- •1 The concept of promise
- •1. What is a promise?
- •(a) A definition of promise
- •(b) Promise: objectively existing phenomenon or human construction?
- •(c) Testing component elements of the definition of promise
- •(i) A promise is more than merely an internal mental process: promises as speech acts demonstrating commitment
- •(ii) A promise is a commitment to a performance of the promisor
- •(iv) A promise must relate to the future
- •(v) A promise must state a commitment in favour of another party
- •(vi) Things which are not components of the definition
- •2. Three crucial qualities of relevance to promises: gratuitousness, conditionality, unilaterality
- •(a) Gratuitousness
- •(b) Conditionality
- •(c) Unilaterality
- •3. Acts having some similarity to, but which are distinct from, promises
- •(a) Vows
- •(b) Oaths
- •(c) Threats
- •(d) Donation (gift)
- •(e) Warranties (guarantees)
- •(f) Agreement
- •4. Promise as a culturally universal and significant idea
- •5. Preliminary conclusions
- •2 Promises as obligations: morality and law
- •1. Introduction: promise as a type of obligation
- •2. Taxonomies of obligations in morality and law
- •3. Promises as moral obligations: the practice of promising
- •(a) Promising as moral, immoral, or amoral?
- •(b) Source of the morality of the practice of promising
- •(i) Promising as a virtuous act; the natural law tradition
- •Scripture
- •The canon law
- •Objections to the morality of promising as having a natural law/virtue basis
- •(ii) Promising as an act of the will: respect for personal autonomy
- •(iii) The ‘contract theory’ of promising
- •(iv) Consequentialism (utilitarianism)
- •(v) Reliance theory
- •A more limited role for reliance
- •(vi) Conclusion on the competing theories of the moral value of promises
- •4. Powers and sanctions relevant to breach of morally binding promises
- •3 The historical development of promissory ideas in the law
- •1. Roman law
- •(a) Formal contracts: the stipulatio
- •(b) Informal contracts
- •(c) Conclusion on Roman law
- •2. Medieval contract law
- •(a) Continental legal thought
- •(b) English law
- •(i) Debt
- •(ii) Covenant
- •(iii) Unilaterality and bilaterality in early English contract law
- •(iv) Assumpsit
- •(v) The doctrine of consideration
- •3. The Northern natural law school
- •(a) Hugo Grotius
- •(b) Samuel von Pufendorf
- •(c) James Dalrymple (Viscount Stair)
- •4. Eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
- •(a) English law
- •(b) Scots law
- •(c) Civilian systems
- •(i) German law
- •(ii) Robert Pothier
- •5. Contract theory and practice in the twentieth century
- •6. A revitalised will theory
- •4 Formation of contract
- •1. Wasted pre-contractual expenditure following termination of contract negotiations
- •(a) A Common law solution to the problem of pre-contractual expenditure: promissory and proprietary estoppel
- •(i) Promissory estoppel: promissory or reliance-based principle?
- •(ii) Promissory estoppel and failed contractual negotiations
- •(iii) Proprietary estoppel and failed contractual negotiations
- •(iv) Conclusion on estoppel and pre-contractual expenditure
- •(b) A civilian solution to wasted pre-contractual expenditure: culpa in contrahendo and bad faith termination of contractual negotiations
- •(c) A mixed legal system solution to wasted pre-contractual expenditure: liability from an implied assurance that a valid contract exists
- •(d) Other solutions to the problem of pre-contractual liability
- •(e) Conclusion on pre-contractual liability
- •2. Pre-contractual duties of disclosure
- •3. Offer and acceptance
- •(a) Offer and acceptance as conditional promise
- •(b) The traditional offer and acceptance model as a unilateral dictation of terms
- •(c) Distinguishing offer from conditional promise
- •(d) Problem cases for a promissory analysis of offer and acceptance
- •(e) Conceiving of offers as binding
- •4. Enforcement of auction/tender conditions
- •5. The firm or irrevocable offer
- •(a) Characterising the firm offer
- •(b) Promises of reward
- •6. Options
- •7. Letters of intent and preliminary contracts
- •(a) An intent to contract
- •(b) A preliminary contract, envisaging a further contract
- •(c) An expectation of a formal contract
- •(d) An expression of intention to do something other than contract
- •(e) A genuine unilateral promissory intention
- •8. Error in formation of contract
- •(a) Choosing the policies which inform the rules on error
- •(b) Constructing workable classifications which implement the policies chosen
- •(i) Roman Law
- •(ii) The Common law
- •(iii) The mixed legal systems
- •(iv) German law
- •(v) An ideal approach to promissory error?
- •9. Extortion in the formation of contract
- •(a) English law
- •(b) The mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Conclusion on extortion
- •10. Implied terms
- •11. Consideration
- •(a) The Common law
- •(b) The mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •12. Requirements of form: unwarranted restrictions on promising?
- •5 Third party rights
- •1. The challenge to third party rights in contract
- •2. The historical legal background
- •3. Third party rights in modern contract law
- •(a) The Common law
- •(b) The mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •(e) Conclusion on third party rights under contract
- •4. Assignment
- •(a) English law
- •(b) The mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •5. The problem of transferred loss
- •(a) English law
- •(b) The mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •6. Conclusion on third parties
- •6 Contractual remedies
- •1. The ‘interests’ protected by remedies
- •2. Mutuality of promises and withholding of performance
- •(a) The Common law
- •(b) Mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •3. Specific performance
- •(a) English law
- •(b) Mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •4. Perfect or substantial performance of contractual promises
- •(a) Contracts for services
- •(b) Sales of goods
- •5. Injunction (interdict)
- •6. Damages
- •(a) Contractual damages and interests other than the performance interest
- •(b) Damages for mere breach of contract, or for fault?
- •(c) English law
- •(d) Mixed legal systems
- •(e) German law
- •(f) Model law
- •7. Liquidated damages: penalty clauses
- •(a) English law
- •(b) Mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •8. Termination of contract for non-performance
- •(a) Historical origins of the right to terminate
- •(b) English law
- •(c) Mixed legal systems
- •(d) German law
- •(e) Model law
- •9. Restitution following termination for non-performance
- •(a) English law
- •(b) Mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •10. Good faith and contractual remedies
- •7 The renunciation of contractual rights
- •1. Terminology
- •2. Bilateral or unilateral renunciations
- •3. Characterising undertakings not to enforce contractual rights
- •4. Express contractual or promissory renunciation of rights
- •(a) The Common law
- •(b) Mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •5. Forbearance, promissory estoppel and personal bar
- •(a) The Common law
- •(i) Forbearance at common law
- •(ii) Forbearance in equity: promissory estoppel in English law
- •(iii) Promissory estoppel in American Common law
- •(iv) Conclusion on promissory estoppel in the Common law
- •(b) Mixed legal systems
- •(i) South Africa
- •(ii) Louisiana
- •(iii) Scotland
- •(c) German law
- •6. Model Law and renunciations of rights
- •8 The future of promise in contract law
- •1. The restricted role of promise in the modern law
- •2. Future possible development of the law
- •(a) General remarks
- •(b) The Common law
- •(c) The mixed legal systems
- •(d) German law
- •(e) The development of supranational model law
- •3. Conclusion on the future of promise
Contractual Remedies |
401 |
charge for occupying the premises must be paid by the contractor for any period of time beyond the intended completion date. Such a clause, operating in effect as a penalty, could not be struck down as a penalty clause as it does not provide for any payment dependent upon breach. Likewise, a sum of money due upon the insolvency of a contracting party would not be caught under the existing penalty clause regime.243 The forfeiture of a deposit might conceivably amount to a penalty, but not if its purpose was an earnest and guarantee of payment.244
Of the varying positions adopted by the three mixed systems, the one which arguably accords most with a respect for the parties’ promises is the Scottish position. That is so because it is only in Scotland, when assessing whether a damages clause should be upheld, that regard is had to the circumstances prevailing at the time of contract formation alone. In the other two systems, a divergence between the actual losses suffered and the agreed damages payable may be taken into account in deciding whether or not to uphold the clause. This extra consideration, in providing a wider basis upon which to attack stipulated damages clauses, clearly has a greater potential to undermine the agreement of the parties.
(c) German law
German law, like other systems, ties the concept of a penalty clause to a sum of money payable in the event of non-conforming performance of any kind (that is, in Common law terms, breach). Under §339 BGB, the general rule is that such penalty clauses are enforceable, though, as with the provisions in the BGB concerning damages in general, such penalties may only be claimed if the debtor was at fault in not fulfilling the relevant obligation.245 As is the position in the Common law, if a damages clause stipulates for payment of a sum in the event of non-performance, should the creditor choose to claim such sum he is then barred from suing for performance.246 That position has an evident logic to it: it would
243The Scottish Law Commission suggested extending the law to cover penalties occurring on occasions other than breach of contract: see Scottish Law Commission, Report on Penalty Clauses. This proposed change has been included in the Bill proposed by the Scottish Government (see n. 242).
244Zemhunt (Holdings) Ltd v. Control Securities plc 1992 SLT 151.
245This follows from the reference to the debtor being ‘in default’ in §339: default entails fault because §286(4) states that the debtor is ‘not in default for as long as performance is not made as the result of a circumstance for which he is not responsible’.
246§340(1).
402 |
Promises and Contract Law |
be nonsensical to allow a party to claim a sum stipulated as payable for non -performance, if that party were able at the same time to force performance of the primary duty. The claim for other penalty sums, for instance for late or defective performance, does not of course prohibit a concurrent claim for performance.
As in the Common law, penalty clauses are subject to scrutiny by the courts, though the criterion for, and method of, such scrutiny is different. The BGB provides that, if application is made to the court before the penalty is paid, a penalty which is ‘disproportionately high’ can be reduced to a ‘reasonable amount’. Such a trigger for scrutiny is somewhat different to that under the Common law, where the court’s jurisdiction to consider agreed damages clauses is founded upon the question of whether the clause represents a genuine pre-estimate of loss at the time the contract was made: if it is, then even if at the time of the breach the damages payable may be ‘disproportionately high’ in relation to actual loss suffered, the clause will stand; on the other hand, if the clause was not a genuine pre-estimate of likely losses, it will be struck out of the contract (not amended), the party suffering the breach having instead to fall back upon a common law damages claim. However, the outcome of the Common law approach may not be so different to the German approach: a disproportionately high German penalty clause can be altered to provide ‘reasonable’ recovery (reasonableness, naturally suggesting some reference to the loss actually suffered), and an English common law damages award is based upon assessment of damages at the time of the trial by reference to the actual loss suffered by the party. The English approach is to look at the good faith nature of the term as agreed by the parties, the German approach to consider the practical effect of the clause at the time a complaint is raised. To that extent, the English approach may be said to pay more regard to the nature of the promise as made.
Unlike the position in the Common law and mixed legal systems, a stipulated penalty may not in German law be the full extent of what may be claimed by the creditor: the creditor is entitled to claim the penalty as the ‘minimum amount’ of damages, but is permitted to claim further damages if his loss exceeds the amount of the penalty.247 This is at odds with the Common law approach, where, if parties commit their agreement as to exigible damages to a valid liquidated damages clause, the amount stipulated is that which is required to be paid by the party in breach, regardless of whether the actual amount of damages suffered
247 §340(2).