12. The resilience of US energy infrastructure

Key data

(2018)

2018 energy infrastructure federal response efforts: 14 instances

SAIDI (Average duration of electric power service interruptions) (2016): 250 minutes SAIFI (Average frequency of electric power service interruptions) (2016): 1.3 instances Total electricity losses (2017): 202 544 GWh

Estimated total cost of 2017 hurricane season: USD 265 billion

Mean shut-in oil production as a percentage of normal monthly production (1995-2012): Intense hurricanes (Cat. 3, 4 and 5): 28.5%

Mean shut-in gas production as a percentage of normal monthly production (1995-2012): Intense hurricanes (Cat. 3, 4 and 5): 25.0%

Number of cyber-vulnerabilities co-ordinated for the energy sector (2016): 186

Sources: DOE (2018a) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security and Emergency Response: 2018 Emergency Response Summary; EIA (2018) Annual Electric Power Industry Report; FEMA (2018) 2017 Hurricane Season FEMA After-Action Report; EIA (2013) Short-Term Energy Outlook Supplement: 2013 Outlook for Gulf of Mexico Hurricane-Related Production Outages; NCCIC (2016) ), ICS-CERT Annual Vulnerability Coordination Report.

Overview

Being prepared and able to respond efficiently and effectively to extreme weather events, cyberattacks, climate change or other hazards has become important for maintaining energy security in the United States (US) (Figure 12.1). The United States has strong emergency response mechanisms for its national security, including energy security. In light of increasing and new threats, both natural and human-caused, the United States has been strengthening its work on preparedness – by improving comprehensive risk assessment, planning and information sharing – as part of its National Security Strategy 2017. The 2015 Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act and 2017 National Security Strategy also reinforced the importance of intra-agency communication and co-ordination as part of emergency preparedness and response for energy supply disruptions as well as resiliency of electricity, oil and natural gas infrastructure.

US energy infrastructure, much of which crosses state borders, is mostly owned and operated by private entities or local governments, and incidents regularly affect several jurisdictions simultaneously. Therefore, a federal and well-coordinated approach that engages the private sector, regulators, and state and local governments is essential.

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12. THE RESILIENCE OF US ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE

Figure 12.1 Losses from billion-dollar weather events (inflation-adjusted)

350 USD billions

300

250

200

150

100

50

0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

IEA (2019). All rights reserved.

Note: 2018 data are preliminary.

Source: NCEI (2019), U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters, www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/.

Definition of resilience

In a narrow sense, resilience can be defined as the ability to withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions, including from accidents, natural disasters, and stresses, shocks and threats to economic and political systems (ACE, 2018).

Energy resilience in a broader sense extends to ensuring a comprehensive risk management framework, going beyond addressing immediate supply disruptions. Rather, it emphasises prevention of and preparation for a potential crisis, flexible adaptation, and efficient recovery. Resilience also provides for the assessment of mediumto long-term risks, including more extreme weather events, as well as new technology threats such as cyberattacks on power grids and oil and gas facilities, thereby covering all interconnected components of the energy sector.

A 2016 document titled State Energy Resilience Framework from the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Argonne National Laboratory outlined a set of resilience-enhancing measures for state and local governments based on key components of resilience over time, which are to anticipate, resist, absorb, respond, adapt and recover (Table 12.1).

Table 12.1 Components of resilience and resilience-enhancing measures

Source: DOE (2016), State Energy Resilience Framework,

www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/01/f34/State%20Energy%20Resilience%20Framework.pdf.

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Institutional governance

The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for emergency response across the country and sectors. The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review

(QHSR) established a series of goals and objectives in the areas of critical infrastructure, global movement and supply chain systems, and cyberspace (DHS, 2014). Under QHSR Mission 5, the DHS has worked to strengthen national preparedness and resilience. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) developed the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which was refreshed in 2017 (FEMA, 2017). FEMA was established in 1979 as the statutory authority for federal disaster relief response with the objective to facilitate the restoration of damaged energy systems and components during a declared emergency. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 established the procedure, still in place today, under which a presidential declaration of an emergency triggers FEMA response and financial assistance.

The US DOE oversees national energy security issues in collaboration with other relevant government authorities, states and industry partners. The creation of the DOE Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) in February 2018 brought together a range of US national energy security mechanisms (DOE, 2018c). The DOE Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration (ISER) division is housed within CESER and is the lead for DOE’s efforts as the Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) for energy as specified under Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD21) on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, and as the co-ordinating agency for Emergency Support Function 12 (ESF-12) under the National Response Framework. For fiscal year 2019, the federal budget allocated USD 120 million to CESER, of which USD 90 million was dedicated to cybersecurity. CESER’s capabilities involve emergency response, realtime monitoring and training nationally, with neighbouring countries (Canada and Mexico) as well as overseas (Ukraine).

CESER’s emergency response programme is co-ordinated with FEMA on all hazards incidents that affect the energy sector (oil, gas and electricity). During an incident it keeps policy makers informed; provides real-time monitoring and energy outage and supply information; co-ordinates and communicates with state, local, tribal, territorial, industry and interagency stakeholders; and deploys staff under the National Response Framework (NRF).

ISER serves as the day-to-day interface between the federal government and the private-sector entities that own approximately 87% of US energy infrastructure. CESER co-chairs the Energy Sector Government Coordinating Council (EGCC) to represent the needs and interests of the sector across the government, and it co-chairs joint meetings of EGCC and the Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council, and EGCC and the Oil and Natural Gas Subsector Coordinating Council.

CESER, together with energy stakeholders, prepares for various types of emergencies through exercises such as Clear Path (DOE’s annual energy sector incident response exercise with local, state and industry partners) and GridEx (Grid Security Exercise Series), which help DOE, industry and government partners test and improve plans, as well as share insights for future research and development (R&D) needs. In case of an emergency, CESER facilitates co-ordination across the government and with the energy

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