect both providers and patients, while still main­taining their functionality. If a disease’s mode of transmis­sion is airborne, then rapid engagement with hospital engineers may be necessary to create negative pressure rooms in the trauma bay. Alternatively, if time or space does not allow for negative pressure rooms, then physical barriers need to be erected to separate trauma patients and minimize cross-contamination or certain trauma bays need to be desig­nated for disease suspects or positive patients [1]. Regardless of how the space is modied, it needs to be able to continue to accommodate staff, supplies, and PPE [26].
In addition to the aforementioned changes, contamination needs to be minimized by establishing zones within the trauma bay. There should be three zones clearly marked out on the oor with colored tape: hot, warm, and cold zones. Each zone corresponds to the degree of contamination within that zone, with hot being on the patient’s side where it is most contaminated (Fig.60.1). In the warm zone, things are still considered potentially contaminated, but on a lower scale relative to the hot zone. This is where dofng of PPE would occur and where “transfer stations” would be sta­tioned. “Transfer stations” are where supplies from the cold zone are placed for pick up by personnel in the hot zone. Lastly, the cold zone is considered clean and where donning of PPE would occur. All unnecessary equipment and sup­plies should be removed from the hot zone and placed in the cold zone. Any necessary equipment such as ultrasounds for FAST exams should be covered with a plastic bag similar to the probe covers used during sterile procedures to allow for easier cleaning and decreased contamination. Lead or plexi­glass barriers should also be kept in the hot zone for use dur­ing X-rays. Equipment bundles for common procedures (chest tubes, thoracotomies, etc.) can be created and passed into the hot zone when required (Table60.3). The trauma team in the hot zone should include only those who are actively working on the patient. If feasible, the trauma team leader can remain in the cold zone to direct the team to fur­ther conserve PPE and minimize exposure. Basic PPE should
RESUS BAY CONFIGURATION
yep
AREA
S
60 Trauma intheSetting ofaPandemic
FOR TRAUMA ARRESTS AND PERI-ARRESTS ALL TEAM MEMBERS TO WEAR ENHANCED DROPLET/CONTACT PRECAUTIONS WITH N95
523
ENHANCED DROPLET/CONTACT
HVAC
VENT
v4 April 1, 2020
Fig. 60.1 Sample trauma bay layout with hot zone indicated in red
PRECAUTIONS – N95 MASK
MONITOR
TOWER
COVID POSITIVE OR SUSPECT PATIENT
Procedure Table
RN
A
MD
A
RN
B
ENTRY/EXIT
DOFFING AREA
Procedure Table
be worn in the warm zone, and additional pandemic-specic PPE is required in the hot zone. The distance between the hot and cold zones should be dictated by how far the pathogen could potentially travel, for example, in COVID-19, it was 6feet from the patient’s head [1, 26].
In order to limit trafc through the trauma bay, clearly designate one entrance and one exit. Only necessary person­nel should have access to the trauma bay. Family or visitors should not be allowed in the trauma bay [27]. Consider per­forming a screening questionnaire and physical exam on arrival of the stable trauma patient. Consider placing a mask on the stable patient to mitigate aerosolization. All suspected cases should have diagnostic tests sent [28]. In the case of an unstable patient or a patient in extremis, omit any screening, assume the patient is positive, and proceed with full pandemic- specic PPE.In situations where the disease can be asymptomatic, there is increasing or high prevalence in the community, or if there are concerns about the hospital reaching capacity, assume all incoming trauma patients are positive [1, 18, 26, 29].
After resuscitation, most trauma patients will ultimately require transport to either imaging, the OR, or be admitted to the hospital. In order to minimize exposure during transport, the shortest possible one-way routes should be delineated beforehand. Not only should transport staff wear PPE, but the patient should as well. Gowns and sheets should either be disposable or placed in clearly marked infectious disease bags. All transport equipment should be disinfected once the patient has been transported to their destination [27]. When
SM
M
DOFFING
TTL
yep.
DOFFING
AREA
RN
D
MD
B
WOW
RT
RN
C
CMAC
NO PPE: Unless directed by TTL
EQUIPMENT BINS
AIRWAY/CHEST TUBE
TO CT
LEGEND: TTL – Trauma Team Leader MD A – General Surgery
Attending or Senior Resident
RN A – Resus Nurse RN B – Resus Nurse MD B – ER Airway physician RT – Respiratory Therapist RN C – Resus Nurse RN D – Resus Nurse SM – Safety Monitor
possible, consider portable imaging methods such as X-rays or ultrasound, to minimize transport through the hospital [30]. Early trauma patient testing can also de-escalate isola­tion at an earlier time point and save precious resources.
Operating Room
During a pandemic, resources such as staff and supplies may become severely limited. In such a setting, nonoperative management of trauma should be pursued whenever possible [19, 29, 31]. Goals of management with regard to the OR include minimizing exposure in the OR, environmental con­tamination, and OR time [16].
Logistical considerations include collaboration with the anesthesia department to establish policies on how to handle positive or presumed positive patients. For example, trans­port should occur along clearly marked pathways to desig­nated ORs (preferably those closest to the entrance to the OR suites to minimize environmental contamination of entire hallways or OR pods) [32], particularly for patients who are positive or presumed positive. Patients who are not intubated should wear PPE at all times during transport. Stable patients should proceed directly to the ORs without passing through the preoperative area. If space allows, patients should be extubated and recovered in the OR instead of the PACU to minimize contamination to one room [16]. To further mini­mize exposure, the same transport team should take the patient from the trauma bay to the OR without transfer of
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Table 60.3 Sample procedural bundles
Trauma team PPE bundle
6 X Waterproof gowns 6 X N95 masks 6 X Face shields 6 X Facemasks with shield
Chest tube/nger thoracostomy
3 X Chlorhexidine prep sticks (large) 1 x Sterile gown 1 x Medium sheet 2 x Green towels 2 x 5cc Lidocaine local anesthetic vials 1 x Red 18 gauge blunt needle 1 x 22 Gauge needle 1 x 10cc syringe 1 x #11 Scalpel blade (disposable) 1 x Chest tube insertion instrument tray 1 X 28Fr chest tube 1 x 0 Prolene suture or 0 silk suture 1 x Gelonet gauze 2 x Trach dressing 1 X ABD pad 1 X Mex roll 1 X Pleur-evac
Thoracotomy (always handed up with a chest tube tray (above))
1 x Bottle of chlorhexidine 2 x Sterile gowns 1 x Medium sheet 4 x Green towels 1 x #10 Scalpel blade (disposable) 1 x 3–0 Vicryl suture 2 x 4–0 Prolene suture with tapered needles 1 x Skin stapler 1 x Thoracotomy instrument tray 2 x 5 Pack of laparotomy sponges 1 x Yankauer suction and tubing
care between different teams in between. Dedicated donning and dofng areas, similar to the warm zone in the trauma bay, should be located outside the ORs. All necessary PPE should be donned prior to entry into the OR.Additional dis­infection measures may be necessary between cases depend­ing on the pandemic disease [18, 19, 33, 34].
During the operation, a runner should be employed so that all staff who are in the OR remain inside until the case is completed [1, 27, 32]. Entry and exit into the OR should be limited [16]. Only equipment or supplies that are required for surgery should be in the OR to minimize waste and clean­ing. Suture trees and other general stock should be kept out­side of the room to minimize contamination. Preference should be given to instruments or supplies that have dispos­able alternatives [34]. No personal items should be allowed in the ORs. Disposable scrub caps and shoe covers should be used instead of personal fabric scrub caps [29, 34].
In pandemics in which the disease is airborne, aerosol­generating procedures such as intubation should only be per-
formed in full PPE.Providers should avoid bag valve mask ventilation prior to intubation if possible and consider rapid sequence intubation [19, 27, 32, 34]. Intubation should be done by the most experienced provider using a video laryn­goscope rather than direct laryngoscopy, and the endotra­cheal tube cuff should be inated prior to commencing mechanical ventilation [34]. Where possible, perform regional blocks instead of general anesthesia, if the proce­dure allows [32].
ICU or Floor
Once a pandemic is anticipated or declared, policies to enforce the ease of access and correct use of PPE should be established. Work should be clustered to minimize entry and exit from patient rooms to not only conserve PPE, but the act of donning or dofng PPE can be a high-risk activity [6, 26]. If space allows, pandemic disease-positive patients should be separated from those who are negative [13]. In these cases, trauma patients may not be clustered in one unit or oor, and so the trauma team will need to be careful when rounding to not spread the disease within the hospital. If a shortage of ICU beds and ventilators occurs, ORs can be repurposed to become ICUs or PACUs [1, 25].
Clinic
For trauma clinic, most patients can be managed remotely by teleconference or video conference. Infrastructure for this should be deployed widely if not in place already. If a patient needs to be seen in person for follow-up, minimize exposure by limiting the number of staff present and try to coordinate the patient’s visit with appointments with other specialties. All patients should be screened for the disease by phone prior to their appointment. They should not come to clinic if they are symptomatic or have recently tested positive for the disease.
Finally, just as ORs can be repurposed to become ICUs, clinics can be repurposed to become temporary emergency rooms in the event of a surge [1].

Systems

Effective communication is key during a pandemic, particu­larly one involving a new pathogen. The prolonged yet dynamic nature of the event requires constant situational awareness and implementation of effective communication strategies as new information regarding epidemiology, and scientic and clinical data becomes available. Regular updates on important items such as hospital capacity, avail-
60 Trauma intheSetting ofaPandemic
525
able resources, prevention strategies, new diagnostic criteria, and potential treatments should be given virtually to mini­mize potential exposure and conserve PPE [18]. These updates should also be easily accessible online for those unable to attend the virtual meetings.
Below we describe suggestions for what can be done at
the country, regional, hospital, and then division level.
Country Level
Regular updates and clear guidance should come from national health authorities such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (United States of America) and Public Health Agency of Canada. In developing nations where resources, even at the national level, are scarce, access to information from other countries will be vital to under­standing how to treat patients while protecting healthcare workers.
Regarding treating trauma patients, guidelines should also be sought from national organizations such as the American College of Surgeons Committee on Trauma, Eastern Association for the Surgery of Trauma, and American Association for the Surgery of Trauma.
Regional Level
At the regional level, weekly meetings should occur between trauma medical directors and program managers to discuss census data, facility-level surge activities, resource and PPE availability, any clinical lessons learned, and sharing of newly developed protocols [1]. Establishing a regional triage system, resource allocation, and crisis standards of care while taking into account local and regional resources should be discussed. Crisis standards of care are generally instituted on a regional level, ensuring the community gets equal care at all available centers. Contingency plans for the pandem­ic’s impact on EMS and ability to transfer patients to higher level of care should also be discussed at the regional level. Capacity should be maintained at all level I and II trauma centers. Finally, in the event that the increase in hospitalized patients secondary to the pandemic combined with an increase in trauma patients exceeds the capacity and capa­bilities of adult hospitals, pediatric hospitals should consider increasing their age limits to accepting young adults [1].
Hospital Level
At the hospital level, a command center should be activated or established. This command center would function 24/7 to manage administrative, clinical, and communication respon-
sibilities such as education and collaboration between differ­ent departments, development of protocols, patient ow, and procurement and allocation of resources [13, 18]. Based on factors such as census, resources, and predicted surge activi­ties, elective cases may need to be canceled or limited to those that do not require post-operative admission [34]. Similarly, in-person ambulatory clinics may need to be can­celed and transitioned to telehealth in order to minimize trafc and exposure at the hospital, as well as increase avail­able space to be repurposed for other uses [1, 20].
Decisions made at the hospital level should be communi­cated to departments through regularly scheduled telecon­ference meetings. Items to discuss at these meetings include community or regional situation, current hospital census, projected number of patients who arrive, and any new poli­cies or protocols or updates to existing ones [18]. Results of the meetings, especially new policies or protocols, should also be easily accessible online to centralize the information and make it available to those unable to attend the meetings.
Education regarding when, how, and how much PPE to use should be available to all healthcare workers [14, 33]. Additional appointments for N95 ttings may be required. This is particularly important at the beginning of the pan­demic when anxiety and uncertainty may lead to over-use of PPE and waste [13]. Clear protocols outlining this should be created and distributed.
Given potential staff attrition secondary to the pandemic, disaster credentialing, privileging, degree of supervision needed, clinical scope of practice, and access to electronic medical records should be considered [18].
In order to protect staff and minimize spread of the dis­ease, visitors to the hospital should be limited and hand hygiene encouraged [18].
Division or Trauma Team Level
At the division or trauma team level, hand-overs and morn­ing reports should continue, but with providers participating remotely or from different rooms if possible [25]. Within the same meeting, regular briengs and memos about new poli­cies, protocols, or clinical knowledge on the pandemic should also be given. Similar to a disaster scenario, under­standing and establishment of early triage to palliative care for those with severe injuries who are not expected to survive will be important in a resource-scarce environment [18]. As discussed in the stafng section, general surgeons whose elective cases have been canceled can be reassigned to assist with trauma resuscitations or other patient care [1, 1315]. In short, all efforts should be directed at effective communica­tion while minimizing exposure and maintaining optimal trauma care [18].
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Conclusion

Unlike other facets of life, trauma, unfortunately, does not stop with a pandemic. As the COVID-19 pandemic showed, pandemics pose signicant challenges to trauma care. Early recognition, exibility, and communication are key to con­tinuing to provide optimal care for trauma patients. As the pandemic evolves, so must the policies and protocols that have been put in place. Finally, given the potential duration and stress of a pandemic, the well-being of those caring for patients must also be supported.
Key Points
• Maintaining trauma readiness in the setting of a pandemic requires early addressing of each of the four key categories of staff, stuff, space, and systems.
• Staff: to address staff well-being while concurrently maintaining quality of patient care, staff may need to be retrained or reassigned, modular stafng schedules created, and telemedicine considered.
• Stuff: centers need to be prepared for potential sup­ply issues that may affect blood products, PPE, and other supplies.
• Space: hospital spaces may need to be recongured or repurposed to adapt to new needs.
• Systems: the prolonged and dynamic nature of a pandemic requires constant situational awareness and effective communication strategies at the hospi­tal, regional, and country levels.

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