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Файл:Ординатура / Хирургия / Библиотека им академика М.И. Перельмана / Книга_5198_Библиотеки_им_академика_М_И_Перельмана.pdf
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- •Foreword
- •Preface: Trauma as a Team Sport
- •Contents
- •History
- •Documented Outcomes
- •Future Direction
- •References
- •Humble Beginnings
- •A New Paradigm Is Born
- •References
- •3: Evidence Supporting Crisis Resource Management Training
- •Introduction
- •References
- •Introduction
- •The Trauma Team
- •Trauma Team Leadership
- •Crisis Resource Management
- •Observe, Orient, Decide, Act OODA Loop
- •Observe
- •Orient
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •Introduction: Why Does Teamwork Matter?
- •Introduction
- •Team Culture: Not Just Leaders; Followers Too
- •Crisis Communication 101
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •Background
- •Leadership Styles
- •Self-Awareness
- •Self-Management
- •Social Awareness
- •Relationship Management
- •Validation
- •Putting It All Together
- •References
- •7: Followership
- •Intro
- •What Is Followership
- •Why Is Followership Important?
- •Summary
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Situational Awareness
- •Situational Awareness: Level One
- •Situational Awareness: Level Two
- •Situational Awareness: Level Three
- •Attention
- •Stress
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •Handover Foundations
- •Handover Challenges
- •Handover Structure
- •Written Handover
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •10: Engaging Team Members
- •Respect
- •Resources
- •Engaging Virtual Teams
- •Virtual Water Cooler
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •Implicit Coordination
- •The Zero-Point Survey
- •Adaptive Coordination
- •Making It Happen
- •References
- •Acute Versus Chronic Stress
- •Recognizing Chronic Versus Acute Stress
- •Education Helps
- •Hyper-realistic Simulation Training
- •Resilience Is Individualized
- •Training Is Key
- •References
- •13: Stress Exposure Training
- •Introduction
- •Stress Training
- •Information Provision
- •Cognitive Control
- •Physiological Control
- •Overlearning
- •Mental Practice
- •Decision-Making
- •Team/Communication Skills
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Conclusions, Implications, Next Steps
- •References
- •15: Trauma Video Review
- •Introduction/What Is Trauma Video Review?
- •Team Simulation/Education
- •Performance Improvement
- •Research
- •Potential Barriers
- •Consent Processes
- •Other Considerations
- •Future Directions
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •Pre-arrival
- •Patient Arrival
- •Resuscitation
- •Pre-departure
- •Communication Skills
- •Structured Handovers
- •Conclusions
- •References
- •Origination
- •United States Prehospital System Legal Structure
- •Science Behind Prehospital Injury Patterns
- •Team Synergy vs Rock Star Player
- •Medical Errors
- •Controversy What Should Our System Implement
- •Training Quality
- •Active Killer
- •Realistic Training
- •Lessons Learned
- •Response
- •Nonmedical Personnel
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Future Direction
- •Conclusions
- •References
- •19: Prehospital Trauma
- •Introduction
- •Safety
- •Scene Assessment
- •Trauma Dynamics
- •Prehospital Ultrasound
- •Trauma Management: Tranexamic Acid (TXA) Administration
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •20: Transport Medicine
- •Introduction
- •The Trauma Clinical Network (TCN)
- •Direct Transport
- •Inter-hospital Transport
- •Emergency or Non-emergency Transportation
- •Monitoring During Transport
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Trauma Team Leader (TTL)
- •Airway
- •Respiratory Therapy
- •Emergency Medicine Physician
- •General Surgery
- •Orthopedic Surgery
- •Neurosurgery
- •Recording Nurse
- •Trauma Team Activation
- •The Trauma Bay
- •Trauma Team Function
- •Summary
- •References
- •22: Interprofessional Team Roles
- •References
- •23: The Trauma Bay Environment
- •Introduction
- •Surge Capacity
- •Decontamination
- •Communication
- •Control Center
- •Security Considerations
- •The Trauma Bay
- •Trauma Observation Unit Setup
- •Special Situations
- •Hybrid Operating Rooms
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Design
- •Formalizing Clinician-Designer-Builder Partnerships
- •A Human-Centered Approach
- •The Missing Link
- •Evidence-Based Design
- •Build
- •Train
- •Excel
- •Putting It Together
- •Summary
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Human Factor Analysis
- •Hybrid Operating Environment Lexicon
- •Summary
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Project Implementation
- •Results
- •Conclusion
- •Appendix A: Dam Tools Usability Testing Questionaire
- •References
- •Introduction
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Team-Based Principles
- •Continuous Improvement Processes
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •29: Trauma Resuscitation
- •Mechanisms
- •Neurologic Injury
- •Musculoskeletal Trauma Including Spine
- •Conclusions
- •References
- •30: Damage Control Resuscitation
- •Introduction
- •Massive Transfusion
- •Permissive Hypotension
- •Vascular Damage Control Techniques
- •Non-vascular Damage Control Techniques
- •Abdominal Compartment Syndrome
- •Open Abdominal Management
- •Damage Control Environments
- •References
- •Damage Control Part 1: Operative Intervention
- •Damage Control Part 2: Resuscitation
- •Damage Control Strategy Under Special Circumstances
- •Blast Injuries
- •Burns
- •Head Injury
- •Crush Injury
- •Conclusions
- •References
- •32: Trauma Team Decision-Making
- •Predictive Scores
- •Clinical Practice Guidelines (CPGs)
- •Trauma Team Leadership: Translating Decisions into Action
- •Future Directions: Toward High Reliability Organizing
- •Conclusions
- •References
- •33: Emergency Critical Care Procedures
- •Introduction
- •Airway Management
- •Tube Thoracostomy
- •Controversies
- •Antibiotics
- •Tube Selection
- •Occult Pneumothorax
- •Vascular Access
- •Peripheral Intravenous Access
- •Central Intravenous Access
- •Intraosseous Access
- •Ultrasound
- •Resuscitative Thoracotomy
- •Outcomes
- •Contraindications
- •Volume Expansion
- •Management
- •Diagnostic Peritoneal Lavage
- •Summary
- •References
- •Introduction
- •REBOA Programs
- •Partial REBOA
- •Intermittent REBOA
- •Vena Cava Occlusion
- •Tourniquets
- •Junctional Tourniquets
- •Abdominal Aortic Compression.
- •Hemostatic Agents
- •Topical Hemostatic Agents
- •Chemical Hemostatics
- •Physiologic Hemostatics
- •Hemostatic Dressings
- •Intra-abdominal Foam
- •Summary
- •References
- •What Is Interventional Radiology
- •Diagnostic Imaging Workup
- •Embolic Therapies
- •Gelfoam
- •Mural Repair
- •References
- •Non-verbal
- •Verbal
- •Wider Structural Perspective
- •Transferrable Solutions
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Pharmacotherapy
- •Paravertebral Block
- •Serratus Plane Block
- •References
- •Clinical Decision Support
- •Quality Improvement
- •Research
- •Trauma Systems
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •Outcomes
- •The Future
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Challenges
- •Provider Stress
- •Non-verbal Communication
- •Standardized Communication
- •Strategy 1: Scripted Procedures
- •Strategy 2: Structure Triage Tool
- •Conclusions
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Fetal Monitoring
- •Radiology
- •Conclusions
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Elderly Population
- •Psychiatric Comorbidities
- •Anticoagulated Patients
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Advanced Trauma Life Support (ATLS)—The Basics
- •Advanced TBI Guideline-Based Care
- •Noninvasive ICP/CPP Determination Methods
- •Brain Tissue Oxygen Monitoring (PbtO2)
- •Extracellular Brain Chemistry—Cerebral Microdialysis
- •Transcranial Doppler
- •Near-Infrared Spectroscopy
- •Continuous Electroencephalography (cEEG)
- •Cerebrovascular Reactivity Monitoring
- •Cerebral Compensatory Reserve
- •Individualized ICP Thresholds (iICP)
- •Integrating “Omics” into Acute Phase TBI Care—The Future
- •Conclusions
- •References
- •44: Basic Trauma Ultrasound
- •Introduction
- •The FAST Examination
- •Technique
- •Uses
- •Blunt Abdominal Trauma
- •Penetrating Trauma
- •Limitations
- •Summary
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Trauma Ultrasound Development
- •Pneumothorax
- •Musculoskeletal Ultrasound
- •Head Trauma
- •Contrast-Enhanced Ultrasound
- •Conclusions
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Imaging Modalities
- •Plain X-ray
- •Computed Tomography (CT) Scan
- •Other Modalities
- •Critical Thinking
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Initial Trauma CT Protocol
- •Iodinated Contrast Administration
- •Emergency Trauma MRI
- •References
- •48: Disaster Medicine
- •Natural or Man-made Disaster
- •The Disaster’s Cycle
- •Incident Command System
- •Triage
- •“Second Hit” Phenomenon
- •Conclusions
- •References
- •49: The Multi-casualty Trauma
- •Introduction
- •Historical Perspective
- •Prehospital Management
- •Triage
- •Pediatric Considerations
- •Intrahospital Management
- •Transfer Corridors
- •Blood Bank
- •Conclusions
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Crew Resource Management (CRM)
- •Resources
- •Review Process Including Logistics
- •Transactive Memory
- •Team Building (Before)
- •Team Performance (During)
- •Team Debrief (After)
- •Health
- •Fitness
- •Interagency Collaboration
- •Bystanders
- •Emergency Medical Services/Tactical EMS
- •Conclusions
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Improvised Explosive Device
- •Anti-police Violence
- •Improved Community Preparedness
- •Conclusions
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Procedures
- •Conclusions
- •References
- •Introduction
- •The MARCHE Algorithm Approach
- •Massive Hemorrhage Management (“M”)
- •Tourniquets
- •Wound Packing
- •Hemostatic Dressings
- •Junctional Tourniquets
- •Airway Management (“A”)
- •Respiration (“R”)
- •Circulation (“C”)
- •Vascular Access
- •Crystalloid
- •Hemostatic Resuscitation
- •Tourniquet Re-assessment
- •Hypothermia Prevention/Head Injury (“H”)
- •Hypothermia Management
- •Traumatic Brain Injury
- •Eye Injuries
- •Analgesia
- •Secondary Survey
- •Antibiotic Administration
- •Prolonged Field Care
- •Summary
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Hypothermia
- •Etiology
- •Pathophysiology
- •Lethal Triad (Diamond) Component
- •Treatment
- •Afterdrop
- •Resuscitation Progression
- •Prognosis
- •Team Dynamics
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •55: Burns
- •Incidence
- •Etiology
- •Prognosis
- •Initial Management: “ABCDE” Approach
- •Admission
- •Dressings
- •Nutrition
- •Multidisciplinary Recovery
- •Summary
- •References
- •War Zones
- •Casualty Care Team Preparation
- •Biological Weapons
- •Biological Warfare Historical Considerations
- •Personal Protective Equipment
- •Anthrax
- •Botulism Toxin
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •57: Nuclear Injuries
- •Introduction
- •Historical Background
- •Transportation
- •Hospital Care
- •Conclusions
- •References
- •Further Reading
- •Introduction
- •Historical Perspective
- •Parabolic Testing
- •Surgical Field Testing
- •Diagnostics
- •Immediate Damage Control Procedures
- •Conclusions
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Pandemic Impact
- •Financial Support
- •Conclusion
- •References
- •Introduction
- •Staff
- •Retraining/Reassignment
- •Consultants
- •Space/Structure
- •Trauma Bay
- •Operating Room
- •ICU or Floor
- •Clinic
- •Systems
- •Country Level
- •Regional Level
- •Hospital Level
- •Division or Trauma Team Level
- •Conclusion
- •References

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Trauma intheSetting ofaPandemic
NielsD.Martin andLilyTung
60
Introduction
Care of trauma patients involves quick decision-making with
incomplete information. Occasionally, our ability to care for
trauma patients is challenged by pandemics, prompting a
need to balance trauma care with preventing a worsening of
the pandemic. Dened by Merriam-Webster as “an outbreak
of a disease that occurs over a wide geographic area (such as
multiple countries or continents) and typically affects a signicant proportion of the population,” pandemics can affect
trauma in unpredictable ways, making preparation for these
events difcult. For instance, on March 11, 2020, the World
Health Organization declared COVID-19 a global pandemic.
During this pandemic, societal lockdowns led to an overall
decrease in traumas worldwide; however, some cities witnessed an increase in violent, penetrating traumas [1–12].
Hospitals often have contingency plans or disaster man-
agement plans for sudden inuxes of patients. When a pan-
demic is declared, there is a potential need to quickly
transition to the mindset of disaster management as a pandemic evolves. The difference between a pandemic and a
natural disaster or bioterrorism is that a pandemic has an
uncertain endpoint. With a new disease, particularly one on a
global scale, there is a constant generation of new information for prevention, diagnosis, and treatment. In spite of the
constantly evolving situation and increase in patients secondary to the pandemic, it is still important to try to maintain
conventional care for as long as possible before changing to
“contingency care” or even “crisis care” under the stress of
the pandemic.
In order to best approach adjusting the pandemic response
to maintain trauma readiness and the highest possible level
of care, there are four categories that are often described in
traditional disaster management that must be addressed:
staff, stuff, space, and systems [13] (Table60.1).
N. D. Martin
University of Pennsylvania, Department of Surgery,
Philadelphia, PA, USA
e-mail: Niels.Martin@pennmedicine.upenn.edu
L. Tung (*)
Royal Columbian Hospital, University of British Columbia,
Department of Surgery, New Westminster, BC, Canada
e-mail: lily.tung@fraserhealth.ca
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2025
L. Marshall Gillman, S. Widder (eds.), Trauma Team Dynamics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-86312-7_60
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Table 60.1 Categories that need to be addressed in a pandemic: staff, stuff, space, and systems
Staff Stuff
Retraining and reassignment of staff Securing of PPE and supply chains
Modular stafng Protocols detailing PPE use
Regular monitoring and testing of staff Judicious use of blood products
Most experienced staff performing high-exposure procedures
Removal of high-risk staff from direct patient care (older,
immunocompromised, students)
Limit in-person consults
Monitoring of staff well-being
Space Systems
Hospital spaces can be recongured, repurposed, or reengineered to
adapt to new needs (e.g., OR ➔ ICU, clinic ➔ ED)
Trauma bay: establish hot/warm/cold zones, limit trafc, prohibit
visitors
OR: minimize staff, environmental contamination, OR time;
consider dedicated pandemic ORs and transport routes, recover in
OR and not PACU
ICU/oor: cluster work to minimize entry/exit from patient room,
organize units by disease status, not service
Clinic: switch to tele/video conferencing, screen for disease if
in-person visit advised
OR operating room, ICU intensive care unit, ED emergency department, PACU post-anesthetic care unit, PPE personal protective equipment
Guidance from national health authorities and trauma associations
Regularly scheduled meetings and updates at both regional and
hospital levels
Updates should be easily accessible online
Retraining of proper PPE use, N95 ttings
Disaster credentialing and privileging
N. D. Martin and L. Tung
Sta
Management of staff will depend on specics of the pandemic itself; however, the over-arching focus remains the
same—protecting staff while maintaining quality of patient
care. As with any new disease, patient care will be constantly
evolving as new information becomes available. Until a
rapid and accurate diagnostic test is available, all trauma
patients need to be presumed positive on arrival. Changes
that need to be implemented include retraining and reassignment of staff, modular stafng, establishing protocols for
tele-consults, and maintaining staff well-being.
Retraining/Reassignment
A potential bottleneck during a pandemic is a shortage of
specialized staff. Specialties most likely to be affected
include emergency medicine, intensive care, and infectious
disease. In cities where the pandemic results in a rise in
trauma, additional support for trauma services may be
required. As certain specialties will likely have their practices curtailed or even suspended, these physicians can be
retrained and reassigned to assist with clinical coverage as
surges occur or when staff become infected and are thus
unable to continue to provide patient care. For instance,
when elective cases are canceled, general surgeons can be
retrained to cover trauma or emergency surgery [1, 13–15].
Given the abbreviated retraining of these physicians, a tiered
stafng strategy may be necessary. For example, should a
mass casualty occur during the pandemic, one fellowship-
trained trauma surgeon may supervise multiple teams each
consisting of a general surgeon, resident, and nurse. This
allows general surgeons to utilize their transferrable skills to
lead trauma resuscitations while having the content expert,
the trauma surgeon, use their training and experience to
safely run multiple resuscitations at once.
Furthermore, physicians of all specialties should also be
updated to become more familiar with treatments or procedures that may become high in demand as a result of the
pandemic. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic,
there was an increase in patients requiring intubation, so hospitals expanded their airway teams, developed protocols for
proning patients in the intensive care unit (ICU), and implemented tracheostomy guidelines for the COVID-19 positive
patients. Similarly, there was a decrease in available ventilators, thus necessitating retraining of staff to understand how
to use BIPAP machines as a supportive modality [1]. Finally,
if backup staff are limited or have already been exhausted,
retired staff can be called upon for clinical duties. This, however, should be a last resort and needs to be balanced with
retirees being older and so potentially more susceptible to
the pandemic [15].
Modular Stang
Given the infectious nature of a pandemic, even with proper
application of personal protective equipment (PPE), healthcare workers can become infected and unable to work.
Besides the aforementioned retraining and reassignment of
medical staff, schedules should be revised so that teams work

60 Trauma intheSetting ofaPandemic
Table 60.2 Example of modular stafng
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6
Team 1 Day shift Night shift Backup Day shift Night shift Backup
Team 2 Night shift Backup Day shift Night shift Backup Day shift
Team 3 Backup Day shift Night shift Backup Day shift Night shift
Team 1: physicians A and B, Team 2: physicians C and D, Team 3: physicians E and F.Teams are to remain intact with no exchanging of team
members
521
in isolation from each other to prevent the spread of disease
by minimizing in-person physician-to-physician interactions
whenever possible [16]. Also, backup teams should be
included in the event that a team needs to be isolated. One
such method to accomplish this is modular stafng.
Modular stafng involves creating teams of providers
such that there are the maximum number of teams with the
minimum number of providers needed for patient care per
team. The team members do not change to allow for containment of any potential outbreaks, and better contact tracing
and quarantining should the need arise [17, 18]. The teams
should also be scheduled for shorter shifts with hand-offs
being done remotely by phone or video conference [13, 18].
Shorter shifts may be necessary because of the increased risk
of burnout from the stress associated with working during a
pandemic and work with additional PPE on [13]. An example of a modular stafng schedule is shown in Table60.2.
Other ways to decrease exposure include having attending physicians only perform high-exposure procedures, particularly in patients who are known to be positive. For
example, during the COVID-19 pandemic when aerosolization was a potential mode of transmission, one Philadelphia
hospital had only the most experienced person in-house perform intubations, and all intubations were performed in the
trauma bay rather than the operating room (OR) in order to
further minimize potential exposure [1]. Also, for operative
traumas, the operating team should be limited to attending
physicians and senior residents. This serves to not only minimize exposure to junior trainees, but it allows for a faster
surgery, thus decreasing potential exposure to the entire OR
team. Similarly, damage control principles should be utilized
to minimize exposure to the entire OR team [19].
Outside the OR, consider having one attending physician
cover more than one service while in-house or allowing for
attending physicians to take call from home as long as they
are within a reasonable distance from the hospital. For example, in a setting where trauma and emergency surgery services are staffed by separate attendings, the decrease in
trauma may allow for one in-house attending to cover both
services. Alternatively, depending on the local patient population and common injury patterns, the trauma surgeon may
take call from home and be called in depending on the severity of the patient’s injuries, with an emergency medicine
physician or other in-house attending physician available to
stabilize and resuscitate until the trauma surgeon’s arrival.
Once diagnostic testing is available, consideration must
be given for regular diagnostic testing and quarantining of
healthcare workers to avoid larger level contamination [20,
21]. This also allows for more rapid containment of an entire
team should one member of a team test positive while asymptomatic. Similarly, in order to protect healthcare workers,
once vaccinations are available, all healthcare workers
should be immunized unless medically contraindicated.
Finally, healthcare workers who are older, immunocompromised, or otherwise more susceptible to the disease may
need to be withdrawn from clinical work that requires direct
patient contact. Residents should return from satellite sites to
their primary institutions to avoid commuting or travel that
may contribute to inter-hospital spread. Medical students
should be removed from clinical rotations to decrease risk of
exposure and conserve PPE [20].
Consultants
Trauma patients are unique in that their injuries may require
multiple different consultants. During a pandemic, protocols
should be developed to allow for teleconsultations, with
clear indications for when in-person consults would be necessary [1]. This would help further decrease potential exposures while still maintaining patient care. Similarly, the
number of trauma team members allowed in the radiology
suite should be limited to one to two providers to limit the
exposure in the often small radiology reading rooms.
Sta Well-Being
The uncertainty and stressors of working in a pandemic can
negatively impact healthcare workers’ mental health and
well-being. Studies have shown that during a pandemic,
healthcare workers experience an increased risk of burnout,
anxiety, depression, and insomnia [14, 22]. The pandemic’s
negative impact on healthcare workers can be due to a number of causes such as an increase in stress and fatigue from
working with high-risk or positive patients, concern about
transmitting the disease to their family or colleagues, the
additional PPE required at work, the lack of PPE at work,
and the uncertainty of working in the presence of a novel
pathogen, especially one with no available treatment [22–24].

522
N. D. Martin and L. Tung
Mechanisms need to be put in place to monitor the psychological and emotional well-being of the team. Those who
are exposed or test positive will need additional resources
and support [18]. For those healthcare workers who choose
to isolate themselves from their families to protect them,
support for childcare, care of pets, or personal needs may
help alleviate some stressors [13, 14]. Additional measures
that may benet the team include well-being sessions, frequent check-ins, and designated areas within the hospital to
decompress. Debriefs should also be encouraged to help
staff process difcult events or situations [25].
Stu
Adequate PPE will be necessary to protect staff and avoid
further spread of the pandemic. At the same time, careful
conservation of PPE may be necessary as supply chains will
need to be secured and manufacturers will require time to
increase production to meet demands in both healthcare and
public sectors. In order to ensure adequate stockpiles or
emergency provisions, hospitals may need to reach out to
local, provincial, or even federal governments for aid.
Furthermore, protocols may need to be developed to more
clearly delineate the use of PPE.This is important particularly at the beginning of a pandemic when information is
incomplete and there is increased anxiety among healthcare
workers, which could lead to an overestimation of the risk of
disease transmission and thus potential overuse of PPE.These
concepts are especially important in trauma because of the
invasive nature of the initial resuscitation exposing the providers to many patient secretions. For this reason, many
trauma centers have staff in full PPE appropriate to the pandemic for every trauma resuscitation.
Finally, there may be potential shortages of blood products during a pandemic due to fear of disease transmission,
donation centers being closed, or prospective donors electing
to remain at home [18, 19]. As such, transfusions should be
given judiciously, conservation methods such as autotransfusion employed, and the public encouraged to continue
to donate blood while maintaining the proper precautions.
Space/Structure
Besides staff, space can quickly become a scarce resource
during a pandemic. Hospital spaces may need to be recongured or repurposed to adapt to new needs. For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic, engineers were engaged to
create temporary negative pressure rooms in trauma bays,
and ORs were repurposed to become ICUs. If the region a
hospital is in has yet to be fully affected by the pandemic,
then simulations to identify potential problems or bottle-
necks are recommended so that necessary changes to procedures and protocols can be made and new workows created
and educated [1]. From a trauma perspective, there are four
locations that may need to be addressed: trauma bay, OR,
ICU, and clinics. Until cleared, trauma patients during a pandemic should be treated as infected in all phases of care.
Trauma Bay
Trauma bays are where the trauma team rst encounters the
patient. It is where resuscitation and life-saving procedures
occur, which necessitates them to be fully equipped and in a
space large enough to accommodate the entire trauma team.
During a pandemic, trauma bays may need to be modied to
better protect both providers and patients, while still maintaining their functionality. If a disease’s mode of transmission is airborne, then rapid engagement with hospital
engineers may be necessary to create negative pressure
rooms in the trauma bay. Alternatively, if time or space does
not allow for negative pressure rooms, then physical barriers
need to be erected to separate trauma patients and minimize
cross-contamination or certain trauma bays need to be designated for disease suspects or positive patients [1]. Regardless
of how the space is modied, it needs to be able to continue
to accommodate staff, supplies, and PPE [26].
In addition to the aforementioned changes, contamination
needs to be minimized by establishing zones within the
trauma bay. There should be three zones clearly marked out
on the oor with colored tape: hot, warm, and cold zones.
Each zone corresponds to the degree of contamination within
that zone, with hot being on the patient’s side where it is
most contaminated (Fig.60.1). In the warm zone, things are
still considered potentially contaminated, but on a lower
scale relative to the hot zone. This is where dofng of PPE
would occur and where “transfer stations” would be stationed. “Transfer stations” are where supplies from the cold
zone are placed for pick up by personnel in the hot zone.
Lastly, the cold zone is considered clean and where donning
of PPE would occur. All unnecessary equipment and supplies should be removed from the hot zone and placed in the
cold zone. Any necessary equipment such as ultrasounds for
FAST exams should be covered with a plastic bag similar to
the probe covers used during sterile procedures to allow for
easier cleaning and decreased contamination. Lead or plexiglass barriers should also be kept in the hot zone for use during X-rays. Equipment bundles for common procedures
(chest tubes, thoracotomies, etc.) can be created and passed
into the hot zone when required (Table60.3). The trauma
team in the hot zone should include only those who are
actively working on the patient. If feasible, the trauma team
leader can remain in the cold zone to direct the team to further conserve PPE and minimize exposure. Basic PPE should

RESUS BAY CONFIGURATION
yep
AREA
S
60 Trauma intheSetting ofaPandemic
FOR TRAUMA ARRESTS AND PERI-ARRESTS ALL TEAM MEMBERS TO WEAR ENHANCED DROPLET/CONTACT PRECAUTIONS WITH N95
523
ENHANCED DROPLET/CONTACT
HVAC
VENT
v4 April 1, 2020
Fig. 60.1 Sample trauma bay layout with hot zone indicated in red
PRECAUTIONS – N95 MASK
MONITOR
TOWER
COVID POSITIVE OR SUSPECT PATIENT
Procedure Table
RN
A
MD
A
RN
B
ENTRY/EXIT
DOFFING AREA
Procedure Table
be worn in the warm zone, and additional pandemic-specic
PPE is required in the hot zone. The distance between the hot
and cold zones should be dictated by how far the pathogen
could potentially travel, for example, in COVID-19, it was
6feet from the patient’s head [1, 26].
In order to limit trafc through the trauma bay, clearly
designate one entrance and one exit. Only necessary personnel should have access to the trauma bay. Family or visitors
should not be allowed in the trauma bay [27]. Consider performing a screening questionnaire and physical exam on
arrival of the stable trauma patient. Consider placing a mask
on the stable patient to mitigate aerosolization. All suspected
cases should have diagnostic tests sent [28]. In the case of an
unstable patient or a patient in extremis, omit any screening,
assume the patient is positive, and proceed with full
pandemic- specic PPE.In situations where the disease can
be asymptomatic, there is increasing or high prevalence in
the community, or if there are concerns about the hospital
reaching capacity, assume all incoming trauma patients are
positive [1, 18, 26, 29].
After resuscitation, most trauma patients will ultimately
require transport to either imaging, the OR, or be admitted to
the hospital. In order to minimize exposure during transport,
the shortest possible one-way routes should be delineated
beforehand. Not only should transport staff wear PPE, but
the patient should as well. Gowns and sheets should either be
disposable or placed in clearly marked infectious disease
bags. All transport equipment should be disinfected once the
patient has been transported to their destination [27]. When
SM
M
DOFFING
TTL
yep.
DOFFING
AREA
RN
D
MD
B
WOW
RT
RN
C
CMAC
NO PPE: Unless directed by TTL
EQUIPMENT BINS
AIRWAY/CHEST TUBE
TO CT
LEGEND:
TTL – Trauma Team Leader
MD A – General Surgery
Attending or Senior Resident
RN A – Resus Nurse
RN B – Resus Nurse
MD B – ER Airway physician
RT – Respiratory Therapist
RN C – Resus Nurse
RN D – Resus Nurse
SM – Safety Monitor
possible, consider portable imaging methods such as X-rays
or ultrasound, to minimize transport through the hospital
[30]. Early trauma patient testing can also de-escalate isolation at an earlier time point and save precious resources.
Operating Room
During a pandemic, resources such as staff and supplies may
become severely limited. In such a setting, nonoperative
management of trauma should be pursued whenever possible
[19, 29, 31]. Goals of management with regard to the OR
include minimizing exposure in the OR, environmental contamination, and OR time [16].
Logistical considerations include collaboration with the
anesthesia department to establish policies on how to handle
positive or presumed positive patients. For example, transport should occur along clearly marked pathways to designated ORs (preferably those closest to the entrance to the OR
suites to minimize environmental contamination of entire
hallways or OR pods) [32], particularly for patients who are
positive or presumed positive. Patients who are not intubated
should wear PPE at all times during transport. Stable patients
should proceed directly to the ORs without passing through
the preoperative area. If space allows, patients should be
extubated and recovered in the OR instead of the PACU to
minimize contamination to one room [16]. To further minimize exposure, the same transport team should take the
patient from the trauma bay to the OR without transfer of

524
N. D. Martin and L. Tung
Table 60.3 Sample procedural bundles
Trauma team PPE bundle
6 X Waterproof gowns
6 X N95 masks
6 X Face shields
6 X Facemasks with shield
Chest tube/nger thoracostomy
3 X Chlorhexidine prep sticks (large)
1 x Sterile gown
1 x Medium sheet
2 x Green towels
2 x 5cc Lidocaine local anesthetic vials
1 x Red 18 gauge blunt needle
1 x 22 Gauge needle
1 x 10cc syringe
1 x #11 Scalpel blade (disposable)
1 x Chest tube insertion instrument tray
1 X 28Fr chest tube
1 x 0 Prolene suture or 0 silk suture
1 x Gelonet gauze
2 x Trach dressing
1 X ABD pad
1 X Mex roll
1 X Pleur-evac
Thoracotomy (always handed up with a chest tube tray (above))
1 x Bottle of chlorhexidine
2 x Sterile gowns
1 x Medium sheet
4 x Green towels
1 x #10 Scalpel blade (disposable)
1 x 3–0 Vicryl suture
2 x 4–0 Prolene suture with tapered needles
1 x Skin stapler
1 x Thoracotomy instrument tray
2 x 5 Pack of laparotomy sponges
1 x Yankauer suction and tubing
care between different teams in between. Dedicated donning
and dofng areas, similar to the warm zone in the trauma
bay, should be located outside the ORs. All necessary PPE
should be donned prior to entry into the OR.Additional disinfection measures may be necessary between cases depending on the pandemic disease [18, 19, 33, 34].
During the operation, a runner should be employed so that
all staff who are in the OR remain inside until the case is
completed [1, 27, 32]. Entry and exit into the OR should be
limited [16]. Only equipment or supplies that are required
for surgery should be in the OR to minimize waste and cleaning. Suture trees and other general stock should be kept outside of the room to minimize contamination. Preference
should be given to instruments or supplies that have disposable alternatives [34]. No personal items should be allowed
in the ORs. Disposable scrub caps and shoe covers should be
used instead of personal fabric scrub caps [29, 34].
In pandemics in which the disease is airborne, aerosolgenerating procedures such as intubation should only be per-
formed in full PPE.Providers should avoid bag valve mask
ventilation prior to intubation if possible and consider rapid
sequence intubation [19, 27, 32, 34]. Intubation should be
done by the most experienced provider using a video laryngoscope rather than direct laryngoscopy, and the endotracheal tube cuff should be inated prior to commencing
mechanical ventilation [34]. Where possible, perform
regional blocks instead of general anesthesia, if the procedure allows [32].
ICU or Floor
Once a pandemic is anticipated or declared, policies to
enforce the ease of access and correct use of PPE should be
established. Work should be clustered to minimize entry and
exit from patient rooms to not only conserve PPE, but the act
of donning or dofng PPE can be a high-risk activity [6, 26].
If space allows, pandemic disease-positive patients should be
separated from those who are negative [13]. In these cases,
trauma patients may not be clustered in one unit or oor, and
so the trauma team will need to be careful when rounding to
not spread the disease within the hospital. If a shortage of
ICU beds and ventilators occurs, ORs can be repurposed to
become ICUs or PACUs [1, 25].
Clinic
For trauma clinic, most patients can be managed remotely by
teleconference or video conference. Infrastructure for this
should be deployed widely if not in place already. If a patient
needs to be seen in person for follow-up, minimize exposure
by limiting the number of staff present and try to coordinate
the patient’s visit with appointments with other specialties.
All patients should be screened for the disease by phone
prior to their appointment. They should not come to clinic if
they are symptomatic or have recently tested positive for the
disease.
Finally, just as ORs can be repurposed to become ICUs,
clinics can be repurposed to become temporary emergency
rooms in the event of a surge [1].
Systems
Effective communication is key during a pandemic, particularly one involving a new pathogen. The prolonged yet
dynamic nature of the event requires constant situational
awareness and implementation of effective communication
strategies as new information regarding epidemiology, and
scientic and clinical data becomes available. Regular
updates on important items such as hospital capacity, avail-

60 Trauma intheSetting ofaPandemic
525
able resources, prevention strategies, new diagnostic criteria,
and potential treatments should be given virtually to minimize potential exposure and conserve PPE [18]. These
updates should also be easily accessible online for those
unable to attend the virtual meetings.
Below we describe suggestions for what can be done at
the country, regional, hospital, and then division level.
Country Level
Regular updates and clear guidance should come from
national health authorities such as the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (United States of America) and
Public Health Agency of Canada. In developing nations
where resources, even at the national level, are scarce, access
to information from other countries will be vital to understanding how to treat patients while protecting healthcare
workers.
Regarding treating trauma patients, guidelines should
also be sought from national organizations such as the
American College of Surgeons Committee on Trauma,
Eastern Association for the Surgery of Trauma, and American
Association for the Surgery of Trauma.
Regional Level
At the regional level, weekly meetings should occur between
trauma medical directors and program managers to discuss
census data, facility-level surge activities, resource and PPE
availability, any clinical lessons learned, and sharing of
newly developed protocols [1]. Establishing a regional triage
system, resource allocation, and crisis standards of care
while taking into account local and regional resources should
be discussed. Crisis standards of care are generally instituted
on a regional level, ensuring the community gets equal care
at all available centers. Contingency plans for the pandemic’s impact on EMS and ability to transfer patients to higher
level of care should also be discussed at the regional level.
Capacity should be maintained at all level I and II trauma
centers. Finally, in the event that the increase in hospitalized
patients secondary to the pandemic combined with an
increase in trauma patients exceeds the capacity and capabilities of adult hospitals, pediatric hospitals should consider
increasing their age limits to accepting young adults [1].
Hospital Level
At the hospital level, a command center should be activated
or established. This command center would function 24/7 to
manage administrative, clinical, and communication respon-
sibilities such as education and collaboration between different departments, development of protocols, patient ow, and
procurement and allocation of resources [13, 18]. Based on
factors such as census, resources, and predicted surge activities, elective cases may need to be canceled or limited to
those that do not require post-operative admission [34].
Similarly, in-person ambulatory clinics may need to be canceled and transitioned to telehealth in order to minimize
trafc and exposure at the hospital, as well as increase available space to be repurposed for other uses [1, 20].
Decisions made at the hospital level should be communicated to departments through regularly scheduled teleconference meetings. Items to discuss at these meetings include
community or regional situation, current hospital census,
projected number of patients who arrive, and any new policies or protocols or updates to existing ones [18]. Results of
the meetings, especially new policies or protocols, should
also be easily accessible online to centralize the information
and make it available to those unable to attend the
meetings.
Education regarding when, how, and how much PPE to
use should be available to all healthcare workers [14, 33].
Additional appointments for N95 ttings may be required.
This is particularly important at the beginning of the pandemic when anxiety and uncertainty may lead to over-use of
PPE and waste [13]. Clear protocols outlining this should be
created and distributed.
Given potential staff attrition secondary to the pandemic,
disaster credentialing, privileging, degree of supervision
needed, clinical scope of practice, and access to electronic
medical records should be considered [18].
In order to protect staff and minimize spread of the disease, visitors to the hospital should be limited and hand
hygiene encouraged [18].
Division or Trauma Team Level
At the division or trauma team level, hand-overs and morning reports should continue, but with providers participating
remotely or from different rooms if possible [25]. Within the
same meeting, regular briengs and memos about new policies, protocols, or clinical knowledge on the pandemic
should also be given. Similar to a disaster scenario, understanding and establishment of early triage to palliative care
for those with severe injuries who are not expected to survive
will be important in a resource-scarce environment [18]. As
discussed in the stafng section, general surgeons whose
elective cases have been canceled can be reassigned to assist
with trauma resuscitations or other patient care [1, 13–15]. In
short, all efforts should be directed at effective communication while minimizing exposure and maintaining optimal
trauma care [18].

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Conclusion
Unlike other facets of life, trauma, unfortunately, does not
stop with a pandemic. As the COVID-19 pandemic showed,
pandemics pose signicant challenges to trauma care. Early
recognition, exibility, and communication are key to continuing to provide optimal care for trauma patients. As the
pandemic evolves, so must the policies and protocols that
have been put in place. Finally, given the potential duration
and stress of a pandemic, the well-being of those caring for
patients must also be supported.
Key Points
• Maintaining trauma readiness in the setting of a
pandemic requires early addressing of each of the
four key categories of staff, stuff, space, and
systems.
• Staff: to address staff well-being while concurrently
maintaining quality of patient care, staff may need
to be retrained or reassigned, modular stafng
schedules created, and telemedicine considered.
• Stuff: centers need to be prepared for potential supply issues that may affect blood products, PPE, and
other supplies.
• Space: hospital spaces may need to be recongured
or repurposed to adapt to new needs.
• Systems: the prolonged and dynamic nature of a
pandemic requires constant situational awareness
and effective communication strategies at the hospital, regional, and country levels.
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