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Critical Incident Team Dynamics
andLogistics
JeremyW.Cannon, JoseL.Pascual, andLewisJ.Kaplan
50
Introduction
The interplay of internal coordination and member cohesion
with the extrinsic forces of chaos, stress, and unpredictability
underscores the need to understand and develop highfunctioning teams to support success during critical incidents
[1]. This concept is termed critical incident team dynamics
and enjoys substantial overlap with team logistics. The successful functioning of teams that perform in high-stress and
unpredictable environments with unpredictable timing (critical incident team) hinges on training so that requisite skills
are developed and enhanced. Performance is continually
assessed and improved, thus establishing a competencybased hierarchy that can function within a uid environment.
The methods by which to assemble, select, train, and review
such teams rest on scientically sound principles that form
the thrust of this chapter’s exploration. This chapter provides
a readily understandable and deployable blueprint for team
administrators, liaisons, leaders, as well as members.
Crew Resource Management (CRM)
As discussed in Part I of this text, the goal of CRM is to
ensure the success of teams by reducing human error [2, 3].
A formal approach to team development is essential since
the unexpected will occur, and for trauma teams as well as
law enforcement agencies, failure to operate efciently can
lead to loss of life as well as substantial and potentially
avoidable morbidity [4]. CRM works to control human fac-
tors to the greatest degree possible to remove their inuence from the calculus of success. Teams that benet from
CRM are those that operate in environments where
unknown external forces continually and adversely impact
plans during their execution. For instance, airline crews,
reghters, oil riggers, and, pertinent to this book, police
and healthcare workers often employ CRM methodology
when developing service lines [5].
Another hallmark of CRM is establishing a culture of
safety where all team members, regardless of rank or tenure,
are empowered to voice concerns and engage in process
improvement. Essential elements include promoting situational awareness, problem identication, decision-making
for problem resolution, effective and equitable workload
distribution, time management, and conict resolution (a
learned skill that relies on courtesy, respect, and trust) [6, 7].
The above processes help dene the atmospheric tone of the
organization, a feature that strongly inuences the likelihood that individual members will feel comfortable enough
to challenge the status quo in search of excellence. CRM
works if it is embedded in the organizational structure, inaugurated with each and every project and task, iterative in
nature, as well as modied and improved using hard data
[8]. Prime examples of the successful application of these
principles may be found in the airline industry or military
special operations teams [9–11]. In each example, the organization is continually improved by empowered individuals
whose goal is continual process improvement as failure is
indeed not an option. Crisis is the crucible whereby the success of CRM is measured.
J. W. Cannon · J. L. Pascual · L. J. Kaplan (*)
Perelman School of Medicine, University of Pennsylvania,
Department of Surgery, Division of Trauma, Surgical Critical Care
and Emergency Surgery, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Corporal Michael J Crescenz VAMC, Surgical Services,
Philadelphia, PA, USA
e-mail: Jeremy.Cannon@pennmedicine.upenn.edu;
Jose.Pascual@pennmedicine.upenn.edu;
Lewis.Kaplan@pennmedicine.upenn.edu
© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2025
L. Marshall Gillman, S. Widder (eds.), Trauma Team Dynamics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-86312-7_50
Characteristics ofCrises
Critical incidents qualify as crises since they are emotionally charged, stressful, and unanticipated events that presage abrupt and often undesired change. Many events
represent critical incidents including natural disasters
(hurricanes, oods, etc.), mechanical disasters (plane
431
432
J. W. Cannon et al.
Key Elements ofTeam Dynamics
Confusion
Chaos
Risk
Crisis
Human
element
Fig. 50.1 Crisis characteristics
crashes, bridge collapses, etc.), and civilian police-related
events. Wars have some features of critical incidents but
are differentiated by having a slower pace toward change
and are more, rather than less, anticipated. Crises that
erupt within wars, on the other hand, occur in an episodic
and unpredictable fashion and benet from appropriate
team training. Examples include improvised explosive
device detonations and sniper attacks that occur in an
unanticipatable cadence and tempo. Crises are different
from conicts in that conicts represent the opposition of
two different wills rather than physical events.
Understanding the ve hallmarks of crises helps optimize
successful management strategies (Fig.50.1).
First, confusion is a hallmark of crisis in that there is
information and plan disarray, since crises are unclear in
nature and course. Confusion impedes obtaining useful and
timely information regarding current events. Second, all crises are imbued with risk which may oppose decisive action.
Third, since crises are unexpected, they represent a unique
and transient concatenation of circumstances, individuals,
and locations, establishing a time sensitivity to their solution.
When the crisis involves individuals, the crisis may be characterized as time competitive in that the commander needs to
maintain the initiative to reach a rapid and successful resolution. Fourth, even when individuals are not the focus of the
crisis, there is a human element centered about the responders and victims that must be acknowledged both during and
after the crisis is resolved. Fifth, tactical crises powerfully
tend to degenerate toward chaos. Effective teams that are
integrated into highly functional systems provide the main
mechanism to resolve, but not prevent, critical incidents.
Time
sensive
Even great leaders cannot craft a superb team if the membership is not up to the task. Member selection is therefore a key
event. There is no single metric that will allow a leader to
select ideal team members, but a montage of metrics may be
ideal [12]. Performance metrics that highlight dedication,
drive, and aptitude combined with a relevant physical tness
assessment may enable optimal member selection for highspeed teams such as SWAT teams [13]. The Cooper Institute
Fitness Assessment is a commonly used instrument that has
been validated as a predictor of a police ofcer’s ability to
complete patrol duties [14]. However, it is less rigorous than
measures employed by US Military Special Operations
Teams during member selection and performance review.
The latter is a key element that is often overlooked, especially in low-activity (i.e., infrequent SWAT team callouts)
regions with dually tasked individuals (patrol ofcer and
SWAT operator, reghter and urban search and rescue operator, etc.) [15]. Instead, iterative assessment is required for
team membership. Military special operations teams have
the benet of continual assessment during deployments as
well as between deployment training sessions. Indeed, tness is part of the job description, and time is allotted for
tness maintenance; no such time is generally allotted for
civilian special response team members, and such activities
are generally not funded. Fitness maintenance or development is therefore the shared responsibility of the team leader
and team members.
Command andControl
The notion of command overlaps with the concept of control.
It is useful to distinguish the two as they are not necessarily
embodied in the same individual. Command identies that
the individual can (by virtue of their position, power, and
authority) compel compliance. Control implies that the individual is providing direction but cannot compel adherence to
their plan. Control is enabled by persuasion, inuence, and
example. Both command and control are inextricably intertwined in critical incidents. Indeed, command is said to have
delegated authority, while control is said to represent perceived authority (Fig.50.1). Military parlance denotes the
two as C2.
Team commanders may be selected on the basis of perceived or demonstrated skill in related or unrelated domains.
Real-world experience (immersive, direct) is always preferable to tenure-based (inferred) experience [16, 17].
Commanders and team leaders need to maintain the initiative
during critical incidents in order to direct the interrelated
events necessary for resolution. This task is enabled by crafting an effective command and control architecture.
50 Critical Incident Team Dynamics andLogistics
433
Command andControl Architecture
Since critical incidents are temporary, command and control architecture is similarly temporary. Embracing the
need to have a single command entity, such temporary
architecture should be explicitly constructed to be directed
by a single entity. Such constructs may be typied by
Emerging Multi- Organizational Networks (EMON) which
consist of task- oriented and mission-specic collaborations of individuals and resources [18, 19]. EMON structure denes lines of authority (effectively but not
necessarily equitably), distributes power, and efciently
allocates resources for critical incident resolution. EMON
resources may be broadly grouped into the following eight
domains:
1. Selecting common technology platforms and across-team
procedures
2. Developing modular teams and responses
3. Establishing the required elements for a unied command
structure
4. Advance planning for every major and predictable type of
critical incident the team might face, as well as recovery
planning for initial plan failure or inefcacy during an
incident
5. Dening the maximum number of supervised
individuals
6. Identifying critical incident relevant facilities
7. Developing resource management plans for all teams
8. Articulating an integrated communication system
Communication systems pose a unique challenge to
EMON structure as crisis events often involve disparate
elements and must integrate different communication
systems and protocols. The most effective team is likely
to fail if unique assets are unable to communicate in a
timely and effective fashion. One such example is the
Area Command Team (ACT) concept of the LA County
Sheriff’s office. Following the 1992 Los Angeles riots,
the LA County Sheriff’s Department completed an indepth review process that evaluated the logistics behind
their successful and unsuccessful resource management
that laid the foundation for modern management paradigms. The ACT concept has articulated structures that
parallel how SWAT teams function today. Those structures include a central command with linked field command coupled with teams that have independent
operational authority in response to conflict exigencies
that depart from the anticipated course. Such a structure
is readily adapted to non-police command team structures as well. Effective ACTs require resources to be
funded and allocated for team use.
Resources
Resource management includes acquisition, cataloging, maintenance, revision, funding, allocation, mobilization, and
deployment of needed elements in a fashion designed to
swiftly resolve the critical incident. Therefore, resource management includes not only material but human resources.
Since critical incidents often span more than one responder
type (i.e., police, SWAT, EMS, re), a system for resource
management is essential. Resources can be housed at a single
depot location or mobilized from various staging locations as
needed. Both approaches work and the selection of the most
appropriate method should be inuenced by local dynamics.
An oft underappreciated aspect of resource management is
team member development [10]. This includes ongoing skills
maintenance training as well as advanced training of existing
members. Recruitment, education, and development of new
members for force augmentation and succession planning are
critical for ongoing competence and success. Regular review
of all of the above elements helps teams and their administrators determine how best to manage teams and their resources.
Review Process Including Logistics
Developing and maintaining a review process that evaluates
team construction, resource allocation, and coordination
within an agency as well as with other agencies should be
distinct from the review process that evaluates team performance during critical incident deployment. The rst relates
to funding and the mechanics of relationship development,
while the latter addresses real-world implementation of what
the former has put in place. An essential element of the
review process is to identify gaps in logistics for critical incident response and coordination. A templated approach to the
review will support a regular process and should identify elements that are missing or decient in number or extent, as
well as those that are ideal. Best practices that may be
exported to other agencies should be identied and considered for dissemination at multiple levels. Agency templates
should broadly overlap across general domains (Fig.50.2).
The domains may include, but are not limited to:
1. Commander, leader(s), and team members (number,
training, and capabilities)
2. Tools and equipment
3. Communication (equipment and protocols) and mobile
platforms
4. Computer and information technology infrastructure and
architecture
5. Intelligence gathering/analysis and dissemination
6. Training time and scope
434
J. W. Cannon et al.
Fig. 50.2 Agency template
domains
7. Standard operating procedures and memoranda of understanding with relevant agencies, policies, and protocols
8. Threat matrix-driven team deployment triggers and succession planning
The review process and logistical evaluation optimize
strategy and resource allocation to ensure that essential elements are available and accessible during critical incidents.
Transactive Memory
Transactive memory is a characteristic of successful teams
that results from iterative training with the team as a whole
[20]. Each team member understands their role as well as
that of the other team members. Integrated training exploits
the expertise of each team member and makes it clear to the
other members of the team. An external reviewer might note
smooth performance without signicant need for communication to address challenges. Such observations characterize
special operations teams that continually practice, train, and
deploy together. Civilian teams rarely do so to such a degree,
and many elements that are mobilized during a critical incident are accustomed to working alone rather than as part of a
dynamic team (i.e., patrol ofcer who is the rst responder to
an active shooter scenario). Thus, the cultivation of transactive memory must be a fundamental goal of team training
throughout the life cycle of a team.
Life Cycle ofTeams
Teams are characterized by standard time frames during their
lifespan (Fig.50.3). Prior to the team’s creation, there is a
perceived need for such a team that may be termed the
“drive” for team creation. Without such a need, the driving
force for team assembly is notably less focused, leading to a
team that is diffuse in targeting and broad in scope. Lack of
focus may compromise training and utilization leading to a
team that is ill equipped to address the mission at hand. Once
assembled, critical incident response teams “strive” to
achieve a high level of performance that is task oriented and
Informaon
Technology
Tools and
equipment
Intelligence
Training SOP/MOU
Communicaon
Threat
Matrix
Commanders, leaders, team members
Drive
Revive
Fig. 50.3 Team life cycle
mission specic. It would not be appropriate for a SWAT
team to prepare for reghting, for example. Once assembled, trained, and deployed, teams “thrive” and rene their
membership, skills, and capabilities. It is during this period
that teams rene their mission. Some teams expand and others contract depending on local need and capability. Having
done so, teams achieve a level of competency and may be
characterized as having “arrived,” demonstrating organization that reects a competency-based hierarchy. After a
period of time and without a new drive, teams may atrophy,
losing the crispness of their skill sets and decreasing the rate
of new skill acquisition. Such events may reect the aging of
team members, lack of utilization as the original drive has
been eliminated or decayed, or leadership failure as well as a
host of other inuences including decient funding for
training.
Team salvage hinges on entering a phase of “revival,”
relying on a new entry into the life cycle demonstrated in
Fig.50.3. Such driving forces often represent changes in the
threat matrix or dynamic, changing environmental demographics, shifts in leadership priorities, as well as new team
leadership or membership. One way to help support team
dynamics is to evolve a stepwise plan for team management
that addresses team building, performance, and debrieng
(Fig.50.4).
Team Building (Before)
Team building is both an internal and external process. The
internal aspect involves progressive team training for different scenarios so that team members become facile at their
Strive
ThriveArrive
50 Critical Incident Team Dynamics andLogistics
Fig. 50.4 Stepped plan for
team management
BEFORE
Team skills
Team cohesion
Team dynamic
Team knowledge
Fitness and health
DURING
Intra-acon
performance
assessment
Plan modificaon as
required
435
AFTER
Aer-acon
assessment
Team and/or
individual debrief
Mental health
support
tasks and are prepared to address the spectrum of challenges
that they might face. Besides supporting the development of
transactive memory, teams also develop an esprit de corps,
especially in teams where members are directly responsible
for each other’s lives [21]. Accordingly, a sense of personal
responsibility characterizes well-functioning teams. These
intense relationships generally do not occur within disparate
teams. Nonetheless, specialty teams should prepare to interface and work with other teams, rendering team building an
external process as well. Regional exercises that bring disparate teams together and drive EMON evolution followed by
a performance review support this goal. City-wide mock
disaster exercises are prime examples of this kind of team
building. Since details are easily lost, trained observers as
well as digital recording of events for post hoc critique might
identify otherwise unappreciated opportunities for performance improvement.
Team Performance (During)
Military actions frequently benet from real-time digital
oversight via satellite imagery, drone-based feed, as well as
xed or mobile digital feed. Recorded actions, environmental elements, verbal cues and directives, and reactions may
be integrated with pre-action and intra-action intelligence as
one method of evaluating team and commander performance.
Other methods exist, and the selected method should reect
the available resources. Non-military critical incidents were
previously generally bereft of such imaging and integrated
data. More recently, the rapid rise of dashboard cameras,
bystander video imaging, as well as the increasingly ubiquitous trafc and store security cameras may allow for a piecemeal approach to critical incident team performance
reconstruction. While urban locales often demonstrate a
greater density of digital surveillance tools, suburban and
rural settings have fewer coverage gaps than in prior years.
Regardless of locale, planning for intra-incident team performance evaluation tools should be included in resource management planning.
Additionally, critical incident managers can team with
media outlets to obtain data such as wide-angle helicopter
footage or multi-angle imaging. Such relationships also
allow managers to restrict the ow of information back to the
general public, where perpetrators of a crime might access it.
Such was the case during hostage negotiations that occurred
in January 2013. In this widely televised negotiation of the
release of a 5-year-old boy from a bunker, the FBI Hostage
Rescue Team used information to build a full-scale bunker
model. The model was then analyzed and accessed multiple
times via various techniques in full scale to best plan the
breach and rescue. With excellent data ow control, all of
this was done in close proximity to the bunker and remained
unbeknownst to the kidnapper; the victim was successfully
rescued several days later.
Team Debrief (After)
Post hoc review is a cornerstone of performance improvement and quality assessment. Improvements in individual
performance, team coordination, information ow, communication resources, resource management, command decisionmaking, initiative maintenance, as well as interagency
coordination rely on post hoc reviews [22]. Obtaining perspectives from individual team members, the on-scene team
leader, and the command post is ideal as it provides a broader
perspective on performance. It is essential that reviews are
nonjudgmental. This encourages accurate and honest evaluation and insight into process improvement. Additionally, a
key element in maintaining a longitudinal perspective is accurate documentation of elements that are benecial, those that
are merely acceptable—and equally important—those that
hinder plan execution [23]. Such a log is also useful in identifying evidence-based interventions targeted to improve
focused performance areas. This information will be important to administrators who will be funding the interventions.
More importantly, such a log creates a matrix of capabilities
that have been developed. Clear identication of the review
process leader encourages ownership of the review, improves
Health/Fitness
Home/finances
Sleep depriv
Ment
436
the utility of the process, and supports operator development.
Frequently, more intensive training follows in the wake of
after-action analysis. Of course, ensuring sufcient time for
training is an element that should be managed under team
building and resource management, but unique needs for
focused training may arise.
The above process is even more important when the performance issue embraces interagency coordination and
dynamics. Such improvements may require ironing out new
relationships—in particular—command architecture.
Regardless, changes should be recorded and may be codied
into a standard operating procedure (SOP) or a memorandum of understanding (MOU). Train derailments are an
event that brings multiple agencies together to address a
disaster whether it involves retail products, ammables such
as oil or gas, or people as was the case in 2015in Philadelphia
[24, 25]. With the panoply of responding agencies, and even
when the National Incident Management System is utilized,
different agencies may have different priorities [26].
Different priorities may ow from divergent views on causation and on-scene risk. A train derailment could be viewed as
the result of human error, environmental challenges such as
track debris, or as the result of targeted violent extremism.
The lack of clarity may disable clear lines of leadership for
interagency coordination. This can lead to counterproductive
decisions including transporting bluntly injured patients by
law enforcement vehicle instead of ground or air ambulance.
While police transport is highly prized to rapidly transport
victims of penetrating trauma, bluntly injured patients may
not enjoy similar benets and may even suffer harm [27].
Unmanaged spine injury, displaced fractures, and the like
may be unfavorably managed during police transport—even
if the goal is rapid scene clearance and rapid access to denitive care. Regardless of which elements need to be improved,
human elements that impact individual responder performance must be accounted for and actively managed [5].
Stressors toBeManaged (Fig.50.5)
Health
Health assessment and maintenance are important in keeping
team members on the job and capable of performing their
duties. Each agency utilizes screening health evaluations of
new hires. Often, the ongoing health maintenance is less stringent than the initial assessment [14, 15]. It is unclear if more
intense health recertication would translate into outcome benet, but considering regular maintenance for critical incident
response teams seems intuitively appropriate. There are few
teams with embedded physicians, but those teams might enjoy
enhanced health maintenance compared to teams without physician teammates. Of note, certain health conditions preclude
J. W. Cannon et al.
aon
Stress
al health
Social media
Fig. 50.5 Stressors that impact stability and performance
participation on a critical incident response team including, but
not limited to: active coronary artery disease, seizures, diabetes, poorly controlled asthma, active anticoagulation, clinically
severe obesity, unrepaired cataracts, and psychiatric illness
[28]. Health maintenance is increasingly important as team
members become older, especially in civilian domains where
critical incident response team members are likely dually
tasked with primary patrol, canine, or detective duties. Such
duties are generally less physically demanding than the responsibilities of the activated critical response team, potentially
impeding tness maintenance and enhancement.
Fitness
Fitness differs from health in that it is the measure of physical capability rather than the overall well-being of organ systems individually and in concert with one another. As
mentioned previously, the Cooper Institute Fitness
Assessment is the most commonly used measure of civilian
police tness. Its application to critical incident teams is limited in that it overlooks the unique aspects of these teams
such as the additional weight of body armor, medical equipment, rearms, ammunition, and other tools, including communication, entry, and surveillance gear that must be
transported over uneven surfaces [29]. Just as important is
the impact of the extreme stress associated with these situations on the ability to perform physical tasks.
Maintaining a high level of tness helps support the ability to perform well, recover after burst energy expenditure,
and enable a stable shooting platform as needed. Indeed, tness may be utilized as part of an agglomerated approach to
member selection and maintenance. Such a paradigm has
been crafted using iterative aerobic and strength assessment
sequences both with and without duty gear and job-relevant
task assessments. Such assessments have been demonstrated
50 Critical Incident Team Dynamics andLogistics
437
to correlate well with job performance for a regional SWAT
team in the USA.Fitness may be signicantly impacted by
diverse elements including sleep deprivation.
Sleep Deprivation andFatigue
No condition may be more insidious than cumulative sleep
deprivation. Once acquired, the effects remain even after
obtaining an appropriate amount of sleep thereafter. A plethora of untoward effects accrue from sleep deprivation including, but not limited to:
1. Inability to focus or concentrate
2. Micro sleep events
3. Lack of impulse control
4. Anger
5. Depression
6. Compromised motor skills
7. Reduced tolerance and ineffective coping skills
8. Cardiovascular disease
9. Weight gain and reduced endurance
10. Impaired judgment
As a result, high-risk occupations such as airline pilots and
truck drivers have established safety limits for wakeful hours
on the job. Even medical trainees must work within an hourlimited paradigm. Sleep deprivation has been linked with disruptive physician behavior as well as burnout and disordered
personal relationships [30, 31]. There is no reason to believe
that sleep deprivation would not have similar effects on critical incident response personnel [32]. Therefore, it is reasonable to establish a sleep deprivation awareness program as
well as embedding the notion that sleep deprivation may render one unt to serve on a critical incident response team if it
is identied [33]. The commander of the team must craft and
enforce a surveillance program to ensure safe and effective
team performance. It is possible that team medics or physicians might strengthen the awareness of sleep deprivation and
help to police the team from such problems. In particular,
lengthy operations that occur without the benet of mutual
aid from neighboring teams accelerate the risk of creating
sleep deprivation and fatigue in the deployed members of a
single team. Therefore, resource management is essential in
ensuring that there are appropriate substitution plans to mitigate against sleep deprivation and fatigue.
Home andFamily
This domain is perhaps the most difcult to manage as personal issues escape the control of resource management.
Additionally, stressors in personal life are often intimately
related to factors such as fatigue and time management. The
impact of family illness, family discord, as well as nancial
stressors cannot be overstated as they may have broad effects
including sleep deprivation, loss of focus and concentration,
diminished tolerance, and frayed temper control and anger. It
has been suggested that these factors are associated with
diminished performance and impaired interpersonal relations, particularly when several stressors are found in combination. Unmitigated home stressors are strongly linked to
maladaptive solutions including alcohol and illicit substance
misuse and abuse.
Alcohol, Illicit Substances, andMental Health
Substance abuse is a well-documented problem throughout
the membership of teams faced with uid and high-stress
scenarios, as well as individuals faced with the ravages of
dysfunctional dynamics including poverty, domestic violence, interpersonal violence, and drug-related culture and
behavior. Depression and anxiety coexist and thrive in the
daily reinforcement of failed social (police, social service,
child welfare, etc.) interventions. As a result, law enforcement personnel are particularly vulnerable to these inuences, as are social workers, EMS providers, and individuals
working in the Emergency Department regardless of discipline. Education is a useful step to combat this process but
must be coupled with surveillance and intervention elements
to prevent maladaptive behavior. Multiple screening tools
are available but often perform less well than the candid
observations of well-meaning team members [13]. A robust
employee assistance program is invaluable in this regard, as
is the iterative feedback from invested team leadership and
membership. In particular, suicide has arisen as an epidemic
in the LEO and rst responder communities [34].
Stress andthePyramid ofComplexity
One method of understanding stress is to visualize it as a
pyramid. In this regard, the critical incident itself forms the
base, upon which all other stressors will rest. The next tier is
the team, the essential elements of which have been covered
above. The third tier is the community in which the team
nds itself and is shaped by the community’s attitudes toward
team members and their mission. A well-regarded and wellfunded team will be less stressed by its interaction with the
community compared to one in which the teams’ presence is
regarded as intrusive, unwanted, and unsupported. The culture of the police environment is tied to both internal and
external forces including hierarchy, monetary investments,
commitment to education, and support in terms of hours
trained and resources allocated. The local government struc-
438
J. W. Cannon et al.
ture support of the agency is also linked to its success and
regard.
The critical incident team also participates in image building in that interactions with community members, local
leaders, and media outlets shape the way that the team is
perceived. Political issues top the pyramid and serve as the
“sharp, pointy end” of the stress climate. Even when everything goes as well as one could hope, the political spin can
substantially alter how the process, conduct, and outcome of
a particular critical incident are viewed. It is essential that the
politics be kept at arm’s length from the team and their mission. Political issues are optimally handled by the upper
reaches of administration instead of the deployed team or its
commander. The commander is a key gure in negotiating
pre-incident relationships with other agencies.
Interagency Collaboration
The success of local critical response teams is in part dependent on healthy relationships with state, regional, and federal
agencies. Fusion centers provide key information to a variety
of agencies throughout the country in an effort to streamline
the response to violent extremism and reduce its occurrence.
It is not uncommon to need to interact with the National
Guard, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Alcohol Tobacco
and Firearms, Department of Homeland Security, US
Marshalls, and others even within a low-activity locale.
Therefore, roles, responsibilities, and communication lanes
are ideally established by protocol prior to a critical incident
or joint task force undertaking. Doing so reduces the likelihood of error, injury, and even loss of life. Members of the
aforementioned agencies are trained operators. As such, they
share many similarities with the members of a local team.
Interagency preparedness underpinned the success of events
like that of the Orlando, Florida Pulse nightclub shooting
[35, 36]. Orlando is a city that works on preparedness on a
regular basis, driven in part, by the location of a popular
vacation destination within the region (Disneyworld).
Therefore, the disaster brought together team members who
were highly trained and who anticipated working together.
Bystanders, on the other hand, are in general not so well
trained and do not practice working in tandem with skilled
operators.
Bystanders
Nonetheless, the untrained bystander plays an increasingly
prominent role in critical incident response [37]. However,
these spontaneous responders fall outside of the paradigm of
crew resource management and team dynamics as they do not
participate in any aspect thereof. The frequency and impact of
bystander efforts are underscored by the Boston Marathon
Bombing of 2013. Initial rescue efforts were undertaken by
bystanders in advance of trained rescue crews [38]. The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as well as the
Federal Emergency Management Agency have recognized
the impact and efforts of bystanders in critical incidents.
Accordingly, these agencies have developed bystander training tools to better prepare for critical incident participation in
advance of trained team arrival, especially where team arrival
will be delayed or nearly impossible due to local geography
or weather concerns (i.e., rural sites, mountain locales, etc.).
Therefore, trained operators of multiple specialties will
need to determine how best to interact with engaged bystanders to optimize bystander assistance. Specic training may
be required to best use this resource, while the nation works
toward establishing a culture of competence in the setting of
critical incident response. Despite the wide availability of
tourniquets and procoagulant gauze to the public, most episodes of mass casualty from rearm violence—exemplied
by the Orlando, Florida Pulse Nightclub shootings—deliver
patients to the hospital without such hemorrhage control
devices in place [39]. Community preparation to store and
have such supplies readily available at “soft targets” that are
generally easily accessible have limited to no security and
limited protective measures is one option to explore to
enhance survival from potentially lethal hemorrhage [40].
Soft targets would include—but are not limited to—malls,
schools, theme parks, sporting arenas, transportation hubs,
and hospitals. Many hospitals preposition such life-saving
supplies across multiple oors and locations. Critical incident team integration into facility safety preparation underscores this kind of approach to equipment and tool logistic
supply and deployment.
Emergency Medical Services/Tactical EMS
Durable changes in the thinking behind how best to position
and utilize trained medics and physicians who are embedded
in critical incident response teams have moved medical providers closer to—and sometimes into—the hot zone or inner
perimeter. Previously, providers were commonly positioned
outside of the threat zones. This ensured their safety and
separated team members based on the type and degree of
their training. Recently, medical providers have been integrated into critical response teams where they largely
remained unarmed [41]. In the wake of the well-publicized
active shooter events in schools, malls, and other locales,
bringing a trained provider to an injured individual who cannot be extricated may be lifesaving.
The tenets of Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC)
provide guidance on what kinds of lifesaving activities are
appropriate when under re, as well as when out of the line
50 Critical Incident Team Dynamics andLogistics
Table 50.1 Phase interventions
Care under re
Threat elimination, tourniquet application, temporary hemorrhage control including procoagulant gauze packing, airway intervention
generally deferred until tactical eld care
Tactical eld care
Airway control, additional hemorrhage control, uid resuscitation including intraosseous line insertion
Combat casualty evacuation care
Tube thoracostomy insertion, continued uid resuscitation, NO wound repair, supplemental oxygen administration (if/when available)
Adapted from Garbarino and Magnavita [30]
439
of re (Table50.1) [41]. To provide medical care in highstress and low-resource settings, the provider must be a
valued team member as their life is in the hands of the
operators that escort the provider to an injured team member, victim, or suspect. A detailed exploration of these
issues may be found elsewhere, as it is outside of the scope
of this chapter [42–44]. Nonetheless, like bystanders,
teams must develop specic methods of interacting with,
and embracing, medical support that follows them into
dangerous territory to preserve life.
Overlap withPandemic Preparedness
The recent pandemic has brought challenges in healthcare as
well as public health and public safety [45]. The tensions that
were noted during periods of lockdown seemed fueled by
local and national politics and were exacerbated by mixed
messaging around mask use, therapeutics, and vaccines.
Public unrest, riots, and accelerated rearm violence established a dangerous and protracted period for law enforcement, especially in the wake of wide laypress coverage of
civilian deaths involving LEOs [46]. It was clear that individual agencies were not sufciently prepared nor resourced
for widespread riots such as those in Portland [47], nor
encampments such as that of Seattle’s now disbanded autonomous zone [48]. Agencies were surprised at the difculties
they encountered despite resources, training, and prior successes in responding to local crises.
There is a parallel to be found with COVID-19 preparedness in the medical community. Even exceptionally wellresourced quaternary facilities were readily overwhelmed
and, given the rate of use of equipment, subsequently underresourced for surge needs. The lessons learned in determining
how to respond to such a vast surge and for such a protracted
period of time can readily translate to the LEO community as
well. Since agencies were overwhelmed, the situations that
can lead to that specic state should be incorporated into
training and preparedness planning. It is in this space that virtual or augmented reality as well as computer- based simulation scenario evolution can be particularly useful but must be
informed by data. The current experience provides that data
to establish models and enable outcome changes in response
to step-by-step decision-making [49]. Such an approach has
been undertaken in fashioning war games involving the
nuclear arsenal. It seems like adapting an iterative approach
to medical or LEO decision-making and asset utilization is
logical and appropriate. Moreover, performance within a simulation scenario aids in team development and skill set acquisition to support outcome excellence.
Conclusions
Team dynamics are both complex and straightforward.
Scientic principles allow one to understand the complex
interplay of forces that may enhance or degrade crew
resource management. Dedicated efforts at team building,
performance review, and performance improvement serve as
the basis for enhancing team dynamics. However, a skillful
leader who is empowered with both command and control is
required to craft a culture of safety and competence. Careful
planning for contingencies and difcult scenarios, as well as
interaction with other agencies—including untrained or partially trained bystanders—helps underpin team success.
However, even the most careful planning will fail if it rests
upon a dysfunctional team. Therefore, improving team capabilities, competencies, tness, health, and interpersonal
dynamics is the linchpin that holds together all components
of the successful critical incident team.
Key Points
• Understanding critical incident response dynamics
and logistics is enabled by a scientic approach to
each element.
• Command, control, and communication are key elements that are required for successful critical incident leadership.
• An iterative process evaluating team dynamics and
logistics before, during, and after incident response
is essential in supporting continued team performance improvement.
• Individual team member management dovetails
with team performance.
440
• Interagency coordination should be specically
planned, tested, and critiqued to optimize performance and help ensure a successful resolution upon
team deployment.
• There are valuable lessons to learn from agency
coordination that ows from the recent integration
of medical resources to address the COVID-19
pandemic.
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